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ABSTRACT
The thesis aims to analyse how Social Services are organised 
and financed in Chile, with a special focus on the regional 
impact of social policies.
In the first place, the study concentrates on describing the 
procedures and strategies that each social ministry or sector, 
(Health, Education, Housing, Social Security) has for financing 
its programmes. This makes possible for the first time in the 
Chilean case an intersectoral view of the organization of social 
services.
In order to address this issue it was necessary to 
investigate the formal sectoral organization and its functions. 
Special emphasis is given to the analysis of the ministerial 
budgeting and planning procedures discussing its links and 
problems. The study also gauges the discretionary powers that 
the regional social services have; this was approached through 
the analysis of different models of decentralization and 
government functions. To obtain information in this area, 
interviews were undertaken with social sector planning and 
budgeting specialists.
S i n c e  1975 , the G o v e r n m e n t  has a d v o c a t e d  a new 
"regionalization" policy, aimed at decentralising the power of 
national Government, eliminating regional inequalities, and 
reducing poverty.
In the second place, therefore, the study analyses the 
patterns of the regional allocation of social expenditures 
testing its relation to regional well-being, urbanization and 
needs. To address this issue it was necessary to define some 
standard criteria to allocate the actual social expenditure 
figures. However, to obtain the social expenditure figures it was 
necessary to study the inter- and intra-ministerial transfers 
and price indexes. Estimates of regional social expenditures per 
capita are produced for the first time for Chile; they cast light 
on the present pattern of regional allocation of social 
expenditures. These figures are then compared with regional 
social indicators of need in order to determine the relationship 
between these variables. The results are presented and 
conclusions drawn.
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INTRODUCTION
During the late nineteenth century, soon after the Chilean 
independence from the Spanish Crown, the country experienced a 
rapid development of the nitrate and other mining industries. One 
of the most important effects of this early export oriented 
growth was a rapid development of the urban population and the 
organization of the labour force. These two factors are often 
quoted as the determinant factors leading to the creation of the 
first social services. In fact, by the end of the century some 
organized pressure groups such as railroad workers or civil 
servants had obtained special benefits from the government such 
as pension funds and health insurance schemes.
By the 1950's the state was financing a variety of social 
programmes covering a significant proportion of the population 
but with significant differences in the levels of provision. Some 
groups of population acquired considerable services and benefits 
whereas others, specially the poor rural workers, obtained very 
few of them. In sum, it can be said that the early developments 
of the social services in Chile cannot be clearly conceived as a 
conscious and global government effort to increase the well-being 
of the families, but rather as isolated pieces of legislation 
resulting from specific pressures or influences.
It was not until the 1960's that governments begin to really 
take the initiative in the organization of the social services 
and define an overall strategy for their development. At this 
stage, social planning started to be approached in a broader view 
encompassing additional issues such as the necessity of stopping 
the increasing regional inequalities or the unnecessary growth of 
cities.
As a result of the specific developments of the social 
services in Chile there are some interesting accounts about the 
evolution of them. But, they have usually taken a rather sectoral 
approach describing the details of the origins and progress of 
each programme, not considering the common aspects of them. 
Moreover, earlier research has been concentrated mostly on
historical reviews or specialised sectoral studies, about the 
nature and levels of benefits provided on each sector. This has 
been an important constraint for planning and assessing the 
impact that this important area of government has had.
Therefore, the first main goal of the present research is to 
analvse how the social services are organized and financed in 
Chile. This issue is particularly relevant in the light of the 
important transformations that the social services experienced in 
the early 1980's.This study concentrates on four sectors of 
social services; health, education, housing and social security.
In other words, we analyse the organization and finance of 
each social sector using the same conceptual and methodological 
framework. As a result of this it is possible to discuss the 
common and specific features of each of them and study the 
transformations that have been imposed on them.
In order to pursue this main objective it is necessary to 
describe the institutional and functional organization of each of 
the social sectors or ministries. In addition to this, a special 
effort was made to understand the planning and budgeting 
procedures in each of them. The purpose of this exercise is to 
assess the existing types of links between the financial and 
organizational aspects of the social services.
An additional issue discussed in pursuit of this first 
objective is the discretionary powers that the regions have in 
relation to the management of social service resources and 
decisions. We discuss the discretionary levels that each of the 
social services and their agencies enjoy in relation to the three 
forms of government intervention: regulation, finance and
production. We also attempt to locate the services or their 
agencies along the decentralization continuum.
This issue is approached in a qualitative and exploratory 
way. The information to address this issue was obtained through 
a number of semi-structured interviews with planning and 
budgetary specialists in each of the social sectors and the 
Budget Office.
A second main goal of the research is to assess the 
redistributive impact of social programmes. This issue is 
considered in the research as a result of the government strategy 
to target social programmes towards the poor. Therefore, our 
aim is to evaluate to what extent the government is fulfilling 
this important strategy.
The third main goal is to explore the regional allocation 
of social expenditures. The regionalization and decentralization 
efforts initiated by the Chilean government in 1975 have been 
directed not only at giving more discretionary powers to the 
regions but also at redressing the historical regional 
inequalities and allocating proportionally more expenditures to 
those regions showing relative higher levels of basic needs 
insatisfaction.
The study defines three hypotheses concerning the patterns 
of regional allocation of social expenditures based on earlier 
studies in Latin America. While governments attempt to channel 
their resources to those regions showing higher levels of unmet 
basic needs, often in reality more regressive patterns are found. 
Rich regions tend to demand and obtain higher levels of social 
expenditure per capita or social expenditures are concentrated in 
urban and more industrialized regions.
In order to test alternative hypotheses it is necessary to 
estimate the regional social expenditures. This is done by 
allocating the actual social services expenditures according to 
four standard criteria of allocation.
The research is organized in four parts. Part One is related 
to the theoretical background of the research. Chapter One is a 
bibliographical review of the most important theoretical and 
applied studies relating to the present research; it includes a 
discussion about the concepts of planning and social planning, an 
introduction to budgeting and other elementary public finance 
concepts and it concludes with a discussion of the concept of 
decentralization and its relation to social policy. Chapter Two
gives a background to social planning in Chile, including an 
historical review of state involvement in the social sectors, and 
a discussion of the present organization of the public sector. 
The chapter ends with a review of the regional aspects of social 
policies.
Part Two is concerned with the definition of the research 
aims. Chapter Three contains the definition of the main topic of 
research. Chapter Four dicusses the most important methodological 
aspects involved in tackling the research aims.
Part Three contains the analysis of each sectors 
involved in the study: Chapter Five: Health, Chapter Six:
Education, Chapter Seven: Housing and Chapter Eight: Social 
Security and Assistance Programmes. Each of the sectoral chapters 
is approached considering the three main issues of the research; 
the finance and organization, the redistributive effects, and the 
regional impact of social expenditures.
Finally Part Four comprises a single chapter with the 
conclusions of the study. Chapter Nine is organized in a similar 
form to the sectoral chapters bringing tog^ether the earlier 
findings; the chapter then reviews the research carried out and 
discusses future research and finally dicusses the implications 
of the research for regional polic^y and the social services.
CHAPTER ONE
SOCIAL POLICY FINANCE AND ITS REGIONAL IMPACT: An approach to the 
concepts
1.1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter intends to provide a conceptual background to 
this research; many of the issues raised in this review will be 
considered as areas to be analysed in respect to the Chilean 
case. At the same time, some of the questions raised in the 
literature may be considered as hypotheses to be tested in the 
present study.
The first section of this chapter provide^ the basic 
approach to planning and social policy, enabling to better 
understand the Chilean planning situation. It will also help us 
to compare the Chilean situation with the theory of planning and 
the practice of planning in Latin America.
Section 1.2. is divided into two parts. The first part 
reviews the main planning traditions described in the literature. 
A special effort was made in trying to delineate, for each of the 
traditions, the major strengths and weaknesses. The traditions 
reviewed are: Rational Comprehensive Approach, Incrementalist
Approach, Mixed Scanning, Transactive Planning, Advocacy Planning 
and Radical Planning. In this section, we also discuss three 
alternative approaches to Social Planning: Social Planninng as 
Social Service Planning, as Social Developmental Planning and as 
Social Welfare Planning and Community Organization. This first 
part concludes by defining Social Planning as a process of policy 
formulation, plan design, implementation and evaluation which 
attempts to meet basic human needs, solve social policy problems 
and promote Social Justice.
The second part of this section is dedicated to a review of 
the planning styles of the Latin American countries, and the main 
problems that the practice of social planning has in that 
continent.
Section 1.3. reviews the main features of the budgetary 
process. Budgeting is approached here, not as an accounting or 
financial subject, but rather as a means for policy 
implementation (Goode 1983) or as the link of social policy to 
social service delivery (Glennerster 1983). Therefore, we discuss 
the type of problems that may arise throughout the budgetary 
process, in each of its phases, (formulation, authorisation, 
implementation and execution). We also consider how these 
problems may affect the finance of a social service. This 
section offers us an important framework for the analysis of 
social service budgets in Chile.
Section 1.4. discusses some works in the area of Fiscal 
Incidence Studies. This involves questions such as, what is the 
net effect of government intervention, how much do persons or 
income brackets pay in taxes, and how much is received in 
benefits from government expenditures. Drawing from some specific 
fiscal incidence studies for Latin America and Chile, we 
establish some interesting methodological approaches for the 
analysis of government expenditures, which will be of great use 
in the subsequent chapters.
From the findings of the studies described in this section, 
some issues will be taken as hyphotheses to be tested in the 
present research.
Finally, section 1.5. introduces the regional dimension of 
social policies. It begins, in the first part, by presenting the 
concept of decentralization and its alternative meanings and 
uses. The second part is dedicated to some more technical 
aspects related to the treatment of national revenues and 
expenditures in a regional dimension, (This has been called 
regional accounting). Finally, we conclude this section by 
describing the Chilean studies in this area.
1.2. PLANNING THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF PLANNING IN LATIN 
AMERICA
A. Planning and Social Planning Models and Definitions 
A.I. Review of the Main Planning Traditions
Planning does not occur in a vacuum. It is related to the 
philosophy of the government in office. Although the majority of 
the definitions are elaborated without attachment to an ideology, 
it is the way in which a government executes its mandate which 
determines ultimately the planning approach that is chosen.
The rise of planning in the western world started after the 
great depression of the thirties and the second world war, 
although the first attempts at planning were made in the Soviet 
Union with its five year plan in 1929. Planning is now understood 
as a deliberate attempt to shape economic phenomena by public 
authorities.
We may begin this section by reviewing some different 
definitions of planning given by different authors in the last 
twenty years:
- Planning is the process by which an actor selects a course of 
action for the attainment of his ends. (Banfield 1959).
- Planning is a process for determining appropiate future action 
through a sequence of choices. (Davidoff and Reiner 1962).
- Planning is the application of the scientific method to policy 
making. (Faludi 1976).
- Planning is defined as foresight in formulating and 
implementing programs and priorities. (Hudson 1979).
This summary shows that there is a common point of 
departure in all the definitions given, which is related to 
systematic analysis for the attainment of certain outcomes.
However, despite the common background of rationalism in each of 
the definitions quoted, there are important differences in the 
practice of planning and the way the planning problems are 
solved. Therefore, we need to have a more practical view of how 
planning is approached in reality; we will do this through a 
review of the main planning traditions .
In this short review, we will try to answer for each of the 
traditions, the following questions: What kind of activity is 
planning?. What do plannners do?. How do planners do this?. What 
are the main criticisms of each tradition?.
1. Rational Comprehensive Approach
The Rational Comprehensive Approach is the most dominant 
tradition, and the point of departure for most planning 
traditions. It perceives planning as an orderly, logical 
progression from diagnosis to action based upon analysis of the 
relevant theories and facts (Gilbert and Specht 1977). The 
designation of the best plan is primarily a technical problem 
that will be solved through careful analysis of the relevant 
data. Planning is then a technical activity which applies the 
"scientific method" to the achievement of aims.
According to Hudson (1979), the rational or synoptic tradition 
has, four elements:
- Goal setting
- Identification of policy alternatives
- Evaluation of means against ends
- Implementation of decisions
Traditionally goals or objectives are set at the inception of the 
planning process. They are a part of the planners ideals or 
preconceptions and his knowledge of the relevant aspects of 
social reality. Then, for the identifiction of policy 
alternatives, resources and obstacles are weighed against the 
social goals; in this sense planning seeks to satisfy social 
needs. However, needs represent the views of what an individual 
or group require, therefore there is an implicit value judgement
embodied in this step. The evaluation of means against ends is 
done from a systems viewpoint, using conceptual or mathematical 
models relating objectives to resources and constraints, with 
heavy reliance on quantitative analysis. Such evaluation 
procedures include cost benefit analysis and models from 
operation research such as deterministic or probabilistic models.
One of the main advantages of the Rational Comprehensive Approach 
is its transparency of procedures, which are clearly stated and 
therefore able to be discussed. Another bonus of rational 
comprehesiveness lies in the feasibility of the model, which is 
oriented always to produce an outcome, which in some cases is 
only the plan. It is perhaps the fact of relying so deeply on 
quantitative models which gives to the Rational Comprehensive 
Approach its feasibility; in this way this tradition avoids many 
of the complexities produced by clashes of interests.
With regards to the weaknesses of the rational approach, there 
are a number of problems. The first one is the problem of 
knowledge, as it has been named by Friedman and Hudson (1974). It 
derives from the fact that dec iJion makers do not possess the 
assets or the time to collect the information required for a 
perfectly rational choice. Many of the decisions to be made about 
specific circumstances and information are isolated situations, 
and this implies judgements that are essentially subjective. So,
p
despite the aparent rationality, values are nevertheless 
present. Therefore many of the social models used for estimating 
the impact of certain decisions have a limited and partial 
validity.
In the second place, because of the heavy reliance on 
quantitative methods, it usually does not include sufficient 
refe^rences to other realities such as political concerns, 
cultural and psychological considerations. Thus, the human 
dimension is considered only partially. Finally, this approach is 
criticised for its bias toward central control in the definition 
of problems and solutions, in the evaluation of alternatives and 
the implementation of decisions.
2. Incrementalist Approach
The Incrementalist Approach derives principally from a series of 
criticisms of comprehensive rationality, mainly its insensivity 
to existing institutional performance capabilities and its 
failure to appreciate the cognitive limits of desicion makers 
(Hudson 1979).
The main advocate of the science of muddling through, or 
disjointed incrementalism, is Lindblom, who argues that the 
rational comprehensive method is impossible, since it cannot be 
practiced except for relatively simple problems, and even then in 
a modified way.
The chief principles of the model are summarized as follows 
(Lindblom 1977):
1. Social objectives do not always carry the same relative 
values, depending on the circumstances. The administrator must 
choose between policies in which values are combined in 
different ways; he cannot first clarify his values and then 
choose among policies. The value problem is always a problem of 
adjustment at a margin, there is no way to state marginal 
objectives or values except in terms of particular policies. 
Therefore the administrator focuses his attention on marginal 
or incremental values, he does not find general formulation of 
objectives very helpful.
2. In the incremental ist method the analysis of the 
relationship between means and ends is absent. Here means and 
ends are simultaneously chosen.
3. The test of a good policy is whether all the analysts have 
agreed on it. This agreement ought to be on the policy itself, 
which remains possible even when agreement on values is not.
4. In the incremental approach, simplification is achieved in 
two principal ways:
i. Firstly it is achieved through the limitation of policy
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comparisons of those policies that differ in a relatively small 
degree to the policies presently in effect. It is necessary 
only to study those respects in which the proposed alternative 
and its consequences differ from the status-quo. 
ii. Simplification is also achieved through the practice of 
ignoring important possible consequences of possible policies, 
as well as the values attached to the neglected consequences. 
The virtue of this strategy is that every important interest or 
value has its watchdog, and these watchdogs protect the 
interest in their jurisdiction.
5. Policy-making is a process of successive approximation to 
some desired objectives in which what is desired itself 
continues to change under reconsideration.
The main advantage of incremental planning is its simplicity and 
reliability. Although it compromises a complex process of 
bargaining for the "marginal additions", this is not far from 
what politicians and decision makers do anyway; this dialogue and 
bargaining among plural interests also helps to find where public 
interest lies.
Despite the practical and attractive approach to desicion making 
presented in incremental planning it has been criticized because 
it does not apply to fundamental decisions, arising from other 
areas not included in the chain of successive policy steps 
leading up to the present. While it is true that incremental 
desicions outnumber fundamental ones, the significance of the 
latter for the society is not expressed only in the number of 
occurrence. Therefore it is a mistake to consider non incremental 
desicions as exceptions, although there always is a doubt of what 
is fundamental and what is a common desicion to make.
3. Mixed Scanning
The third planning model to be reviewed , Mixed Scanning, is a 
response to the extreme approaches presented above and combines 
elements of both.
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In a mixed scanning strategy, scanning may proceed in several 
levels with varying degrees of detail and coverage. But it seems 
most effective to include an all encompassing level, which covers 
all parts, leaving no major part unconsidered, and a highly 
detailed level. In this way, the option selected in the first 
level can be explored as fully as is feasible (Etzioni 1977).
In this approach it is important to differentiate between two 
types of decisions:
i. Fundamental decisions are made by exploring the main 
alternatives in relation to the goals established. The aim here 
is an overview, so that details and specifications are omitted, 
in contrast to the rational approach.
ii. Incremental decisions are made in the contexts set by 
fundamental decisions.
So, each of the two elements helps to reduce the effects of the 
particular shortcomings of the other.
Mixed scanning is characterized by its flexibility. Etzioni 
suggested that the strategy followed is determined neither by 
values nor by information but by the positions of and power 
relations among decision makers. When deciding about strategy, it 
is also important to take account of the environment. For 
example, an incremental approach would be adequate in a stable 
situation and where the decisions were made from the start. This 
approach is less acceptable in rapidly chaining conditions and 
when the initial course was wrong. Another further consideration 
is the capacity the actor has for mobilising power; the greater 
the control capacities the more encompassing scanning the actor 
can undertake, which produces a greater effectiveness in its 
decision making.
In summary, in mixed scanning, planning is not a technical 
matter, as was the case in the rational comprehensive method and 
incrementalism. Planning here is acknowledged to be influenced by 
outside factors such as environment or planners' capacity.
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4. Transactive Planning
Transactive Planning belongs to a new paradigm in planning 
originated in the early seventies, which put man's psycho-social 
development as a central focus of planning (Friedman and Hudson 
1974). The new paradigm rejects the bureaucratic model of 
organization in which traditional planning had been mJlded. 
Planning is in this case understood as a from of social learning.
In the transactive approach, planning is not carried out in 
relation to anonymous beneficiaries, but in a face to face 
consultation with people affected by de^cisions. The traditional 
system of exchanging documents has proven to be unsuccessful; 
there is a barrier between planner and client, the planner has a 
highly abstract language, whereas the client has a simple and 
experience related vocabulary. Transactive planning tries to 
break this communication barrier with a continuous series of 
personal transactions between planner and clients.
The main principles of transactive planning are explained by 
Friedmann (1977), using the taoist philosophy:
1. All systems obey their own laws of internal change.
The planner must respect the laws of transformation and be 
mindful of his limited abilities to control the flow of events. 
This principle applies also to mutual learning, the more the 
planner assimilates the client's knowledge, the greater the 
complexity of which he is aware.
2. The planner needs to use the natural forces at work in 
society to produce the desired results.
This means selective intervention and methods of indirect or 
field control.
3. Under conditions of mutual learning, the planner appears to 
be doing nothing; he learns, and in learning he imparts new 
knowledge.
4. Mutual learning cannot be compelled ; the planner cannot 
accelerate the process of understanding and behavioural change.
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5. In mutual learning, the property of learning is held in 
common trust: no one is the master, each has something to give 
and something to receive.
In summary, the main achievements of transactive planning are its 
special attention to psychological and institutional processes 
facilitating mutual learning, and its potentiality to really 
focus on public interest. The transa±ive approach is not 
applicable to every situation; it is inappropiate where expertise 
carries sufficient authority to act without the benefit of mutual 
learning.
5. Advocacy Planning
Advocacy Planning also does not form part of the traditional 
planning paradigm. It derives from adversary procedures modelled 
upon the legal profession, usually applied to defend the 
interests of the weak against the strong.
Within the planning profession in general, there are some 
attempts to reduce the importance of attitudes and values, 
because it seems that the major public questions are themselves 
matters of choice amongst technical methods and solutions. The 
practice of advocacy planning invites the examination and debate 
of political and social values. Davidoff (1977) suggested that 
appropriate planning action cannot be prescribed from a position 
of value neutrality, because prescriptions are based on desired 
objectives. Therefore, the planner should not only explain the 
values underlying his prescriptions, but should be an advocate of 
his propositions.
Another important feature of advocacy planning is the proposition 
of alternative plans to the "official one", thus breaking the 
monopoly of the "unitary plan", planning will be stimulated in a 
number of ways (Davidoff 1977):
- The existence of alternative plans will create a better 
informed public.
- The public agency will have to compete with other planning
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groups to win support.
- Those in opposition will be forced to produce plans, rather 
than simply criticizing the official propositions.
The advocate's plan will have the features of a legal brief, 
proposing specific substantive solutions:
- It will present the facts and reasons supporting one set of 
proposals.
- It will show the values underlying the plans, which will help 
the process of evaluating the plan.
In summary, advocacy planning produced a shift in the formulation 
of social policy from backroom negotiations out into the open; 
this constitutes one of the key elements of the advocacy 
movement.
6. Radical Planning
Radical Planning shares with advocacy planning the aim of 
promoting a socially just type of society. The difference lies in 
the analysis of capitalist societies and the rejection of 
ameliorative policies as mechanisms of long-term structural 
change.
Planning according this approach is focused less on ad hoc 
problem solving, and more on the theory of the state which 
determines the structure and evolution of social problems. State 
planning is seen by many marxists as assisting capital to collect 
profits; general social welfare programmes are interpreted as 
either serving the reproduction of needs of the capitalists or as 
maintaining support for the system as a whole. Planning can only 
serve the interests of the working class if it possesses 
sufficient political power or pressure to obtain what it wants.
It is not the purpose of this introductory section to 
describe in detail the different schools of thought in planning. 
Any list of planning traditions and models could be extended 
almost indefinitely. Those presented above are probably the most
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important traditions, and therefore sufficient to show the 
variety of concerns that planners address and the range of 
conceptual tools they bring to their tasks. In listing the 
planning traditions as totally separate from one another, it was 
meant to facilitate an understanding of them. This could lead to 
the idea that most practising planners are concerned with their 
school of thought only, but the blending of planning styles more 
commonly occurs in the practice of planning than an adherence 
exclusively to a single style. In this regard, Cartwright (1977) 
has suggested that rather than different planning styles or 
blends of styles, there are different types of planning problems, 
distinguishable in relation to the planner's perception of them 
and the consequent strategy to be followed. He classifies 
planning problems in relation to the number of variables entailed 
in the definition of the problem and in relation to the nature of 
those variables (calculable or incalculables), arriving at a 
categorization of four types of problems ranging from simple 
problems to metaproblems. For each type of problem there is a 
strategy that better suits it, for example: in simple problems it 
is possible to use the rational comprehensive method, since there 
are a defined number of variables, all of which are calculable; 
whereas in the case of metaproblems, with an unspecified number 
of variables, the majority of which are incalculable, the only 
possible alternative is incrementalism.
To summarize this section, it is important to consider that 
to define the planning problem, which is the planner's main task, 
the planner must keep in mind two considerations: i) what role
the government in office gives to planning, and ii) according to 
his or his client's perception of the problem, he must define a 
strategy to tackle it, which will probably use elements from more 
than one of the planning traditions.
With this brief background of planning theory, we now move 
to a more specialised field of planning, i.e. social planning.
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A.2. Approaches to Social Planning
Let us begin by mentioning that the word social has at least 
three main uses. Firstly, social as part of the natural 
characteristics of man, living in company and organized into 
communities; in this sense social planning can be defined as 
planning that involves people (societal planning), as opposed to 
planning that involves things, or "physical" planning. Secondly, 
social can be equated with sociability, meaning companionship, 
friendship; social planning is then the provision of certain 
resources to promote sociability, such as youth centers, 
playgrounds, etc. Finally, in the context of applied Social 
Sciences and Administration, social is usually understood as an 
antonymus of economic; in this narrow sense social activities are 
those associated with the general quality of human life, in 
opposition to other activities such as monetary matters, 
production or physical output.
We prefer here to use the term social planning in its 
broader meaning, that is, as societal planning, which includes 
a sense of both social planning as oppos^ed to economic planning, 
and of sociability. Furthermore, it is expected that this 
approach will make clear that there is no competition between 
economic and social aims, since all ends of planning are social, 
and economic development and planning are means for obtaining 
these ends. As Abel-smith (1966,10) has argued, why does a 
society need economic growth if it is not to promote social 
rather than economic ends. This conception of social ends as 
enveloping economic ends is more clear in developing countries, 
whereas in the developed world the two remain fragmented.
Before giving the specific definition of social planning to 
be used in the rest of this work, it is relevant to give a short 
enumeration of the ways in which the term social planning has 
been used in the literature.
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1.- Social Planning as Social Service Planning
The development of social service planning emerged soon after the 
second world war in Britain and other developed countries. At 
that time social services began to plan for reconstruction, 
following the instructions of the central government. But it was 
with the introduction of the Public Expenditure Survey Committee 
(PESO) , in 1961, that each department was forced by the Treasury 
to justify their bids for resources with complete forecasts of 
the costs and demands on their services, thus generating a medium 
term planning system, which spread from the central departments 
to the regional and local divisions. In this background social 
planning began to be understood in two ways:
i) Firstly, it was understood asthe coordination of existing 
social services, rather than a response to day-to-day 
pressures. The need for coordination was becoming more acute 
since there was an increasing fragmentation of the planning 
machinery and service delivery. Of particular importance in 
social service planning was coordination between the planning 
of strategic and operational priorities, (Walker 1984,9), both 
concerned with the allocation of resources, the former overall 
allocation, the latter specific allocation.
Social service coordination takes place in two dimensions:
- Each social service must elaborate its budget and programmes 
in relation to the treasury's requirements, in order to produce 
a coordinated action.
- An institution must be created to design the overall 
strategic social priorities, the framework of ideas, and 
coordinate between social services.
ii) Social planning is also seen as a variety of rationing 
procedures which are fundamental to the achievement of social 
priorities. As Glennerster (1983,3) has pointed out, "those
procedures are not automatically incremental, ....  they imply
some conscious choice of alternatives or priorities. Social 
planning as rationining tends towards higher rationality, 
visibility and predictability of the decisions taken".
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2,- Social Planning as Social Developmental Planning:
This approach to social planning is linked to developing 
countries. In such countries the role of the state in the 
provision of social welfare is small, in comparison to developed 
countries. There are some reasons for this. Many of the services 
are provided through the traditional social structure, (for 
example: care of the mentally handicapped within the family). The 
type of social problems characteristic of industrialised 
economies are different than those of developing countries, for 
example those associated with the way of living ("urban stress"), 
or the demographic structure (young population needs less health 
care). Although some of the features of industrialized countries 
can be found in developing countries, with high urbanization,etc, 
the development and demand for social welfare services is in 
relative terms smaller. In this case, therefore, social planning 
as a discipline cannot emerge from the need to coordinate or 
ration those services which are less organized. The rise of 
social planning in the third world can be explained mainly by the 
move to broaden the scope of development planning by placing much 
more emphasis on social change and the achievement of social 
goals (Conyers 1982,10).
Development planning is concieved as the conscious governmental 
attempt to increase its rate of economic and social progress. 
Planners in the thirld world realized that plans were unlikely to 
be implemented succesfully unless there was a full consideration 
of "non economic" variables, and especially, social aspects 
should be regarded as justifiable ends in themselves. These two 
elements are characteristic of thirld world developmental 
planning.
As in the case of planning as coordination of social services, 
there are two approaches to social developmental planning. These 
are sectoral and unified. The former is related to each social 
service only and is not very much concerned with social 
development as a whole, whereas the latter recognizes the
interdependence of social and economic measures. Despite this 
academic distinction, most common in social developmental
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planning is the synthesis of the two approaches. Hardiman and 
Midgley have defined social planning as ”a process of policy 
formulation, plan design and implementation, which attempts to 
meet basic human needs, solve specific social problems and bring 
about greater equity and social justice" (1982,22).
3.- Social Planning as Social Welfare Planning and Community 
Organization
Social welfare in broad terms, includes all the activities 
related with social work, such as day care services, child 
welfare services, care of the aged, rehabilitation services for 
the disabled or for offenders, group activities for young people, 
etc. Therefore, social planning is seen as planning for the types 
of services listed. At the outset, all these activities were 
undertaken by philanthropic organizations, but with the 
i n v o l v e m e n t  of social w o r k e r s  and t h e i r  s u b s e q u e n t  
professionalization, planning procedures were introduced for the 
achievement of these goals.
Community organization attempts to increase community 
participation and strengthen community identity, by providing 
opportunities for local citizens to become involved in welfare 
activities. In this sense, social planning as community 
organization is aimed to improve the delivery of social work 
services to the local community. Again, social planning is seen 
as planning for the type of activities just described. This is 
the way in which social planning has been understood in the North 
American social work literature.
The term social welfare planning is also sometimes used to 
describe the coordination of local voluntary welfare activities.
Thus far we have described the three main interpretations of 
social planning separately; let us briefly mention some of their 
common features. The models prefered in these social planning 
traditions are rational comprehensive and incrementalism. In the 
case of social welfare planning it is true that the synoptic 
approach has been succsesfully used, but social workers have
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proposed the use of advocacy planning, which attempts to advocate 
and promote the interests of the disadvantaged members of the 
community.
Another important common interest of the different 
interpretations of social planning is the promotion of 
geographical equity, since every social priority determined and 
implemented has some territorial implications.
Finally, it should be noted that despite having described 
separately three interpretations of social planning, it is clear 
that all of them are part of the same aim: the determination of 
social priorities. All the interpretations are subsets of a 
broarder one: social developmental planning.
This section concludes with the definition of social 
planning that will^used throughout the work. It is elaborated 
from the previous definitions given by Glennerster (1981), 
Midgley and Hardiman (1982) and Walker (1984). Social planning is 
a process of policy formulation, plan design, implementation and 
evaluation which attempts to meet basic human needs, solve social 
policy problems and promote social justice.
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B. Planning and Social Planning in Latin America
This section is based principally on the reports 
prepared by, Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL- UN) 
and the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning 
(ILPES) concerning the present situation of planning in Latin 
America (L.A.)(^)« The information was gathered as a special 
request of the 2nd. conference of L.A. Ministers and Chiefs of 
Planning Offices (1978) and presented to the 3rd. conference in 
1980 for revision and updating.
The report envisages planning rather as a process than a 
mere blue print; and so planning involves a variety of 
institutions and sectors, and therefore is beyond a technical 
exercise or theory. It is a practice that evolves in relation to 
the new objectives of development and structural transformations.
Although the report gave no details about the operational 
planning models most used in L.A., it is possible to conclude 
from its analysis that the whole conception of planning in the 
region is derived from the rational comprehensive model in 
theoretical terms and incrementalism in practice.
Planning in Latin America
The planning styles were defined in relation to the 
variables appearing in table 1.1.
1 .
Estado actual de la Planificacion en America latina y el Caribe. 
Cuadernos del ILPES No 28 
CEPAL - ILPES N.U. 1982
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TABLE 1.1.
PLANNING STYLES IN LATIN AMERICA
Plan. Style Nat. Proj . of Development Notion of Planning
STYLE 1
STYLE 4
FREE MARKET 
♦Subsidiary State 
Subsidiary Social Policy
Wide external openess
Subsidiary 
Comprehensive or 
proj. and progs. 
Normative
STYLE 2
PARTIALLY REFORMED MARKET 
Market partially corrected
Complementary Social Pols. 
Regulated external openess
Regulatory 
Comprehensive or 
proj. and progs. 
Normative
REGULATED MARKET 
Regulated market Regulatory
STYLE 3 Clear pursuit of Soc.Pol. Comprehens ive
Restricted exter.openess Normative or
Adaptative
CENTRAL PLANNED Centralised
State resource Allocation Comprehensive 
Pre-eminence of Soc. goals Adaptative
SOURCE: Estado actual Plan, en A. L. pp.9; adapted
* Subsidiary policy means working through subsidies in a sporadic 
form, when the need appears, rather than a continuous subsidiary 
situation.
PLANNING STYLES OF LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
1. The First Stvle is featured by a state that has a subsidiary 
role in the allocation of resources, the market is the first 
mechanism for it, and it is recognised as the most efficient 
device. The economy is widely open to foreign investment,
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therefore external agencies also influence the national plans. In 
the social context, this planning style is featured by a 
prominence of economic growth over other policy objectives, 
though it does recognize certain specific areas, such as poverty, 
on which the state must to intervene.
In the case of Argentina, the government declares that "All 
public sector activities should be to enhance the market forces 
as the engine of the general activity" (ILPES, 1982:10). The 
Chilean government advocates the principle of subsidiarity in 
many of its plans: "The state field of action is constrained and 
limited to those functions that because of their nature or 
interdependence cannot be carried out adequately by the private 
sector"(ILPES,1982:10) .
In this style there is a clear correspondence between growth 
and development. This is clearly stated in the Uruguayan National 
Plan of Development (1973-77).
The approach to planning in this style is that of national 
indicative plans of development, which at times is complemented 
by sectoral operational plans. A radical approach in this area 
was taken by Argentina in acknowledging the inexistence of 
national planning and recognizing sectoral planning as the only 
one in use (ILPES, 1982:20).
During the early seventies Colombia and Brazil also adhered 
to this style.
2. In the Second Stvle of "partially reformed market" there is a 
joint planning effort by private agents as well as the state. It 
protects private initiative but also recognises the necessity of 
promoting and implementing some actions to offset private 
insufficiencies, especially in relation to the social objectives 
of the country. Within the social context, in this style the 
state plays a more active role, through redistributive programmes 
to solve some specific problems.
This style has been used by a variety of countries, with 
different population sizes and stages of development; they can be
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presented in three groups:
The majority of the Caribean countries are included in one 
group of which the components have a common feature: The planning 
system is dedicated almost exclusively to the formulation of 
projects and programmes. This is part of the development plans of 
Barbados and the Dominican Republic.
Another group of countries have the common feature of a 
potential desire to have a comprehensive type of planning, but in 
practice it is basically the formulation of projects and 
programmes again. The objectives of the Salvadorean plan are 
achieved through the execution of fifty one strategic programmes, 
the plan defines the responsibilities of each institution and 
coordinates and assess their action.
Finally, we can find countries in a more developed stage, 
such as Colombia which in its National Integration Plan for 1979- 
82 proclaimed that the objective of economic growth is the 
improvement of the quality of life, which is a mean for the moral 
and spiritual improvement of the community. The second 
development plan of Brasil gives some autonomy to the social 
objectives and the instruments for achieving them, but it defines 
the total expenditure to be spent in different areas of action. 
Venezuela is also included in this group.
3. The Regulated Market Stvle estimates that the overcoming of 
the big development problems requires some structural changes, 
which is the only way for obtaining a more equal society. In this 
case the whole planning is defined in relation to social goals. 
There are some variations within this style in respect to the 
state property of productive means.
The Mexican plan for 1980-82 was aimed to transform the 
economic growth into social development, which was part of the 
national project for social transformation. The Peruvian plan was 
very similar: "development is conceived as a planned process for 
structural transformation and the enhancement of the productive 
capacity aimed to overcome the socio-economic desequilibriums 
and external dependency" (ILPES,1982:24). Costa Rica considered
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that the objectives of social equity not only included the 
distribution of income but also the distribution of wealth 
through new forms of property. Similar objectives were found in 
the reconstruction plan of Nicaragua and Jamaica.
4. Finally, The Fourth Stvle is characterised as promoting a 
national development of a socialist type, so this style was 
limited to Cuba and Nicaragua (During the Sandinista Government); 
"the planning of the national economy, based in the social 
property of the means of production, is the form by which the 
socialist state directs in effective form the development of the 
national economy. The improvement of the level of living of the 
population is the principal goal of the socialist productive 
system".
Having analysed the different planning styles found in L.A., 
we now move to a description of the social planning approaches 
implemented in the continent.
The Problems of Social Planning in Latin America
Demo (1983) has argued that the practice of Social Planning 
in L.A. , was far from the formal governmental declarations of 
good. The practice of planning in reality remained in its 
traditional form, it was basically defined by economic policies 
and therefore, it happened that social planning was usually 
paternalistic, residualist and compensatory. Some developments 
have been seen in this area in the form of planning through 
social projects and programmes, this new approach can be seen to 
be less paternalistic. Although it was possible to manipulate 
the social reality through projects, there still remained the 
p r o b l e m  of c o m p a r t m e n t a l  izat ion and the lack of an 
interdisciplinary approach.
1. Lack of Coordination of the Social Programmes.
There were many institutions that generated partial actions, 
and therefore did not have the necessary impact for fighting 
poverty (Franco, 1983). The problem of unsatisfactory 
coordination also produced a waste of resources,since often
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different institutions were trying to solve the same problem 
but through their own networks.
There were also problems in relation to the way in which 
social services operated.
The policies were usually designed by qualified bureaucrats 
who did not consider that their policies would be put into 
practice by other bureaucrats, who in turn did not have the 
aggregate view of the creator or simply did not understand 
the ideas. This sometimes produced the abandonment of the 
policy; lower tier bureaucrats always prefer rutinary work 
rather than innovations.
The institution that designed the social policies must obtain 
the necessary resources, and must confront other parts of the 
bureaucracy.
In the implementation phase, these requirements of the 
institutions were assessed by more powerful departments, such 
as the central bank, the ministry of finance, which were 
likely to use their authority to control public expenditure. 
These central departments used devices that had no relation to 
the social objectives of the policies but had proven to be 
effective, for example approving the budget in a fragmented 
way, discussing every new addition,etc. (^).
The phenomenon of having a clientele was also very common.
In some services dedicated to specific problems a relation 
between the bureaucrats and their customers appearsed, which 
was not only part of their role, but a tool for promotion 
within a particular service or to different jobs outside the 
institution. Clientelism can be seen in two lights: it can be 
harmful for anti poverty policies since it helps to maintain 
the status quo with the present relationship between the 
bureaucrat and "customer"; on the other hand an agency that 
recognises the poor as their real customer can work much 
closer and better for them.
2. More details about these techniques is given in section 1.3.
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THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL PLANNING IN LATIN AMERICA
There was a : relationship in Latin America
between some socio-political and socio-economic contexts and the 
type of statements involved in the planning strategy; for example 
ILPES (1982) considered that in cases of general crisis the 
planning system produced non relevant responses, usually using 
more r^tuorical devices. On the other hand a stable context 
could produce a coherent plan, but it might also have been 
entirely trivial. It should be kept in mind that there was always 
the possibility of deducing the existence of a development 
strategy from the actions of the government and some specific 
statements about the subject.
It has been commonly assumed that to solve the development 
problems the main requirement is political will, but the patterns 
of social development are generally related to the level of 
economic development. We see from table 1.2., that for the period 
analysed the more developed countries of L.A. had maintaim/their 
levels of social expenditure. It is arguable that there are some 
structural factors and elements of social inertia which do not 
allow for radical changes; in some cases the level of expenditure 
was maintained despite important ideological changes. For 
example, Uruguay, which was considered to have subsidiary 
social policies, had not only maintained their social expenditure 
levels but also experienced some increases in particular sub­
periods. At the other extreme, Mexico and Peru had steadily 
maintained their levels of social expenditure despite that both 
had priorised social objectives before economic policies.
In contrast but less clear, countries with lower economic 
development seemed to have a differential response in their 
social expenditure levels in relation to the policies advocated. 
Countries with a complementary social policy approach, such as 
Bolivia and the Dominican Republic, had maintained their levels; 
whereas countries of the third style with a clear commitment to 
the implementation of social policies had increased their social 
expenditure, as in the case of Ecuador and Nicaragua. In summary, 
in countries with more development a great influence of past
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social policies was felt in determining the present expenditure 
strategies.
GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN
TABLE 1.2.
THE SOCIAL SERVICES IN 
(As % of G.D.P.)
LATIN AMERICA
Country c. 1973 c. 1976 c. 1981 c. 1986
G.D.P. + US800
Peru 5.8 5.5 3.5
Mexico 5.8 7.3 8.0 6.4
Panama 7.3 7.2 13.7 15.6
Chile 25.5 15.2 19.1 18.1
Uruguay 13.5 15.7 15.5 14.1
Venezuela 8.6 9.2 9.8 10.5
G.D.P. +US400 - 800
Bolivia 4.5 5.5 4.2 6.2
Ecuador 4.0 4.3 6.6
Guatemala 4.0 4.6
Nicaragua 5.7 8.7 9.8
R.Dominicana 6.7 6.6 6.3 5.2
SOURCES:
1973-1976 Cuadernos ILPES No.28, Santiago 1982
1981 Statistical Yearbook 1982
1986 Government Finance Statistical Yearbook - IMF
The social planning practice in L.A. showed that past social 
commitments have a very important role in the present 
implementation of social policies. This was specially true for 
more developed L.A. countries, although (at some point) they may 
desire or be compelled to change their social strategy. The 
practice also shows that countries with a clear social priority 
had increased their social expenditures, some faster than total 
public expenditure, denoting the importance of their aims. The 
different ideological approaches and their subsequent planning 
styles are difficult to assess in relation to total social 
expenditure only.
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1.3. SOCIAL EXPENDITURE AND BUDGETING
Public expenditure can be defined as the dispensation by 
the state of non-market criteria for economic resources which it 
had acquired from firms and households (Heald, 1983) (^).
When analysing the different levels of expenditure 
between and within countries, it is necessary to consider that 
there are theoretical explanations which explain the growth of 
public expenditure. Among others theoretical hypotheses; the 
"Wagner Law" (^ ) states the the share of the public sector in the 
economy will increase as economic growth proceeds, owing to the 
intensification of existing activities and the extension of new 
ones. The "public Choice School" enunciates that the government 
set both revenues and expenditures to maximize its chances to win 
re-election.
According to Glennerster (1979), there are a number of 
factors that influence the specific different levels of public 
goods and services provision .
- Firstly, the ideology of the party in power is important. 
According to the different ideological approaches a decision 
is made about the proportion of public provision in relation 
to private.
- Demographic factors are determinant for the type and amount 
of services provided. Example: an aged population will
require different services than a younger popultation.
- There are other factors such as tastes, substitutes and 
opportunity costs, which influence the provision of public
3. There are a number of obstacles in the operationalisation of the definition of public expenditure; there 
are confusions between gross and net expenditure. This is how charges and other sources of sectoral revenues 
are treated. There are also problems with the different transfer payments made by the state, does, which are 
basically redistributions between the taxpayer and the beneficiaries; there are overlaps depending upon the 
type of transferences. Finally, for comparative purposes there are important differences between the type of 
functions or agencies included or not included within the public sector.
4. See: R. Musgrave and A.Peacock (1958) Classics in the theory of public finance.
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goods the same way they influence the provision of private 
goods.
- Finally, some factors related to the public finances of 
the country are influential as well, such as tax structure, 
the government expectations of economic growth and
inflation, etc.
Having said that there exist these different factors 
influencing the government expenditure levels, it is also 
possible to identify some common trends of expenditure within 
developing countries in opposition to industrialised, (see table
1.3.)
TABLE 1.3.
GOVERNMENTAL EXPENDITURES - Functional Classification 
(1978-80 AVERAGES)
TYPE OF EXPENDITURE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES INDUSTRIALISED
COUNTRIES
Defence 14.0 13.9
Soc.Sec.& Welf. 18.0 37.6
Education 10.9 5.4
Health 4.8 11.7
Housing 2.3 2.5
Econ.Servs. 24.9 11.3
SOURCE:
A.Prest Public finance in developing countries pp. 18
The major contrast is between the proportion of 
expenditure devoted to social security, welfare and health in the 
two sets of countries. Developing countries spend proportionally 
more on education and economic services due to the necessity of 
these countries to promote capital formation, whereas 
industrialised countries, with usually an older population, spend
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more on health care and the finance of social security.
One practical way to assess the real significance of 
social policy objectives is through the analysis of the public 
budget. From it we can determine whether the objectives stated in 
the plans and policy proposals are to be put into practice or 
not. In the next part of this section we describe the most 
important features of budgeting.
BUDGETING
The budgetary process is what links social policies and 
plans to service delivery (Glennerster, 1975) ; there are many 
forces influencing the shape of the budget, such as bureaucrats, 
beneficiaries of public policies, etc. But the budget is 
basically a political process, and it principally reflects the 
political priorities of those in power.
To understand who gets what and why they get what they 
do, it is important to approach resource allocation not as the 
passive response of economic agents to external stimuli, but 
rather as a political and economic process by which central 
authorities and competing spending departments make their 
decisions about scarce resources. An examination of the 
composition of different public budgets reveals that within the 
total budget, the expansion in expenditure has not been uniform 
between programmes. The questions arising therefore are: what
factors determine the relative expansion of different programmes, 
who or what determines the national priorities (Jackson, 1982). 
There are many individuals who can influence the budgetary 
outcome: voters (clients), politicians and bureaucrats.
In this section we will describe the most important 
features of budgeting and its consequences.
Practical Purposes of Budgeting
According to Goode (1983) budgeting has at least four 
practical purposes:
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1. The budget sets a framework for policy formulation. This 
is related to specific sectoral policies rather than 
national ones.
2. Budgeting is a means for policy implementation. The budget 
is a guide for management and at the same time an instrument 
for administrative control.
3. Since the budget is usually based on laws or decrees, it 
prevents the abuse of power and diversion or improper use 
of public funds.
4. The budget document can be used as a source of public 
information on past activities, current decisions and 
future prospects.
The budget performs various economic tasks, related to 
the allocation of resources between public and private sectors 
and among competing demands within government. It also performs a 
stabilization function which requires an assessment of the 
economic impact of government operations in the economy and a 
consequent adjustment of the budget. Finally, distributional 
aspects require attention to the incidence of public expenditure 
and the income groups that are expected to be served. The first 
and the last tasks are usually considered as the social 
implications of budgeting, whereas stabilization is related to 
the economic implications.
Budget Coverage
The first and most important rule in the formulation of 
a budget is the necessity for a comprehensive statement of 
estimated revenue and expenditure of the central government^ . If 
this rule is broken, there is no assurance that the scarce 
resources will be allocated to the uses judged as most urgent.
5. See:
A. Prest op. cit. pp.149 
R. Goode op. cit. pp.11
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also it is not possible to exert a proper public accountability.
This principle is often not observed. Governments
sometimes set aside specific revenues which are earmarked to
finance specific expenditures; the range of these funds is 
variable. For example: import taxation was used to finance 
Defence expenditures in Peru. This practice was very common among 
Latin American countries, and reflects the lack of confidence in
the government system, especially in its allocation procedure. On
the other hand, it is easier for spending agencies to ask for 
an increase in the proportion of an earmarked tax for a specific 
use, whereas for the government it is more difficult to justify a 
general increase in taxation to finance public expenditure as a 
whole (^).
Other forms excluded from the budget are some autonomous 
or decentralised agencies set up outside the scope of the central 
budget, but they still receive important grants from public 
revenue. In some African countries foreign aid or loans are not 
included in the budget.
Caiden and Wildavsky (1974) have called "Fragmented 
budgeting" the problem of earmarking and autonomous funds outside 
the budget. They have established a relationship between 
fragmented budgeting and "repetitive budgeting"; they state that 
the larger the proportion of public expenditure not included in 
the budget, the less able the finance ministry's to meet prior 
commitments and more likely to reconsider the budget every month.
Comprehensiveness does not mean total and absolute 
consolidation. A comprehensive budget includes only the agencies 
that are under the effective financial control of government 
budget. Therefore, as an example, a national budget should not 
include the transactions of local governments if they have their 
own resources and responsibilities but it should include the 
government grants to them.
6. Taylor (quoted in Prest) has pointed out that earmarking revenues constitutes a built-in guarantee that 
government expenditure will vary (increase) regardless of need.
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Budget Form and Classification
It is common to find a distinction between ordinary or 
current expenditures and development or capital expenditures; in 
some countries this distinction takes the form of two different 
budgets. Although the distinction is initially attractive in 
political terms, since the government in office can show publicly 
how much they are "investing", in practice it does not make much 
sense, because the division is essentially arbitrary and it would 
mean that nothing in the ordinary budget has anything to do with 
development (Prest, 1985). For example, where does one place 
education, usually included in the current budget, since it can 
be considered as investment expenditure as well. According to 
Caiden & Wildavsky the separation of public expenditure into two 
budgets is a way of avoiding the conflict between planners and 
finance. Both groups are struggling for funds and each one has a 
different approach. Planners are basically spenders and at the 
moment of choice they prefer growth. whereas finance always 
prefers stabilitv. So, it seems that the case of capital 
budgeting must actually rest on whether it helps the government 
in its functions of policy making and management.
With regards to the different classifications the budget 
may have, it depends again on how the government operates; the 
most common alternative is a combination of objective, functional 
and economic classifications. The objective classification 
distinguishes between the type of expenditure, personnel, 
supplies, etc. Functional classification distinguishes the 
different government functions such as health, education, etc. 
Finally, economic classification separates capital from current 
expenditures.
Budgetary process
The budgetary process involves four phases: formulation, 
authorisation, execution and evaluation. Each one follows a 
number of stages C )  .
7. The budgetary process discussed here is following (principally) American literature, and the stages 
described are not necessarily universal.
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1) Formulation:
Formulation is the first phase of budgeting, it has been 
traditionally considered as the whole budgetary process itself. 
In this phase we can recognise 9 stages.
1. Preparation of policy outline; This is the first attempt 
to compatibilize reality with the desires or expectations 
included in the national plans. There is a time horizon 
problem for this compatibilization -the budget commonly only 
encompasses the public expenditures for a sole year, whereas 
the plan is made for a period of years incorporating broad 
policy priorities.
2. Preparation of initial estimates: There are some countries 
which include in the budget only expenditure and revenues are 
preparated in a totally different procedure . Although many 
of the original estimates may change during the execution of 
the budget, it is necessary to have a correct estimate of the 
public revenues before imposing certain expenditure ceilings. 
This will achieve a better organised and integrated budget.
R E V E N U E  E S T I M A T E S  are f o r m u l a t e d  in t w o  w a y s  
(P r e m c h a n d ,1983). First, an accounting approach of 
forecasting receipts, based on the rate of growth recorded 
for the previous years, may be adopted for each major source 
of revenue. A second more organised approach is to provide 
for an explicit recognition of national economic parameters 
including the likely increase of GNP, the rate of inflation, 
and the impact of increased government expenditure on 
taxation. In countries which derive most of their revenues 
from the sale of a few commodities, revenue estimation may be 
less complex.
SOURCES:
N. Caiden & A. Wildavsky: Planning and Budgeting in Poor Countries.
R. Goode: Government Finance in Developing Countries.
A. Premchand: Government Budgeting and Expenditure Control.
A. Prest: Public Finance in Developing Countries.
A. Wildavsky Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of the Budgetary Process.
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DETERMINATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES: The determination of
public expenditures takes place in two ways (Premchand,1983). 
In a model of devolution, totals are decided by the central 
finance or planning agency and communicated to all other 
agencies. In an aggregative model, the individual expenditure 
requirements of each programme are compiled and consolidated. 
A combination of these practices is usually found.
An important outcome of these two previous stages is the 
BUDGET CIRCULAR, which is the basis for sectoral or 
ministerial budget formulation. It contains a description of 
the national goals and economic prospects of the country. It 
promotes a better understanding of the budget, indicating 
causes of resource constraints and their impact on the 
budget. On the practical side, it should also include methods 
for computing maintenance costs, interest payments, estimated 
inflation rate and other necessary information for the 
formulation of the budget.
3. Preparation of revenue and expenditure estimates by 
agencies: In this stage a number of considerations are
taken. First of all it is necessary to distinguish between 
continuing charges and new services, and also the changes 
in the costs of the services. After this has been done, 
there are some elements to consider in relation to the 
nature of each programme, for example demographic changes, 
the ageing of the population, etc. The most common 
approach by far to solving the allocation problem is what 
has been described in the first section of this chapter as 
incremental budgeting. In this approach the expenditure 
allocations for the next year are based on the previous 
allocations plus some marginal variations which are the 
points most critically assessed and discussed.
Spending departments employ some tactics to obtain 
greater shares in the expenditure, (some of these tactics 
and problems have been described by Caiden and Wildavsky
(1974) and Goode (1983)). One common practice is called 
"padding" by which some "additions" are included in an
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original project in order to prevent future cuts from the 
budget office or to prevent uncertainties arising from 
possible price changes. An opposite practice to padding is 
also possible: "camel nose" appears when only the first
part of a project is submitted for approval, and then 
additional supplementations are requested. Another 
technique proceeds is that when cuts are requested, the 
spending department reduces considerably an important 
programme but assures the finance of the remaining 
programmes with this move the department knows that sooner 
or later the pressures for keeping the original important 
programme will be made from outsiders to the budget 
office.
A problem does arise because of different approaches 
between spending agencies and the budget office. The 
agencies do not have an overall view of the public 
expenditures and therefore they think that a small 
increase in their own expenditure allowances will not 
affect the country; but if every agency has the same 
approach the effects will be devastating for the public 
finances.
4. Review and consolidation of agency requests: In this 
stage the Ministry of Finance collects the agencies* 
requests, and makes the initial analysis and comparisons 
between the requests and the expenditure ceilings.
5. Discussion of requests between spending agencies and 
budget office: The budget examiners do not have time to 
check every item of the departmental budget, so they 
usually take an incremental approach by which the previous 
experience is taken granted and only the new additions are 
discussed. Here the problem of different approaches 
appears again; the main concern of the budgeters, who are 
outside judges, is to have solvency, whereas spending 
departments are concerned with their departmental 
priorities.
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6. Draft budget: After the discussion with different agencies 
a draft budget is prepared by the budget office according 
to the ministerial estimates and the changes initiated by 
the discussion; this draft budget is presented to the 
upper level of decision: The Minister of Finance.
7. Spending Ministers' final appeal. After a draft budget has 
been produced the spending ministers usually have an 
opportunity for a final appeal directly to the Minister of 
Finance.
8. Final decisions by the President or Cabinet: The draft 
budget is presented to the President or the Cabinet for
the final decisions: at this stage usually no changes are
made.
9. Submission to legislature.
2) Authorisation
The authorisation phase is not a lenghty one, but it 
varies enormously according to the practice in different 
countries. As Prest (1985) has shown there are some countries 
such as the UK where over the years there has been an increasing 
tendency to rubber stamp the proposals, whereas in countries such 
as the U.S. there is always the possibility of a mutilation of 
the executive proposals; there are also some intermediate 
situations such as Latin American practices, where the executive 
is empowered to spend each month amounts not exceeding those
spent in previous years, in case budget approval is delayed.
There are difficulties related to the different 
approaches between the legislature and the executive. Caiden and 
Wildavsky (1975) have pointed out that despite their 
responsibilities the legislature does not often worry about how 
the revenues they distribute are raised. Secondly, they are not 
responsible for a consistent budget since they are not 
responsible for its application. These practical problems of 
partial understanding and responsibility towards the budget 
often make delays and unnecessary discussions for its approval.
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3) Implementation or Execution
Budget execution is the use of the spending authority of 
the expenditures granted by the budget law or decree. In some 
countries a detailed control to spending departments is exercised 
by the Ministry of Finance before entering into commitments, 
usually this does not involve a re-examination of the merits of 
the expenditure. In the majority of the systems the budget office 
apportions the annual authorisation by time periods (months or 
quarters) and establishes limits on the amounts that can be 
committed within each period. These apportionments help the 
budget office to maintain control of the expenditure by not 
allowing the departments to spend their budget during the first 
part of the year and then expect supplementations.
Special concern in the execution phase is put on the 
changes occurring during the course of the year. These changes 
are unavoidable and in some way or another are part of the 
execution. The four more important sources of change in the 
budget execution are:
- New additions or supplementations to approved expenditure 
plans due to underestimation of costs or deliberate
exclusion of certain items (®).
- The budget may also be change products of a smaller yield of 
taxation. This is very possible in the case of earmarked taxes 
financing special programmes, or an incorrect estimation of 
operational revenues in the case of certain services.
- The budget may also be changed because of unexpected 
transfers of funds between or within the spending 
authorities. The degree of formalisation of these transfers 
may vary according to their magnitude and function.
8. Sometimes spending departments have deliberate policies to obtain additional supplementations during the 
year, especially for doubious areas of expenditure since the supplementations are usually scrutinised less 
carefully.
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- Finally, one of the most important sources of change in the 
budget is inflation. Governments commonly include their 
estimates of inflation in the budget circular, but since it is 
a highly political issue the chances of having a low estimate 
are great.
This practice of constant changes to the original 
budget, has been called by Caiden and Wildavsky (1974) 
"Repetitive budgeting", the process of budgeting is repeated and 
remade over the course of the year. The entire budget is treated 
as if each item were supplemental, subject to last minute 
renegotiation. This practice is not seen at a central level but 
at the level of spending agencies. The finance department wants 
to ensure a cash flow during the year as well as a provision for 
uncertainties, therefore the original apportions are reduced to 
insure that there is cash when needed. Wildavsky (1975) 
criticised this practice since it basically promotes uncertainty 
and eliminates the planning purposes of the budget, it also 
encourages lobbying and manoeuvring by departments; he proposed 
to replace "repetitive budgeting" by "continuous budgeting", 
which is analysed later in this study.
4) Evaluation
This is the phase on which the budgets of many countries 
are weaker. There are three aspects to be considered here. One 
is the accounting evaluation of revenues and expenditure; this 
can be done by the budget office or finance ministry, and it 
basically provides statistical information about the fulfilment 
of the budget. Secondly, there is a necessity for a financial 
auditing, which is intended to check the compliance with the 
budgetary law and other legal requirements; any irregularities 
should be reported to the legislature. Auditing should be carried 
out by an independent agency not linked with the accounting 
function (^ ) . Finally, there is a necessity for a performance 
audit (or comprehensive audit) which comments on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the programmes. In many
9. According to Goode (1983) this is the case in Latin American countries, where the Comptroller general 
has both accounting and auditing functions.
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developing countries it is common to find that financial auditing 
is non existent and there is no possibility to glimpse a 
performance audit.
Budgeting is a part of politics, it can never be a 
purely technical exercise; this is very important to remember 
since evaluation is not exempt from political analysis. But, 
despite the influence of the ideology in power, many of the 
external conditions for budgeting remain the same. About this 
point Goode (1983) argued that it is easy to exaggerate the 
differences in budgeting between (developing) countries with 
authoritarian regimes and those with democratic governments. The 
economic uncertainties are identical and the technical problems 
are almost the same.
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1.4. FISCAL INCIDENCE STUDIES 
Introduction
This section is concerned with the literature on the 
effects of government intervention. We will review works covering 
issues such as the distributive aspects of public expenditure or 
redistribution in state welfare spending; these are generally 
grouped under the broa^der title of Fiscal Incidence Studies. 
These studies try to determine who is actually paying the taxes, 
considering all possible shifts, and who is receiving the 
benefits from the goverment. The final intention is to determine 
the net incidence; this implies the assessment of certain groups 
-income bracket or social class- to determine if they are made 
better off or worse off, as a result of the state's policies of 
redistribution. In this section we will look at the studies done 
in the U.K., in Latin America, and conclude with some works in 
this area based on Chile.
The aim of this section is not only to introduce the 
reader to the theme of fiscal incidence studies, (which is 
related to the main issue of this research) , but to be able to 
obtain some methodological approaches for the treatment and 
allocation of public expenditures.
Fiscal Incidence Studies
The post war period was characterised by a continuous 
increase in public expenditure; this trend lasted until the early 
1980's. It was believed then that economic growth would allow 
increasing social ex^nditure, which in turn would produce greater 
equality (O'Higgins 1983). A similar pattern was attempted in 
developing countries during the same period, with the clear 
intention of raising the level of living of their people as 
quickly as possible.
Unfortunately, the expected results of these policies 
did not appear clearly, and therefore, produced a loss of 
consensus about the role of the state as a service provider. Much
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of the debate in this area has been concentrated in the area of 
social expenditure; here the evidence has not been favourable to 
it. As Le Grand (1982) pointed out for the case of Britain, 
almost all public expenditure on the social services benefits the 
well off to a greater extent than the poor.
These facts, and basically the necessity to assess the 
policies undertaken, produced a growing interest in fiscal 
incidence studies.
FISCAL INCIDENCE STUDIES IN THE U.K.
The analysis of the distributive effects of public 
expenditure and taxation has been an issue in the UK from the 
beginning of this century. According to Barna (1945), the first 
studies of this type were undertaken in 1919, but covered only 
the distributive aspects of taxation,after the first world war. 
The first comprehensive fiscal incidence study was done by Barna 
in 1945.
One of the best known modern sources of information on 
the distributive effects of taxes and benefits is a series of 
studies prepared annually since the 1960's by the Central 
Statistical Office (CSO). Their general purpose is to show how 
taxation and public expenditure, on the Social Services, cash 
benefits and consumer subsidies, affect the observed distribution 
of income between households.
CSO studies do not attempt to calculate the effects of 
every tax and expenditure, but deal only with those taxes and 
benefits clearly applicable to individuals. There are 
considerable difficulties in moving from the aggregates of 
government expenditure and finance published in the National 
Income and Expenditure Blue Book to apportioning taxes and 
benefits to individual households. Therefore, areas of public 
expenditure such as defence, roads and public parks are not 
considered, since there is deemed to be insufficient information 
to calculate who benefits. In the case of 1982, for example, the 
estimates given covered only 48% of total government
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expenditures and 59% of its receipts.
For the analysis of the redistributive effects of 
government intervention, it is necesary to compare original 
income of each household, with the final income each recorded 
after paying taxes and receiving certain benefits. This 
comparison is carried out in different stages; each stage is 
analysed separately, giving great attention to the methodological 
procedures. This serves as a basis for the discussion below.
Stages for calculating final income;
Original Income
+Cash benefits 
-Direct Taxes 
-Indirect Taxes 
+Benefits in kind 
= FINAL INCOME
TABLE 1.4.
SUMMARY OF THE EFFECTS OF TAXES AND BENEFITS
[Ouintile groups of households ranked by original income 
(Average per household Bottom 2nd 3rd. 4th. Top Average (
((pounds per year) 
(Original income 150 2620 6690 10440 17390 7380 1
( +Cash Benefits 2690 1970 890 680 540 1350 (
(Gross income 2830 4580 7580 10720 17920 8730 1
( - direct income 10 430 1430 2280 4100 1650 j
(Disposable income 2820 4160 6150 8440 13820 7080 j
[ - indirect taxes 740 1220 1710 2190 3050 1780 1
( +benefs.in kind 1140 1200 1360 1420 1450 1320 j
[Final income 3220 4130 5790 7670 12260 6620 1
SOURCES:
CSO Economic Trends, Nov. 1983 p.84
- Original income: is pre-tax income from earnings, 
investments and private pensions.
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The distribution of original income is highly uneven, with a 
clear concentration in the top fifth quintile group.
Original income depends on the time period and income unit used 
for its definition; there are many conceptual problems that make 
the use of original income very dependent on the assumptions 
made.
- Cash Transfers: are state pensions , unemployment 
benefit, child benefits, and all other transfers from 
the government.
Overall cash transfers are highly redistributive, the bottom 20% 
receives considerably more cash transfers than any other group.
- Direct Taxes: are income tax and national insurance 
contributions.
Direct taxes are meant to be very progressive, in that they are 
paid in relation to income. This is clear from Table 1.4. , the
bottom quint ile pay very little in the way of direct taxes, but 
in the next quintile the tax is already a tenth of gross income. 
It is important to bear in mind that there are some areas of 
income not included, such as capital gains, imputed rent of owner 
occupied houses, fringe benfits, home production, etc. The 
consideration of these may alter the distributive role of direct 
taxation.
- Indirect Taxes: are payments of local rates and 
estimates of payments of other indirect taxes such as 
VAT, duty on tobacco, etc.
Indirect taxes do not have an effect of reducing income 
inequality; their overall impact is very similar in both the 
lowest and the highest quintile groups.
- Benefits in Kind: are the imputed benefits from public 
expenditure on education, health, housing, etc.
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The average value of all benefits in kind tends to increase with 
income, but not in proportion to original income, therefore they 
tend to be progressive. However, the method of calculation of 
each benefit is open to question; for example in education, each 
person of school age is allocated an amount equal to the average 
expenditure on that type of education. In the case of the health 
service, estimates are made according to the average use 
according to age and sex, and the total expenditure is allocated 
based on the estimates (Atkinson, 1983) .
- Final Income: is the end result of these calculations. 
As a final result of the stages analysed. Table 1.4. suggests 
that the main redistributive impact of government intervention is 
from direct taxes and cash benefits. Overall, CSO studies show 
that redistribution does take place through government 
intervention.
FISCAL INCIDENCE STUDIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND LATIN 
AMERICA
Fiscal incidence studies in developing countries and 
Latin America have been reviewed through surveys of these types 
of studies prepared by Bird and De Wulf (1973) and De Wulf
(1975) .
Fiscal incidence has two components, tax and expenditure 
incidence; both are summarised in the net fiscal incidence. In 
relation to tax incidence De Wulf points out the existence of two 
different approaches, effective and formal approaches. For the 
former approach, there are some Latin American examples, which 
attempted to pinpoint the final locus or the resting place of the 
tax, taking in consideration all shifting of the tax. As to the 
formal approach, there are good examples in the case of India, 
which were concerned only with estimating the burden of taxation 
as it was "intended" by the legislator. In this case direct taxes 
are assumed not to be shifted, while indirect taxes are assumed 
to be fully shifted forward, burdening consumers' incomes.
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The general impression of the studies of tax incidence 
surveyed is that the tax system in developing countries tends to 
burden the income of the rich families relatively more then the 
incomes of the poor. While the majority of the studies suggest 
proportionality of the tax structure, there are only two 
exceptions (two countries out of the twenty-two surveyed). This 
conclusion is interesting, since the majority of the research 
surveyed by De Wulf suggested beforehand that tax structures are 
regressive in developing countries because they rely very heavily 
on indirect taxes.
Looking now to the other side of the equation, i.e. 
expenditure incidence, there also exist a few different 
approaches :
- Money flow approach: concentrates on the recipients of 
direct payments made by the government, without considering 
who ultimately benefits from the services supplied through 
public expenditure.
- Benefit approach : emphasizes the services rendered by
public expenditure and those who in the final analysis 
benefit from these services.
- The third approach considers how the transfer of purchasing 
power from private to public sector modifies the expenditure 
pattern in the economy, and how this affects factor and 
output prices.
- Finally, some studies concentrated on the urban rural 
classification, using money flow approach and benefit 
approach at the same time; in this sense very little shifting 
of benefits between sectors is allowed. Money spent on a 
certain region was assumed to benefit only that region.
Apart from the different approaches to analyse the 
distributional impact of government expenditure, it is necessary 
to spend some time reviewing the allocation procedures used in 
some specific areas, as this may cast light for similar steps to 
be undertaken in this research.
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- Expenditure pure "public goods" are those goods for which 
private allocation of resources is inefficient because they 
are comsumed jointly by all. Usually defense, justice, 
foreign affairs and general admistration are considerd in 
this category.
There is no agreed formula used for the allocation of 
this type of expenditure, although some alternatives seem to have 
set a trend. Several authors distribute this expenditure in 
proportion to income, since people with greater wealth and assets 
are the most benefited by governmental protection of their 
property. The other alternative is to assume that each family 
benefits equally from general government expenditure.
- For the analysis of specific benefits. De Wulf points out 
two important considerations:
i) Studies generally attempt to estimate the distribution of 
expenditure benefits in a given period of time, and it is 
usually forgotten that the benefits generated from that 
investment accrue in future years. The most common assumption 
here is that benefits received by a family from past 
investment expenditure are reasonably well approximated by 
allocating this year's capital expenditure.
ii) Government expenditure in some areas such as education, 
health and transportation not only provides benefits to 
identifiable individuals, but at the same time increases the 
overall efficiency of the economy. For example:
- Expenditure on health: In some studies, the expenditure 
on this area was treated in the same way as the expenditure 
on pure public goods. Others have used the income 
distribution of patients derived from a household sample 
survey.
- Expenditure on education: The expenditure on this area is 
allocated according to its beneficiaries, which in this 
case are clearly identifiable. The usual procedure was to 
estimate the average cost per student for the different 
types of education provided, and then to allocate the
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benefits.
- Expenditure in agricultural programmes: This was oftenly 
allocated according to agricultural incomes.
De wulf recognises that the conclusions of the studies 
are questionable, because of the many allocation and valuation 
choices that the researcher had to make at his own discretion. 
The general conclusion to appear from these studies is that upper 
income groups receive benefits from government expenditure which 
are a smaller share of their incomes than that of their lower- 
income counterparts (De Wulf 1975).
The final step of incidence studies is to determine the 
net fiscal incidence or budget incidence. This is obtained by 
summing algebraically both the tax (negative) and the expenditure 
(positive) incidence estimates for each of the sub groups.
The budget incidence studies clearly suggest, according 
to De Wulf, that the government budget has considerably 
redistributed post tax, and its expenditure favours the lower 
income class. In many cases, the upper income classes are net 
contributors to the government budget and lower income classes 
are net gainers.
In summary. De wulf concluded that the results of 
incidence studies are highly variable depending on the 
assumptions and the methodologies used; thus these results are 
only approximate. However, they show at least the broad direction 
of the distributional effects of budget policy, which is very 
useful for policy making, especially if referred to specific 
policy areas.
A recent contribution to fiscal incidence studies in 
Latin America is a case study for Colombia, sponsored by the 
World Bank, directed by Selowsky (1979). The study is 
concentrated on publicly provided services, of which consumption 
by individuals or households can be identified and measured; so 
public goods such as defence and justice are omitted. It measures 
the consumption of public services as a final commodity, rather
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than tracing the distributive effect when the. services are 
consumed as a factor of production. In practical terms the study 
he intends to identify the beneficiaries of publicly provided 
services, and to measure the subsidy received by household 
consumption of some of these services, and it attempts to explain 
the present distribution of consumption.
The methodological approach is rather different to the 
other studies reviewed, since this study obtained the data from a 
country-wide sample survey taken in 1974. The survey was made for 
the sole purpose of the study, instead of using an already 
existing survey. This has the advantage that it provides 
information on households not consuming particular services; from 
a policy point of view, it is fundamental to determine whether 
the present situation arises from a lack of supply of the service 
or from a demand phenomena governing the use of that supply. The 
sample was stratified in the first stage by urbanization (city 
size); this resulted from two hypotheses. The first hypothesis 
claimed that urbanization is highly correlated to the consumption 
of government services. The second hypothesis was that the higher 
the degree of urbanization , the more consumption varies across 
households, this variation being associated with the level of 
household income (Selowsky 1979). These hypotheses are very 
interesting since they represent phenomena common to many Latin 
American conutries. The survey was able to trace the 
beneficiaries of one third of total government expenditure. The 
data presented a breakdown by urban and rural population.
The results showed, overall, that income was more evenly 
distributed in rural areas and particularly at low levels of 
income. They also showed that the total subsidy per household for 
education and health was remarkably constant across income 
groups. This pattern disappeared when subsidies were broken down 
by type of education and by type of health provision. Subsidies 
for primary education were much larger for low income households, 
and those for higher education were much smaller. The constancy 
of the subsidy as expressed per household did not hold if 
expressed per capita, because household size was substantially 
larger in the poorest quintiles.
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FISCAL INCIDENCE STUDIES IN CHILE
The best known fiscal incidence study for Chile, was 
produced by Foxley, A^ninat and Arellano in 1979. This study is 
in practice more than a conventional fiscal incidence study, 
since they were also looking at some policies that are not 
commonly considered in this sort of study, (these are the land- 
reform programme and the nationalization of industrial
enterprises).
With regards to the distributive incidence of taxation, 
they started by analysing the Chilean tax structure, they found 
the following features:
- Low importance of taxation levied on income flows generated 
in the capital market, contrasting with the cumulative impact 
of taxation on labour income flows.
- Direct taxation collected directly from sources of 
earnings.
- Low taxation on independent economic activity.
The overall conclusion of direct tax incidence was that 
the pattern of such levies was progressive, with upper-income 
families bearing a higher burden than the poor.
The overall conclusion about the incidence of taxation 
was that the Chilean taxation structure was of a semi­
proportional nature: "Our findings indicate that the high degree 
of progressiveness reported in the case of direct taxation is 
almost completely compensated for by the regressiveness of 
indirect taxes, and this is especially so in the case of the 
lower and middle income classes"(Foxley et al, 1975:48).
The analysis of government expenditure incidence was 
focused on poverty groups, defined as the poorer 30% of the
10. Nationalization is the transfer of an industry from foreign ownership to state ownership.
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population. In the assessment of fiscal incidence of government 
expenditures on poverty groups, it was necessary to distinguish 
between two different types of programmes; progressive programmes 
and poverty programmes.
Progressive programmes improved the relative income 
position of the poor, although their absolute expenditure might 
still have been less than rich families; whereas poverty 
programmes implied not only improvement in the position of the 
poor but also more government expenditure on them than the 
average household.
This study concluded that around two-thirds of the total 
expenditures were involved in programmes increasing the relative 
income share of poverty groups, but this figure did not take 
account of the "leakages” from progressive programmes. On the 
other hand, around one third of public spending programmes were 
largely concentrated on poverty groups. Overall expenditure 
programmes in the social sectors were oriented to the poor in a 
larger proportion than public spending in directly economic 
activities. More than 80% of public expenditures in the social 
sector (public health, public education and housing programmes), 
had a progressive character as compared to only 49% in the 
economic activities.
The analysis of poverty programmes showed that one 
hundred of them, had an asset creating effect, in comparison to 
those which were used purely for consumption; these latter 
included mainly expenditures in social welfare, social security 
and public transport.
In summary, Foxley,Aninat and Arellano (1979) found that 
budget expenditure showed a progressive effect on income 
distribution, in that the position of poorer groups improved 
significantly at the expense of families in the higher income 
brackets. On the other hand, the tax system showed an allocation 
of the tax burden almost proportional to the structure of income 
distribution by brackets, with the exception of the highest 
bracket, whose contribution to financing state expenditure 
appears to be more than proportionate. Another element not
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considered previously was that the state obtained from the 
external sector a considerable margin for financing the 
redistributive process.
The latest two Chilean studies to be reviewed are not 
strictly fiscal incidence studies, in the sense that they do not 
cover the impact of all public expenditure and taxation; they 
rather concentrate on the redistributive effects of social 
expenditure itself, with some detail for each ministerial 
programme.
In the analysis of the redistributive role of social 
expenditure, Rodriguez (1984) attempted to assess the impact of 
the programmes in this area. For this task he designed a 3900 
household sample survey, representing grouped regions. He also 
used as a secondary source of information data obtained directly 
from the beneficiaries of certain social programmes. Therefore, 
the methodology used here is closer to the one used by Selowsky, 
needing fewer assumptions about the allocation of benefits 
overall. The poverty line was defined as twice the value of the 
minimal basket of goods as defined by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America (UN).
The results clearly suggested the "urban bias" of the 
majority of the social programmes, and the widespread difference 
in the regional coverage of certain programmes, especially in 
social security; this conclusion was consistent with that of 
Selowsky. He concluded that in relative terms poverty affected 
more families in rural areas, since 80% of rural families are 
poor. However, in absolute terms, there are more poor in urban 
areas. The most important cause of poverty was the unemployment 
of householders.
The objective of Yanez's studies (Yanez 1983 and Yanez 
and Aguilo 1986), was mainly the estimation of the social 
expenditure figures for the last fifteen years (1970-1985). The
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figures were compared with performance indicators to assess the
achievement of the programmes. He concluded that the level of
public social expenditure has been maintained throughout the
decade below the levels of 1970; only in 1980 was there a rise in
real terms. Among the programmes with major increases were social
f
assistance and the programmes related to the absortion of 
unemployment. On the other hand, housing was the programme to 
diminish most.
One of the main achievements of Yanez's work is the 
clear methodology he followed, especially in relation to the 
different items or programmes to be considered as a part of 
social expenditure. This is an important contribution since 
there has been some disagreement between government officials and 
researchers about the areas to be included in social 
expenditures; the majority of authors do not give a clear 
reference on this issue. Yanez provides a methodology 
transformining nominal figures into real ones; this is again a 
big contribution, since the official deflator underestimates 
inflation during part of the period. Finally, he also includes a 
methodology for consolidating transfers between and within 
ministries, this allows analysis of the "true" expenditure 
figures, avoiding double counting.
As the reader can observe, Yanez is an important 
contribution for the present research because he produced a 
methodology that helps in a crucial way to arrive at the regional 
expenditure figures, which is one of the aims of the present 
study. Therefore, the more technical aspects of Yanez's work are 
discussed in Chapter 4.
This section has helped us to understand what fiscal 
incidence studies are or, in other words, how the net effect of 
government intervention can be assessed. However, at the same 
time, it has also served to warn about the necessary assumptions 
and difficulties that may arise in undertaking such studies. It 
has also provided some interesting findings that may be tested in 
the Chilean case. Finally, it has introduced some insights into
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the methodological approaches for analysing government revenues 
and expenditures.
So far, we have been reviewing studies about the 
redistributive impact of government intervention, without 
considering the regional effects of these policies although some 
hints were given by Selowsky and Rodriguez; this issue will be 
addressed in the next section.
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1.5. DECENTRALIZATION AND THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF SOCIAL POLICIES
Introduction
As was mentioned in the Introduction, one of the main 
topics of this research is to analyse the discretion that the 
Chilean social services and its regional offices have in managing 
public decisions and resources, and to test to what extent the 
regional allocation of social expenditures is related to regional 
needs. Therefore, we need to concentrate on enquiring about the 
meaning of decentralization and how to obtain regional figures of 
social expenditures.
This section is divided into three parts. In the first 
part we discuss the meaning of the concept of decentralization, 
its alternative definitions, and its relation to resource 
allocation. In the second part we introduce some works related to 
the attempts to define a system of regional social accounting, 
which gives a regional dimension to the national accounts. These 
studies give a framework for the treatment of governmemt 
expenditure at a regional level, which is one of the tasks of 
this research. Finally, we describe the main findings of two 
Chilean works in this area.
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A. Decentralization and Social Policy 
A.I. Introduction to a Concept
At first inspection it may appear somewhat puzzling, to 
link in a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  m a n n e r  Social P o l i c y  and 
Decentralization. However, it must be said that in the last three 
decades there has been a constant critique of the performance of 
public and social services in meeting people's needs. Some 
critiques have come from the rigid structure of service delivery, 
the difficulty in adapting national programmes to local needs, 
the strictly sectoral approach (partial), and the gross 
inequalities in the levels of service provision. The solution 
that many authors have suggested for these problems is to 
decentralise social services ( H ) .
Let us start by clarifying that the literature uses the 
term of decentralization in a variety of ways, which that makes 
it appear as a very diffuse concept. Unfortunately this study is 
not free from these influences. In a broa^der definition, the 
concept of decentralization involves the delegation of power to 
lower levels in a territorial hierarchy (Smith, 1985). The 
present discussion approaches decentralization in its 
territorial dimension, rather than the decentralization of 
parastatal or non government organizations (Functional 
Decentralization) (Conyers, 1984).
Decentralization is a process which can take many 
specific forms throughout a continuum of different alternatives; 
there are at least four types of decentralization models defined 
in the literature (^^):
Centralized Decisionmaking : In a centralized government 
structure, the social sector programmes are financed and 
managed from the centre. Regional services are only able to 
make routine decisions with none or very little control over
11. For a more detailed bibliographical background of decentralization, see:
Borja, J. 1987; Cheema, G.S. and D. Rondinelli 1983; Conyers, D. 1984; and Smith, B. 1985.
12. This section draws on Winkler (1981).
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resource allocation.
Delegated Decisionmaking: Delegation is the transfer of 
g o v e r n m e n t  tasks or f u n c t i o n s  to s e m i - a u tonomus 
organizations such as public organizations and many regional 
development agencies, which may then receive public funding 
and are ultimately accountable to the government.
Deconcentrated Decisionmaking: Déconcentration refers to the 
transfer of administrative and management powers to lower 
levels within central government agencies. It most 
frequently takes the form of creating or expanding powers of 
regional directorates.
Déconcentration has usually received a pejorative meaning of 
simply not being fully decentralized. However, as Borja 
(1987) has pointed out, the decentralization process has 
elements of simple administrative déconcentration; 
therefore, the two concepts cannot be presented as antagonic 
values.
Decentralized Decisionmaking: Decentralization implies
that the institutions have autonomy to exercise their 
own authority, and have their own resources either raised 
by them or transferred to them for their own free use in all 
their programmes and functions (Borja, 1987).
Countries adopt decentralization policies for a number of 
reasons. The literature presents two main threads of discussion 
on decentralization.
From the point of view of economics, it is said that 
decentralization improves efficiency. It is claimed that a 
centralized government is incapable of managing all the levels of 
service delivery, and this results in high costs of provision 
(Winkler, 1989). It is also expected that decentralization 
enables service provision to be more responsive to local 
preferences, producing an efficiency gain, in that the same 
amount of resources generate a more highly valued output (Heald, 
1983) . This social efficiency gain can be considered as part of
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the public choices open to a citizen. In a decentralized system 
of social services a citizen must be able to express his 
preferences by "voting with the feet", which means having the 
opportunity to select the service delivery which matches his 
preferences.
Politically, decentralization is said to strengthen 
accountability, political skills and national integration. It 
brings government closer to the people (Smith, 1985). 
Redistribution of political power is rarely stated as an 
objective of decentralization, but democratization or inclusion 
of marginal groups in society is a frequently stated goal 
(Winkler, 1989).
The tremendous growth of state activities since the Second 
World War, their growing complexitiy and diversity of functions, 
has m a n y  t i m e s  p r o v o k e d  a real c r i s i s  of p o l i t i c a l  
representativeness; the natural channels of participation are 
insufficient or not able to incorporate other dimensions. As a 
result of this situation there is a growing demand for political 
participation from the base (Borja, 1985). Therefore, many 
governments have resorted to the decentralization of services in 
order to produce a greater participation of the public.
The existence of large inequalities in the provision of 
public services, which appear in the form of territorial 
disequilibriums, has also made a way for pressing to obtain 
regional power for developing policies to redress these 
tendencies.
A.2. Decentralization and Resource Allocation
While decentralization is an important concept in terms of 
the management of social services, it can be too broad to have a 
practical meaning in terms of the actual allocation of resources 
from the national point of view. Therefore, it is necessary to 
spend some time discussing some concepts used in this regard.
Firstly, it is important to clarify what the central 
government is trying to achieve through the central provision to
60
regional services. On the one hand, if the government is 
concerned with the treatment of areas and the desired aim is that 
each area should have an equal standard of service, then a 
situation exists in which territorial equity is the desired 
objective. On the other hand, if government is concerned with 
the treatment of individuals, the desired objective is 
interpersonal equity.
In the case of Territorial Eauitv. Heald (1983) has 
distinguished between the different points of view that this 
concept may have. If the focus is upon actual outcomes, 
territorial equity requires that there are actually equal 
standards of provision in all areas. If, however, the focus is 
upon potential outcomes, territorial equality requires that there 
might be equal standards of provision. In this case local choices 
determine whether the standards are in fact equal; some 
communities prefer to spend more in some programmes and le^s in 
others, whereas, in the former case equal standard of provision 
should be entrusted.
It should be noted that if the specified objective is in 
terms of actual outcomes, it is immediately clear that this is an 
extremely centralist concept. The territorial equity objective 
defined in terms of potential outcomes means that the preferences 
and perceptions of need of the centre and the locality both 
count. This situation may provoke a set of intergovernmental 
tensions as a result of contrasting interests.
It is possible to achieve territorial equity whilst 
maintaining local autonomv. According to Heald (1983, 244),
"equalization grants have developed as a policy response to the 
problem of reconciling decentralization with territorial equity". 
The centre can obtain territorial equity through the payment of 
equalization grants, which can be designed to eliminate the 
effects of low resources and high needs.
Grants from central governments to regions or other 
subnational levels can be categorised in a variety of ways. An 
important distinction must be made between specific grants and 
general or block grants (Smith, 1985):
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Specific grants are related to particular services and are 
calculated according to the expenditure incurred on a 
particular function; this means that they are earmarked 
funds. The revenue for such a source may only be used for 
the function specified, and often there are strings 
attached.
General or block grants can be spent in any of the functions 
that a subnational level of government is legally empowered 
to perform.
Another distinction can be made depending on the objective 
for which grants were created; Smith (1985) suggests three 
alternative criterions:
Service: Grants for education, health, etc.
Specific purpose: For example, grants for meeting special
needs.
Basis of distribution: Grants can be distributed according 
to different criteria such as percentage of local authority 
expenditure or units of benefits supplied.
The conventional wisdom suggests that as subnational 
governments are more dependent on central financial allocations, 
the whole system becomes more centralized. However, as Smith 
(1985;p.115) has suggested "there is a sense in which grants 
strengthen decentralised governments by enabling them to perform 
functions that they would otherwise be unable to perform". The 
same author has mentioned that there appears to be a widespread 
move away from specific grants to block or general grants; this 
provides subnational governments with more freedom in deciding 
how to spend the money. Examples of these types of grant 
allocations can be found in the British National Health Service 
and the Rate Support Grant.
Finally, a further, but related, concept may help to judge 
the fairness of the allocations. The concept of Territorial 
Justice has been introduced as the territorial dimension of
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social justice; this states that the most appropiate distribution 
of resources between areas must be "to each area* according to 
the needs of the population of that area" (Davies, 1968; 16). 
The statistical condition of territorial justice, was defined by 
Davies (1968, p.39) as "a situtation in which there is a perfect 
positive correlation between indices of standards of provision 
and the index measuring the relative needs of each area for the 
service, the relative inequality of the standards indices being 
the same as that of the index of relative needs".
The purpose of introducing this last concept is not to 
confuse the reader, but to introduce him to an issue that will 
recur throughout the entire research. As stated in Chapter 3, one 
of the aims of this study is to assess to what extent the 
regional allocation of social expenditures is related to the 
regional need, in other words, to what extent it can be said that 
the regional impact of social policies in Chile corresponds to a 
case of territorial justice.
A.3. Decentralization in Latin America
It seems convenient to conclude this section by presenting a 
brief description of the way in which Latin American countries 
have approached the problem of decentralization.
The present bureaucratic structure of Latin America has been 
partially inherited from the colonial times. During this period 
centralization was functional to the interests of the Spanish 
crown. After independence, many countries maintained the same 
government structures, because as new emerging states it was 
necessary to consolidate the territorial unity of the country; 
therefore centralisation was still a useful instrument.
During present times (^^), many Latin American countries 
have adopted national decentralization programmes to overcome the 
long existing over-centralization trends of the continent. 
However, it must be noted that the term decentralization has had
13. This section draws from an analysis of the Latin American process of decentralization prepared by R. 
Harris (1983).
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a variety of meanings. It has frequently been related to the 
efforts to deconcentrate decision making from the central 
headquarters of central government ministries to their field 
offices. According to Harris (1983), the term has also been used 
for the establishment of a relatively autonomous public 
organization in specific functional areas (decentralized 
agencies), or for the transfer of public enterprises to private 
ownership and control (often refered to as "debureaucratization” 
or privatization).
The Latin American bureaucracies (suffer at the time of this 
research) from a lack of coordination between state agencies and 
from a frequent overlap between them and the national government. 
To o v e r c o m e  these flaws some g o v e r n m e n t s  c a l l e d  for 
administrative reforms emphazising "sectoralization", grouping 
and coordination of agencies by related functions and 
"regionalization", the coordination of all government agencies 
operating within a designated geographical area (Harris, 1983).
The same author has argued that sectoralization and 
regionalization were both centralizing reforms, since they 
attempted to coordinate or consolidate diverse governmental 
agencies operating in various functional sectors or geographical 
regions. It is usually claimed that regionalization means 
decentra lizaton, but in practical terms the only form of 
decentralization present in such a case is déconcentration, since 
it involves a better coordination of the regional field officers 
of the central ministries (^^). Nevertheless, the net effect of 
these reforms tends to result in a greater centralization since 
central government through its field offices coordinates and 
controlc-s some previously uncoordinated agencies.
The evidence quoted by Harris (1983), shows that, despite 
the significant decentralization efforts made by Brazil, Mexico 
and Venezuela, many of the attempts at deconcentrating government 
have failed due to "unpredicted" factors, such as the lack of 
confidence in the ability of officials in the regions, the
14. In this aspect there is coincidence between Harris and Borja who both argue that déconcentration, 
although not the same as decentralization, may lead to decentralization.
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slowness of many central governmental agencies and the lack of 
regional support, as in the Argentinian case of "forced 
decentralization".
In sum, it must to be said that decentralization and 
centralization tendencies coexist despite the important efforts 
to overcome the latter.
Despite the limitations of the decentralization process in 
Latin America, some positive results can be mentioned;
Firstly, many distant regions have obtained better access 
to central government resources and institutions.
Secondly, the administrative and technical capability of
regional and local organizations have improved.
Thirdly; new organizations have been established at
regional and local levels to plan and manage development
(IS).
B. Regional Social Accounting
In the early 1960 *s, there was much discussion on the 
validity of designing accounts at the sub-national level, since 
the impossibility of applying the national accounts system to the 
local level was clearly recognised. The intention was to design 
an accounting system to help the analysis of policy issues at a 
regional level.
One of the earliest works in this area was produced by 
Stone in 1960 (P.A. Stone 1961) ; he provided estmates of the
regional accounts for the U.K. at aggregate levels for
consumption, production and accumulation in each region, as well 
as the region's account with the central government. Stone 
treated the public sector in the following manner: consuming and 
accumulating functions of the central government were abstracted 
from the regions in which they were placed and were accorded the
15. The decentralization process of Chile is discussed in section 2.4.
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position of a separate region, whereas government producing 
activities were included with all other forms of production in 
the region concerned. The armed forces were entirely removed from 
the regions and were entered on a separate government account.
Stone did not consider some central government expenditures 
which form part of the regional domestic expenditures, such as 
schools, hospitals, etc; this is one of the main weaknesses of 
his work. In fact his contribution is more as a way to use the 
existing data, rather than as a complete new system of regional 
accounting.
Although various parts of the G.D.P. were estimated by 
Stone, the work of Woodward (1970), was the first attempt to 
disaggregate the majority of the components of regional G.D.P.
The purpose of Woodward was two-fold, to supply an estimate 
of regional accounts for the U.K., and to provide some 
suggestions for improvements in the statistical sources. He 
distributed the components of the G.D.P. and domestic expenditure 
shown in the National Accounts Blue Book. One important 
achievement of Woodward's book is the consideration of the "net 
beneficial expenditure" by the public sector, which corresponds 
to the regional division of the Blue Book public sector combined 
current and capital account. Here he excluded all the 
expenditures which do not directly benefit the residents of the 
region; this includes most of the central government current 
expenditure, important parts of its capital expenditure, and all 
military expenditure in goods and services. Many items of capital 
expenditure were omitted as well, leaving in the regional account 
only those items related to environmental and social services, 
such as schools, hospitals, sewerage and roads; he also included 
capital expenditure on universities. All these exclusions 
produced a rather narrow definition of public expenditure in the 
regional context. For example, the exclusion of capital 
expenditure on housing seems to bias the figures, as some regions 
are dependent on the provision of housing by the public sector. 
His final figures were a result of the available data and data 
generated by various proxy methods, some of which included strong 
assumptions.
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An alternative approach that avoids many of the problems 
described earlier was developed by The North Region Strategy 
Team, under the direction of J. Short. This work was part of a 
broader work in the United Kingdom.
The emergence of the regional strategies in the early 1970*s 
provided a new impetus for regional data; these strategies were 
concentrated on the public sector. Some of the strategies such as 
the West Scotland Plan and the Strategic Plan for the North West 
attempted to provide data on public expenditure relating to their 
regions, but their approach made no distinction between the use 
of public expenditure as a contributor to gross regional product 
on the one hand, and supplying services on the other.
Public expenditure at a regional level was best approached 
by the North Region Strategy Team (NRST) They used the annual 
review of public expenditure made by the government (Public 
Expenditure Survey Committee PESO). They considered PESO as a 
framework for their report because:
”It provides the only systematic and comprehensive method 
available for classifying public expenditure on a consistent 
programme-by-programme basis, both over time and across all 
spending authorities" (NRST 1976, 8).
One of the key features of the NRST classification was the 
distinction made between: a) public expenditure made in a region 
supplying the services, which were of benefit to the residents of 
the region rather than the nation as a whole (expenditure made 
"in and for " a region or regionally relevant expenditure); and 
b) expenditures which were made " in " a region and contributed 
to gross regional expenditure. In other words, expenditure in a 
region was an analysis of total public expenditure, while the 
analysis of expenditure "in and for" the region covered that part 
of total public expenditure which was relevant only to the region 
which directly benefited in social welfare terms. According to 
Short (1978), for the period 1970-74, regionally relevant public 
expenditure accounted for 68% of total public expenditure; he 
also showed that Scotland received 92.3 pounds sterling per 
capita more of regionally relevant public expenditure than the
67
average of the country, whereas West Midlands received 73.6 
pounds sterling less than the average.
C. Regional Effects of Public Policies
In this final part of the bibliographical review, it is 
important to refer to two works which are not directly related to 
those of the previous section. Both have a comprehensive 
approach, which is closer to the purpose of this research. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that because of some constraints 
in their methodologies the results are not comparable to the 
outcomes of this research.
One study of the regional effects of fiscal policy in Chile 
was undertaken by Boisier (1982). It had the intention of 
demonstrating the lack of regional neutrality of the fiscal 
policies in Chile, and the inconsistency between fiscal policy 
and the national strategy for regional development. In practical 
terms, it was an attempt to undertake a fiscal incidence study at 
a regional level.
Boisier started by analysing the relationship between 
fiscal revenue and expenditure per region, showing that there was 
a large variability between regions in the amount contributed to 
the fiscal revenue and the amount spent on them; some regions 
obtained as much as three times their contribution to the public 
fisc from government expenditures, whereas others obtained from 
the government only one quarter of their contribution to it. He 
then constructed an index, to determine which regions were 
subsidised from the process of government intervention. The 
outcome is very clear: only two regions are benefited in net 
terms from the fiscal process; the rest were made worse off, 
especially the Valparaiso region, which encompasses the main 
port, and the majority of the import taxes re concentrated there.
The differences in the regional tax burden originated mainly 
in their intersectoral composition of economic activity; thus 
even a "homogeneous or neutral" tax policy induces a
differential impact in each region. The regional tax burden is
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mainly determined by the proportion of the value added tax in 
relation to total tax revenue. This proportion is variable 
depending on the size of the economic sectors.
Boisier's conclusions follow straightfowardly from the 
preceding arguments:
- Chilean fiscal policy is not neutral, from the regional 
point of view.
- Therefore, fiscal policy does not accord with the regional 
development policy. This states that the services and social 
benefits given by the government should be similar in the 
different regions and geographical areas of the country.
- The tax policy is regressive in inter-regional terms, since 
the tax burden for the richest region is similar to the 
national average, but the richest region receives more than 
the average in public expenditures.
The main constraints of Boisier *s work is that he took the 
regional tax and expenditure figures just as they appeared in 
the Treasury accounts (Tesoreria). This information was gathered 
by the Tesoreria's field offices with a clear "in a region" 
criteria; this means that it did not consider really who is 
actually paying the taxes but where from the taxes are payed. In 
the case of the Valparaiso region this was be a serious flaw, in 
that it has the two main ports of the country and, therefore, the 
majority of the import duties were registered in that region, but 
those imports were considered for the whole country and not for 
that single region; for this reason the fiscal revenue arising 
from those taxes should have been allocated to all regions by a 
specific criteria. A similar situation can be said to have 
arisen in relation to government expenditures, since most of them 
were allocated in Santiago (the capital city), because most 
ministries had their supplies centre in the capital, but their 
purchases were distributed throughout the country.
A second study of regional inequalities in social welfare in 
Chile has been carried out by Raczynski (1986) . Her study was
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based on the (publicly) available information of the regional 
expenditures provided by the ministeries. This has two 
drawbacks:
i. The information is limited only to those areas on which the 
social ministeries produced regional information of their 
expenditures. For example, in the case of the Ministry of 
Health, it included only the expenditures on the National System 
of Health Services (only two thirds of the total sectoral 
expenditures), in the case of Social Security, there were no 
regional estimates at all. This means that overall Rackzynski's 
social expenditure figures covered only 26% of the total 
expenditure figures estimated in the present research.
ii. An additional constraint is related to the fact that each 
ministry prepared their estimates of regional expenditures 
according to their own methodology. This means that the figures 
produced were not comparable between ministeries.
iii. Finally, the time periods covered on these series are 
different.
Raczynski (1986) points out that public expenditures had not 
benefited equally each of the social sectors nor each of the 
Chilean regions (^^). Although she acknowledges that there has 
been a decrease in health inequalities, measured in terms of 
infant mortality rates, she claims that there are important 
inequalities in secondary education. With regards to housing, 
she points out that housing expenditures had benefited mostly the 
extreme regions of the country (extreme north and south), but not 
the regions that had initially a worse situation in this area.
The study concludes by stating that the regional 
developmental efforts of the country from 1930 to 1973 were based 
on a strategy led by a planning state aimed at substituting 
imports ; this situation contributed to the concentration of 
economics and population resources in the big cities, helping to
16. Raczynski*s sectoral conclusions, for health, education, and housing are be considered in each relevant 
chapter.
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increase more the regional inequalities in levels of living. 
Although she does give some credit to the regionalization process 
in which the country was involved since 1975, she argues that 
central government kept its vertical control of the regions and 
did not transfer authority to them; therefore, she argues that 
there was a case for déconcentration of central government to 
field regional offices but not for real decentralization. 
Raczynski also claims that the regionalization process has been 
governed by a policy of National Security, privileging the 
extreme border regions.
Although Raczynski*s work does provide a very valuable 
insight into the theme of regional inequalities in Chile, there 
are some constraints in her data that may affect some of her 
conclusions. We expect through this research to be able to 
produce more accurate estimates of the regional social 
expenditures and difcuss some of the issues raised by her.
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CHAPTER TWO;
THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL PLANNING IN CHILE
2.1. REVIEW OF CHILEAN SOCIAL POLICIES
A. Early Social Policies
Prior to the independence of the country (1810) there was no 
collective effort for the prevention or alleviation of poverty. 
However, there were some isolated attempts that showed concern 
for social issues; the Catholic Church promoted from the outset 
an equal treatment of the native Chileans (aborigènes), 
providing them with education and culture.
The date of Chilean National Independence coincides 
basically with the peak of the Industrial Revolution in Europe. 
The period is characterised by the appearence of the urban wage 
earner, who worked under severe adverse circumstances and later 
promoted the social laws in Europe, starting with the Poor Laws 
in Britain.
By the end of the Nineteenth Century, Chile suffered the 
effects of its own Industrial Revolution. In contrast with other 
Latin American countries, Chile had an early industrialization 
process. The two wars in which Chile was involved during that 
century, forced the rural peasant to move from the country side 
to the battle fields through the cities, and many of them never 
returned to the fields but were overwhelmed by the new discovery 
of the city. On the other hand, the rapid development of the 
Nitrate Industry in the north of the country promoted urban 
concentrations and a growth in the proletariate of the labour 
force. Under these circumstances, the urban population rose from 
27% in 1875 to 38% in 1890. The u r b a n i z a t i o n  and 
industrialization processes contributed in an important way to 
the development of the services (Lavin 1987).
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B. The "Social Problem"
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Chile had a large 
proportion of industrial urban w o r k e r s ,i .e ., an early 
proletariat, whose working conditions were very bad. The main 
social problems were those related to the working conditions and 
labour organization. There were also problems involving the 
family environment, such as inadequate housing facilities, lack 
of hygiene, malnutrition and illiteracy. This period came to be 
referred to in Chile as the "social problem", and it marks the 
begining of the social legislation of the country.
The only institutions which provided social support were 
some workers cooperatives and associations, similar to the 
British Friendly Societies. However, at this time the political 
parties began to endorse the social demands of the workers.
The election of Alessandri in 1924, marked the begining of 
state legislation in the social sector.
The constitution of the Welfare State and the Middle class
In the period from 1932 to 1973 a variety of new social 
institutions and services were created, the Labour code (1931), 
the Popular housing fund (1936), the National Health Service 
(1952), The Medical Service for Employees, the National Board for 
School Meals (1953). At the same time, there was an important 
increase in the number of workers covered by pension funds. The 
result of this "institutionalization" of the welfare state was a 
huge increase in the public social expenditures during the 
period,which rose more than 10 times in real terms and almost 
four times as a percentage of the G.N.P.
However, the important increases in terms of benefits and 
beneficiaries of social expenditure did not favour equally the 
various sectors of the population and ended being financed in 
an inflationary way. According to Arellano (1985) the increases 
in social expenditures were a result of the workers demands and 
pressure groups, which produced a very complicated legislation 
with a variety of benefits and contributions, according to the
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type of work performed or the area of economic activity. There 
are many examples,to cite two such instances: in the area of 
social security, family allowances were established in 1937 for 
private employees, but only in 1953 for blue collar workers; the 
minimum wage for the workers of the Nitrate Industry was created 
in 1934, but was made extensive to all industrial workers only 
in 1956.
TABLE 2.1.
THE EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURE
1935 - 1981
YEAR EXPENDITURE
Thous. of Mill.(1981) As % 1
1935 12.3 5.2
1945 23.3 8.0
1955 55.1 14.9
1961 85.4 17.0
1965 124.2 20.0
1970 206.9 19.9
1975 153.2 18.3
1981 202.1 14.3
SOURCE: Arellano (1985).
By the end of this period, under the government of the 
Christian Democratic Party (1964-70), the social expenditure 
reached its peak as 20% of the G.N.P. For the first time in 
history the government stated a clear social policy, known as the 
"Redistributive Strategy", which was a global proposal for the 
social sector in which the state took an important role 
(Lavin,1987). One of the main aspects of the strategy was to 
incorporate important groups of the population which had not been 
assimilated into the "formal" welfare institutions, like the 
peasants and the urban poor. Nevertheless, despite this good 
intention, it was not possible to stop the relative improvement 
of the middle class (Arellano, 1985).
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The redistributive strategy of the late 1960*s turned into 
a more radical redistributive strategy in the early 1970's. The 
political programme of the Popular Unity Government stated from 
the outset that it was necessary to conduct the country into a 
transformation process to lead it to a socialist economy 
(Martner, 1971). The main areas of interest were not only social 
policy goals, but also the transformation of the Chilean economy 
into an economy less dependent and less monopolistic; this 
implied the nationalization of the main foreign industries 
operating in the country, state control of the banks, and 
serious attempts to achieve a better distribution of income and 
wealth.
In relation to social policies and their organization, an 
important achievement of the period was the elimination of the 
legal discriminations between blue and white collar workers in 
the access of each to social services. An additional interesting 
contribution was the creation of planning and budgeting offices 
in the Ministries of Education and Health.
Selectivity and technicality in Welfare: The retreat of the
state.
At the end of 1973, Chile experienced a coup d*etat, by 
which the Socialist Government was overthrown and a military 
Junta took over. In 1974 the new military government made a 
study of poverty named "The map of extreme poverty", which showed 
that an important proportion of the poor did not benefit from 
the social programmes. Therefore, the government with its neo 
classical economic policy began to restructure the universal 
programmes. In 1978 a universal means test (ficha C.A.S.) was 
introduced.
The move towards a selective social policy was now 
accompanied by a policy of restricting social expenditure, which 
in 1987 was 19% of G.N.P. . At the same time, a number of 
changes in the legislation were introduced, the aim being now to 
eliminate the "artificial" barriers of the social legislation and
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to decrease discrimination favouring the different pressure 
groups.
The principal aspects of this new legislation are reviewed 
in the next section.
C. Present Social Policies
The social policies of the Military Government are placed in 
the context of a neo-classical economic policy, which promotes 
economic growth and stability with a limited participation of the 
state.
According to ODEPLAN Social Reports (1982, 1983), the
Chilean Social policies are based on the "Principle of 
Subsidiarity". This means that larger institutions (i.e. The 
State) should intervene only when the common good cannot be 
properly attended to through the activities of smaller 
institutions. In other words, each individual should freely 
choose his own aims and objectives in life, if these are not 
contrary to the public good. However, in conditions of poverty 
the individual is not able to choose, therefore a subsidiary 
society needs a policy for equality of opportunity.
Equality of opportunity is the final aim in social 
development, it implies equalizing opportunities from "below to 
above", through a social net of programmes and benefits. This net 
will not allow people to be below the minimun established 
(ODEPLAN 1982).
The principles are defined from the proposal of the 
government to eliminate extreme poverty and promote equality of 
opportunity.
The main principles in relation to social policies are (^):
1.
According to: Informes Sociales - ODEPLAN 1982 1986.
76
1.- To achieve a high and sustained level of economic 
development:
Social development must be harmonious with economic 
development, this is the only alternative for eliminating 
poverty in the long term.
It is impossible to approach social development without 
economic development, if the latter does not happen only 
poverty will be distributed.
2.- Subsidiarity:
The state must intervene only in the areas in which the 
private sector is not interested; this is specially relevant 
for the alleviation of poverty and the promotion of equal 
opportunities.
3.- Subsidy and subvention:
The state will transfer a grant in money or in kind to 
people living under special social circumstances. There are 
two alternatives:
- Subsidy : A grant of money transfered to a specific 
individual. Example: Unemployment subsidy.
- Subvention: A grant of money transfered to an institution 
to provide for a service. Example:Educational subventions.
4.- Progressiveness (Targeting):
State help should reach the poor, avoiding spillovers to 
other groups of the population. Social policies should be 
targeted on the poor.
The main elements of the strategy are the following 
(ODEPLAN,1982):
1.- Direct Subsidies (^):
Subsidies must have known beneficiaries and known benefits.
2. In this case the word "subsidies", is used as an equivalent meaning to the wording "social programmes". 
The word subsidies, is used here by ODEPLAN to stress that these programmes involve no costs for the 
beneficiaries, i.e., they are a free state transfer to them.
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this is in contrast to indirect subsidies,which do not define 
specific beneficiaries,such as a price subsidization of 
bread.
2.- Progressive subsidies:
Subsidies should be greater for those in poorer conditions. 
Subsidies are regressive when they benefit rich families.
To achieve the aim of targeting the social subsidies on the 
poor, the government designed a national means test, which 
consists of a survey that asks each poor family about their 
living conditions - housing, sewerage, overcrowding, 
occupation, income and wealth. With this information an index 
is calculated to stratify the population and therefore 
determine if they are or are not potential beneficiaries of 
state help.
3.- Decentralized subsidies:
Subsidies should be decentralised in order to offer a benefit 
closer to local needs and resources. Under the heading of 
decentralization, ODEPLAN (1982) emphasizes an efficiency 
element. Through decentralization the government attempts to 
reach people with higher levels of benefits, as bureaucracy 
and intermediaries will diminish.
4.- Integral Subsidies:
Subsidies should be linked since poverty is a multifactorial 
phenomenon, therefore it is important to attack 
simultaneously all the elements causing poverty.
5.- Rationalize the administration of social services
A further element is included in the 1986 Social Report 
(ODEPLAN 1986). It is claimed that the quantity and the 
quality of the programmes and services will also depend on 
the costs and procedures for producing them. For this reason 
it is necessary to operate with low costs of administration 
and efficiency in the use of resources. Coordination between 
services should also be achieved.
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In summary, the present Chilean social policy is a selective 
strategy intended to achieve efficiency in eliminating extreme 
poverty. Therefore, it is not a universal welfare state but 
corresponds more closely to a Basic Needs strategy.
The selectivity and targeting aims of the Chilean social 
strategy appear as a move to a residualist model of welfare, with 
a strong commitment to selectivist forms of welfare provision, 
supplemented, where necessary, by universalist services (Pinker, 
1971). This model fits the neo-liberal policies adopted by the 
governent. In contrast to other Latin American countries, Chile 
did have an incipient institutional model of welfare, with an 
important disposition for universal forms of welfare provision 
and equality. Therefore, what we are seeing now is a retreat of 
state finance in the social sector, but the country is still 
trying to maintain (or even improve) the traditional forms of 
welfare provision for the poor. For the middle class, the state 
is basically regulating the provision of welfare to other 
institutions like the private sector. To some extent the 
evolution of the Chilean social policies are similar to those of 
Britain after the introduction of the neo-classical model.
It is difficult to qualify Chile under one of the social 
planning models described earlier. According to ODEPLAN there is 
an important aim of achieving coordination between social 
services, but this seems to be a desire more than a reality. As 
we will describe in the next section, there are no specific 
institutions performing this task exept for ad hoc meetings; 
therefore it is not possible to envisage Social planning as 
social service planning.
At the same time, the government has stated that social 
policies should be linked to economic ones and that there is no 
social development unless there is an economic one. This gives 
an idea of social developmental planning, since the two areas 
should be considered simultaneously. However, in practice there 
is usually a primacy of economic aims over social ones.
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2.2. PLANNING AND SOCIAL PLANNING IN CHILE
Early attempts at planning in Chile may be traced to the late 
thirties. Two elements interacted in the creation of the 
Corporation for Production (CORFO) in 1939, the earthquake of 
January, that year, and the election of the Popular Front 
(united front of the left). These two elements helped in the 
creation of solidarity consciousness and an environment for state 
intervention.
The depression of the thirties also helped to convince 
pressure groups of the need to be less dependent upon external 
conditions. As a result, the state assumed a more active role in 
the organization of the national economy. Under these 
circumstances, one of the first tasks of CORFO was the prepartion 
of a general plan to promote production (1939), its main purpose 
being to raise the living standards of the population.
Despite efforts of CORFO, it was impossible to formulate a 
plan dwe to data constraints and the lack of adequate 
professionals (Contreras, 1971). Therefore by 1943, one of the 
main objectives of the institution was to research into 
population and national income.
The Department of Planning and Studies was created in 1950, 
and was commissioned to elaborate the Ten-Year Plan (1961-1970). 
The plan was to be coordinated by a new institution: the
Corporation for Economic Programming and Reconstruction (COPERE), 
which linked CORFO with other ministries,such as Finance, Public 
Works,and Economic Affairs. Nevertheless, attempts to produce a 
formal planning scheme failed again. In contrast to the Plan to 
promote production, the main cause of failure did not lie in 
administrative problems, such us data constraints, but in the 
governmet's lack of conviction in planning. In fact, the plan did 
not influence much, and national policies continued to be 
dominated by short term considerations (Sunkel, 1969). The plan 
was used mainly as an instrument to obtain international funding, 
as this was a requirement for obtaining economic aid. Perhaps,
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one of its major achievements was to demonstrate for the first 
time that a public institution was capable of formulati^ng a 
plan.
Although the achievements of the planning initiatives were 
not appreciated by the people, the efforts of CORFO helped to 
create a more systematic approach to decision making in the 
public sector. The presidential election of 1964 revealed that 
there existed clear consensus in all the political parties 
concerning the necessity to establish an institution with clear 
tasks in the area of planning.
The government of the Christian Democrats began the study of 
a bill for the creation of a National Planning Office (ODEPLAN), 
which was presented to Parliament in 1967. The bill suffered some 
important changes before approval; ODEPLAN lost a mandatory right 
to control the execution of the plans as well as control over its 
budget. In other words, the Ministry of Finance held primacy over 
the new planning institution. In fact, as a former minister of 
Finance acknowledged (Molina, 1972) there has been a tradition 
in Chile by which the Ministry of Finance has the main 
responsibility in formulating and applying the economic policy. 
He goes further to mention that sectoral planning offices will 
have only an advisory role in decision management unless the 
minister is a charismatic person who can influence the Minister 
of Finance.
In contrast to previous governments, the Christian Democrats 
had a clear commitment to planning, both in national and in 
regional terms. According to their ideology they wanted to 
create more popular participation and social welfare. As a result 
of this, planning was viewed as an "innovative" tool to 
legitimize the new social objectives and as an alternative means 
to translate the general value propositions into institutional 
arrangements (Friedmann,1966). However, in practice it was 
apparent that the planners basically followed the traditional 
Rational Comprehensive Model of planning, and therefore there was 
a mismatch between the ideology and the proposals developed from 
this ideology,and the practical policies and strategies of the
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government. The same situation arose in regional planning-to 
solve the ” the regional problem" was attempted on a national 
scale, where interesting national proposals existed without 
clear operational references for each region.
During the period of the socialist government (1970-1973), 
the basic aims and proposals of the planning system were 
maintained, although its rhetoric changed to a socialist one 
proposing areas of social property. The government tried to make 
planning a more participatory task by publishing the National 
Plan of the Economy (1971-76) in a popular edition for 
discussion. Nevertheless, the efforts proved insufficient and the 
activity continued to be an elitist one, dominated by qualified 
professionals.
Although the country was one of the first in Latin America to 
establish a National Planning Office at a Ministerial level, the 
outcome of many years of work is still doubtful; the majority of 
the National Development Plans are kept in different libraries 
where they are hardly ever consulted. The most surprising feature 
of the plans is that, despite the enormous ideological 
differences separating the past three governments, they include, 
in broad terms, similar policies. This seems to be a clear 
reflection of the scant relevance that national planning has 
had (3).
The military government has followed the same planning 
pattern and style as the previous governments. It prepared 
enourmous plans, including sections for each area of the economy 
and each region. On each of these sections, it included a 
diagnosis, a description of general and specific policies, 
actions and goals. However, these were prepared in the same way 
as previous governments, despite important ideological 
differences. From the early 1980*s many of the plans made in the 
earlier years are now "under revision", an elegant name for 
dismissal. Since 1979 there has been a clear change in direction: 
the economic liberalization of the country is evident, and
3. Boisier (1978) reaches a similar conclusion with regards to regional plans.
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therefore it is no longer possible to match an "interventionist” 
type of planning with the neo-liberal economic policy. In fact, 
according to the description of the planning styles made in the 
previous chapter, the country passed through at least three of 
the four planning styles reviewed for Latin America, from a 
market partially reformed, to a regulated market which was almost 
centrally planned, and then to a free market, in which the state 
has a subsidiary role in the allocation of resources.
There are three new planning instruments in this period that 
are worthy of explanation:
1. The abandonment of the National Development Plans, produced a 
gap in the field of policies at a national level. This gap is 
filled from 1979 with the Socio-economic Programme, which is a 
general description of the sectoral policy priorities of the 
government for a couple of years, which are reassessed (^ ) after 
each year. These Socio-economic Programmes only provide policies 
at a ministerial level, there are no general policy statements 
about government aims.
2. There is a change in regional planning, too. The Regional 
Plans no longer define areas of development, growth poles, areas 
of selective migration, etc. Instead they are a crude diagnosis 
of the socioecnomic regional situation, together with a list of 
projects that are meant to alleviate the problems analyzed in the 
diagnosis. Despite the practical approach of the new regional 
plans, it is very difficult to regard them as such, considering 
that the structure of the plans is defined centrally, and that 
the regions have no discretion on it. At the same time most of 
the statistical information to be used in the diagnosis was also 
provided centrally. Therefore, the major achievement of the 
regional plan, as it was with the first attempts at planning in 
Chile, is their capacity to motivate regional bureaucrats and 
help them to understand their role as planners. As for the 
practical results of the plans, the regional diagnosis usually 
comprised issues unfamiliar to the centre,and yet it has to be 
acknowledged that most of the projects identified and listed on
4. Rolled-over.
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the plan, are not a result of it, but were commonly identified 
before the plan.
3. Finally, the Ministerial Programmes are prepared annually by 
ODEPLAN in conjunction with each ministry. These programmes 
comprise the most relevant tasks to be undertaken during the 
following year. These tasks do not include normal or current 
activities, and cannot involve additional expenditures. Their 
utility lies in that state clear tasks which must be completed 
before ad deadline. They remain the only planning instrument of 
the government to be periodically assesed and also monitored 
exclusively by specific personnel. Therefore, the ministerial 
programmes can be described as the only planning procedure of 
real use in the last eight years.
In the present organization of the country, there is no 
official body assigned to Social Planning as such. In ODEPLAN, 
the sectoralists of the planning department work in conjunction 
with the ministries to which they are assigned. But coordination 
between them is not part of their current activities, and 
consists only of ad hoc meetings to deal with specific problems. 
Other ministerial planning offices do not have regular joint 
meetings. The only body that could claim to have the power to 
coordinate the social services is the Council of Social 
Ministries. integrated by the ministries of the social area 
(Interior, Education, Housing, Social security. Health, ODEPLAN 
and other general administration bodies). In practice, the 
Council of Social Ministries only meets three to four times 
during the year to discuss the allocation of the Social Fund, 
which is dedicated solely to investment in the social sector, 
and is a small proportion of the expenditure in the sector. 
However, since 1984, due to financial constraints the resources 
available for the fund decreased considerably, ending up to be 
less than 2% of the social sector expenditures. This change 
occurred the same time that the meetings of the Council became 
less and less frequent.
In 1984 the Government created the Secretariat for Social 
Development and Assistance, to fill the void in the area of 
Social Planning. Despite this well intentioned initiative, the
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new institution does not have a clear place in the bureaucratic 
structure of the public sector. Therefore its instructions or 
recommendations are subject to the criteria of the people in 
charge of the Secretariat. There is no legal support.
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2.3. PUBLIC SECTOR FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION
A. The Organization of Public Sector Finances and Expenditures
To understand the Chilean public sector finance
and organization it is necessary to start by developing a broad 
idea of the different sources of revenue and expenditure 
available to the country.
In Table 2.2. we can observe the Chilean public finances with 
an economic classification of revenues and expenditures. The 
structure introduced in this table is based on the year 1987, but 
it has been very stable for the last 10 years. As might be 
expected, the main source of revenue for the public sector is 
taxation, which accounts for almost 60% of total revenues. After 
tax revenues, operational revenues obtained from the receipts of 
State enterprises and the charges from the use of certain public 
services, comprise 13% of total public revenues. Other important 
areas of revenue are social security contributions (5%), and the 
sale of assets (7%), which is a programme for disposing of areas 
of public property.
In relation to the expenditure side, we note in the first 
place that social security imposes the biggest burden on the 
budget, accounting for 23% of total public expenditures, this 
includes the payment of all types of pensions and labour injuries 
compensation. After social security , current transfers comprise 
almost 17% of total public expenditures. Current transfers are 
all outlays for which there are no reciprocal retributions;these 
comprise principally transfers to the private sector and to some 
other public institutions. Transfers to the private sector may 
usually involve a contribution to private institutions rendering 
a service to the public sector, like a ministerial nursery, or 
to international agencies with which the state is affiliated. 
Transfers to public institutions are contributions that a public 
institution will make to finance other public institutions 
related to it; for example, the National Fund of Health transfers 
financial resources to finance the National System of Health 
Services. In this case, it is necessary to elaborate the actual
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expenditure figures, since the same money can be counted twice, 
in the "donor" and the "receipient" institution; a procedure to 
deal with this problem is described in Chapter 4.
Personnel is the other important area of expenditure, since 
public sector activities include a variety of services that are 
highly intensive in labour. For 1987, capital investment in 
personnel was almost 9%. This area of expenditure has ranged from 
5.5% to 10% of total expenditures during the last ten years.
1 TABLE No, 2. 
1 CHILEAN PUBLIC FINANCES 
1 (Milions of Pesos 
1.................
2.
- ECONOMIC
- 1987)
CLASSIF. j
1
1 REVENUE 
1
% 1
1
1 Operations I 211,204 13.4 1
{Social Security Contrib. 84,532 5.3 [
|lax Revs. 933,005 59.0 1
(Sale Assets 106,916 6.8 I
1 Loans Recover. 27,370 1.7 I
[Transfers 16,917 1.1 I
[other Revs. 84,383 5.3 1
[Debt 111,134 7.0 1
[Prev. Years 
1
4,864 0.3 I
1
[TOTAL
1
1,580,325 100.0 1
1
[EXPENDITURE
1
1
[Personnel 235,511 16.3 I
[G.&S.Consump. 120,786 8.4 1
[G.&S. Produc. 24,153 1.7 1
(Soc.Sec. Payments 332,619 23.1 1
[Curr.Transfers 241,965 16.8 1
[Transf.Servs. 3,943 0.3 1
[Capital Inv. 128,192 8.9 1
[Pinanc.Inv. 93,348 6.5 I
[Cap.Transf. 28,091 1.9 I
IPay.Public Debt 223,211 15.5 1
[Prev. Years 
1
8,783 0.6 1
1
1
1
1,440,600 100.0 I
SOURCE:
Contra I on* a General de la Republica 
Estados de Ejecucion Presupuestaria 1987
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1 TABLE No. 2.3. | 
I CHILEAN PUBLIC FINANCES-MINISTRIAL CLASSIFICATION j 
1 (Ml IIons of Pesos 1987) |
I REVENUE X EXPENDITURE X  (
|Gen. Adm. 948 0.1 11,722 0 . 8  (
jInterior 81,233 5.1 130,766 9.1 (
(Foreign Aff. 238 0.0 16,512 1.1 (
(Economic Aff. 139,466 8.8 115,834 8.0 j
(F i nance 17,372 1.1 21,708 1.5 j
(Education 687 0.0 104,180 7.2 j
(Justice 1,773 0.1 16,003 1.1 (
(Defense 13,815 0.9 147,619 10.2 (
(Public works 32,518 2.1 67,732 4.7 (
(Agriculture 8,646 0.5 15,773 1.1 (
(Nat.Goods 548 0.0 782 0.1 (
(Labour & Soc.Sec. 111,045, 7.0 350,351 24.3 (
(Health 24,670 1.6 98,571 6.8 j
(Mining 278 0.0 2,447 0.2 (
(Housing 20,942 1.3 48,602 3.4 (
(Transport 881 0.1 1,600 0.1 j
(Gen.Secret. 2 0.0 2,096 0.1 [
(Const. Trib. 7 0.0 44 0.0 (
(TREASURY 1,125,257 71.2 288,267 20.0 (
(TOTAL 1,580,325 100.0 1,440,609 100.0 j
SOURCE:
Contraloria General de la Republica 
Estados de Ejecuccion Presupuestaria 1987
If we now look to Table 2.3., we can observe the ministerial 
revenues and expenditures. The Treasury accumulates most ofthe 
public sector revenues from taxation and some other minor 
sources. Generally speaking, the ministries do not contribute 
much to fiscal revenues, one exception is Economic Affairs, 
which concentrates the operational revenues of most public 
enterprises. With regards to the social ministries, we observe 
that Labour and Social Security and Health produce some revenue, 
coming from the contributions of the workers to cover the 
expenses of these services.
The Treasury is the main financial source for each of the 
ministries. From it, two streams depart. One is called "free 
fiscal contribution", which finances ministerial current 
expenditures. The share of the fiscal contribution in each 
ministerial budget is variable, some ministries, like Education, 
with modest operational revenues will be financed almost 99% from
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the “free fiscal contribution", whereas Economic Affairs will 
receive no fiscal contribution at all. In the case of the other 
social ministries, such as Labour and Social Security, Health and 
Housing, between 55% to 75% of their revenues will come from the 
fiscal contribution. The other stream of resources from the 
Treasury is called special expenditure programmes; this wil be 
explained later.
Looking now to the ministerial expenditures, we note that 
Labour and Social Security have the biggest share of all (^), 
followed by the Treasury special expenditure programmes. These 
comprise three areas: Subsidies, Complementary Operations and the 
Programme for the Payment of the Public Debt. Other important 
expenditure ministries are Interior, Economic Affairs, Education 
Defense and Health.
In the Chilean public finance literature it is common to find 
different definitions of what constitutes the public social 
expenditures. The most usual definition is the one adopted by the
Central Bank of Chile, which considers in their entirity budgets
ofthe ministries of of Education, Labour and Social Security, 
Health, and housing; in addition to some special social
programmes of the Ministry of the Interior, the National 
Childhood Service of the Ministry of Justice, and some so called 
"Social Assistance programmes" financed directly from the 
Treasury subsidies programme. Under this definition, social 
expenditures comprise 62.8% of total public expenditures.
B. Budgetary procedure
Budgeting is a form of planning. The budgetary process is
what relates the plans and social policies of a government to the 
public institutions which provide or subsidize social services. 
Therefore, the budget should embody the ruling party's priorities 
and aspirations. As Waterson (1965) has remarked, the nature of 
the link between the plan and the budget is a test whether a 
government is serious about its plan and intends to carry it out.
5. The state has assumed the burden of the transition from a "pay as you go" system of pensions to one of 
Individual Capitalization, this will be explained in Chapter 8.
89
It seems important to spend some time describing the 
budgetary process in Chile, since it casts light on how 
expenditure decisions are taken. The budgetary cycle follows the 
traditional pattern of a national budget of any western country. 
There is not much literature published on the subject. The 
information provided here relies on some publications by ODEPLAN, 
and some personal interviews conducted in the Budget Office by 
the author. Therefore, the names given to same stages of the 
cycle are not official but they are used for methodological 
reasons. (figure 2.1.)
The cycle starts in the formulation phase with an analysis 
made by the Budget Office makes of the previous four budgets, and 
a detailed survey of how the public accounts will be at the end 
of the fiscal year. All the figures under analysis are adjusted 
to constant prices, giving the Budget Office a clear picture of 
the evolution of real expenditure over the last few years. This 
is the first approximation of the budget, from which many 
policies and expenditure constraints are derived. It is with this
information that the exploratorv budget is made. In the
formulation phase we identified some stages (in section 1.3.), 
the Chilean Exploratory Budget, corresponds basically to the 
stage of the "preparation of initial estimates".
Four criteria are used for the actual delineation of the
exploratory buget:
i) Special Expenditures: Made just once and with no reason to 
assume that they will be repeated. Example: Expenditures in 
the organization of a special conference.
ii) Committed Expenditures: Expenditures that were undertaken 
in previous years and are still being paid.
iii) Assesment of proposed expenditures relative to actual 
expenditures: To have a clear picture of the deviations 
between what is budgeted and actual expenditures.
iv) Policy criteria: Allows for possible policy changes.
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The exploratory budget is sent to the Director of the BO 
for approval. Once it has been approved, it is communicated to 
the different ministries, (thus the budget is named Communicated 
Budget). This approach follows a devolution model, as mentioned 
in chapter one. The communicated budget gives a clear frame of
expenditure to each ministry, divided among Departments or
services within the ministries, and by current and investment
expenditures. The communicated budget is accompanied with the 
Financial Basis (Bases Financières) or budget circular, which
provides information related to the expenditure policies of the 
year. For example decisions concerning further personnel 
recruitment or the investement of surpluses in the financial 
market would fall under this category. The financial basis also 
give information about the expected rate of inflation and other 
economic variables. In relation to investment expenditures, the 
ministries must include every project adopted by them in a form 
according to the Basic Statistical System for Investment (SEBI). 
This form is sent to ODEPLAN for approval. This information can 
be sent any time during the fiscal year. Thus in practical terms 
the communicated budget only tells the ministries how many of the 
pre-approved projects will be financed (^).
The budgets produced by each ministry according to the
described instructions are compiled by the Budget Office without 
any changes. This stage is called the Proposed Budget. This stage 
recalls the aggregative model for the determination of public 
expenditure, however in this case the discretion that each 
service has is very restricted by the communicated budget and 
the financial basis. This Proposed Budget is later constrasted 
with a "frame for maximum expenditure figures", which contains 
the limits on which the following bargaining procedure may take 
place. This frame has been prepared simultaneously with the 
exploratory budget, and is aimed at preventing the customary
policy of asking for more funds to obtain what is necessary; for
the same reasons the communicated budget is usually designed a 
bit "tight".
6. In theory ODEPLAN, is only an advisor in investment matters to the Budget Office, but in p>ractical terms 
projects not approved by it are hardly financed, unless they have a very important political implication to 
overide ODEPLAN's evaluation
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It is with the proposed budget and the notion of the 
Budget Office for the maximun expenditure figures that a series 
of discussions are started; firstly, there is an "internal" 
discussion between Budget Office and ODEPLAN (as advisor), 
secondly the "open" discussions are between the Budget Office and 
each ministry about current expenditure, and then again with 
ODEPLAN on investment. At the end of the discussions the budget 
is re-arranged and presented to the Director of the Budget Office 
for approval. The approved budget is called Reviewed Budaet- 
Budqet Office. and is sent at the same time to the Minister of 
Finance. The Minister analyzes the compatibility of the reviewed 
budget with the fiscal and monetary policies, also in respect to 
the estimated economic growth, taxation yield and other 
macroeconomic variables; the reviewed budget is now Reviwed 
Budget MF.
It is important to note that up to this previous stage, 
the nature of the budgetary cycle is very incremental, in the 
sense that the main estimates and analyses are based on previous 
expenditures. This is confirmed by the fact that in the 
bargaining meetings the main discussion concerns the additions 
to past current expenditures or decreases in the future budget in 
relation to the previous one. However, with regards to investment 
expenditures some features of the rational comprehensive method 
may be found. There is a consideration of means versus ends by 
using Cost Benefit Analysis and other forms of rational decision 
making. At the same time, the description of each project in 
accordance to the forms of the Basic Statistical System for 
Investment follows a rational approach to decision making. 
Unfortunately, investment is a minor proportion of total public 
expenditure.
In the final stages of the budgetary cycle, the Minister 
of Finance presents the budget to the President, who considers 
the political reality of the country, and may be influenced by 
senior gorverment officials,such as the Regional Governors 
(Intendentes). After this stage, the budget is given legal form 
and then introduced to the Legislature for final approval. In 
Chile during the military rule, the legislative power was in the
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hands of the Military Junta; this was made up of the Chief 
officers of the armed forces. Therefore, the clear institutional 
links that exist between the legislative and the executive bodies 
avoid the classical conflict of authorisation. The approved 
budget starts on the 1st. of January of the following year, (see 
figure 2.1. for dates).
In relation to the nature of the budgetary process, and 
especially the implementation or execution phase in poor 
countries, it is interesting to make a comparison between some of 
the elements described by Caiden and Wildavsky (1974).
1.- Changes in the budget: The main changes in the Original 
budget, the one approved by the Legislative power, in 
relation to the final one at the end of the year, having 
been modified by Law decrees, are basically due to:
i) Deliberate under-estimation of expenditure in order to 
have the departmental budget approved.
ii) Wrong estimation of inflation or internal revenues, by 
both Budget Office or Ministry, and the consequent 
difficulty in meeting the programmed expenditures. Some 
services may deliberately underestimate their operational 
revenues, in order to receive a bigger share of the public 
fisc. However, present legislation requires a special 
Decree to incorporate additional revenues, preventing the 
services from underestimating this because the funds 
sooner or later will have to be declared to the Ministry of 
Finance.
iii) The emergence of unexpected situations which are 
deemed important for political or practical reasons and, to 
a minor extent, "formal” changes in policy during the year.
Although it is common to expect that not a single 
figure would remain exactly as it was in the Budgetary law 
after all the changes, the structure of expenditure is
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usually maintained despite the possible modifications.
2. - Budget Coverage: Unlike many developing countries, the 
coverage of public expenditure in the budget is very complete. 
There are now some institutions not included in it, so called 
"decentralized institutions” (^ ), but all of them are 
accountable to the Comptroller. In previous administrations there 
used to be some expenditures not included in the budget (Cuentas 
extra-presupuestarias) which were related to earmarked taxes.
3.- Uncertainty: In general the cash flow from the Budget Office 
to the ministries has to be renegotiated every month, but usually 
there are no unexpected variations to the official one, with the 
exception of extraordinary hardships. However, it is known that 
at a ministerial level, it is common practice that the 
ministerial budget offices try to retain as much of the funds 
as possible in order to overcome difficult situations which may 
arise, therefore at a service level there is a degree of 
uncertainty in the availability of funds.
The Evaluation phase is restricted basically to a financial 
assessment of what is really spent in relation to the planned 
expenditure, there is also global financial auditing; both types 
of assëbent are done by the General Comptroller. The auditing 
corresponds to a review in order to acknowledge that the 
expenditures were made in accordance with the budgetary law.
Although every ministry or department must present with its 
budget a list of the main objectives and goals of the programmes 
or projects on which money is being spent, there is no 
performance auditing in Chile. There is no institution to analyse 
the effectiveness or efficiency of the programmes. According to 
some Budget Office officials, the majority of the objectives are 
repeated every year, and "we have no time to read through them", 
or "we will only be able to pay attention to the justification of 
a new programme or area of expenditure". This is again a feature 
of incremental ism: since the bureaucrat has no time for general
7. These “decentralized" institutions should be considered as delegated institutions in our terminology.
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policies or values, they are forced to focus on marginal changes.
In conclusion, from the previous remarks it is clear that if 
there is no assessment of goals in relation to expenditure, it is 
difficult to expect clear links between the budget and planning.
There are usually some different approaches between planners 
and budgeters; planners tend to be spenders and have a high 
regard for investment spending, whereas budget officials are 
usually concerned with administration and control. As we 
mentioned earlier, the National Planning Office has no right to 
enforce the national or regional plans, and as we saw in the 
budgetary process, its participation is restricted to the 
investment part of the budget. Therefore, the only formal links 
between the budget and planning are related to the investment 
sector, where the planning institution sets priorities for 
investment, which are considered for the approval of the 
projects. On the other hand ODEPLAN, through the ministerial 
programmes, ocassionally studies one or two programmes of 
expenditure, this may affect the budget structure during the next 
period.
C. The Development of Social Expenditures
Before presenting some figures about the evolution of social 
expenditures in Chile, it is necessary to discuss briefly the 
exact meaning of the concept: "Social expenditure".
There are two issues to be analysed here: one is related to 
the institutional coverage, and the other is related to the 
definition.
In relation to the institutional coverage, it has to be said 
that during the last 15 years there have been important 
redefinitions of social service roles and activities, leading to 
the disappearance of some services and the creation of others. 
This has provoked changes in the institutions and the areas of 
expenditure considered as "social expenditure". For example, the 
Treasury is now paying at its own expense the full cost of family
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allowances, which used to have a mixed finance from the pension 
funds and the Treasury prior to 1980. A few studies have tried 
to trace the institutional coverage prior to 1975 in order to 
have a clear reference for comparis^on, others take the present 
structure as given.
The social expenditure definition to be considered in the 
present work,is derived from the Central Bank's definition 
introduced in section 2.3.A.. However, we have excluded some few 
programmes from the latter definition because of lack of 
information and difficulties in obtaing access to the bureaucrats 
in charge of them. Therefore, Public Social Expenditure in this 
study will be defined as the budgets of the Ministries of 
Education, Labour and Social Security, Health and Housing, the 
Family Allowance Fund for Poor Families from the Ministry of 
Interior, the Special Employment Programmes and the contribution 
to the private pension funds by the Fund for Family allowances 
and unemployment subsidies from the Treasury (See Figure 2.2. for
a clearer picture) . This definition will be used as far as
possible, but in some cases the appropiate analysis can only be 
carried out using a different definition.
W i t h  r e g a r d s  to d i f f e r e n t  d e f i n i t i o n s  of social 
expenditures, a distinction has to be made between public and 
fiscal social expenditures. Public Social Expenditure, the 
concept used in this study, includes all the expenditures being 
financed from ministerial resources (operational revenues, sale 
of assets,and others) and the free fiscal contribution. Another 
measure used in other studies is Fiscal Social Expenditures or 
net expenditures, it includes only the free fiscal contribution
to each ministry, this is the subsidy element of public
expenditure, or all that is financed directly from taxation. 
Finally, it is possible to find a further definition of social 
expenditures in the Chilean literature. The definition of Direct 
Social Expenditures includes only the "free fiscal contribution", 
this is similar to Fiscal Social Expenditures, except that all 
the expenditures related to the social services bureaucracy are 
not included. In this way the Direct Social Expenditures includes 
only the subsidy component of public expenditure that actually 
reaches the families.
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FIGURE 2.2
THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
MINISTRY OR PROGRAMME AREA INCLUDED
Health All
Education All
Housing All
Labour and Social Security All
Interior - Social Fund Social Fund for the
finance of family allowances
for poor families.
Treasury- Subsidies Programme - Programme for 
Unemployment Absortion.
- Municipal fund for intensive 
employment proyects.
- Fund for family allowances 
and unemployment subsidies 
(Private sector) (®).
In the present work, we will use the concept of public 
social expenditure, since it is a broader definition and 
considers the total of resources on which the services really 
have to operate. Therefore, it includes the fiscal social 
expenditures. At the same time, it is the definition adopted by 
many international institutions, such as the International 
Monetary Fund (^).
8. This fund finances family allowances and unemployment subsidies for workers contributing to either public 
or private social security schemes. As the public pension schemes will receive the funds for family 
allowances and unemployment subsidies as a transfer from the Treasury, we consider those funds in the 
"recipient" institution budgets (i.e. the pension funds). In the case of family allowances and unemployment 
subsidies paid through private pension funds, only the transfer from the Treasury must be considered as a 
net expenditure.
9. It should be noted that the ministerial expenditure figures introduced in the sectoral chapters will not
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CHILEAN
TABLE No. 2.4.
PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1970-85 
(as % of G.N.P.)
1970 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Interior 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.41 Ô.33 0.86 0.55 0.38 0.20
Education 4.42 4.43 4.27 4.21 4.00 4.51 4.31 4.11 3.95 4.32 5.05 4.39 4.25 4.14
Labour & Soc.Sec. 9.67 7.27 6.87 9.42 7.17 7.44 7.27 7.40 7.75 9.18 11.75 10.85 10.95 10.08
Health 3.05 2.57 2.45 2.40 2.41 2.75 2.81 2.55 2.55 2.75 3.38 2.89 2.84 2.59
Housing 2.35 3.04 2.63 1.68 1.47 1.84 1.17 1.26 1.28 1.20 0.87 0.76 1.01 1.32
Treasury-Asist. Progs. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.41 1.16 0.95 0.68 0.54 0.58 0.28 0.63 1.46 1.06 0.98
TOTAL 19.74 17.56 16.44 18.54 16.63 17.92 16.64 16.23 16.52 18.06 22.54 20.90 20.49 19.31
SOURCE:
Haindl,Budinich and Irarrazaval(1989)
The evolution of public social expenditures in relation to 
G.N.P. can be appreciated on Table 2.4. The series shows that for 
the earlier 1980s social expenditures have been maintained in the 
region of 20% of G.N.P., this constitutes an increase in 
comparision to the 1970's trend. Social expenditure reaches its 
peak in 1982 being 22.5% of G.N.P. If we compare Chile's social 
expenditure figures with those of other Latin American countries, 
we note that Chile has the highest expenditure figure of the 
Latin American countries considered in Section 1.2..
One important property for social expenditures to have is to 
respond to people's needs in difficult periods of the economy. In 
the economist's language, it should be counter-cyclical. From the 
table we can appreciate that social expenditures reached a peak 
in 1982, when the external debt recession was hitting Chile in a 
very strong way.
necessarily be identical to those of the Comptroller described in Table 2.5. The differences arise from the 
use of different consumer price indexes, the treatment of transfers and the exclusion of some items of 
expenditure.
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1 TABLE No. 2.5.
1 PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
1
1_________ _________
(Mi I Ions of 1987 Pesos)
1
1
1
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 [
1
1 Interior Social Fund 4,029 1,450 20,911 12,806 9,547 4,890 11,717 5,770 1
1Education 92,221 110,647 100,376 129,104 138,254 115,956 118,256 123,670 115,619 104,180 1
1 Labour & Soc.Sec. 349,483 322,796 360,565 384,934 450,007 359,493 362,672 352,432 351,057 350,351 j
1 Health 96,231 106,131 102,856 116,180 126,158 104,725 105,636 100,829 97,736 98,571 1
1 Housing 
1
39,036 52,715 51,671 48,426 34,204 27,142 36,802 48,715 43,537 48,602 1
1
1 TOTAL
1............ .... ..
576,971 592,289 619,496 680,093 769,533 620,122 632,912 630,535 619,666 607,475 1
1
1 STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
1
1___________________
(X of total Social Expenditures)
1...................
I
1
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1
1
1 Interior Social Fund 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 2.7 2.1 1.5 0.8 1.9 0.9 1
1 Education 16.0 18.7 16.2 19.0 18.0 18.7 18.7 19.6 18.7 17.1 1
[Labour & Soc.Sec. 60.6 54.5 58.2 56.6 58.5 58.0 57.3 55.9 56.7 57.7 1
[Health 16.7 17.9 16.6 17.1 16.4 16.9 16.7 16.0 15.8 16.2 1
[Housing
1
6.8 8.9 8.3 7.1 4.4 4.4 5.8 7.7 7.0 8.0 1
1
[TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1
SOURCE:
Contraloria General de la Republica 
Estados de Ejecuccion Presupuestaria 1987
The structure of social expenditure can be observed in a 
more recent series including 1986 and 1987 (Table 2.5.). We 
note that Social Security has varied from 55 to 61% of total 
social expenditures. This comprises not only the payment of 
pensions, but some social security subsidies such as 
unemployment subsidies, maternal allowances and others. In the 
case of education it ranges from 16 to almost 20% of social 
expenditures; its share has been relatively constant, although it 
increased after 1981-82 when the municipalization process of
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education was introduced. Health care, as one of the most stable 
components, has maintained its share of between 16 to 18% of 
total social expenditures. Housing is, in relative terms, the 
area most affected by changes in its share throughout the period, 
ranging from 8.9% to 4.4%. During the recessionary years the 
housing budget was severely diminished.
The case of the social fund, which was created in 1980, 
constitutes a special case, as it is a programme specifically 
designed to help people in most need. Therefore, it may be 
expected that its share in the total social expenditures will 
vary according to the economic performance of the country. As we 
see from table 2.5. the share of the Social Fund has ranged from 
0.2 to 2.7% of social expenditures.
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2.4. REGIONAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL PLANNING
A. Regional organization
As has been mentioned in Chapter 1, Chile had an early 
industrialization process as a result of the heavy basis of its 
economy based on the exports of mineral products. The crisis of 
1929 hit the country strongly, lessening the demands for most of 
its main products. As a result, the country adopted a policy of 
"import substitution”, aiming at creating further industries and 
being able to produce internally most of the country's 
necessities. Under this scheme, the state played a significant 
role in creating economic activities. At the same time public 
employment grew in a considerable way. This process resulted in a 
growing development of cities and a considerable centralization 
of the country, especially in the capital city of Santiago where 
most of the industry was concentrated. According to Gwynne 
(1985), the ocurrence of urban primacy; this is, one city 
dominating the national urban structure, is also a feature of the 
spatial concentration patterns found in Latin America.
The widespread acceptancy of the import-substitution model 
in Latin America in the 1950's had an important impact on the 
industrialization process of the continent. According to Gwynne 
(1985) this process wcis characterised by a primacy of industry 
over other areas of possible investment for development such as 
agriculture. Industrial activities have been promoted to supply 
the national market, specially in the area of consumer goods. 
However, this preference has made industry dependent on capital 
-intensive foreign technology producing a relatively small 
generation of employment. One of the most interesting aspects of 
this process is the fact that despite the application of a 
variety of government policies, industrialisation was mostly 
concentrated in one metropolitan area, because of the existence 
of economies of scale and the entrepenuers* preferences for 
locating his investments on a more secure environment for him 
(^^). In fact, Gwynne argues that the growth of manufacturing
10. A more secure environment is a place where the entrepeneur can develop contacts that may help the 
development of his industry.
102
employment has not been nearly so dramatic as that of urban 
dwellers. Urbanisation has dramatically increased due to large 
migration from the rural areas and high urban fertility rates. In 
practical terms, urbanisation is a phenomenon on itself that is 
being reinforced by industrialisation. In addition to this 
argument, it is also been said that the industrialisation process 
can be related with a distinctive tendency of Latin America, that 
of increasing regional inequalities.
During the sixties the state made its first efforts to stop 
the centralization trend. According to Boisier (1978), this 
period corresponds to "intra-regional" or ad hoc efforts to 
create alternative centres to the capital city. During this stage 
many cities created their own councils of local or regional 
development. The state contributed to these initiatives creating 
some special legal incentives for industries localized in those 
areas or simply creating industries in those organized areas. 
However, these efforts proved to be insufficient to stop 
continuing centralization and growing regional inequalities.
By the late sixties and early seventies, there was a clear 
consciousness of the necessity of rectifying these trends. 
Therefore, the state initiated an ambitious programme of national 
planning at a regional scale aiming to accelerate the economic 
development and to diminish regional inequalities in the level of 
living. One of the tools for implementing this policy was the 
creation of growth poles. Through this strategy the government 
created some decentralized industries that were aimed to induce 
further development of economic activity through out its zone of 
influence . However, as Raczynski (1986) has pointed out, the
strategy had a number of weaknesses which inhibited regional 
development; it had a clear approach from "above to below" and 
central conduct of the process, an exaggerated "economicism," 
as the goals were the improvement in economic efficiency to 
create more economic growth, and a marked industrial and urban 
bias. Nevertheless, the most critical aspect of the application 
of this model in Chile was its incapacity to generate effective
11. An interesting analysis of the government's intervention in an import substitution industry-on a Chilean 
"growth pole", can be seen in: Gwynne, 1980.
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local multipliers (Gwynne, 1985). For example, one of the 
industries chosen in the Chilean case was the Motor Vehicle 
Assembly, which despite being localised at more than a thousand 
kilometres away from the capital city, it had most of its parts 
supplied directly from it.
The military government also addressed these important 
issues which had been present for long time in the Chilean 
s o c i e t y . Their response was the convocatory of a new 
"regionalization process" . The principal aim of this new
policy was to "allow the President to have a vertical 
organization, with wide coverage in all the country, to assure 
the implementation of government actions" (Canessa, 1979). The 
regional governors or Intendentes are, according to the 
legislation, the representatives of the President in a region, 
and not the regions representative to the President. After a few 
years of learning experience, the regionalization process was 
widely conceived as an attempt to have better organization and 
coordination of regional field offices of the central ministries.
In relation to the Chilean regionalization process, Cumplido 
(1983) argued that it corresponds to a déconcentration model 
because the regional institutions are only representatives or 
executors of the national policies, having few areas of 
discretion. At the same time Cumplido has criticized the dual 
structure of powers of the Regional Ministerial Secretariats 
(SEREMIs), because this tends to generate competence conflicts 
and parallel orders. The author recognises the positive effects 
produced by the National Fund for Regional Development (FNDR), 
which allows the regions to formulate investment projects 
according to their priorities.
Cumplido's assertions are in accordance to those of Harris 
(1983) quoted in the earlier chapter. The regionalization process 
coincides with a Latin American trend towards decentralization. 
Harris argued that the later regionalization attempts in Latin 
America are rather a centralization process, which aims to 
achieve greater coordination of the governmental organizations
12. Law Decree No. 575 13 July 1974
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operating at a local level.
According to the new regionalization and to the 1980 
Constitution, Chile is a unitary country with a single central 
authority. However, its internal structure corresponds to a 
global criterion of déconcentration. The country is divided for 
the purposes of government and administration into Regions(13), 
Provinces (51) and Comunas (municipalities) (335).
The Region constitutes the supreme territorial unit for 
the administration of the state. The highest authority of the 
region is the Intendente, who has the responsibility for the 
coordination and execution of the policies, programmes and 
projects for the development of the region. The Intendente is the 
regional representative of the President of the Republic. For the 
planning process, at a regional level, the Intendente has the 
permanent advice of the Regional Secretariat for Planning and 
Coordination (SERPLAC), which itself depends directly on the 
National Planning Office (ODEPLAN).
At the same time, each ministry and public service is 
deconcentrated at a regional level through the Regional 
Ministerial Secretariats (SEREMIs). These institutions have a 
dual character, in that are direct collaborators with the 
Intendente in their fields (public works, health,education,etc), 
and at the same time they are the regional representatives of the 
Minister. Each SEREMI is responsible for the execution of the 
sectorial policies at a regional level and the definition of 
investment projects in the area.
According to the constitution each region should have a 
R e g i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  C o u n c i l  (COREDE), i n t e g r a t e d  by 
representatives of the several regional institutions, (For 
example, entrepeneurs, trade unions, and social organizations). 
The COREDE will have the power to assess the work of the 
Intendente and to advise him in the formulation of the investment 
budget of the region. However, the effectiveness of the COREDEs 
remains to be seen, since most of its member have been appointed 
by the Intendentes. Furthermore, the newly elected government has 
proclaimed that the whole institution of COREDEs is subject to
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revision in the future parliament. The most likely alternative 
here is for the new government to favour regional collegiate 
bodies with a clear representational structure, i.e. whose 
members have been elected democratically.
In sum, the regionalization process has helped the central 
government to approach the users of public services. More 
efficiency is being achieved at a regional level, due to better 
coordination of regional institutions and clear directions from 
the centre. However, unless there is a transfer of decisional 
powers it is still not possible to speak of an effective 
decentralization. We can conclude that we have a case of clear 
déconcentration or administrative decentralization at most.
Regional Aspects of Social Policies
In the early 1980s the government first introduced specific 
measures in the social sector in order to allocate "social 
subsidies to the demand". The purpose of the policy was to 
"distribute public resources in relation to the effective 
localization of the population requiring the service" 
(ODEPLAN,1986).
The practical actions taken towards achieving the aim of 
social subsidies to demand were the following:
Health: Introduction of a capitation fee instead of direct
central allocations. The capitation fee helps to
allocate the Health Service's budgets in relation to the 
use of medical services.
Education: Introduction of a subvention scheme similar to a 
"voucher scheme", in which the central Ministry of 
Education pays a fixed sum to schools, both public and 
private, per student in class.
Housing: The main shift in this sector was from indirect to
direct subsidies, with a national selection process to
consider the saving capacity of the family and its well­
being through the national means test.
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Social Security and Assistance Programmes: In this sector the 
changes are more recent, some of which were introduced 
only at the end of 1987. In the case of Familly 
Allowance for poor families and Assistance Pensions, the 
state fixed the number of benefits to be paid in each 
region, giving the regional authorities discretion for 
allocating them according to the national regulations.
The results of these actions produced an effective delegation 
of the administrative powers of the central ministeries in favour 
of their regional field offices. Nevertheless, this delegation 
was not a transfer of decisional powers, since the procedures for 
allocating the benefits were still set at the central level.
Moreover, it is known that some of the "decentralization 
measures" specifically aimed to reduce the expenditure of the 
social programmes. For example, in the case of Social Security, 
the state offered to the regional authorities an incentive, 
which consisted of the transfer to the regional investment funds 
of half of the "savings" produced by the exclusion of 
beneficiaries who do not fulfil the requirements according to the 
new selectivity rules. In the case of the health services, the 
introduction of capitation fees was an attempt to control the 
current expenditures of hospitals. In this case the ministry went 
even further by introducing ceilings in the number of 
consultations allowed per hospital or public medical clinics. 
There is further evidence to show the hidden objective of 
"regionalization". This evidence will be analyzed in the 
sectoral chapters.
In sum, the government is trying to adapt its organization 
and policies to include a greater consideration of local needs 
and preferences. However, at the same time the state bureaucracy 
is using some of the regionalization policies to introduce cuts 
in the social sector budgets.
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B. National Characteristics
Before concluding this chapter about the context of Social 
Planning in Chile and turning to the sectoral chapters, it is 
convenient to make a brief introduction of the basic 
characteristics of the country and its regions. Since this 
research will address the regional impact of social policies it, 
seems advisable to give some elementary references about the 
regions.
Chile was founded in 1536 by the Spanish conqueror Diego de 
Almagro, five years later the capital city of Santiago was 
founded by the Spanish conqueror Pedro de Valdivia. In 1810, it 
acquired its independence from Spain initiating the republican 
period.
In 1987, Chile had a population of over 12.5 million 
inhabitants, with a population density equivalent to 16.6 
(habitants/Square kilometers). As can be observed in Table 2.6., 
Chile has relatively good social indicators in relation to other 
developing countries of the same economic categorye. In fact, its 
life expectancy of 71.7 years is one of the highest for Latin 
America, closely folowed by Argentina with 70.6. However, other 
important Latin American countries show a worse performance on 
this indicator; Brazil with 64.9, Mexico with 68.9 and Peru with 
61.4 (^^).
The infant mortality rate is also a good indicator in the 
Chilean case; its rate of 18.5 is comparable to that of the 
Eastern European countries, and in fact, also to some Southern 
European countries.
13. Source: Statistical Yearbook for Latin America 
1988 Edition
Economic Commission for Latin America Santiago,
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TABLE 2.6.
BASIC DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 
(MIDLE ECONOMIES AND CHILE)
CHILE Lower Midle
Hidle Income
Economies Economies 
(1985) (1985)
Total Population (1987) 12,536,383
Pop. Density (Hab./Sq.Kms.) (1987) 16.6 41.9 32.6
Pop. Growth (Avg. Annual rate 1985-90) 1.6 2.3 2.5
Life Expectancy at Birth (1987) 71.7 58.0 62.0
General Mortality (1987) 5.6
Infant Mortality (1987) 18.5 82.0 68.0
Illiteracy Rate (1982) 8.9
GNP/Capita (US 1985) 1,430 820 1290
Average disposable Monthly 201
income (US 1985)
SOURCES:
Chile: Compendio Estadistico 1989 I.N.E.
GNP: World development report 1988 
Monthly Income: Haindl and Weber 1986
Midle and Lower Midle Economies:
World Development Report 
World Bank 1988
With regards to the age structure, Chile is a young country, 
with having 51% of its population less than 24 years old, and 31% 
of the population below 14 years old. At the same time the 
proportion of the population above retirement age (65 years) is 
only 5.9%. However, the country is experiencing a rapid change 
on its demographic structure, according to which the period of 
demographic transition will result in a stabler and older 
structure.
In relation to economic indicators, it must be acknowledged 
that the Chilean figure for the GNP/Capita has been decreasing 
since the world recession in 1981 when the country reached its 
peak of U$2,600 (^^) . Based on the 1985 GNP per capita of
U$l,43 0 Chile is classified by the World Bank as a middle income 
economy and in the sub group of Lower middle income countries.
14. Source: World Development report
Word Bank 1988
Washington,
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However, it must be said that after 1987, the economy has been 
growing at an annual rate of about 5%.
C. Regional characteristics
In table No. 2.7. it is possible to note the evolution of 
the Chilean regional population in the last seventeen years. Like 
many other developing countries, Chile concentrates a large 
proportion of its population in the capital city or the main 
metropolitan area. The share in the Metropolitan Region has been 
increasing in the last decades; during the early fifties and 
sixties the rural-urban migration contributed to the growth of 
the Metropolitan area, but by the late eighties much of the 
effects of the migration process had stopped. But the 
Metropolitan Region continued to increase its share because of 
its high rates of annual growth, which were above the national 
figure of 1.6%. The regions of the extreme north, Tarapaca and 
Antofagasta, and the regions of the extreme south, Aysen and 
Magallanes, are the only other regions to show an increase in 
their share in population, although it is much smaller than that 
of the Metropolitan Area. The annual growth rates of these four 
regions ranged from 3.4% to 2.1% all well above the national 
average.
TABLE 2.7.
REGIONAL POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR CHILE
(30th. June each year)
(REGION 1985 % 1986 X 1987 % I
1 1 Tarapaca 308,909 2.5 314,783 2.6 324,087 2.6 1
1 2 Antofagasta 363,329 3.0 366,316 3.0 370,563 3.0 1
1 3 Atacama 191,254 1.6 194,488 1.6 195,956 1.6 1
1 4 Coquimbo 448,667 3.7 452,465 3.7 459,393 3.7 I
1 5 Valparaiso 1,284,976 10.6 1,314,298 10.7 1,336,073 10.7 I
1 6 O'higgins 615,389 5.1 621,664 5.0 627,665 5.0 1
1 7 Talca 778,030 6.4 792,961 6.4 805,141 6.4 1
1 8 Bio-Bio 1,591,398 13.1 1,609,694 13.1 1,625,840 13.0 1
1 9 Araucania 740,601 6.1 745,199 6.0 755,137 6.0 1
(10 L.Lagos 884,831 7.3 896,211 7.3 903,418 7.2 1
(11 Aysen 72,275 0.6 73,019 0.6 74,509 0.6 1
112 Magallanes 139,413 1.2 141,699 1.1 145,539 1.2 1
|RM Metropolitans 4,702,606 38.8 4,804,232 39.0 4,913,062 39.2 1
1 TOTAL 12,121,678 100.0 12,327,029 100.0 12,536,383 100.0 1
SOURCE: National Institute of Statistics
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The urbanization process of Latin America is mostly a 
result of the colonial legacy (Gwynne, 1985). During this period 
the city served rather as an agent for consolidating the 
occupation and administering the Spanish Crown interests. Lately, 
the export oriented structure of the economy consolidated this 
organization of the urban system. Chile does not escape to this 
common Latin American features. As is seen in Table No.2.S., 
Chile is a highly urbanized country.
The regional distribution of the population shown in Table 
No. 2.8, allows an initial classification of regions. URBAN are 
those regions with 90% of their population living in urban areas, 
these are Antofagasta, Metropolitan, Tarapaca, Atacama, 
Valparaiso and Magallanes. All these regions have one or two big 
cities in which between half and two thirds of the total regional 
population are concentrated. The INTERMEDIATE regions are Aysen, 
Bio-Bio, Coquimbo and O'higgins. Finally, the RURAL regions are 
Los Lagos, Araucania and Maule; although these regions were 
classified as rural they have important urban centres, but in 
relative terms they correspond to the rural group.
TABLE 2.8.
ESTIMATES OF THE URBAN REGIONAL POPULATION 
(CHILE)
REGION 1985 1986 1987
1 Tarapaca 94.4 94.5 94.6
2 Antofagasta 98.7 98.7 98.8
3 Atacama 91.9 92.2 92.3
4 Coquimbo 75.1 75.3 75.7
5 Valparaiso 91.1 91.3 91.4
6 O'higgins 65.7 66.2 66.6
7 Maule 57.4 57.9 58.2
8 Bio-Bio 77.0 77.3 77.6
9 Araucani a 58.0 57.9 58.2
10 L.Lagos 59.6 60.1 60.4
11 Aysen 79.8 80.3 80.9
12 Magallanes 92.3 92.4 92.6
RM Metropolitans 96.7 96.8 96.9
TOTAL 83.3 83.6 83.8
SOURCE: National Institute of Statistics
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A first insight into the regional well-being is provided in 
Table No. 2.9., which shows the regional distribution of the 
Gross Domestic Product standarized by the regional population. 
Distribution patterns follow those of table 2.8.; among the seven 
regions with income per capita above the national average, we 
found all but one to be urbanized regions and only one 
intermediate: O'higgins. The poor regions are those defined as
rural.
The pattern of the regional well being described above is 
very stable through time, although some variations may be seen in 
the social indicators of health, education and housing. 
Nevertheless, the basic correlation between urbanization and well 
being is very clear in all sectors.
I ESTIMATES OF THE
TABLE No. 2.9. 
REGIONAL G.D.P. PER 
(CHILE)
(in $ 1977)
CAPITA I
1 REGION 1985 1986 1987 1
1 1 Tarapaca 40,153 40,842 41,945 1
1 2 Antofagasta 58,903 58,216 60,850 1
1 3 Atacama 43,728 43,394 45,539 1
1 4 Coquimbo 17,954 18,738 19,514 1
1 5 Valparaiso 29,235 30,692 31,923 1
1 6 O'higgins 36,137 37,305 39,068 1
1 7 Maule 19,306 20,090 20,921 1
1 8 Bio-Bio 23,509 23,715 24,826 1
1 9 Araucania 16,361 16,858 17,591 1
|10 L.Lagos 19,687 20,806 21,824 1
|11 Aysen 23,954 24,779 25,677 1
112 Magallanes 76,491 77,199 79,474 1
|RM Metropolitans 32,334 34,123 35,281 1
1 TOTAL 29,406 30,553 31,766 1
SOURCE: National Institute of Statistics 
Central Bank
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CHAPTER THREE
PROBLEM DEFINITION
3.1. MAIN TOPIC OF RESEARCH
The research aims to analyse and discuss how the Social 
Services are organised and financed in Chile, with a special 
concern on the regional impact of social policies.
In the first place, the study will concentrate on describing 
the procedures and strategies with which each social ministry or 
sector, as named through out the thesis (Health, Education, 
Housing, Social Security), finances its programmes. This will 
present for the first time an intersectorial view of the social 
services organization in Chile.
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, since 1975 the Government 
has advocated a new "regionalization" policy, aimed at 
decentralising the power of national government, eliminating 
regional inequalities and reducing poverty it is important 
therefore,in the second place to test to what extent the regional 
allocation of social expenditures is actually related to regional 
needs. This has been done through the calculation of the 
regional social expenditures per capita. These figures have been 
produced for the first time ever in Chile and cast light on the 
present pattern of regional allocation of social expenditures. 
Then these figures are compared with regional indicators of need 
in order to determine if there is a relation between these 
variables.
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3.2. PRINCIPAL ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED
According to the description of the main research topic, a 
deductive method was followed starting with a necessary 
theoretical background for understanding properly the research 
theme, at the same time some cross references with other Latin 
American countries were also considered. In relation to the main 
topic of research, the principal issues to be addressed are 
described below.
1.- What are the main features of the social sector’s finance and 
organization?
This heading is aimed at describing and analysing the 
strategies, procedures, and rules that might affect the actual 
distribution of social expenditures.
Description
a.- What is the formal organization of the sector (^)?
Perhaps the most elementary question when analysing the 
social sector's finance and organization, is what are the 
aims, functions and structure of the main institutions of 
the sector.
b.- Is there an annual or periodical planning procedure?
It seems that for most of the planning traditions reviewed 
in Chapter 1 it is important to have a systematic or 
periodic planning procedure. As was described in Chapter 
2, at a national level Chile does not appear to have a 
systematic annual planning strategy, with the exeption of 
some specific sectoral tasks. Therefore, it is interesting 
to test if this approach is common to each sector.
1. In this case we will consider public and private structure and organization of the sector.
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c.- What are the links between planning and the budget?
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, both Glennerster (1983) and 
Goode (1983) have insisted that the budget is the means by 
which social or public policies and plans are implemented. 
Therefore, it is important to examine to what extent the 
planning and budgetary processes are formally linked in 
Chile.
2.- Is it possible to observe some relation between the 
officially stated progressive social policies and ministerial 
expenditure structures?
From the social policy precepts introduced in Chapter 2, we can 
analyse how far expenditure is spent on poverty programmes being 
defined as government priority.
3.- How is the expenditure and budgetary process of each social 
ministry organised?
Under this heading, following on the aproaches to budgeting of 
Caiden and Wildavsky (1974) and Goode (1983) , we attempt to
analyse how the budgetary phases of formulation, authorisation, 
execution and evaluation are undertaken in each ministry, and 
whether they correspond or not to the patterns described in the 
bibliographical review.
4.- How extensive is the discretion or autonomy that the 
regions really have in planning and managing the 
social programmes undertaken on its territory?
In attempting to solve this question, we will concentrate on the 
basic forms of government intervention: regulation, finance and
production of social policies and programmes. We will be 
analysing to what extent each of these forms are performed or 
decided at a central or a regional level. For this last point, we 
will consider some elements of the theoretical approach to 
measure decentralization developed by Smith (1979).
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5.- What is the regional allocation of social expenditures 
per capita in each social sector?
This point concentrates on calculating the actual regional 
expenditure figures. This involves a complex process of data 
a n a l y s i s ,described in Chapter 4. The findings of these 
calculations will give a first indication of the equalisation 
role of Central Government between regions.
6.- What is the relation between the regional allocations of 
social expenditures and regional needs?
It is not only important to know the regional expenditure 
allocations, as mentioned in Item No.5, but also to test whether 
they are related or not to the regional needs. Using Davies* 
(1968) concepts, we are interested in testing whether resource 
allocation is following a criterion of territorial justice.
Specific Topics to be Examined in Relation to the Regional 
Allocation of Social Expenditures
In the theoretical review of Chapter 1 we discussed some 
studies, related to the present one, that were undertaken in 
La tin A m e r i c a  and o ther c o u ntries. Some of those 
studies'findings, especially those of Selowsky (1979) and 
Rodriguez (1984), were considered as interesting statements to be 
reviewed in the present research, in that they discuss the 
implications of the regional allocation of social expenditures.
The main competing hypotheses to be examined are listed below:
1. The government will channel a higher proportion of its funds 
to the less wealthy regions, measured in terms of their 
basic needs insatisfaction.
2. The richest regions will demand and obtain higher levels of 
social expenditure per capita.
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3. Urbanization results in the extended family and the 
community being less able to provide education, housing and 
health care, thus inferring a greater need for social 
services: c o n s e q u e n t l y  social e x p e n d i t u r e  will be
concentrated on more industrialized and urban regions.
In relation to the third hypothesis under analysis, as has 
been mentioned before, Gwynne (1985) and other authors have 
observed that in Latin America there are mutually reinforcing 
and intertwined relations between industrialization and 
urbanization. We define this hypothesis only in relation to the 
latter phenomenon, urbanization, since data on this is more 
r e l i a b l e  and itis the u r b a n i z a t i o n  c o n s e q u e n t  on 
industrialization that is probably most significant for social 
needs.
7.- What lessons for the future can be learned from the present 
system of regional allocation of social expenditures?
Under this heading it is intended to review the main findings of 
the study analysing the implications this may have for the 
future development of the Chilean Social Services.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS
4.1. INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we will describe the principal steps that 
were undertaken to address the issues listed in Chapter Three. 
Although the methodological aspects considered here are to be 
used through out this research, in some particular cases it was 
necessary to define ad hoc procedures in order to tackle specific 
problems which had arisen.
Sections 4.2., 4.3. and 4.4. delineate the methodological
steps used to discuss the first main topic of research,a topic 
related to the intersectoral analysis of the procedures and 
strategies of the finance and organization of each social 
ministry at national and regional levels. Therefore, we will be 
looking at the ways of obtaining access to the information 
required. At the same time we will define a procedure for 
examining in a qualitative approach the information about the 
ministerial organization and finance.
Sections 4.5. and 4.6. will discuss methods to analyize 
the elaborated information in order to address the second main 
topic of research, which states the extent to which the regional 
allocation of social expenditures is related to regional needs. 
Therefore, the first of these two sections will explain how the 
national expenditure figures were elaborated and how the regional 
allocations were estimated. The next section sets the framework 
for the data analysis.
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4.2. GETTING ACCESS AND INFORMATION ABOUT MINISTERIAL FINANCES
Since the main objective of the present work is the analysis 
of the Chilean Social Sectors finances and Organization, it was 
necessary to obtain this information directly from the 
ministerial bureaucracy. To the knowledge of the author there 
are no global descriptions of this theme in the Chilean case. The 
research methodology of this part included a theoretical review, 
some structured interviews and feedback provided from the 
observation of practice and from the own officials in charge of 
the services. To some extent, this approach is consistent with 
that of "administrative anthropology", defined by Glennerster et 
al. (1983).
The steps for approaching this problem were the following:
1. Bibliographical Review
The bibliographical review summarized in Chapters 2 and 3 
provided an important background for defining the specific tasks 
to be considered in the subsequent steps. Most of the issues 
discussed in these studies were considered as topics to be 
examined in each ministry. The most important contributions in 
the area of planning and bureaucratic organization were taken 
from Caiden & Wildavsky's "Planning and Budgeting in Poor 
Countries", and Glennerster's "Paying for Welfare". With regards 
to the budgetary process, Premchand's book on Government 
Budgeting and Expenditure Control, tog.^ether with Goode's 
"Government Finace in Developing Countries" were of great use.
The sectoral bibliographical reviews included in the first 
section of the ministerial chapters also contributed to the 
definition of the most important issues and problems in each 
area.
2. Documentary Analysis
An important contribution towards understanding the bureaucracy 
and organization of the Social Services were the reviews of the 
main Official Publications in the area. Although these usually
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did not include a complete description of the ministerial
organization, they did provide an insight into the basic 
structure of service delivery and above all, an introduction to 
the most important programmes and policies in action. In this
regard, the latest Informes Sociales of ODEPLAN (1984-85 and 
1986) contributed enormously. The Annual rep^orts of the Ministry 
of Housing and some ad hoc reports of the Ministries of Education 
and Health were also considered.
3. Structured Interviews
The most important ideas and issues raised through the 
bibliographical review and Documentary Analysis were included in 
a structured interview with Budget and Planning Senior officials 
from each social ministry. All the interviews had a similar 
structure but were different in some aspects of finance which 
were specific to each ministry.
4. Feedback
The interviews with the officials were not only a way to obtain 
specific information, they also contributed to a great extent to 
introduce the research topic to the officials, receiving some
interesting feedback from most of them.
The interviews also provided the opportunity to negotiate 
further access to information, especially about expenditures and 
need indicators series. Usually, this information was obtained 
through lower ranking officials or simply processed by the 
researcher lii/-self. In these occasions, it was extremely useful 
and illuminating to discuss with the ministerial staff their 
perception and ideas about the services; this was also considered 
a feedback to the information provided by Senior officials.
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4.3. PROCEDURE FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT OF
SOCIAL POLICIES
The analysis of the redistributive effects of social 
policies in Chile, is considered one of the issues to be 
addressed in the present work. In Chapter Three we mentioned the 
intention of checking how far the officially stated goal of 
progressive social policies is related to the ministerial 
expenditure structure.
As the reader can appreciate, the discussion of this issue 
and specifically obtaining the required data for analysis is an 
excercise that is beyond this research; in fact, it could be a 
vast area of research in itself. Therefore, in dealing with this 
issue we must rely on works previously carried out in this area.
Two related results are obtained from this analysis. In the 
first place, we want to address issue No.2, that is, how far 
expenditure is being spent on poverty programmes which have been 
defined as a government priority. In the second place, depending 
on the previous results, we can infer the government's 
will^igness to achieve its stated policy proposals.
The information data source to be used in this section 
comes from the works of Haindl and Webber (1986) and Haindl, 
Budinich and Irarrazaval (1989). These studies analyse the 
distribution of fiscal social expenditures (^ ) in each of the 
social sectors per income deciles of the Chilean Population. 
These studies were sponsored by The World Bank, and are based on 
a nation wide sample survey of 22,000 households (^). The samples 
have national representativeness and an estimated sampling error 
of 5%. The surveys were carried out in November 1985 and 1987. 
They included questions on family characteristics, income.
1.
It should be noted that the outcomes of these studies refer to Fiscal Social Expenditures. They constitute 
an important porportion of public social expenditure but are not totally equivalent, (see section 2.3.C.). 
In 1985, fiscal social expenditures were 78% of public social expenditures.
2. The Sample Survey is known as CASEN: National Socioeconomic Characterization.
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housing, education, health and social security.
In order to test the share of fiscal social expenditures 
reaching poor families, we need to define a poverty line. There 
has been a considerable discussion about poverty levels in Chile. 
Some official measures based on housing standards have concluded 
that poverty affects 14% of the population, other studies based 
on minimum basket requi ^  rements concluded that 45% of the Chilean 
population lives in poverty (^). We decided to set a more 
consensual level of poverty, one that might be accepted by a wide 
range of experts and could be calculated using the available 
data.
The level defined was that of many studies on income 
distribution: The lower 30% of the income distribution.
Therefore, we will test what proportion of the programme or 
sector expenditures reaches the lower 30% of the population. We 
will classify the share of fiscal social expenditures received by 
the bottom 30% according to the categories in table 4.1.
TABLE 4.1.
REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT OF SOCIAL EXPENDITURES ON THE LOWEST 30% OF
THE POPULATION
TYPE OF PROGRAMME SHARE OF BOTTOM 30%
Regressive
Neutral
Slightly Progressive
Progressive
Very Progressive
up to 30 % 
30 % 
30 - 50 % 
50 - 65 % 
65+%
3. In relation to Chilean poverty levels; see:
Irarrazaval, I. (1989) La situacion de la pobreza en Chile: Aspectos conceptuales y cuantitativos. 
Documente de Investigacion No. 93 Dept. Economie Universidad de Chile.
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4.4. TESTING EFFECTIVE REGIONAL DISCRETION IN MANAGING PUBLIC
DECISIONS AND RESOURCES
In order to test the effective regional discretion in 
managing public decisions and resources, we will be looking at 
three forms of government intervention (*):
Regulation: The state, through a law or other legal
procedure, defines what activities may, or may not, 
have to be undertaken.
Finance: The state through its budget may finance some
activities and make them available free or almost 
free of charge to the common citizen. For Example, 
the state may finance old's people homes which are 
run by a voluntary organization.
Production: The state may produce or manufacture some
specific social goods. For example the state runs its 
own public schools.
It should be noted that the last two forms of intervention 
can also be performed by the private sector, or by a mixture of 
both private and public.
The analysis here has basically a qualitative approach based 
on the information provided by Senior officials , the insights of 
the researcher into each sector, and some bibliographical 
background. Since this is a qualitative analysis and, as was 
mentioned in Chapter 1, decentralization is a concept that can 
take many specific forms throughout a continuum; we cannot expect 
to define with exactitude the level of decentralization of a 
certain institution, and this is not the basic issue here. 
However, through a series of relevant topics and questions 
concerning each of the three forms of government intervention, we 
will be able to produce an idea of the pattern of discretion or
4. These three forms of government intervention have been adapted from Le Grand and Robinson's (1984) 
categories of government policies and Musgrave and Musgrave's (1989) explanation of the allocation function 
of public finance. However, the names given here do not correspond necessesarily with those used by them.
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autonomy that the region has in for managing decisions and 
resources (^ ) .
An important caveat ought to be introduced in relation to 
the testing of effective regional discretion in managing public 
decision and resources. As the level of analysis here is the 
region and this level is being compared with the central or 
national level, we consider local government regulation, finance 
and production. For example: all public schools in Chile are now 
managed by the municipalities, therefore for our purposes the 
production of primary and secondary education is regional. In the 
case of finance, the approach is a bit more complex. We consider 
as "regional", the allocations transfered from the the centre to 
the municipalities in order to perform such tasks as had been 
previously undertaken by the central ministries , as in the case 
of health and education. In this research we are not studying 
local governmet revenues.
REGULATION
Three questions are to be considered in relation to this form of 
goverment intervention:
1. Who defines the tasks or functions of the agencies?
There is usually a sharing of responsibilities between central 
and local governments. The centre may define broad goals and 
the use of resources, and localities determine the mode of 
delivery.
2. What is the source of agency authority?
It is important to clarify where the acting powers of an 
agency come from? Do they have an origin in the central 
goverment? If such is the case, the agency is probably then a 
deconcentrated institution. But, if the acting powers come 
from the regional level,then the agency should be a 
decentralized institution.
5. Some of the methodological questions used in this section were taken form Smith (1979).
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3. Who controls the functions of the agencies ( )?
Has the regional level the capacity to exercise control at 
all? Can the central level impose control over regional 
offices or must it influence the field offices in order to 
change some actions?.
FINANCE
In this area we have defined five different forms of financing 
regional social programmes and policies, ranging from central 
control to regional discretion over the management of resources.
Grants or funds transfered from central government to the regions 
were not considered at the outset as a necessary reduction of the 
regional autonomy. What may effect the autonomy of the region is 
the type of grant being trasfered (^ ) or the method of 
administering the grants. Another important issue to be 
considered here is the definition of some constraints in the use 
of resources transfered to regions, such as imposing ceilings on 
some types of expenditure.
1. Centrally managed finance: This is the case of national 
programmes which have effects "in and for" the regions, but 
have almost no discretion in the allocation of resources.
2. Specific-purpose grant or fund: Under this category we 
include funds transfered to a region for a single objective. 
The eligibility criteria for benefiting from this fund is 
defined centrally, the central level may also impose ceilings 
in the number of beneficiaries. The regional level has the 
discretion to select the individual beneficiaries. A goal of 
territorial equity might be behind this form of allocation.
6. This question can also be related to production.
7. For more details on the types of grants: see section 1.7.
125
3. Fund for subsidising specific activities: This form is
very similar to the previous one, but in this case the regions 
have more discretion; there are almost no imposed ceilings in 
the number of beneficiaries and the region is free to use 
these resources within a sector.
4. Block grant or fund: In this case we have a fund that has a 
broader defined purpose (such as "investment"). The region can 
decide in which sector to use the resources, and there is no 
pre-defined basis of distribution from the central level.
5. Regionally managed finance: The region has total freedom in 
managing the resources in the areas decided by it.
PRODUCTION
In the production of a social good or service, we will look at 
two aspects:
Personnel Policies: How far personnel recruitment, promotion 
and transfers are in regional hands or are managed centrally.
Levels of field administration: The greater the numbers levels 
in the field organization's hierarchy, the greater the 
decentralization involved. Despite the fact that different 
levels may have variable powers,together they add up to strong 
decentralization.
Other aspects to be considered here are the frequency with 
which field officers must refer matters to central 
headquarters, and the frequency of communications between 
headquarters and the field for planning and control.
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4.5. METHODOLOGICAL STEPS FOR THE DERIVATION OF THE NATIONAL AND
REGIONAL SOCIAL EXPENDITURE DATA
In this section we will concentrate on the methodological 
steps needed to produce a regionalized series of Chilean Social 
Expenditures.
A) Regional Allocation Criteria
The starting point for producing a regional series of 
social expenditure is to have a standard criterion for allocating 
national figures on a regional basis.
The criterion is defined from the conceptual basis derived 
from the writtings of Short (1978), introduced in Chapter No 1. 
As a reminder of Short's work, it is necessary to mention that he 
defined two regional dimensions of public expenditures:
a. Expenditures in a region : Expenditures in a region
c o m p r i s e s  all the e x p e n d i t u r e s  ma d e  w i t h i n  the 
geographical boundary of the region, irrespective of where 
the real benefits accrue.
b. Expenditures jji and for a region, or regionally relevant 
expenditures : This type of expenditures comprise only 
those expenditures made in a region, for the benefit of 
that region. This latter category may be subdivided into:
i) Expenditures from which benefits accrue exclusively 
to a particular region
ii) Expenditures from which benefits accrue in and also 
beyond the region concerned
To clarify these concepts an example can be given. The 
Ministry of Education purchases every year textbooks to be 
distributed in all the regions. However, the actual purchase is 
made in only one region, where the publishers are located. 
Therefore, this expenditure is 100% in a region. However, since 
the textbooks are to be distributed through all public schools 
the benefits of this purchase will be shared by all the regional
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educational authorities, therefore these expenditures can be 
treated as regionally relevant,according to the regional and 
final distribution of the text books.
In the present work all the figures are treated according 
to the regionally relevant criterion. A special effort was made 
to isolate from these figures all expenditures that did not have 
a clear regional impact or were basically national programmes 
with no clear criterion for regional allocation. Fortunatelly, 
this was not an important proportion of the total social 
expenditures. Other areas of public expenditures such as Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and others are not considered in this work, 
since this research is not a regional fiscal incidence study (®).
In addition to Short's basic definitions, it is necessary to 
define some criteria to clarify the quality of the regional 
figures obtained:
Criteria:
a) Correspond to those expenditures which have a clear 
regional accounting system from the original data 
source.
For example, each Health Service or Regional Housing Service 
has its own budget, therefore the expenditure figures of their 
budget are by definition regionally relevant.
b) Correspond to those programmes or to the parts of 
those programes that do not have a defined regional 
accounting system to match the "in and for" 
criterion but have a regional connotation. 
Therefore, it is necessary to define an external but 
specificaly related indicator to regionalize these 
expenditure figures.
For example, in the case of the Programme of Complementary
8. This means that we are not looking at the net impact of public activities in a region. This is the net 
effect between public expenditures and taxes, in this case all public activities should be considered, not 
only the social ones.
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Feeding(M.of Health)it was possible to regionalize these 
expenditures by multiplying the quantities of products 
distributed in the regions (according to ministrial sources)by 
the estimated costs of each one.
Overall,we consider that criteria A and B are the two most 
accurate approaches to regionalize public expenditures as they 
both have a clear regional reference basis.
c) This criterion is similar to b), but in this case the 
criteria to allocate the regionally relevant expenditures 
is a sectorally related indicator, which is not as 
specific as the ones used in the former case.
The example in this case is the Chilean Undersecretariats, which 
typically pays the salaries of all the civil servants in the 
upper tiers of each ministry. However, it is not possible 
through an accounting procedure to establish the exact amount of 
expenditures devoted to each region, therefore a secotrally 
related indicator was used to allocate these expenditures. This 
can be medical consultations per region, proportion of school 
registrations or others.
d) This criterion was reserved for some national or ample 
programmes within the social ministries. In this case it 
was not possible to allocate these expenditures with a 
specific or sectorally related indicator. Therefore, a 
general external indicator was used.
For example, in the case of the National Council of 
Television, dependent upon the Ministry of Education, a general 
external indicator was used to allocate its regional 
expenditures,such as regional distribution of population, 
regional G.D.P. per capita or other indicators considered more 
appropiate.
B) Social Expenditure Data Sources
One of the most important tasks of the present work is to 
produce a regional distribution of social expenditures; the data
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for elaborating this information was obtained through each 
ministerial and service source. In many instances the 
Departamenta1 or Service sources did not match with the 
Ministerial figures;on these occasions it was necessary to check 
the accounting system of both institutions to understand the 
origin of the differences. In order to have a common basis for 
all the public instituions, allowing comparisions between 
programmes, the ministerial or service figures were adjusted to 
the final figures of the "Estados de la Gestion Financiera del 
Sector Publico" of the General Comptroller. This is the only 
series of public expenditure figures with a broad coverage and 
elaborated on a uniform basis.
In spite of the uniform basis of the Comptroller figures, 
they are usually presented in an aggregate form, making it 
difficult to elaborate from this single source the regional 
figures.Therefore, in most cases the original ministerial or 
service budgets were used to elaborate the regional figures. From 
this stage, the regional structure of the expenditure 
distribution was elaborated, and then, this structure was used to 
allocate the Comptroller figures.
C) Transfer Elimination
Most ministries transfer part of their resources from one of 
its institutions or departments to finance the work of another. 
It is even possible to find interministériel transfers which 
finance services related to the original ministry but performed 
by another. The expenditure figures published in the "Estados de 
la Gestion Financiera" consider as expenditures all the transfers 
between and within public institutions; this means that it takes 
no consideration of the transfers with a view either to 
eliminate or consolidate them. Therefore, in this study great 
caution was taken in order to avoid doubly counting these 
"expenditures". The intra and interministerial transfers were 
studied according to the Yanez (1983), and Yanez and Aguilo 
(1988) methodology, introduced in Chapter 1.
As a general rule, the resource involved in a transfer were 
registred as an expenditure in the institution that received the
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transfer, and were eliminated from the "donor" institution.
Great care was also taken in discovering the type of 
transfers involved. The Chilean accounting system registers as a 
"transfer to the private sector" some purchases that a public 
institution makes for the public sector. As an example; the 
Central Supply Warehouse of the Health Ministry considers as a 
transfer to the private sector all the expenditures involved in 
the purchase of milk for the National Programme for Complementary 
Feeding. In these cases the transfers were not consolidated.
D) Public Sector Price Index
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there has been an important 
controversy in Chile in relation to the representativeness of the 
official consumer price index. This problem was very important 
between 1974 and 1978, when some scholars estimated that the CPI 
underestimated inflation (Cortazar & Marshall 1980). Fortunately, 
this problem is not crucial for the present study, since the 
basic data series is from 1985 to 1987 ; but some more extensive 
data series used the appropiate CPI.
However, there is an additional difficulty for constructing 
a real public expenditure series The majority of the works in 
this area transform nominal figures into real ones through the 
CPI. Yanez, (1988), has shown that the CPI is an imperfect 
deflator for public sector expenditures, since the basket of 
public goods differs considerably from the basket of goods that 
an average family consumes. For example, one of the main 
components of public sector expenditures is wages and salaries, 
which in the last years has grown less in nominal terms than the 
CPI, therefore deflating through the CPI subestimates the real 
level of value.
In the present study, the nominal figures were all 
transformed into real ones through Yanez's public sector deflator 
for each ministry. This deflator considers appropiate variables 
for the goods which the public sector typically buys.
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4.6. METHODS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
This section is aimed to introduce most of the statistical 
devices which will be later used in the data analysis. Special 
emphasis will be given to explaining why these specific devices 
were chosen for the analysis, and the constraints in their use 
and analysis.
One of the most important issues to be addressed in the 
present study is to determine to what extent the Chilean regional 
allocation of public expenditures represents a situation of 
territorial equity. Therefore, we need a statistical indicator of 
dispersion that can show the relative equality of different 
distributions.
The traditional indicators of dispersion,such as mean or 
standard deviation, have the advantages of expressing their 
results in the same measurement unit as the variable analysed. 
But it might be somewhat misleading to compare the absolute 
magnitude of standard deviations. One might expect that with a 
very large mean one would find a fairly large standard deviation. 
One might therefore be primarily interested in the size of the 
standard deviation relative to that of the mean. This suggests 
that we can obtain a measure of the relative variability by 
dividing the standard deviation by the mean; this has been termed 
coefficient of variation.
In the case of the data usedin this research,some items are 
presented in different metrics. Therefore, we need an indicator 
such as the coefficient of variation that shows the relative 
variation of the variables.
In each sectoral chapter, the coefficient of variation of 
the regional allocations of public expenditures per capita is 
calculated. Through this it is possible to make comparisions 
between the equality of the territorial distributions of the 
different ministries, and when possible these figures are
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compared with similar calculations for Britain or other 
countries.
B. Data Pooling
A practical problem of some importance ofcurred when 
attempting to investigate further the statistical associations 
and causal relations between the variables under study. The 
series of regional expenditures were calculated for all thirteen 
Chilean regions for only three years from 1985 to 1987, because 
of the great complexity involved in the process. However, a two 
dimensional problem occurs, on the one hand,thirteen observations 
are too few to have good estimators from statistical models, on 
the other hand, three years are insufficient to use time series 
models. Therefore, a data peopling was used, in which cross 
section and time series data are combined.
According to Pindyck & Rubinfeld (1981), a condition for the 
use of pooling is that cross section parameters should be stable 
over time. Fortunately, this is one of the features of the data 
under analysis. The social indicators chosen for the study do not 
present important discontinuities over short periods of time, as 
is commonly to found in many financial and economic indicators. 
For example, it is not expected for infant mortality to show 
important differences from one year to another unless there is a 
national catastrophe.
Pindyck & Rubinfeld suggest that a good test to check the 
stability of the parameters is to run”N" regressions for each "T" 
time period. If both Alphas and Betas are constant over time, 
this means that a more efficient parameter estimate can be 
obtained if all data are combined, so that one large pooled 
regression is run N*T observations. The suggested test was 
performed for each sectoral set of variables and found no 
significant differences in the estimated parameters of each 
regression.
The results of the statistical analyses from this data pool 
should be taken with caution. We are not dealing with a time 
series, therefore we cannot make assumptions about future
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evolution based on this information. What we are getting is a 
picture of the present situation with a broader information base, 
which can be considered as an average of the three year period 
under analysis.
There is an additional problem in the use of pooled data, 
related to the structure of the disturbance term, which may be a 
complex one. The difficulty arises because the disturbance term 
is likely to consist of time series-related disturbances, cross- 
section disturbances, and a combination of both. Therefore, great 
effort was made in defining tests and mechanisms to check the 
presence of heteroscedacity, multicollinearity.
C. Correlation and Regression
After the calculation of the coefficient of variation, a 
second step in data analysis was the calculation of a product 
moment intercorrelation matrix, to test the strength of the 
linear associations between pairs of variables in use.
The linear correlation coefficient or Pearson correlation 
coefficient measures the degree to which a change in direction 
and magnitude of one variable is associated with a comparable 
change in the other.
The calculation provides data which can solve possible
links as well as describing the strength of empirical 
associations.
Further to correlation analysis, it was desirable to explore 
the dependancy relations between the variables under study. 
Therefore, several multiple regression models were fitted with an 
emphasis in testing the hypotheses formulated above.
As a result of the issues and topics described previously, 
the dependent variable was usually defined as the sectoral 
expenditure in per capita terms, leaving as independent variables 
a number of relevant indicators for each sector. It may appear 
somewhat striking to define such dependant variables instead of 
traditional sectoral status or performance indicators such as
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General Mortality, Infant Mortality, Literacy, Educational level, 
etc. However, since the main objective was to test to what extent 
social expenditures are linked to needs, the form of the model 
was defined in a way that related needs indicators to the 
sectoral expenditures and not, inversely, what are the variables 
which influences changes in infant mortality, educational 
levels, etc(9). Nevertheless, in some specific cases, some 
regressions of the latter form were performed to explore the 
relations between these variables.
Because of the constraints in using a pooled database an 
important effort was made in performing a variety of statistical 
tests to assure the reliability of the results. These tests 
included an analysis of the regression goodness of fit, the 
relative importance of the parameters, and other tests for 
cheking the presence of heteroscedacity and multicollinearity, 
each of them are described in Annex No.l.
9. A further constraint for using a variety of social indicators as dependant variables, is that they were
expressed as percentage rates, making it difficult to assume that they have a normal distribution ranging
from minus infinite to infinite; therefore with small ranges of variation the dependent variable may be
truncated, impeding any statistical inference to be made from the results.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HEALTH
5.1. BACKGROUND TO THE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE OF HEALTH CARE IN 
CHILE
As was mentioned earlier, Chile has a very long history 
of state intervention in social welfare programmes, which finds 
its origins in the early industrialization period it experienced 
in comparision to other Latin American countries. As an example, 
in 1918 a health insurance scheme was organised for the workers 
of public railroads, by 1925 a milk programme for children was 
started.
The situation in the early fifties before the foundation 
of the National Health Service (SNS) , was that of a variety of 
institutions with many overlaps and total lack of coordination 
(Mardones, 1977). There was a the General Direction of 
Beneficence and Social Assistance, which was the main health 
provider in the country, and almost entirely financed by fiscal 
revenue. The users of the Beneficence were at large poor people; 
the origin of this institution is related to the Spanish 
conquerors and their intention to organise the provision of a 
minimun health standard. Manual workers contributing to the 
Obligatory Insurance Fund for Invalidity and Illness were also 
beneficiaries of the Beneficence. This fund only provided some 
ambulatory health consultations, and all major operations were 
perfomed in the Beneficence hospitals. There was also a legal 
guarantee of medical services and primary food for the wives and 
children of those contributing to the Obligatory Insurance. On 
the other side, there was the National Service for Emolovees; for 
those contributing to other funds, it provided basically for 
preventive medicine, and ultimately it shared the hospitals with 
the Beneficence. Finally, there was the National Direction for 
the Protection of Infants and Adolescents, which covered all the 
children of non-contributing parents, this was totally financed 
from public expenditure and used the medical infrastructure of 
the Beneficence.
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There were also a number of public and environmental 
health institutions, some of them dependent directly upon the 
Ministry of Health, others dependient upon other public 
institutions, such as the municipal hygenic services.
This short review of the health sector development prior 
to the foundation of the National Health Service, shows that the 
basic problems health care faced at that time were due to the 
variety of institutions performing similar tasks with no 
coordination between them, and sometimes with overlaps in their 
functions. With regards to the private sector; during this period 
there were few private clinics and there were no developed health 
insurance schemes.
This situation is demonstrated in figure 5.1., which 
shows the complicated links between the Ministry and its 
dependant institutions.
In 1952 the National Health Service fSNS) was created in 
an effort to consolidate the diverse public institutions involved 
in public health care under a unified structure. It incorporated 
the majority of the previous institutions, except the National 
Service for Emolovees. as figure 5.1. shows. The changes produced 
by the organization of the SNS involved mainly an institutional 
re-arrangement, without incurring new expenditures. The original 
structure comprised one director, to whom four departments 
depended: environmental hygene, epidemiology, medical attention
and technical services. There also was a General Sub Director who 
managed 18 health zones; in theory these zones had decentralized 
discretion for the management of the budget, but in practice this 
did not happen (Urzua, 1977). In practical terms, the Ministry 
allocated the budget on the basis of historic apportions related 
to the assigned and centraly estimated population, without 
specific consideration of the local needs or circumstances.
The organization of the SNS was slbwer than expected due to 
a lack of financial backing from the central government and to 
the inherent problems of combining different institutions with 
different aims and, in practice, even different wage levels.
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The National Medical Service for EmployeesfSERMENA) . 
founded originally in 1942, was a way of recognising the special 
status that skilled worker had in relation to manual workers; it 
was also thought of as a mechanism for alleviating the burden on 
the SNS hospitals and doctors. But because there was a real 
shortage of doctors, and many of them were working part time in 
both SNS and SERMENA, it was necessary to improve the quantity 
and quality of medical services given. So, in 1968 the SERMENA 
was reorganised, the main aim being to supply more doctor hours 
per patient. The solution was then to change the system of 
payment to doctors from a fixed wage to a payment per medical 
action, at the same time the modifications allowed the users of 
the service to choose their doctors, even from the private 
sector; for this reason this system is thereafter known as "free 
election system" or Prefered Provider System (Valdivieso, 1977). 
SERMEMA was basically financed from the Medical Assistance Fund 
(FAM), to which s^kiled workers and pension funds were required 
to contribute. FAM financed, in the form of medical vouchers, 
part or all of the medical action; it also offered some personal 
loans to finance the difference between private cost and 
SERMENA's contribution. The value of the medical consultation and 
other medical services, such as operations. X-rays, etc, were 
specified in special fee schedules. Doctors were required to be 
registered with SERMENA, and all the payments to them were 
through the Medical Association.
In the mid sixties, the distribution of the population 
in the health system was the following: 60% were beneficiaries of
S.N.S., 25% were beneficiaries of SERMENA; the remaining 15%
were covered by private medicine or had no health protection at 
all (Quesney, 1988).
In 1975, around 70% of the active doctors were 
registered in SERMENA, which was providing health care for more 
than two million people. In the same year SNS and SERMENA were 
covering 91% of all medical consultations in the country 
(Valdivieso, 1977).
The organization figure for the seventies shows a 
simpler structure, with only two public services in the health
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sector. At the same time, the ministry was performing 
simultaneously normative and operative or productive functions.
By 1980, many of the original expectations of the health 
care system were not being obtained and for that reason the 
goverment initiated a large scale reorganization of the sector. 
The main flaws of the old system, as identified by the 
government (ODEPLAN, 1980), were:
1. - The users of the public health system had no 
freedom to choose their desired type of medical 
consultation. There was an unnecessary discrimination 
between skilled workers and manual workers, in that only 
the former were able to use the "free election system", 
whereas the latter were obliged to use only the SNS 
facilities. The argument in practical terms is that in 
the lower tiers there is not a large wage differential 
between employees and manual workers, and therefore some 
workers are prepared to pay part of private medical 
services, and on the other hand some employees would 
like to use fully the SNS facilities.
2. - Another important problem in SERMENA was that of 
administrative irregularities. For example, doctors 
could overcharge patients (at no expense to themselves 
or to patients) by simply filling more vouchers. Another 
irregularity was in relation to the identification of 
S E R M E N A  b e n e f i c i a r i e s ,  t h e r e  was no form of 
identification and therefore it was easy for non menbers 
to have illegal access to the system.
3. - The management system was very centralised, and in 
practical terms the Health Zones were unable to 
influence in any way their expenditure and revenue 
decisions.
4.- There was an excessive concentration of the services 
offered, almost all of them were performed by public 
institutions.
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5.- Finally, the health services were concentrated very 
much on curative health care. Although the system had 
relatively good facilities in big cities, it was 
necessary to improve the conditions in poor rural areas 
where mortality was high.
These flaws are related to the basic problems of health 
services finance in Developing Countries identified by the World 
Bank. The Bank argues that the problem is not only insuficcient 
funds to meet the growing health needs, but also the existing 
inefficiencies in the management and incentive system of health 
services. The Bank also cites the existing inequalities in the 
distribution of the benefits from the health services (Banco 
Mundial, 1987).
In relation to the evolution of the Chilean health 
indicators between the 1960*s and the 1980's it must be said that 
they show a very positive evolution (Medina, 1979). The last 25 
years feature a systematic pattern of diminishing health risks. 
The group most benefited with this trend are the children: infant 
mortality has been diminishing at an annual rate of 3.6%. This is 
a clear result of policy priorities: maternal and infant diseases 
have been in the top priority since 1960, and subsequent 
governments have put an effort into the organization of 
ambulatory programmes for pregnant women and children up to 6 
years old (Medina and Kaempffer 1983). Castaneda (1984) has 
argued that despite a trend toward improvement since 1960 in the 
infant mortality rate and related indicators there is evidence of 
an acceleration of that trend since the mid 1970's. The reasons 
for the decline in mortality indicators are the shift toward the 
provision of services for mothers and children and primary 
health care in general. However, Foxley and Raczynski (1984) have 
argued that in the last ten years, this positive trend for 
children has been helped by a drop in the birth rate and a 
concentration of births in the social stratum with lower death 
risks.
As a consequence of a low death rate, life expectancy 
has incresed by 10 years during the period (See Table 5.1.). In 
relation to principal death causes there is a big shift from
140
infectious diseases and pathologies related to infants, including 
malnutrition, (all typical of developing countries), to a mixed 
situation including some of the former pathologies but with a 
grearter share of circulatory diseases, cancer and accidents, all 
more common in developed nations. The changes and improvements 
are associated with the increase of medical coverage and with 
improvements in other social sectors, such as education, 
sanitation and others.
TABLE 5.1.
CHILEAN HEALTH INDICATORS FOR THE LAST 25 YEARS
YEAR GEN.MORTALITY INFANT MORTALITY LIFE EXPECTANCY 
AT BIRTH
1960 12.4 119.5 57.1
1965 10.8 97.3 —
1970 8.9 82.2 61. 5
1975 7.3 57.6 64.2
1980 6.7 33.0 65.5
1985 6.3 17.9 67.1
Source: National Institute of Statistics and Ministry of Health
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5.2. HEALTH FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION
5.2.A. Present System of Health Gare
The Military Government wanted to reorganize the Health 
Sector from 1974. The majority of the organizational problems 
acknowledged were shared at first by both the Governemt and the 
Chilean Medical Society. However, the policy solutions offered by 
the Government varied from a privatization move, to a shared 
responsibility with emphasis in the public sector. This former 
solution was the source of the disagreement with the Medical 
Society, because medicine was treated as a "social service" but 
had no possibilities to develop in a competitive free market 
economy, the hospitals were overcrowded and had insufficient 
resources and, at the same time, the government was demanding 
efficiency in management (Raczynski, 1983). Under these 
circumstances, the government did not introduce all the changes 
at the same time; some delay was deliberately intended in order 
to have the backing of the Medical Association, but this was not 
achieved in most cases.
A second important area of discussion was related to 
the ministerial policy priorities in health care. Despite the 
acknowledged improvements in health care of the previous decades, 
there were still important areas to be improved. At that time, it 
was agreed that the public effort was concentrated in curative 
hospital based medicine, therefore it was possible to make 
additional improvements by concentrating public efforts in 
primary health care. This meant developing health actions through 
out patient sevice clinics and rural clinics with programmes 
oriented to mothers and their children (ODEPLAN 1980). This view 
was shared by a wide range of health analysts including Navarro 
(1976) .
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FIGURE 5.1.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MINISTRY OF HEALTH ORGANISATION
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The government tackled these problems through the 
reformulation of the ministerial functions and activities (^), 
in which it re-organised the SNS and SERMENA, the SNS becoming 
the National Health Service Svstem (SNSS) and SERMENA becoming 
the National Health Fund (FONASA) (see figure 5.1.)• This change, 
which is practically a unification of the services, then 
allowed both skilled workers and manual workers to have access to 
the system as a whole with no distinction. Therefore, now it was 
possible for the contributions of both manual workers and 
employees to go to FONASA.
The new health organization attempted to be a direct 
response to the problems identified earlier. Therefore it is 
important to look at each of them in some detail:
1.- Freedom to choose
The new law established a single health regime for all 
workers dependent or independent, and ended the distinction 
between manual workers and skille<^ w o r k e r s . It also 
established the level of payment that the beneficiaries have 
to pay per consultation.
2. Administrative irregularities:
The Free Election System or Preferred Provider System 
(formerly SERMENA) was now administred by FONASA. In relation 
to the administrative problems of abuses or misuses of former 
SERMENA identified earlier, Prefered Provider System users 
were obliged to show a special identification card to be able 
to purchase medical vouchers. This process has also been 
simplyfied by allowing some banks and FONASA branches to sell 
the vouchers. To receive medical atention the user of the 
free election system must purchase a voucher through which he 
pays part of the doctor fees, the rest being subsidised by 
FONASA. Afterwards the doctor will receive from FONASA the
1.
Law Decree No. 2,763 1979
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total cost of that medical attention.
3. Decentralization:
One of the most commonly recommended ways to tackle 
the problems of administrative inefficiency and management, 
is decentralization. A strategy for decentralising both 
planning and budgeting processes of health services has been 
firmly advocated by the World Bank (Banco Mundial, 1987). The 
Chilean centralization problem was tackled with the division 
of functions at a sub-national level within the ministry; the 
normative function is now executed by the regional 
ministerial secretariat (Secretaria regional ministerial 
SEREMI), the productive or operational function is performed 
by the health services of the country. The SNSS is now 
organized in 26 semi autonomus regional services, each of 
which with the required infrastructure to provide from 
primary health care to curative or specialized tertiary 
health care. Each regional service is managed by a Director 
appointed directly from President. For this reason, in 
figure 5.1. the Ministry is drawn to the left of the 
operative or productive services of health care, in this way 
we stress that the Ministry is performing a normative role, 
and the links to the Health services are not as vertical as 
they used to be. However, as will be explained below, the 
Ministry still finances directly most of the health 
activities, through FONASA.
A new feature appears too in the allocation system of 
the budgets of the SNSS. Instead of being allocated to health 
zones, regardless of the volume of health services supplied 
as in the past, SNSS budgets were now partially based on 
system of anticipated payments. These payments are now named 
Bill per medical consultation or fee for service system 
(Facturacion por atencion prestada (FAP)), and help to 
allocate budgets more in line with the actual utilization of 
medical services. The aim of this system is to change the 
distribution of financial resources from a subsidy of the 
supply of health services to a subsidy of the demand of 
health services (Viveros-long, 1986).
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The changes also embraced the municipalization of 
outpatient service clinics (consultorios). The aim here was 
to promote decentralization and efficiency through the 
consideration of all local demands. The system was financed 
by a municipal FAP (FAPEM) which paid more than the SNSS fees 
for medical consultations. In order to administrate 
transfered out-patient service clinics municipalities created 
Social Development Corporations. These Corporations are 
private non profit institutions; they receive the the SNSS 
reimbursements and use them to pay the clinics expenses (2).
Another way by which decentralization was tackled 
involved the elimination of the territorial jurisdiction of 
the former health zones, so that each health service should 
compete with the other to attract more patients, and 
therefore obtain more resources through the FAPs paid from 
central government.
4. Diversification of public services
An important change in health care finance and delivery 
during this period is that for the first time the government 
explicitly included the private sector in the provision of 
public health services and defined for the state a subsidiary 
role (Viveros-long, 1986) . This idea materialised with the 
introduction, in 1981, of the Provisional Health Institutes 
(Instituciones de Salud Previsional, ISAPRES). (The ISAPRE 
system is discussed below).
5. Shift to primary health care
The new institutional structure promoted a shift to 
primary health care; this was achieved through some 
decentralization policies. Additionally, in 1978 the 
government obtained an important financial support from the 
Interamerican Development Bank (IDE), to build a large number 
of rural outpatient health service clinics. At the same time
2. The theme of Social Development Corporations is also discussed in Chapter 6: Education,
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special training courses for nurses, midwifes and paramedical 
personnel were organised.
The Programme of Complementary Feeding (PNAC) was also 
redefined to improve targeting to poor families. In an 
attempt to discourage middle and rich families from the 
programme, it no longer distributes its benefits through the 
welfare offices of enterprises or institutions; instead it 
was required that every receipient (children from 0 to 6 
years) must attend the regular medical consultation for 
nutritional vigilance. The savings produced from this new 
form of operation were used to enhance the variety of 
products offered to children in relation to their nutritional 
status.
With these changes in primary health care and in the 
complementary feeding programme, the ministry simultaneously 
moved towards targeting its expenditures on the poor, i.e., 
making its programmes more progressive.
Organization and Production of Health care
The new health law of 1986 (^ ) established a single
health regime for all the population using the public scheme. The 
beneficiaries of the public system are all workers paying their 
mandatory health contributions to FONASA or low income families 
which qualify as such through a means test. There are two main 
alternatives within the public sector, the institutional (SNSS), 
and the free election system or the prefered provider system.
Under the institutional scheme the state subsidizes the 
users in a form inversely related to their incomes; poor families 
make no payment at all. The law defines four groups of 
beneficiaries :
Group A: Indigents and rec^ipients of assitance pensions
3. "New Health law" Law No. 18,469 
1 January 1986,
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Group B: Affiliated with personal disposable income below 
$16,288 - No Charge 
Group C: Affiliated with personal disposable incomes between 
$16,288 and $25,540 - 75% subsidy 
Group D: Afiliated with personal disposable incomes above $25,540 
- 50% subsidy.
Low income families, usually employed in the informal 
sector of the economy (i.e. do not contribute to FONASA), can 
only receive medical treatment under the institutional scheme in 
groups A or B.
The same regulation of the institutional scheme applies 
to the users of the Municipal Outpatient Service Clinics 
(Consultorios). In this work, this latter form of public health 
production has been differentiated in order to discriminate 
between centralized and decentralized modes of production.
The free election svstem benefits only the families of 
those workers contributing to FONASA. The beneficiaries can 
choose from three levels of subsidiation ; this choice can be 
exercised either in a private clinic or in an SNSS hospital.
The free election system is a tri-level care svstem. 
which consists of a fixed subsidy per medical voucher, and 
corresponds to different levels of subsidisation according to the 
level at which the consulted doctor is registered. There are 
three different levels (^):
Level 1: 50% Subsidisation of medical consultation.
Level 2: 33% subsidisation of medical consultation.
Level 3: 25% subsidisation of medical consultation. (^ )
4. There are other percentages of sii)sidisation per level in other medical services. However, the rank 
between the levels is always maintained, this means level 1 is always the cheapest, level 3 the most 
expensive.
5. FONASA has a price list of over 2000 types of medical treatments including examinations. Each type of 
attention has a base price which is applicable to doctors registred in each of the three levels.
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Theoretically there should be no differences in the quality 
of the medical services in relation to the different levels; 
differences should arise only as a result of amenities offered, 
waiting lists, etc. In practice, however, the majority of the 
more experienced doctors are located in the third level, whereas 
young doctors are in the first level. This produce the result 
that sometimes people have to see a doctor in an undesired 
(expensive) level, because it is impossible to find a known 
specialist in lower levels.
All the hospitals belonging to SNSS were included in the 
first level, as a way of controlling prices. FONASA users have 
some priority in the different levels of subsidisation, they 
usually prefer levels 2 and 3 for medical consultations, but they 
choose level 1 for laboratory exams (Castaneda, 1987).
It must be noted that the original expectations of the
Ministry were, on the one hand, that an important part of the
SNSS beneficiaries were going to use the "free election system", 
alleviating the burden of SNSS users and allowing it to 
concentrate on the most needy people; on the other hand, they 
expected that a few of the former SERMENA users would use the 
SNSS facilities.
A further alternative within the public sector is the Armed 
Forces Health Services. These services are exclusively for the 
armed forces and their families, and are not analysed here.
With regards to the private alternatives of health 
provision, there are two possibilities here; private medical 
practice and ISAPRES.
Private medical practice is available to all those who are
not contributing to FONASA, or to an ISAPRE, or who are not low
income families. In other words, this alternative applies to 
those self employed workers who choose not to contribute to a 
health insurance scheme, prefering to pay the cost of the medical 
consultations directly.
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In relation to the Provisional Health Institutes (ISAPRES), 
it must be said that these private health organizations are 
similar to the U.S. Health Maintenance Organizations, and receive 
the health contributions of those who made the choice not to 
contribute to FONASA. These should provide at least the same 
benefits as former SERMENA and must comprise curative and 
preventive medicine and the payment of temporal invalidity 
subsidies. The initial motivation of the goverment for the 
ISAPRES was to "alleviate the burden of the State Health System, 
and to stimulate the development of a private health 
infrastructure, leaving governmental health for the poor" 
(Raczynski, 1983). The main fears about this private health 
system were publicised from the outset by the Chilean Medical 
Society: i) The mandatory contributions for health care were to 
low to finance the high costs of curative medicine; ii) as a 
result, the ISAPRES would be highly selective, and would be 
competitive only for high income and low health risk workers; 
iii) This would produce at the same time, an important reduction 
of resources for the public health services.
Some of the original fears proved to be real after some 
time. As a result of the new health law, the mandatory payroll 
rates changed from a range of 3.5% to 4.5%, depending upon the 
institution to which the deductions were going; from a flat 4% 
rate in 1981, the rate then rose to 5% in January 1983, and to 6% 
in June of that year, and finally in January 1986, the deduction 
increased to 7%. It is interesting to note that one of the 
attractions of the new social security system (including in this 
case health insurance), was the lowering of the contributing 
rates and the subsequent increase of the disposable income of 
workers. Although social security contributions have stayed at 
the same rate of 13%, the practice has shown that the revenue 
yielded from the original contribution rates to finance health 
care were totally insufficient. This financial crisis is an 
indirect result of the health contributions going to the private 
sector, which correspond mainly to high income contributors, who 
are at the same time the people with low health risks.
It is now clear that the system favours mostly high income 
groups, in that the plans discriminate in relation to the income
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and number of beneficiaries per policy (cargas). Workers with 
higher levels of income, and smaller family will obtain more 
benefits.
The ISAPREs system has provoked an important transference of 
people from the "free election system" to the ISAPREs; this was 
an intendend policy. However, this has produced a constraint in 
FONASA resources. As Arellano (1987) showed, there is a negative 
net result between less expenditures in FONASA, (because of 
people leaving), and fewer resources in the public system, 
(because of the contributions shifted to the private system).
Despite the previous remarks, the evolution of ISAPRES has 
been very rapid. The number of beneficiaries has been growing at 
an annual rate of 60% (Miranda, 1989) . The share of ISAPRES in 
relation to the other health systems has grown to 10.6% of the 
total population; this has been helped by the rise in mandatory 
contributions and by other legal changes, and it is expected to 
grow to 15 - 20% of the total population. The profitability (®) 
of the institutions has ranged between 40% in 1985, to 23.6% in 
1987 (Miranda, 1989). Finally, the ISAPRES business has been 
featured by high stability; on the one hand, in the seven years 
through which the system has operated, only one institution has 
been closed by insolvency, and on the other hand, the top five 
ISAPRES have maintained their position during the period.
ISAPRES are only developed in the more urbanised high income 
regions, and the majority are working with contracts for private 
clinics already established as such, and so are not producing new 
"real" capital investment in the health sector.
To sum up, it should be noted that according to the New 
Health Law, the consumer has, theoretically, six alternative 
forms for accessing health care, although there are some 
restrictions for some of these (see figure 5.1.).
6. Profitability measured in relation to assets. See: Miranda 1989.
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From the public sector side, the consumer can access health 
care through SNSS hospitals, Municipal Outpatient Service Clinics 
or through the Free Election System receiving the medical 
treatment in a SNSS hospital or a private institution. There is a 
further alternative within the public sector in the form of the 
Armed Forces Health Services, but this is exclusive to the armed 
forces and their families, and therefore is not available for the 
general public. According to table 5.2. around 80% of the 
population relies on the public provision of health care; this is 
an interesting point, since it is almost the same share as in the 
mid 1960*s, despite the new law aimed at privatising Health.
In the case of the private sector, the consumer can have 
access to a Provisional Health Institute (ISAPRE), or simply use 
a private practice with no contributory system. According to 
Table 5.2., 14 to 16% of the population has access to private 
health care. According to Miranda (1989), more than 31% of the 
total health resources spent in the country are concentrated in 
the ISAPRES system. This helps to understand, that private 
healthcare is far from being a redistributive system.
TABLE 5.2.
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFICIARIES OF HEALTH SYSTEMS (?)
1987 (%)
ISAPRES FREE ELECTION SNSS Armed Forces Other TOTAL
11.0 11.0 70.0 5.0 3.0 100.0
7.5 19.0 65.0 8.5 100.0
Source: Author estimates 
Arellano (1987)
(first
(second
line)
line)
7. Since all workers must make their mandatory health contributions to any one of the systems available, it 
is not expected to find persons in more than one system, unless they are acting illegally. For example, an 
ISAPRE beneficiary can buy a medical voucher for a SNSS beneficiary.
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To conclude this section on the present system of health 
care in Chile, it is possible to summarize the governmental 
efforts in three areas:
i. The administrative changes of the public health services have
meant a redefinition of the system's functions:
Regulation: The National Health policies are
formulated by the Ministry of Health. At a 
regional level the Ministry is represented by a 
Regional Ministerial Secretariat for Health.
Financial Subsidy: This is concentrated in the National 
Fund of Health (FONASA), which administers all of 
the financial resources of the Ministry.
Production: The execution of the health policies is a
function of the National System of Health Services 
(SNSS).
ii. The government has liberalized the different alternatives of 
health care within the public sector, eliminating the 
discrimination between skilled workers and manual workers, 
and allowing each to use the service most suitable to his own 
budget.
iii. The Ministerial effort has been concentrated in 
stimulating the development of private health care in an 
attempt to alleviate the burden of the public health system 
and to leave the state system in a subsidiary role. However, 
as Table 5.2. shows, 80 to 85% of the population still rely 
on the public health system.
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5.2.B. Total Public Expenditure in Health
The analysis of the evolution of total public expenditures 
in health in Chile is not an easy task. During the last ten years 
there has been a big controversy on the subject. The figures 
produced by researchers show important differences in absolute 
terms. However, Castaneda (1984) has pointed out that the main 
difference arises from the variety of deflators used rather than 
the original nominal series used. The findings reproduced here 
confirm this point of view.
Three series of public health expenditures can be compared 
in Table 5.3. Each of the authors quoted used different 
deflators; Yanez used his own price index, Cheyre and Symon used 
the GDP implicit deflator, whereas the Comptroller used the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). As can be seen, the main differences 
in the trends appear during two periods: 1973-76 and 1978-80,
during which the National C.P.I. was subject to many criticisms. 
Nevertheless, it can be appreciated that the general trends 
observed are very similar. From 1970 to 1982 health expenditures 
grew by more than 35%,having experienced during this period an 
important decline during the international oil recession(1975-6).
The peak of the period is reached in 1982, when total 
public health expenditures accounted for 9.8% of total public 
expenditures or 3.4% of the GDP (Cheyre & Symon, 1987). After 
1982 there is a sharp decline in the expenditures when the 
country was hit by the new international recession. According to 
Yanez's figures, the present total expenditure levels are similar 
to those of 1970, but 18% lower than those of 1982.
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TABLE 5.3. 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN HEALTH
(PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN HEALTH (HEALTH EXPENDITURES per CAPITA (
((Millions of 1986 pesos) ( (1986 pesos)
(YEAR (YANEZ CHEYRE COMPTROLLER (YANEZ CHEYRE COMPTROLLER (
1 1970 ( 83,400 [ 8,929
1 1973 ( 52,600 ( 5,334
1 1974 ( 67,000 72,241 j 6,683 7,205
1 1975 j 53,000 64,054 j 5,198 6,282
1 1976 j 57,900 54,907 ( 5,582 5,294
1 1977 ( 69,400 68,406 66,799 j 6,578 6,483 6,331 [
1 1978 j 79,100 74,819 80,276 ( 7,370 6,971 7,479 j
1 1979 ( 84,100 74,266 88,533 ( 7,703 6,802 8,109 j
1 1980 j 78,800 74,347 85,800 ( 7,096 6,695 7,727 [
1 1981 j 99,700 92,263 96,934 j 8,828 8,169 8,583 j
1 1982 j 99,800 95,909 105,220 j 8,809 8,465 9,287 j
1 1983 j 84,200 81,423 87,365 i 7,186 6,949 7,456 (
1 1984 j 84,000 82,705 88,143 j 7,048 6,939 7,395 j
1 1985 j 79,600 80,117 84,141 j 6,567 6,609 6,941 j
1 1986 j 77,100 81,514 i 6,255 6,613 j
1 1987 j 81,800 86,500 ( 6.525 6,900 j
Source:
1. Yanez (1983) and Yanez y Aguilo (1988 
Quoted in Arellano
2. Cheyre & Symon (1987)
3. Contraloria General de la Republica 
Informes Gestion Financiers (1986 and 1987)
The health expenditures in per capita terms are plotted in 
Figure 5.2. The evolution of per capita expenditures shows a 
similar trend to total health expenditures. However, it must be 
noted that the growth shown here is less than that for total 
expenditures; in 1987 the government spent $6,525 per person 
which is 27% lower than what it spent in 1970, or 26% lower than 
1982. It should be noted in figure 5.2., that health expenditures 
show two peaks in the periods when the country was most 
economically stricken by the oil recession (1974) and the 
external debt crisis (1982). This is a remarkable countercyclical 
trend which will not be found in all other social sectors.
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FIGURE 5.2.
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In sum, during the 197 0-87 period the country experienced 
an important decrease in health expenditures in real terms, both 
in absolute and per capita figures. This trend is due to a 
government policy of cost containment in health care and the more
active role of the p r ivate sector after the cre a t i o n  of the
ISAPRES. The total public expenditure in the health sector is now 
2.6% of GDP. If the expenditures done through the private sector 
are added, the hea l t h  sector accounts for 3.4% of the GDP, a 
figure similar to that of the 1982 peak and the late sixties.
However, the e v o l ution of health finances may not be
directly correlated to health status. As was mentioned before
Chile has experienced important improvements in primary health
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care during this period, although its expenditures were reduced 
by an important proportion. This is similar to the conclusion of 
Abel-Smith (1984) in his study of cost containment in health care 
in some European countries.
5.2.C. Expenditure Structure
Introduction
Prior to the analysis of the expenditure structure, it is 
important to clarify that all the figures presented below were 
elaborated according to the methodology for transfer elimination 
described in Chapter Four. In the case of the Health Ministry, 
there are important transfers between the National Fund of Health 
(FONASA), the SNSS, and the Central Supply Warehouse (CSW), this 
is an important source of confusion for health finance analysts. 
For example, in the initial health budget for 1987, transfers 
were 45% of total expenditures, whereas in the final budget, 
after the elimination of internal transfers, the item was only 
7.8%.
Another caveat to be made is in relation to the up-dating 
of nominal figures. The deflator used was that developed by Yanez 
(1988), described in Chapter Four. This deflator was used for all 
the institutions except the CSW, for which a special deflator was 
produced considering its own expenditure structure, especially 
with regards to milk.
In this section we will describe firstly the economic 
expenditure structure of the Ministry of Health. Then we will 
describe the institutional expenditure structure.
Economic Expenditure Structure
The economic and institutional expenditure structure 
outlined in Table 5.4. considers only the three years under 
analysis in the present research: 1985 to 1987. However, we will 
also consider some references from the 1970's in order to 
describe the possible changes over time.
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TABLE 5.4.
THE STRUCTURE OF HEALTH EXPENDITURES
jEXPENDITURE (Undersec.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN HEALTH 
(Millions of 1987 pesos)
1985
FONASA SNSS Inst.Sal. C.S.W. TOTAL (Undersec.
EXPENDITURE STRUCTURE 
(%)
1985
FONASA SNSS Inst.Sal. C.S.W. TOTAL
(Personnel j 419.6 332.1 32533.2 381.1 133.9 33800.0 ( 51.9 1.4 57.3 50.6 1.9 37.8
|G.& S. cons. j 183.9 1153.6 17627.7 321.5 92.7 19379.4 ( 22.7 4.8 31.1 42.7 1.3 21.7
|G.& s . prod. j 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Soc.Uel.Prov. ( 0.0 21717.5 3167.3 0.0 0.0 24884.9 ( 0.0 90.0 5.6 0.0 0.0 27.8
(Transfers ( 1.6 4.8 5.7 3.4 6263.5 6279.0 ( 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.5 88.9 7.0
(Cap.Inv. j 11.4 704.8 806.8 13.2 0.8 1537.0 1 1.4 2.9 1.4 1.7 0.0 1.7
(F inane, inv. ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(PubI.debt ( 0.0 17.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.7 j 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Previous year ( 191.9 193.0 2586.6 33.0 557.2 3561.8 [ 23.7 0.8 4.6 4.4 7.9 4.0
(other j 0.0 10.1 16.0 1.6 0.0 27.6 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
(Total ( 808.5 24133.6 56743.3 753.8 7048.2 89487.4 ( 0.9 27.0 63.4 0.8 7.9 100.0
(EXPENDITURE (Undersec. FONASA
1986
SNSS Inst.Sal. C.S.W. TOTAL (Undersec. FONASA
1986
SNSS Inst.Sal. C.S.W. TOTAL
(Personnel j 438.3 365.4 33463.0 390.6 139.5 34796.7 j 67.6 1.5 57.8 56.1 1.9 38.4
(G.& S. cons. j 190.5 1111.0 17898.2 267.1 101.7 19568.5 j 29.4 4.6 30.9 38.3 1.4 21.6
(G.& s. prod. 1 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Soc.Wei.Prov. 1 0 21697.8 3407.2 0.0 0.0 25105.0 j 0.0 90.8 5.9 0.0 0.0 27.7
(Transfers 1 2.4 29.1 4.0 0.8 5695.4 5731.7 [ 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 76.5 6.3
(Cap.Inv. 1 5.2 479.8 924.2 8.9 4.1 1422.0 j 0.8 2.0 1.6 1.3 0.1 1.6
(F inane, inv. 1 0 33.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.2 j 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Publ.debt 1 0 23.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.0 j 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Previous year ( 11.7 94.9 1879.0 28.5 1500.8 3515.0 j 1.8 0.4 3.2 4.1 20.2 3.9
(other 1 0 61.5 296.5 0.7 0.0 358.7 j 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.4
(Total ( 648.1 23895.8 57872.0 696.6 7441.4 90553.9 j 0.7 26.4 63.9 0.8 8.2 100.0
(EXPENDITURE (Undersec. FONASA
1987
SNSS Inst.Sal. C.S.W. TOTAL (Undersec. FONASA
1987
SNSS Inst.Sal. C.S.W. TOTAL
(Personnel j 426.3 381.0 33395.6 398.6 143.0 34744.5 j 71.8 2.0 54.1 59.4 1.7 38.5
(G.& s. cons. [ 154.0 1091.1 21642.5 259.6 115.8 23263.0 [ 25.9 5.8 35.1 38.7 1.4 25.8
(G.& S. prod. ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Soc.Wei.Prov. j 0.0 15935.3 3355.9 0.0 0.0 19291.2 j 0.0 84.7 5.4 0.0 0.0 21.4
(Transfers ( 2.2 36.7 1.9 1.0 6975.8 7017.6 ( 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.1 82.3 7.8
(Cap. Inv. ( 6.0 9.6 1297.2 10.5 12.1 1335.4 j 1.0 0.1 2.1 1.6 0.1 1.5
(F inane, inv. ( 0.0 538.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 538.3 j 0.0 2.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6
(Publ.debt { 0.0 26.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.5 j 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Previous year 1 5.3 20.2 1920.8 1.3 1228.4 3176.0 j 0.9 0.1 3.1 0.2 14.5 3.5
(other ( 0.0 767.2 63.0 0.6 0.0 830.8 j 0.0 4.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.9
(Total j 593.8 18805.9 61676.9 671.6 8475.1 90223.3 ( 0.7 20.8 68.4 0.7 9.4 100.0
Author calculations based on:
Estados Ejecucion Presupuestaria del Sector Publico
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Personnel: Expenditures on personnel comprise the payment of
the salaries and wages of all public employees in the health 
sector. As a social service, Health spent most of its resources 
in labour costs. The proportion of expenditure in this item has 
remain^ed constant, at around 37% to 38%, from 1970. However, 
because health expenditures overall have diminished in real 
terms, the Ministry has adopted a policy of increasing the 
number of nurses, midwifes, medical technologists, and others, 
in order to allow the system to increase the number of medical 
consultations at a lower cost.
Goods and services: The expenditures on goods and services 
includes the medical supplies for providing health care. The 
expenditures in this item have evolved somewhat eratically, 
ranging from 21 to 26% of total expenditures.
Social Welfare Provisions: Social welfare provisions are the 
expenses resulting from state subsidy of the purchase of 
medical vouchers for the beneficiaries of the "free election 
system", it also includes the payment of maternal and illness 
subsidies.
This item has diminished in importance as a result of the 
creation of ISAPRES, since these institutions must now pay the 
subsidies. Still it constitutes the second largest area of 
expenditure within the Ministry of Health.
Transfers: Transfers are basically the purchase of milk to be 
distributed through the National Programme for Complementary 
Feeding (PNAC).
Investment: Investment expenditure has systematically fallen 
since 1970, when it was 13.5% of the total budget. From 1974, 
the Ministry argued that it was an intended policy aimed to 
concentrate efforts on the available infrastructure; therefore 
investment expenditure has remained around 2% of health 
expenditures. However, it should be mentioned that through the 
National Fund for Regional Development the Ministry of Health
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receives some funding for investing in its sector; in 1987, 
this was equivalent to an additional 2% of the total 
expenditures.
All investment projects must be approved through ODEPLAN*s 
Basic statistical system for i n v e stment. This is the 
governmental project evaluation system described in Chapter 
two.
Institutional Expenditure Structure:
Undersecretariat : This basically covers the ministry's
central bureaucracy which performs the ministry's normative 
function. It has a large share of expenditures in personnel, 
comprising health planners and financial analysts both at 
central headquarters and in the regions. The expenses in goods 
and services are almost totally related to office and similar 
items. The Undersecretariat acconut for less than 1% of total 
health expenditures.
FONASA: The National Fund of Health performs the financial
function of the ministry. FONASA is the legal successor of 
SERMENA. Its funds are obtained from different sources such us 
the free fiscal contribution from the Treasury and mandatory 
contributions from workers. It accounts for 21 to 27% of total 
health expenditures. The funds originally allocated to FONASA 
are later distributed among other ministerial institutions, 
such as SNSS, CSW, etc.. It also finances the "Free election 
system", and health related subsidies.
SNSS: The National System of Health Services (SNSS) performs the 
operative or productive function of the ministry, i.e. 
providing health care to the population. It accounts for more 
than 60% of the ministerial budget. In this case it is 
necessary to give a larger explanation of it expenditure 
structure.
The expenditures on personnel are paid according to a 
payroll list, and represent the most important area of 
expenditure of the SNSS. Each of the 27 health services has a
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limited number of employees, which is fixed by the budget law; 
at the same time the salary scales and promotion policies are 
also set from the central level. Therefore, despite the extent 
to which each health service may have some budgetary 
discretion, personnel expenditures are centralized. The 
Regional Director has discretion for recruiting additional 
professionals at the expense of the regional SNSS budget. This 
means that the Director must budget some regional additional 
resources in order to finance these.
The health services finance their expenditures on goods 
and services for consumption through the "Facturacion nor 
atencion prestada” system (FAP) (fee for service or bill per 
medical consultation) FAPs are paid to each health service in 
relation to the number of consultations given; this system 
helps to allocate budget more in line with local needs. The 
effects of this procedure will be considered in section 5.2.D.
The payment of social welfare provisions makes up 
around 5 to 6% of the total SNSS budget. These expenses 
comprise the payment of subsidies to those contributors to 
FONASA who are unable to work due to illness, pregnancy or 
childcare. The funds for these health subsidies are allocated 
monthly by FONASA in relation to the expenditures of previous 
years. As a way to provide incentives for efficiency and fewer 
expenses in this area, the ministry designed a policy by which 
each health service can spend in goods and services for 
consumption, the savings produced by the difference between the 
central monthly allocation and the actual expenditure in 
subsidies.
Finally, the allocation of capital investment between 
health services is defined according to central priorities; 
local autonomy is limited to the identification of different 
investment projects.
Institute of Public Health: The Institute is a research body
and acts as a national reference laboratory and quality control 
agency.
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Central Supply Warehouse (CSW): The CSW is the main supplies
purchasing organism of the SNSS. After the creation of the 
SNSS, the health services were permited to buy their supplies 
from the private sector; therefore the CSW evolved from a 
virtual monopoly, and as a result providing 89% of pharmacy 
items in 1975, to a simple competitor, providing 40% of these 
items in 1983 (Scarpaci, 1985).
The main expenditure item of the CSW is transfers. This 
area corresponds to the purchase of powder milk and other 
products for the National Programme for Complementary Feeding.
5.2.D. Budget and Planning
In this section we describe and discuss how the 
budgetary process of the Ministry is organized. In this analysis 
we also look at the existing links between planning and budgeting 
in Health. Therefore, firstly we will delineate the main elements 
of the ministerial process of budgeting. In the second place, we 
will analyse in more detail the effects that might produce in the 
ministerial budget the introduction of the new schemes of bill 
per medical consultation (FAP) or (fee for service), and the 
financial decentralization of the Programme for Complementary 
Feeding of the Central Supply Warehouse (CSW). In the final part, 
we will look at the links between planning and budgeting.
In general terms, as the Health budget is part of the 
national one, it must follow the same phases and stages of the 
national budget. However, it is interesting to direct attention 
to some particular aspects (®);
8. The description of the budgetary and planning processes of the health sector will be larger than the rest 
of the other sectors. In the next sectoral chapters we will concentrate on the differences observed in 
relation to the standard procedure of the health sector.
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Formulation
In contrast to the national level, the Ministry does not 
prepare its own policv outline for the elaboration of the 
budget; it prefers to rely on the financial basis of the 
budgetary office.
In the case of the health sector services, and in
general most social services, revenue estimates are not of great 
significance since most revenue comes from the Free Fiscal 
Contribution, and therefore the services largely must rely on the 
budget allocations. In the mean time, in order to prepare their 
budgets, they usually work with the previous year's allocation 
plus the estimated rate of inflation. The Budget Office supplies 
to each health institution an estimate of their expenditures for 
the next year. This figure comes from the Communicated Budget 
prepared by the Budget Office, and in practical terms it contains 
the final ceilings on expenditure.
Based on the previous year's allocations, health 
institutions receive their revenues and expenditure figures from 
the central level. The only exception is FONASA which receives 
workers' health contributions; in this case FONASA plans in 
relation to the previous year's contributions with and a 
consideration of the delay in receiving them.
Health institutions concentrate heav»ly on giving
grounds to the expenditure areas which the budget office will not 
anticipate. For instance, areas such as personnel, in which most 
of the structure is fixed by law, will be approved without major 
considerations; almost certainly, most parts of the previous 
year's explanations and justifications of the figures will be 
included. In the SNSS, an area demanding accurate explanation for
the Budget Office is the "over salary rate" of doctors, whose
base income will increase according higher experience and years 
of service. This salary rate produces a change every year, 
therefore the budget office knows that it is an area to look at.
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The Ministerial Planning Office compiles the service 
budgets, correcting minor mistakes, but usually not allowing for 
internal discussions, due to the tight schedule of the central 
budget. This proposed budget, which is almost enterely based on 
the prior communicated budget, will be sent to the budget office 
for approval (^).
Authorisation
The authorisation phase depends almost entirely on the 
Budget Office and the Ministerial Planning Office. On some 
occasions, such as 1983, reductions to the institutional 
estimates of expenditures can be made after the internal 
consolidation of the departmental budgets and the formal
approval of the budgetary law. In such a case, the institution 
facing the reduction must redefine some areas of expenditure, 
though this does not usually mean re-assessing the whole health 
budget.
Implementation
The implementation phase does not usually present 
significant problems, as the expected cash flow for the resources 
should have been included earlier in the departamental budget. 
The Ministry of Finance, through the Budget Office, provides the 
resources according to the planned cash flow.
However, some financial problems may arise due to 
inaccurate estimation of operational revenues or to delays. In 
the case of FONASA, because workers' health contributions are 
coming from different pension funds, the transfers of resources 
to FONASA may be delayed, creating important problems of 
insolvency which are automatically transfered to the health 
services (SNSS). On some extreme occasions the Budget Office has
9. It must be remembered at this stage that the total amount of expenditure devoted to capital investment is
not subject to discussion, as it has been set by the Budget Office; but, depending upon the amount of
resources involved, the health investment specialists will have some rounds of discussion with ODEPLAN's 
investment department.
10. In practical terms, for the health institutions within the ministry the process of budget consolidation
by the planning office becomes an informal authorisation.
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given funds in advance, while the pension funds' monies are 
expected.
Cases of wrong estimation of operational revenues can 
occur when a regional health service underestimates its revenues 
from the ministerial reimbursements of the fee for service system 
(FAP). However, as will be explained bellow, FAPs only cover part 
of the operational costs, the rest of the service expenditures 
being financed from the centre.
There are not important fluctuations in the budget 
estimates during the year, with the exception of specific 
occasions related to national ventures for vaccinations or 
others. Therefore, in relation to implementation we can conclude 
that the Ministry of Health is not affected by the problem of 
"repetitive budgeting", as the institutions are certain of the 
availability of the funds approved in the original buget. This 
fact can be endorsed by comparing the original ministerial budget 
expenditures with the final actual figures. For the years 1985, 
1986 and 1987 the accrued figures were 107%, 101% and 101% of the 
original budgeted figures. This implies a small range of 
variation in relation to the original figures.
There is no comprehensive evaluation phase of the 
budget. There is a partial financial assessment of the level of 
budget completion, analysing specifically the expenditures agreed 
upon for the next year.
In sum, it can be said that the ministerial budget 
possesses some elements of comprehensive rationality, li the 
sense that there are predefined and transparent procedures known 
to all the agencies. One area can be acknowledged as having a 
fully rational approach -investment expenditures, where it is 
possible to find precise goals and an evaluation of means against 
ends. However, as capital expenditure is less than 2% of total 
expenditures, its "rational" influence is minimal.
In more practical terms, the budgetary approach is very 
incremental, in that only marginal additions or changes are 
really analysed. A clear example of this is in the case of "over
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salary rates” of doctors, which is one of the few items to be 
justified in depth.
The regional health services' budgeting capacity is 
really concentrated in the area of goods and services for 
consumption (23% of their budgets). However, personnel 
expenditures, which account for 54 to 57% of the budgets, are 
centrally defined. According to a financial analyst of the 
Ministry of Health, the 27 health service budgets have an initial 
historical basis for the allocation of the resources. This 
originated from summing up hospitals budgets within a 
geographical region, prior the creation of SNSS and, as was 
explained in the introductory background, many of the hospitals 
were built as a result of pressure groups or political interests. 
Therefore, the present health service allocations are really a 
result of previous historical allocations .
After describing how the Ministry of Health budget is 
organized, it is interesting to discuss in more detail two areas 
in which there has been important transformations in order to 
decentralize their financial organization.
Fee for Service Scheme or Bill per medical consultation (FAP)
The Facturacion por atencion orestada (FAP) or fee for 
service scheme is a mechanism that takes into account the amount 
and type of services rendered by the agency. FONASA has a list 
of all possible consultations and prescriptions which are valued, 
depending the level of complexity (^^), in terms of a special 
unit callW "unidad arancelaria”. Each month every health
service details all the medical consultations given, valuating 
them according to a established national price scheme. The 
Ministry provides a form for the monthly reports fResumenes
11. In section 5.3. we will have more elements to discuss the impact of this type of historical allocations.
12. There are three predefined levels of complexity: alfa, beta and gamma. FONASA has a different 
coefficient by which the total amount of midades arancelarias is multiplied. Through this system the 
Ministry can promote different levels of complexity. Between 1980 and 1985, there was only a single scale of 
FAP payments (FAP integral), which was based on FONASA price schedules.
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Mensuales Consolidados RMC) that should register all types of 
consultations and services given (^^). FONASA refunds to each 
health service a proportion of the total cost apportioned to
each billed service or medical consultation. It should be 
noted at this stage that FAP schedules do not make allowances for 
the regional variations in prices. The system only reimburses the 
operational costs of medical consultations comprising basically 
medical supplies; other fixed costs expenditure, such as 
salaries and bills are still financed directly from the service 
budget, which is set at central level. This system is similar to 
the American Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG), which is a mechanism 
for prospective payments; a DRG equals the average amount of 
resources (labor, inpatient room and board services, pharmacy 
items, diagnostic services and other costs) spent in treating a 
patient (Scarpaci, 1988) (^^) .
For stimulating efficiency, the Ministry has recently 
designed an interesting incentive mechanism by which it allocates 
30% of the budgeted expenses for goods and services for 
consumption. The incentive mechanism is based on three types of 
indicators;
Financial: The ratio between billed treatments and health 
services revenues.
Balanced budget.
Biomedic: Ratio between normal/total deliveries.
Hospital discharges /total consultations.
Emergency consultations/ total consultations.
Social welfare provisions: Days of inhability to work/ total 
contributors.
13. Even the services not subject to FAP reinbursement should be included in the RMCs.
14. The FONASA list considers the total cost of giving a medical prescription; this is labour, 
infrastructure, medicines, etc. It will not refund the costs financed centrally such as personnel and 
investment.
15. More about DRG can be found inzGrimaldi, P. and J. HichelettizDiagnosis Related Groups. Pluribus Press, 
Chicago U.S.A. 1983,
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The aim here is to promote efficiency by providing a 
financial reward to those regional health services that follow 
the ministerial policies on these matters. This reward scheme 
might help the regional services to have in the future resources 
of their own and to spend them at their own discretion.
A similar system to FAPs is also applied to the payment 
of Out-Patient Municipal Clinics fConsultorios Municioalizados), 
which were transfered in 1981 from the health services to 
municipalities. The "Facturacion por Atenciones Prestadas en 
Establecimientos Municipales" (FAPEM) work in a similar way to 
FAPs, the only difference being that the former considers the 
payment of personnel costs. On top of FAPEM, some municipalities 
have increased their health expenditures with their own 
resources.
The idea here was to encourage the use of municipal 
clinics to decongest SNSS hospitals. In practice this move 
produced a huge increase in expenditure, because some municipal 
clinics, in order to obtain more resources, remained open more 
time than usual or managed to organise visits to primary schools 
to treat and vaccinate children, receiving for those activities 
the corresponding reimbursements from central government. As a 
result of this the ministry imposed ceillings on certain types of 
medical attentions and restored the same FAP regardless of the 
provider, reducing therefore the local capabilty for increasing 
staff recruitment or investment (Scarpaci, 1985).
Central Supply Warehouse (CSW)
The CSW is the main supplies purchaser organism of the 
SNSS. This involves the purchase of medical supplies and the food 
to be distributed through the National Complementary Feeding 
Programme (PNAC).
As was mentioned earlier, the CSW is no longer the 
monopolistic provider of medical supplies to the SNSS; it now has 
to compete with private suppliers.
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In 1988 the Ministry started a similar scheme of 
competence with private suppliers in the case of the supplies for 
the National Complementary Feeding Programme. It firstly studied 
the historical allocations of feeding produces (^^), defining a 
regional optimal quota of produces and its equivalent costs. 
After that, the Ministry allocated the resources to each regional 
SNSS defining a minimun level of provision. In the new system the 
resources are transfered to the regional SNSS, being the region 
authorised to make public tenders for the purchase of milk and 
related products. In this instance the CSW can participate as any 
other private supplier. The Ministry now allows the regional SNSS 
to spend any savings arising from lower prices and lower 
transport costs, providing that they have met the minimum quotas 
defined. However, although the "savings” can be spent as the 
region chooses they must be approved at the central level.
Unfortunately, we note again that this reward scheme is 
based on historical allocations which may not be equitable.
In conclusion, these new approaches are interesting 
devices which may help to decentralize and make more flexible the 
finance of the health sector. However, the proportion of 
resources involved in these schemes accounts for only 26 to 32% 
of the health budget (^^). Therefore, their strength is not 
enough to redress the historical pattern of allocation.
As mentioned earlier in the case of the SNSS the 
Regional Directors cannot actually manage around 60% of their 
budgets, which are defined centrally for them (this includes 
basically personnel and social welfare provisions). Therefore, 
their financial capacity is still constrained in an important 
manner. At the same time the incentive schemes are valuable 
alternatives for allowing the health services to increase their 
budgets and to spend in the areas most needed according to 
regional discretion. However, the incentive schemes can become
16. The PNAC products are basically powder milk and some nutritional cereals.
17. See: table 5.4.
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somewhat perverse as the reward system will favour the central 
policies. The Ministry will probably spend less because of the 
incentive indicators' definition. At the same time the centre 
will assure that the rewards are not wasted but invested in areas 
of which they approve, and therefore a better service can be 
achieved.
A second perverse element is related to the fact that 
because of the type of indicators chosen, it is probable to 
expect that the best performers are going to be the urbanised and 
more organised regional SNSS. This is the case, for example, with 
emergency consultations, which because of the distances and 
access problems have a relatively higher occurrence in rural 
areas. Another similar constraint concerns public tenders of milk 
and related products. In an area comprising mostly rural 
dispersed population, because of the lower quantities and the 
distances involved the costs will possible increase due to the 
loss of the economies of scale, again harming the poor areas. 
Unfortunatelly, since this scheme has been recently introduced 
there is no statistical information as the its results, but 
according to some ministerial sources it is clear that the more 
urbanised and older regional SNSS are getting the greater share 
of the incentive scheme.
Planning
Within the Ministry of Health, the Director of the 
Planning Office is the third in the hierarchy after the Minister 
and the Undersecretary. For the last five years the heads of the 
Planning Office have been economists.
The Planning Office has five departments:
Financial resources: Its main activities are the elaboration 
and implementation of the budget, as described above.
Human Resources: Its functions are the organization and the 
structure of personnel policies.
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Control and Evaluation (^®): This department processes all the 
information flows to the Ministry and delivers them to 
the appropriate users.
Planning: The main task is to define medium and long term 
health policies.
Programming: This deals with the control and analysis of the
evolution of illnesses, through a system of established 
goals and aims.
We now concentrate on the last two departments:
The Department of Planning analyses the demographic 
tendencies and the setting of medium and long term policies and 
goals. In the early 1980*s it concentrated on defining the 
"health strategies for year 2000" according to the World Health 
Organization recommendations.
They have also undertaken a number of national and 
regional diagnoses of the coverage of health programmes. From the 
outcomes of these works, medium term policies were defined.
In performance there are usually no links with the 
financial resources department, nor does the department of 
planning spend time trying to assess the financial implications 
of their policy proposals. It should be said that there is a 
natural barrier between both departments, as Planning is composed 
of public health specialists (i.e. medical doctors), and Finance 
of economists. Each knows he speaks a different language and 
does not try hard to understand the other. In the words of a 
financial analyst, being asked about the links between the two 
departments : "planning is a technical department not an
administrative one, that is why we have no links with them".
However, the lack of links between planning and 
budgeting does not prove that planning is a redundant activity 
within the Ministry. Most of the policies defined by planning do
18. This will be described in section 5.2.E.
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have an important effect in the long and medium term. But, as 
the financial aspect is not considered simultaneously, many 
proposals will end in adeclaration of good will. Although some 
sophisticated mechanisms are used to estimate the future trends 
of some illnesses, it is not in a situation of rational 
comprehensiveness. Many aims are stated, but there is a weak 
evaluation of the means to achieve them.
The Planning Department is also in charge of defining 
the Ministerial Programmes in conjunction with ODEPLAN . These 
programmes have proven to be highly successful by being able to 
define simple tasks or areas to be studied. Most of the present 
decentralization measures are a result of short and ad hoc 
studies undertaken.
Finally, with regards to intersectoral planning, 
according to the planning officials, they only have joint 
committees to deal with specific subjects such as drug problems 
(with the Ministry of Justice) and nutrition (with the Mnistry of 
Education) . But in this case, the outcomes of the meetings are 
even more restricted than others, as none of the ministeries like 
to spend their resources in "helping the others to perform their 
functions".
The Department of Programming is in charge of monitoring 
the evolution of ilnesses and health related problems. It 
maintains close links with the Department of Control and 
Evaluation. The occurrence of any unexpected illness or an 
increase in infant mortality, will mean a close control to the 
regional SNSS affected.
The Department also sets annually the number of medical 
consultations and health visits in general that each regional 
service must perform. These goals are defined by the historical 
activities of the health services, deviations from which imply 
receiving a warning from the central level.
The Programming Department has contributed in an 
important manner to the decrease of infant mortality and other
172
major health problems by monitoring closely the evolution of 
indicators in all regions.
To conclude this section on budgeting and planning, we 
would like to summarise the main findings introducing them as the 
major weaknesses and strengths of the system.
In relation to the weaknesses, it is clear that the lack 
of formal and practical links between planning and budgeting is 
an important constraint for the achievement of policy proposals. 
As mentioned earlier in Section 1.2.B, this is a common problem 
for social planning in Latin America.
As a result of the former problem, planning and 
budgeting are usally approached in a rather disjointed procedure, 
leaving each department or agency to solve its problems or to 
perform its activities with a background of general but strict 
rules.
Incrementalism appears to be the model guiding the 
budgetary process and parts of the planning procedures. However, 
it seems that the bureaucrats have not acknowledged this fact and 
still act as though they are using a rational comprehensive 
approach, and not taking advantage of the "Science of Muddlimg 
Through". For example, they must to include explanations and give 
grounds for the expenditures of major programmes every year, 
although every official knows that these will not be considered, 
as these expenditures are justified in and of themselves for 
their historical background.
Finally, another constraint is related to rigid 
expenditure and budgeting rules. In accordance to this rules, the 
problem arises that some semi-autonomus institutions are 
confined by a lack of discretion. Thus the regional SNSS are 
allowed to manage only a proportion of their budgets.
As may happen in other areas of Social Policy, some of 
the institutional weaknesses can also be considered from another 
point of view as strengths for the system. The rigid structure of
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operation of the system helps to have transparent and known 
procedures for all institutions. In this regard we mentioned that 
the problem of repetitive budgeting is not present in this 
sector, although it is a recurrent phenomenon in many developing 
countries.
Another interesting feature is the power of some 
practical approaches to achieve specific aims. This is the case 
of successful Ministerial Programmes which set specific tasks, 
deadlines, and institutions to tackle the problem. The rule seems 
to be "small is beautiful", ( there are broad social policy 
aims, but let us define a few tasks to achieve these aims in 
steps and stick to them) . This situation may also apply to the 
Programming Department which closely controls a specific set of 
indicators.
Finally, it ought to be pointed out that, although there 
are some schemes which may act as a breack through device with 
regards to the problem of lack of discretion, their influence 
remains to be seen as the schemes have been recently developed 
and their impact on the general budget is minimun. This is the 
case of the fee for service scheme and the decentralization of 
the CSW.
It is not possible to assimilate the health and 
budgeting procedures to one of the planning models reviewed 
earlier. There are some elements of rational comprehensiveness, 
there are also a number of steps and phases solved in an 
incremental approach although it is not acknowledged as such. It 
may be possible to say that there is an unconscious distinction 
between fundamental and incremental decisions, especially in the 
prepation of the budgets; but as Mixed Scanning is featured by 
its flexibility we cannot consider that this is the model 
followed here. It is clearly not possible to find elements of 
transactive or advocacy planning as most decisions are taken 
centrally without consideration of the beneficiaries.
In sum, since the features of the health model take 
elements (deliberately and not deliberately) from many of the 
planning models described, we are in the apparent necessity for
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defining a further new model that will pick most of the elements 
of the health planning and budgeting structure. We leave this as 
an open question to be considered in the following sectoral 
chapters.
5.2.E. Information System
An important element for the definition of policies, 
norms and actions in the health sector is a good information 
system. The Ministry of Health has organised, through its 
Department of Control and Evaluation, some pre-existing 
statistical sources in the form of a health information system. 
The aim of the system is not only to contribute to the decision 
making process but also to asses and control the performance of 
the health sector.
The information required for the seven components of the 
system is gathered by each health service, with different levels 
of aggregation, according to central norms and forms.
System Components;
1. Bio-demographic information: It provides the basic information 
to gauge the quantity of resources needed.
Indicators: - Population
- Vital Statistics
2. Illnesses of ephidemiological importance: The health services 
have to inform periodically about the appearance of some 
illnesses for ephidemiological watchfulness.
For example: Meningitis, cholera,aids,etc.
3. Malnutrition and alimentary surveillance: It is a follow up
system for children under six years and their mothers.
It works through a sample of 73 urban and rural outpatient 
service clinics which are representative of the total 
beneficiaries of SNSS.
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4. Work and school accidents: The main objective is to provide 
statistics to prepare studies for preventing working 
accidents. The data is processed by sex, age and 
circumstances.
5. Mortality audits: As a way to continue the decrease of 
infant mortality, every maternal or child death is subject to 
an audit, which is aimed to find the precise cause of death. 
Through this information the Ministry presumes to define 
preventive actions in this area.
6. Resources: Every health service must inform the central 
authorities periodically about their number of employees and 
their area of work.
7. Health Consultations (Atenciones de salud): This component has 
two objectives: i) To gather the information about the number 
and type of consultations given in the public and private 
systems, and ii) To report the amount of resources to be 
transferred to each health service according to the number of 
consultations given and the valuation of them.
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5.2.F. Discretionary powers over public resources and decisions
Before proceeding with the analysis of the discretionary 
powers over public resources and decisions, it is important to 
remind the reader that as we mentioned in section 4.4., we 
basically take a qualitative approach through which we expect to 
be able to have an idea of the pattern of discretion or autonomy 
that the region has for managing decisions and resources.
Secondly, it is also important to remember that although we 
are analysing the regional discretion, we are doing it from a 
national point of view. This means that we will not compare the 
discretionary powers of each region in particular or between 
them, but rather, we are concerned with the regional dimension in 
general.
A final reminder to the reader, is that the methodological 
approach to follow here draws from section 4.4. Therefore, the 
concepts introduced there should be taken into account now. In 
that section we introduced some categories within the three forms 
of government intervention. In table 5.5. we summarize the 
discussion about the regional discretionary powers.
F.l. Regulation
For answering the questions related to regulation, we have 
defined three categories : central, regional and shared
regulation.
In relation to the definitions of tasks or functions of the 
health agencies, it was found that the great majority of them 
rely on the centre. In the case of the regional health services 
(regional SNSSs), the Programming Department sets the number and 
types of consultations to be rendered on each health service and 
keeps close control on them. They might have minor areas of 
discretion, such as opening times and other administrative 
procedures not considered as the main task of the agency.
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TABLE 5.5. 
DISCRETIONARY POWERS OVER RESOURCES AND DECISIONS IN HEALTH
1 Govt. Intervention Forms (Undersecret.( FONASA ( SNSS (Ins.Pub.Health ( CSW TOTAL
(REGULATION 1 1 
1 1
1
1
1 1 
1 1
(Who Defines Tasks
( 1 
( Centre ( Centre
1
( Centre
1 1 
( Centre ( Centre Centre
1 Source of Authority ( Shared ( Centre ( Shared ( Centre ( Centre Centre
(Control ( Shared ( 
1 1
Centre ( Shared 
1
( Centre ( Centre Centre
(FINANCE
1 ( 
( CMF 99%( CMF 98%
1
( CMF 66%
1 I 
( CMF 100% ( CMF 17% CMF 70%
I bf 1X( BF 2% ( FSSA 32% 1 I SPF 83% SPF 7%
( 1 ( BF 2% 1 1 FSSA 21%
1 1 
1 1
1
1
1 1 
1 1
BF 2%
(PRODUCTION
1 (
1 1 
1 1
1
1
1
1 1 
1 1 
1 i
(Personnel
{ 1 
( Centre ( Centre
1
( Shared
1 1 
( Centre | Centre Centre
(Field Administration 1 2 ( 2 ( 3-4 1 1 1 3-4 2-3
(Levels 1 1 1 1 1
FINANCE: CMF Centrally Managed Finance 
SPF Specific Purpose Fund 
FSSA Fund Subsiding Specific Activity 
BF Block Fund
RMF Regionally Managed Finance
PRODUCTION: Levels of Field Administration
1 Central
2 Regional
3 Area
4 Local
An exception to this rule might be the case of outpatient 
municipal service clinics as they rely on municipal authority. 
However, as was explained earlier, these service clinics were 
transfered from the SNSS to the municipalities; this transfer 
implied that the outpatient clinics* functions are now performed 
under municipal authority, but they were defined earlier under 
the SNSS. Moreover, the fee for services (FAPEM) , are payed to 
the municipal clinics in accordance to the SNSS price lists and 
incentive schemes. Therefore, we conclude that the functions of 
these service clinics are also defined by the centre.
With regards to the source of the agency authority, we can 
again state as a general rule that the powers of most health 
agencies come from the central Ministry of Health. However, there 
are two interesting exceptions to this general rule. The Regional 
Ministerial Secretariats (SEREMI), which depend on the 
Undersecretariat, have a dual structure. On the one hand they are 
the Ministerial representatives in the regions (i.e. their
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authority comes from the centre); but on the other hand, they are 
also accountable to the regional Governors fIntendentes) . 
However, as explained in Chapter Two, the source of the Governors 
authority is the centre, as they are appointed directly by the 
President and accountable to him. The regional collegiate bodies 
have power only to influence the regional investment projects in 
health, but they cannot formally challenge the regional SNSS 
performance. Therefore, there is a share in the source of the 
SEREMI authority between the centre and the region. At a regional 
level, the SEREMI is able to decide administrative measures, but 
it is regulated from the ministerial headquarters, therefore it 
is a case of administrative déconcentration.
The second exception are the regional SNSSs, whose 
situation is very similar to those of SEREMIs. The regional SNSSs 
depend on the authority of the SEREMI, as their function is to 
assure the fulfilment of the ministerial policies. However, it is 
often common that the Ministry itself will by-pass the SEREMI to 
make certain the observance of some measures. Therefore, we have 
a situation of shared source of authority.
In the case of the powers to control agencies, we apply the 
general rule of central decisions again, as most of the control 
rules are set by the centre. However, when acting as controllers, 
the SEREMIs have the capacity to control the regional SNSSs. At 
the same time, regional SNSSs have power to control the 
activities of municipal outpatient service clinics. Therefore, 
for these two cases we are in a situation of shared 
responsibilities again.
F.2. Finance
In the area of finance, we have attempted to give a more 
quantitative measure of the regional discretionary powers. We 
estimated the proportion of resources being spent in each of the 
five forms of financing introduced in section 4.4.
In the column refering to the total ministerial finance, we 
note that 70% of its resources are centrally managed. This 
includes the social welfare provisions of FONASA, personnel, 
goods and services for consumption and other major areas of
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expenditure of FONASA, SNSS and the Undersecretariat. This is an 
indication of the constrained financial capacity of field 
agencies.
Specific purpose funds comprise only 7% of total 
ministerial expenditures. Almost all of the funds classified 
under this area corresponds to the Programme of Complementary 
Feeding. In this case the funds are transferred to the region for 
the specific purpose of being spent on the programme in 
accordance to central regulations, the region only having 
discretion in some parts of the delivery system. It is probable,
however, that in the near future according to the new
decentralization scheme that is being applied to the CSW, since 
1988, part of the funds classified here as specific funds may be
considered as regionaly managed finances (^^).
Funds for subsidising specific activities add up to 21% of 
total ministerial resources. This area comprises the fee for 
service scheme (FAP) of the SNSS. Under this circumstance the 
centre transfers funds to the regions to perform a specific 
activity, i.e. finance the goods and services for consumption of 
each regional SNSS. In contrast to the previous type of fund, the 
region is free to spend these resources within the frame of goods 
and services. For example, the region has the discretion to spend 
more on pharmaceutical products or surgical implements.
In the future, according to the new incentive scheme 
introduced into the FAPs, a small part of these expenditures may 
be classified as RMF.
19. It is inportant to clarify that the CSU's goods and services for consumption have been clasiffied as 
CMF. We considered as goods and services for consumption only the effective goods used by the CSW. In this 
case we have a difference with Yanez and Aguilo (1988), as they considered all the expenditures registered 
under this item, although most of them are sold later to regional SNSS or private hospitals. Therefore, 
there would have been double accounting if we had followed Yanez and Aguilo's approach; the share of goods 
and services in the CSW budget would have been greater, and its form classification different.
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Finally, only 2% of ministerial expenditures are classified 
as block funds. These funds have a broader definition. The region 
or the agency can decide in which area to spend it. Such is the 
case of investment expenditure.
F.3. Production
Production is the final form of government intervention to 
be considered. Under this heading we analyse two dimensions : 
personnel and field administration.
In section 5.2.D. we indicated with regard to budgeting and 
planning that personnel is one of the most centralized areas of 
expenditure in the Ministry of Health, being the total number of 
employees per agency financed from the central level. Therefore, 
we have again a general case of centralization.
The exceptions are related to the regional SNSS which may 
recruit additional personnel at their own expenses with resources 
arising from the new FAP incentive schemes; whether this is done 
this remains to be seen. In the case of outpatient municipal 
service clinics, some municipalities recruited additional 
personnel financed by their own resources.
The levels of field administration are an interesting 
indicator of the agencies hierarchy and delivery systems. The 
more levels in field a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  the g r e a t e r  the 
decentralization involved. In this area we observe that the 
Health Ministry is fairly decentralized as far as administrative 
levels are concerned. It is possible to reach even to the local 
level through the Ministerial network.
Unfortunatelly, we have no formal research studies to draw 
from concerning delivery systems in Health Care and the 
discretion of field agencies in producing programmes of health 
care. Some sources indicate that they do enjoy growing degrees of 
discretion as some national programmes have been adapted to local 
conditions. For example, in areas of low milk and nutritional
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cereals consumption, the programme will not only consist of 
giving these foods, but also of teaching how to cook and use 
them.
Overall, we can conclude that regulation is mainly a 
centralized process, with some degree of discretion in relation 
to control and the authority of field agencies. In the 
decentralization continuum, governmental regulation in health is 
located between centralized and deconcentrated regulation.
Finance is also a centralized form of intervention in 
health, as 70% of its budget was found to be as centrally managed 
finance. However, the remaining 30% of the budget was classified 
as more decentralized alternatives, and this proportion can 
possibly increase as new decentralization schemes have just been 
introduced.
In production, we note that personnel is perhaps one of the 
most centralized and least discretionary forms of intervention. 
However, field administration and other areas which could not be 
assessed, such as delivery systems, were found to be 
decentralized.
In sum, we have a general view that regulation and finance 
are centralized non discretionary forms of government 
intervention in Health. In the case of production, despite 
personnel being centrally managed, we found this form to be the 
most decentralized and discretionary of all. Overall, we consider 
that the Health Ministry follows a deconcentrated model.
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5.2.G. Summary and Conclusions: Organization and Finance of 
Health Care.
At the beginning of section 5.2., we described the 
weaknesses of the health system according to a governmental 
analysis in 1980. The problems defined there included the absence 
of a possibility to choose the type of medical consultation; 
administrative irregularities; lack of targeted programmes for 
the poor and for primary health care; and centralization.
The first problem was addressed through the elimination of 
the distinction between skilled workers and manual workers, 
allowing each now to choose their desired health scheme ; the 
National System of Health Services, the Free Election System or 
the Provisional Health Institutes (ISAPRES).
The problem of administrative irregularities was tackled 
through more strict controls for those accessing public financed 
health care systems.
Primary health care and targeting for the poor were 
addressed through building a number of primary health care out 
patient service clinics in urban and rural areas. At the same 
time some programmes were redifined in order to make them more 
attractive to poor families and less atractive to rich families. 
Finally, the "new health law" clearly defined the groups to be 
entitled to free health care. In section 5.3. we will assess to 
what extent these changes have produced an alteration in the 
distributive effects of health expenditures.
In relation to decentralization, various attempts have been 
made. Firstly, the main producer of health care, the SNSS, was 
deconcentrated into 26 semi-deconcentrated field agencies. 
Simultaneously, some financial mechanisms have been defined to 
allow more regional discretion in the management of public 
resources and decisions in health care. However, our assessment 
shows that despite the efforts made, the ministerial organization 
and finances are still centralized. The financial incentive 
mechanisms were probably designed as cost containment devices
183
rather than financial decentralization schemes, as their impact 
on the budget is too small to redress the historical 
centralization trends. Around 70% of the Health budget is 
centraly managed; one future alternative here can be to allow 
FAPs to meet the full cost of the services to be provided.
However, we consider that in addition to the government's 
"defined problems", there are other constraints that may restrict 
further developments and achievements in the health sector. The 
most important of these is the scarcity of links between the 
financial and planning functions; although both have common 
problems, such as "unaware" incrementalism, both seem to operate 
in different dimensions, each being able to perform its 
activities without requiring information from the other. For 
example, finance has made an attempt to decentralize some areas 
of the budget, whereas the regulation of health activities, 
linked to planning, has remained centralized.
Another important problem to be considered is the change in 
the Chilean pattern of mortality and morbidity. As we said in the 
first section of this chapter, the country has shifted from 
pathologies typical of developing countries to more complex 
pathologies such as cancer, cardivascular diseases, etc. This 
requires at the same time a change in policy priorities from 
preventive and primary health care to a more costly curative 
health care. In this case, the links between finance, planning 
and policy making should be closer than ever as new health habits 
must be introduced.
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5.3. REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF HEALTH POLICIES
In this section we discuss the redistributive effects of 
health expenditure in relation to the poor population. It is 
important to bear in mind that none of the health programmes 
performed by the ministry has a poverty-targeting aim defined by 
the government, such as will be found in other sectors. 
Therefore, to what extent how far the institutional allocation is 
related to poverty is arguably not a fair test for this sector. 
However poverty- targeting is a goal which encompasses all the 
sectors according to the governmet's priorities. In sum, the aim 
of this section is to assess to what extent the Government 
accomplished an important item within its policy proposals; this 
objective was considered in the list of issues to be addressed 
in this research in Chapter 2.
It ought to be remembered that for this exercise we rely on 
the information provided by Haindl and Weber (1986) for the year 
1985 and Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval (1989) for the year 
1987. It would have been highly desirable to have information for 
the year 1986. But, the studies quoted are based on large sample 
surveys and there was no financial support to undertake a survey 
in 1986. However, it must be said that this type of indicator 
does not usually show discontinuities over short periods of time, 
therefore to miss one year in between will probably not make a 
great difference in the tendency over the period.
The methodological approach followed in the studies 
mentioned considered four stages:
Firstly, it was necessary to study the distribution of population 
according to the membership of each health system. This 
information was obtained directly from the survey, as it included 
questions about the affiliation to different health systems.
Secondly, it was necessary to chart the medical treatment 
received by each beneficiary. This information was also obtained 
from the survey as it included questions on the the occurrence 
of different health episodes during the last three months (^0).
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Thirdly, the costs met by each person were estimated. Every 
person receiving a medical treatment may face two costs: one is 
the cost of the mandatory health contribution (^^); the other is 
related to ad hoc charges made by hospitals depending on the 
socio-economic background of the persons. The total costs 
involved were estimated with information from the SNSS; their 
allocations were made according to the information provided in 
the sample survey.
Fourthly, the costs of providing the different types of medical 
treatments were also estimated. This was estimated with 
information provided by the SNSS.
Once all this information had been gathered, it was 
possible to estimate the individual benefits accruing to users of 
the public health scheme (^2). Overall, people belonging to 
Groups A and B (See Section 5.2.A.) were net beneficiaries from 
the public expenditures in health; those belonging to Groups C 
and D were net contributors to the Public Health System.
In the case of health expenditures, the studies located the 
Direct Social Expenditures by income deciles. As explained in 
section 2.3.C., Direct Social Expenditures comprise only the 
subsidy component of public expenditure which actually reaches 
the families, without considering the bureaucracy expenditures 
for producing the service (23).
20. The survey included questions about eight different types of medical treatments. It also considered the
type of hospital in which the treatment took place (Private or SNSS) and the costs involved for the patient.
21. Persons classified in group A will usually not contribute to a health scheme as they are indigents.
22. The approach here was to take the estimated cost of the medical treatment received by the person and
then substract the costs met by him, obtaining therefore, the "net" benefit, publicly financed, received by 
the person.
23. This means that the redistributive effects of the expenditures in the Undersecretariat and the Institute 
of Public Health are not assesed here.
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In Table 5.6. we estimate what proportion of the Total 
Public Social Expenditures were accounted for by the Direct 
Social Expenditures. In the first place we substract the 
contributions paid by SNSS users to the system, obtaining fiscal 
social expenditures. In second place, when the administration 
costs are substracted from fiscal social expenditures, we obtain 
direct social expenditures in health. Therefore, under this 
definition we are able to capture only 44 and 46% of the total 
public health expenditures presented in table 5.6. for 1985 and 
1987 respectively. In conclusion, these figures indicated that 
the analysis here is constrainted to less than half of the total 
expenditures presented in Table 5.4. However, as this is the only 
basis of information, we have no alternative but to use it.
TABLE 5.6.
ESTIMATES OF DIRECT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES AS A PROPORTION OF 
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN HEALTH 
(Millions of 1987 $)
a) Total Public Expenditure in Health
- Contributions paid
b) Fiscal Social Expenditures in Helath
- Administrative costs
c) Direct Social Expenditures in Health 
c) / a) X
1985 1987
89,487 90,223
29,738 37,849
59,750 52,375
20,486 11,184
39,263 41,191
43.9 45.7
Author calculations based on:
Table 5.4.
Ley de Presupuestos del Sector Publico 1985 -1987
Haindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
In table 5.7. we can observe the redistributive effects of 
health expenditures. With the information provided by the authors 
quoted it is possible to calculate the amount of resources 
reaching the lower 30% of the population in the areas of the 
National Health Service System and the Central Supply Warehouse. 
With the comparison of these figures to the total direct social 
expenditures, as estimated in table 5.6., we obtain the proportion 
of total direct expenditures reaching the bottom 30% of the
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population.
TABLE 5.7.
REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF HEALTH EXPENDITURES 
(Millions of 1987 $)
1985
1987
Total Share of X TYPE OF PROGRAMME
Direct Exps.Bottom 30%
SNSS 32,478 15,913 49.0 Slightly Progressive
CSW 6,786 3,394 50.0 Slightly Progressive
TOTAL 39,263 19,307 49.2 Slightly Progressive
SNSS 32,287 17,891 55.4 Progressive
CSW 8,904 5,076 57.0 Progressive
TOTAL 41,191 22,967 55.8 Progressive
Author calculations based on:
Table 5.4. and 5.6.
Haindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
From table 5.7. it is possible to note that despite health 
programmes not having a pre-defined redistributive aim, they do 
prove to contribute to the alleviation of poverty.
Moreover, the table shows that there has been an increase 
in the progressivenes of the programmes over the period under 
analysis. This seems to be a result of the introduction of the 
new health law in 1986. The law defined in a precise way the 
groups entitled to free health care, not allowing other users to 
this right. Therefore, this selective procedure might have been 
the element that contributed to the regressive trends. At the 
same time the introduction of the auto-targeting element in the 
complementary feeding programme might also have helped to 
increase prog r e s s i v e n e s .In sum we conclude that health 
expenditures do have a progressive element, therefore we have a 
case in which the broad social aim of progressivenes is being 
achieved.
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5.4. REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF HEALTH EXPENDITURES
5.4.A. Data Constraints and Methodology
Health expenditures were regionally allocated following the 
methodology described in section 4.4. For the three years under 
analysis, over 85% of health expenditures were allocated 
according to criterion A, i.e., with a clear regionally relevant 
criterion from the original data source (See table 5.8.); this 
figure shows the accuracy of the figures presented.
Criteria for regional allocation by institution:
Undersecretariat:
This corresponds to the ministerial bureaucracy both central 
and regional. As there was no statistical serie to allocate the 
regional expenditures on the undersecretariat, they were 
allocated according to the regional distribution of health 
personnel. (Criterion C).
FONASA:
The elimination of transfers in FONASA was not an easy task as 
many of them were not clearly registered in the Estados 
Analiticos of the Comptroller (^^). Therefore, many of them had 
to be traced back in FONASA*s Department of Finances. After 
the elimination of transfers, around 90% of FONASA budget was 
on the payment of Social Welfare Provisions.
In relation to the payment for social welfare provisions, it 
has to be said that although all the institutions paying these 
benefits must send a monthly report to FONASA, they are not 
compiled annually. However, from these reports it is possible 
to obtain the regional allocation of these resources. However, 
as they had not been compiled it was not possible to obtain an
24. The Analiticos are the most detailed accomts of government expenditure,
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annual average of the regional expenditures in this area (25).
TABLE 5.8.
CRITERIA OF REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF
(X)
HEALTH EXPENDITURES
1985 Undersect FONASA SNSS Ins.Pub. C.S.W. TOTAL
Health
Crit. A 90 100 88
Crit. B 89 7
Crit. C 100 10 11 4
Crit. D 100 1
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
X Min. Budget 1 27 63 1 8 100
1986 Undersect FONASA SNSS Ins.Pub. C.S.W. TOTAL
Health
Crit. A 91 100 89
Crit. B 77 6
Crit. C 100 9 23 4
Crit. D 100 1
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
X Min. Budget 1 26 64 1 8 100
1987 Undersect FONASA SNSS Ins.Pub. C.S.W. TOTAL
Health
Crit. A 85 100 86
Crit. B 82 8
Crit. C 100 15 18 5
Crit. D 100 1
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100
X Min. Budget 1 21 68 1 9 100
NOTE: See text for explanation
25. To estimate the amual average it would have been necessary to obtain the information of some 20 
institutions paying around five different forms of social welfare provision from thirteen regions during 
twelve months, for the three years under analysis, then to obtain a weighting score to produce a weighted 
estimate of the social welfare provisions. The calculation of this single average would have taken at least 
six weeks.
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Neverthelees, as social welfare provisions are paid on a 
monthly basis and there are only minor seasonal variations, it 
was decided to choose a representative month.
Therefore, with the information available, (the total monthly 
expenditure on this area, and the evolution of social security 
contributions and contributors), we studied the overall monthly 
variations in social welfare provisions.
The aim was to select a representative month, estimate the 
regional expenditure structure for that month, and use that 
structure to allocate the annual expenditure in this area 
according to the Comptroller's figures. The month chosen was 
July, as it represents a period of important economic activity 
but not the peak of the year. Therefore, we have a criterion 
for type A, which provides an appropiate estimate of the 
regional expenditure structure.
For the rest of FONASA expenditures, we used the same criterion 
as for the Undersecretariat: Personnel (criterion C).
SNSS:
For allocating the regional expenditures of the SNSS, we had 
access to the 27 budgets of each health service for the three 
years under analysis. This information proved to be very 
useful, as we discovered through the analysis of it some 
interesting financial and organizational aspects.
To produce the actual regional expenditures in SNSS, we 
consolidated the 26 budgets eliminating the relevant transfers 
to avoid double counting, and then regionalized them, i.e. we 
summed the 26 budgets in order to match the 13 geographical 
regions.
As these figures have a clear regional accounting procedure 
they are categorised as criterion A.
Institute of Public Health:
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This research body corresponds in practical terms to a national 
programme which oversees the quality of the medicines being 
produced. There is no specific criterion to use here, therefore 
this falls under criterion D.
C.S.W.
Around 80% of the Central Supply Warehouse budget consists of 
the purchase of products for the National Complementary Feeding 
programme. The CSW does not have a record of the regional 
expenditures on this programme. We estimated it using the 
information available.
The CSW does keep a record of the amount of kilos of products 
given per region. This information itemizes the different types 
of products distributed. There are six types of products 
which are distributed in different combinations or mixtures 
according to the age of beneficiaries and their nutritional 
status. We estimated the costs (2?) of the basket of products 
for each possible combination. With this information we 
estimated the regional expenditures by multiplying the relevant 
quantities of products given per region with their respective 
unitary prices.
Despite the difficulty in producing the regional expenditure 
estimates, we have a clear regional basis for the allocation of 
them. Therefore we consider these estimates under criterion B.
The rest of Central Supply expenditures are hospital supplies 
which were allocated according to medical health consultations 
(criterion C).
The estimated regional health expenditures are presented 
in per capita terms, as it was convenient to standarize these 
figures in relation to population size. These results are 
presented in tables 5.9. to 5.10.
26. There are 3 types of powder milk and 3 types of nutritional cereals.
27. The actual costs were obtained from the National Institute of Statistics price for the consumer price 
indexes.
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5.4.B. Regional Expenditures and Regional Needs
The creation of the Chilean National Health Service had 
as an impetus, as in Britain, an important desire to obtain a 
more equitable distribution of resources. From the outset, it 
was deliberately planned to have an important central role to 
ensure an equally good service everywhere.
The Chilean regional maldistribution of resources is an 
acknowledged problem, which has its origins in the centralized 
tradition of the country described earlier and the concentration 
of population and wealth in the capital city of Santiago. Navarro 
(1976) argues that one of the causes of the maldistribution of 
health resources is that the urban bourgeoisie control most of 
the national wealth and income in developing countries, therefore 
they can greatly influence the market through distributing health 
services according to purchase power and they can also influence 
medical and professional education.
At the same time, it is also necessary to consider, that 
the improvements in health indicators during the last decade had 
mostly a national implication, improving the national health 
status overall, but the regional inequalities have been 
maintained (Ugarte, 1979).
One of the principal objectives of this research is 
to test to what extent the regional allocation of social 
expenditures is actually related to regional needs. For this task 
it was not only necessary to régionalisé the health expenditures, 
but to define a set of health indicators to contrast the regional 
allocations with the satisfaction level of basic needs. Three 
groups of indicators were defined according to the sectoral 
statistics available:
Consultations: - Medical consultations per inhabitant-MECO
- Paramedical consultations per inhabitant-PACO
- Average length of stay in SNSS hospitals-AVLE
- Medical discharges per bed.- MDIS
193
Resources: - Doctors per 10.000 habs.-DOCT
- Other medical staff per 10.000 habs.-OTHE
- Public beds per 1000 habs.-BEDS
- Bed occupation index-BEOC
Biomedical: - General mortality-GEMO
- Infant Mortality-INMO
- Maternal mortality-MAMO
- Malnutrition-MALN
- Life expectancy at birth-EXPE
In addition to health indicators, a fourth group of 
variables related to the regional socio-economic features was 
defined. This included:
- Regional GDP per capita-GDP
- Average regional income per capita-INCO
- % Urban population (Census Definition)-URBN
- % Population living in cities above 20.000 
habs.- URBZ
and,
- Health expenditures in the SNSS, including only 
the expenditure budgets of SNSS hospitals- HESN
- Total health expenditures; which includes in 
addition to the SNSS, the expenditures in social 
welfare provisions and the Central Supply 
Warehouse. - HETO
B.I.- Preliminary Data Analysis:
The basic data is presented in table 5.9. to 5.11. where 
the data is also analysed considering some dispersion statistics 
such as, average, standard deviation, coefficient of variation 
and an index that considers as base level the national average of 
each variable.
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TABLE 5.9. 
INDICATORS - 1985 
Total=100)
1 9 8 5
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MECO PACO AVLE MDIS DOCT OTHE BEDS BEOC GEMO INMO MAMO MALN EXPE GDP INCO URBN URBZ HESN HETO
Tarapaca 97.4 99.3 101.2 98.3 92.6 81.5 97.8 87.4 86.9 76.9 0.1 51.7 101.8 136.5 85.7 113.3 127.3 102.0 101.9
Antofagasta 74.3 84.7 101.2 101.3 81.2 99.2 97.9 96.8 96.7 90.8 40.0 98.9 99.1 200.3 83.2 118.5 119.9 86.8 104.8
Atacama 144.7 129.8 82.1 130.0 75.4 85.5 86.1 86.7 72.1 93.8 80.0 109.2 102.0 148.7 82.8 110.3 83.9 110.2 103.2
Coquimbo 89.7 119.3 81.0 118.0 63.3 90.5 86.1 86.8 98.4 110.3 200.0 105.7 102.6 61.1 69.0 90.2 63.7 86.2 83.9
Valparaiso 108.5 102.9 107.1 90.0 114.6 115.9 123.4 104.0 106.6 95.9 140.0 89.7 100.7 99.4 90.8 109.3 101.4 109.7 109.3
O'higgins 100.4 94.9 78.6 121.7 78.8 85.4 88.6 98.5 108.2 95.4 80.0 109.2 99.9 122.9 79.4 78.9 43.1 78.3 73.6
Maule 95.5 128.2 90.5 115.3 93.8 102.3 102.8 94.8 118.0 116.9 160.0 111.5 98.3 65.7 83.3 68.8 57.4 90.4 82.4
B1oB{0 112.3 108.8 90.5 118.7 85.0 118.5 103.5 94.5 108.2 122.6 60.0 108.0 96.1 79.9 88.6 92.5 81.6 101.2 97.0
Araucania 83.7 100.0 106.0 108.7 70.2 109.4 110.2 97.3 124.6 129.2 100.0 94.3 97.7 55.6 94.3 69.6 41.3 93.6 87.2
Los Lagos 98.6 124.1 90.5 97.0 85.2 109.7 114.7 87.8 106.6 111.3 160.0 106.9 98.5 66.9 98.2 71.5 46.0 101.4 91.3
Ays en 156.2 86.0 101.2 103.3 120.9 127.2 146.5 89.8 90.2 132.8 200.0 73.6 99.9 81.5 93.8 95.8 63.8 203.9 158.4
Magallanes 90.8 83.9 102.4 82.0 120.6 120.0 140.4 69.4 103.3 60.5 140.0 39.1 100.2 260.1 117.5 110.8 105.8 144.2 136.0
Metropol. 97.8 86.6 113.1 87.7 117.9 89.4 89.3 110.4 88.5 74.4 60.0 100.0 101.8 110.0 117.0 116.0 135.5 101.0 107.4
INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
COUNTRY TOTAL 1.8 0.8 8.4 30.0 4.6 5.4 2.8 75.2 6.1 19.5 0.5 8.7 71.5 29406 42788 83.3 71.4 4681 7382
AVG 1.9 0.9 8.0 31.7 4.2 5.6 2.9 69.7 6.1 19.7 0.5 8.0 71.4 33673.2 38952.8 79.8 58.8 5073.4 7589.6
STD 0.4 0.1 0.9 4.2 0.9 0.8 0.5 7.2 0.8 4.1 0.3 1.9 1.3 17068.2 5681.6 14.9 22.6 1481.5 1624.6
COEF.VAR. 21.3 15.7 11.0 13.3 20.8 14.3 17.9 10.3 13.4 21.1 55.0 24.3 1.8 50.7 14.6 18.7 38.5 29.2 21.4
MECO Medical consultations per inhab. INMO Infant mortality
PACO Para medical consultations per inhab. MAMO Maternal mortality
AVLE Average lenght of stay in SNSSS hospital MALN Malnutrition
MDIS Medical discharges per bed HESN Health expenditures per capita in the SNSS
DOCT Doctors per 10000 inhabitants HETO Total health expenditures per capita
OTHE Other medical staff per 10000 inhabitants GDP GDP per capita in 1977 $
BEDS Beds per 1000 habitants INCO Regional average income
BEOC Bed occupation index URBN % urban population
GEMO General Mortality URBZ X population living cities above 20.000
H
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TABLE 5.10.
HEALTH INDICATORS - 1986 
(Index Total=100)
CONSULTATIONS*--| |
1 9 8
RESOURCES--- I I BIOMEDICAL- -OTHERS- I-EXPENDITURE]
MECO PACO AVLE MDIS DOCT OTHE BEDS BEOC GEMO INMO MAMO MALN EXPE GDP INCO URBN URBZ HESN HETO
1Tarapaca 98.8 100.3 97.6 92.4 88.5 79.3 100.5 84.9 72.9 78.5 60.0 46.2 101.8 133.7 83.8 113.0 127.0 101.1 99.2
[Antofagasta 73.2 72.6 95.3 95.4 80.0 100.2 101.5 94.5 91.5 94.2 160.0 71.4 99.1 190.5 78.2 118.1 120.3 89.4 96.2
[Atacama 114.0 122.5 69.4 123.1 74.8 82.4 86.9 86.4 88.1 111.0 120.0 114.3 102.0 142.0 78.9 110.3 84.0 109.8 102.6
[Coquimbo 90.5 123.7 74.1 113.9 60.7 88.9 87.9 87.8 96.6 115.2 100.0 112.1 102.6 61.3 68.5 90.1 63.9 83.8 83.6
[Valparaiso 109.4 107.4 115.3 90.8 109.8 113.0 121.6 106.7 105.1 93.7 80.0 93.4 100.6 100.5 92.1 109.2 101.0 106.3 107.8
[O'higgins 99.1 96.1 74.1 133.3 74.6 83.3 82.4 98.4 108.5 94.8 80.0 111.0 99.9 122.1 78.2 79.2 43.3 76.3 76.4
[Maule 93.9 128.0 84.7 118.5 88.9 99.8 102.6 96.9 108.5 109.4 120.0 114.3 98.3 65.8 83.4 69.3 57.4 92.3 83.1
[BioBio 110.0 111.9 83.5 113.9 85.3 119.7 105.7 92.6 105.1 111.0 80.0 108.8 96.1 77.6 85.3 92.5 81.7 108.9 101.9
[Araucania 85.6 102.0 90.6 109.2 72.6 108.0 113.4 94.9 118.6 130.4 120.0 94.5 97.8 55.2 92.4 69.3 41.5 95.4 81.9
[Los Lagos 101.6 119.1 82.4 111.2 87.7 108.5 112.9 88.2 113.6 115.7 120.0 97.8 98.6 68.1 99.2 71.9 46.1 103.7 91.2
[Aysen 160.5 101.1 85.9 106.6 102.5 125.0 148.4 89.7 86.4 114.7 100.0 72.5 99.9 81.1 92.6 96.1 64.0 212.8 160.2
[Magallanes 97.6 77.9 89.4 81.8 117.4 117.0 144.0 80.6 89.8 69.1 0.0 42.9 100.1 252.7 113.8 110.6 105.9 138.2 131.5
[Metropol. 98.8 85.5 125.9 85.5 120.4 91.4 89.0 109.9 89.8 79.1 80.0 101.1 101.7 111.7 119.1 115.8 136.6 98.7 107.4
[INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
[COUNTRY TOTAL 1.7 0.9 8.5 30.3 4.8 5.4 2.7 74.8 5.9 19.1 0.5 9.1 71.6 30552.9 45227.1 83.6 70.9 4694.7 7346.0
[AVG 1.7 0.9 7.6 32.1 4.3 5.4 2.9 69.7 5.8 19.3 0.5 8.3 71.5 34366.0 40545.3 80.1 58.5 5116.3 7476.7
[STD 0.3 0.1 1.3 4.5 0.8 0.8 0.5 6.0 0.7 3.3 0.2 2.2 1.3 16854.4 6251.3 14.8 22.5 1561.8 1608.8
[COEF.VAR. 19.2 16.3 17.2 14.1 19.6 14.5 18.5 8.7 12.7 17.0 39.5 26.4 1.8 49.0 15.4 18.5 38.4 30.5 21.5
MECO Medical consultations per inhab. INMO
PACO Para-medical consultations per inhab. MAMO
AVLE Average lenght of stay in SNSSS hospital MALN
MDIS Medical discharges per bed HESN
DOCT Doctors per 10000 inhabitants HETO
OTHE Other medical staff per 10000 inhabitants GOP
BEDS Beds per 1000 habitants INCO
BEOC Bed occupation index URBN
GEMO General Mortality URBZ
Infant mortality 
Maternal mortality 
Malnutrition
Health expenditures per capita in the SNSS 
Total health expenditures per capita 
GDP per capita in 1977 $
Regional average income 
X urban population
X population living cities above 20.000
H
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TABLE 5.11.
HEALTH INDICATORS - 1987 
(Index Total=100)
CONSULTATIONS--'
1 9
RESOURCES- I I BIOMEDICAL-
MECO PACO AVLE MDIS DOCT OTHE BEDS BEOC GEMO INMO MAMO MALN EXPE
(Tarapaca 97.2 103.4 92.9 90.6 88.2 79.0 100.8 86.3 73.5 60.7 76.1 46.6 101.7
(Antofagasta 76.5 77.3 96.4 93.7 83.0 95.6 102.2 96.5 92.9 95.1 87.0 95.5 99.0
(Atacama 111.0 120.4 81.0 118.8 80.2 78.4 89.5 84.8 89.3 111.9 123.8 112.5 102.0
(Coquimbo 96.7 123.8 77.4 117.4 62.7 88.7 89.7 89.4 98.2 105.4 55.1 108.0 102.6
(Valparaiso 107.3 109.4 107.1 96.8 110.3 115.6 120.0 105.6 115.3 95.4 151.1 90.9 100.6
(O'higgins 101.6 99.0 73.8 126.8 76.2 80.9 89.8 98.6 103.6 96.2 84.9 112.5 99.9
(Maule 96.7 136.0 86.9 116.9 87.8 100.5 103.1 98.1 110.7 108.6 75.8 108.0 98.3
(BioBio 110.7 112.8 86.9 115.0 80.4 119.4 105.5 94.2 104.9 111.0 93.5 104.5 96.1
(Araucania 92.2 106.5 89.3 103.3 80.1 108.0 117.6 96.6 121.4 137.8 111.0 92.0 97.8
(Los Lagos 108.6 119.1 85.7 96.1 88.7 109.3 119.5 89.2 114.6 117.7 156.6 102.3 98.6
(Aysen 154.3 96.5 81.0 111.7 123.0 143.0 150.2 91.2 91.1 133.5 0.0 81.8 100.0
(Magallanes 98.5 77.0 95.2 74.1 121.5 119.6 144.3 84.8 91.1 88.6 136.0 45.5 100.1
(Metropol. 95.4 81.8 125.0 88.1 119.2 91.1 86.3 108.7 92.2 79.5 78.7 102.3 101.7
(INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(COUNTRY TOTAL 1.6 0.8 8.4 30.7 4.6 4.9 2.6 73.8 5.6 18.5 0.5 8.8 71.7
(AVG 1.7 0.9 7.6 31.8 4.2 5.0 2.8 69.5 5.6 19.1 0.5 8.1 71.6
(STD 0.3 0.1 1.1 4.5 0.9 0.9 0.5 5.3 0.7 3.7 0.2 1.9 1.3
(COEF.VAR. 16.5 16.8 14.4 14.2 20.3 18.1 18.1 7.7 12.9 19.5 43.0 23.3 1.8
|...
GDP
-OTHERS.....
INCO URBN
132.0 
191.6
143.4
61.4
100.5
123.0 
65.9 
78.2
55.4
68.7
80.8 
250.2
111.1
104.0
96.6
98.8
75.3 
95.1
79.8
90.9
81.6
89.9
76.3 
127.8 
116.6
118.0
100.0 100.0 
31766.0 47803.4
35725.7 45990.0 
17386.6 7652.4 
48.7 16.6
112 .8
117.8
110.1
90.3
109.0
79.4
69.4
92.5 
69.4 
72.0
96.6
110.5
115.6
100.0
83.8
80.3
14.8
18.4
URBZ
126.8
120.7
83.8
64.3 
100.4
43.7
57.2
81.8 
41.9
46.2 
64.5
105.9
137.6
100.0
70.4
58.2
22.4
38.4
I-EXPENDITURE- 
HESN HETO
98.6
91.2
107.5
90.6
108.3 
82.1
92.3
106.5 
98.1
106.2
208.8
132.3 
97.0
100.0
4919.8
97.2
93.4 
101.8
91.2 
107.5
81.4
88.2
102.4
89.4 
97.3
168.1
121.1
103.4
100.0
7196.9
5372.0 7431.4 
1528.7 1514.1 
28.5 20.4
MECO Medical consultations per inhab. INMO Infant mortality
PACO Paramedical consultations per inhab. MAMO Maternal mortality
AVLE Average lenght of stay in SNSSS hospital MALN Malnutrition
MDIS Medical discharges per bed HESN Health expenditures per capita in the SNSS
DOCT Doctors per 10000 inhabitants HETO Total health expenditures per capita
OTHE Other medical staff per 10000 inhabitants GDP GDP per capita in 1977 %
BEDS Beds per 1000 habitants INCO Regional average income
BEOC Bed occupation index URBN X urban population
GEMO General Mortality URBZ % population living cities above 20.000
From the table we can note that for the period under 
analysis, the regions receiving higher levels of expenditures 
per capita are Tarapaca, Antofagasta, Atacama, Valparaiso , 
Biobio, Aysen, Magallanes and Metropolitan, all of which are a 
high proportion of urban population. This pattern is very similar 
to that of GDP, and is the case of average income for Magallanes 
and Metropolitan. In sum, we observe a positive relation between 
health expenditures, urban population and regional incomes.
With regards to biomedical indicators. we notice, 
overall, that the regions showing levels above the national 
average, (this means, with a worse performance than the national 
average), are those that receive lower levels of health
expenditures per capita. In fact O'higgins, Maule, Biobio, 
Aruacania and Los Lagos are those showing the worst performance 
in general, infant and maternal mortality. This matches the rural 
set of regions with some intermediates like Biobio. Two
additional regions show a bad peformance in the biomedical
indicators, except in general mortality; they are Atacama and 
Aysen, both of which were previously selected as receiving above 
average health expenditures.
Life expectancy shows very small regional variations; 
it can be seen that it follows the regional distribution of GDP 
and Urban Population. There is an important exception in this 
distribution, the case of Coquimbo, which is often recognised as 
the poorest region of the country.
In sum, it is possible to mention that the biomedical 
indicators show, overall, that poor performance in this area is 
linked to rural and some intermediate regions or, most
importantly, that health expenditures are lower in regions with 
poor bio medical performance.
The indicators of consultations and resources are mostly 
determined by the level of public expenditures, since public 
money will directly contribute to buy health resources and to pay 
salaries. The indicators of average length of stay and medical 
discharges are inversely related, the regions with longer
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hospital stays are basically those receiving higher health 
expenditures. Whereas, those with higher medical discharges per 
bed are the ones receiving lower expenditures per capita; this 
appears to be a rationing system by which in order to decrease 
health costs the length of stay is reduced. This seems to be a 
compelled efficiency system, through which poor regions are 
forced to be efficient by shortening the stays in hospitals and 
increasing the medical discharges.
In relation to resource indicators it is important to 
note that the availability of doctors and other paramedical 
specialists per inhabitant is related to the number of 
consultations which these specialists can offer. But, in contrast 
to the other set of indicators, it is possible to observe a clear 
regional pattern; doctor availability is clearly related to 
urbanization, GDP and total health expenditures. It should be 
clear at this stage that poor regions are on average offering 
lower quality attentions to their inhabitants. There are 
important regional disparities in resources; for example, the 
Metropolitan region has twice as many doctors per person as 
Coquimbo.
Finally, on the indicator of bed availability, we note 
that poor regions are better endowed in relaton to the national 
average. However this allocation is due to history and it does 
not indicate better hospital facilities; in fact the bed 
occupancy indicator shows that only Valparaiso and Metropolitan 
have above average bed occupancy, leaving the rest in a lower 
position.
In summary, it is possible to conclude with the 
evidence presented until now that, in broad terms, health 
expenditures tend to favour urban and higher income regions. This 
coincides with two of the competing hyphotheses introduced in 
Chapter 3 . On the other side, poor rural or intermediate
regions tend to have a lower level of health expenditures and a
28. As a reminder, the relevant competing hypotheses in this case are: (in brief)
No2. The richest regions will demand and obtain higher levels of social expenditures per capita. 
No3. Social expenditure will be concentrated on more industrialized and urban regions.
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lower performance in the biomedical indicators. Moreover, we 
conclude, as Cooper and Culyer (1970) did for England, that the 
indexes are usually related with one another so that a region 
performing poorly according to one criterion also did poorly 
according to another. At the same time some consultations and 
resource variables show that poor regions are, to some extent, 
facing a "compelled efficiency" by which they show a good 
performance in out-put indicators, such as average length of
,A-al
stay, but this do^match this with a better regional health 
status.
Interregional Disparities
In relation to the interregional disparities we note 
that total health expenditures per capita show coefficients of 
variation ranging from 20.4% to 21.5%. Similarly health 
expenditures in the SNSS show higher coefficients ranging from 
28.5% to 30.5%. It is possible to compare these findings with 
that of Noyce et al. (1974) for the English Health services; they 
obtained a coefficient of 14.2% considering 14 English regions, 
concluding that their results show important regional disparities 
in terms of health expenditures. Therefore, comparing these 
figures with the Chilean ones, we conclude that Chile shows 
considerably higher levels of regional inequalities.
The interregional disparities of resources and other 
indicators range somewhat below the levels of health expenditure 
dicators. Special attention should be given to medical 
consultations and doctor availability which show higher 
disparities. This may contribute to the continuation of 
disparities in health status. With regards to health and resource 
indicators we conclude, as Ugarte (1979) , that despite some 
decreases in the interregional disparities, the regions with a 
poor performance have been consistently the same. According to 
Ugarte*s findings in 1965, the worst performers were O*Higgins, 
Maule, Araucania and Los Lagos.
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Although there has been no thorough study of the trends 
in regional inequalities, comparision with some previous 
estimates by the author for 1983 (^9) show marginal decreases
over time. In the case of total health expenditures the 
coefficient of variation for that year was 22.9% and for health 
expenditures in the SNSS it was equivalent to 28.8%. At the same 
time there have been no changes in the ranking or performance of 
the regions. This means that those regions with a good 
performance in 1983 are almost the same in 1987; this is 
demonstrated by the Spearman Rank correlations of 0.87 between 
1983 and 1985, and of 0.72 between 1983 and 1987 .
B.2.- Associations Between Health Variables
In order to test further the competing hypotheses and 
the variable relations described earlier, it was decided to 
calculate a (Pearson) correlation matrix to study the linear 
associations of the variables in use. This analysis was 
approached in three stages, socio economic indicators, biomedical 
indicators, and resources and consultations.
Let us start by reviewing the associations between 
health expenditures and socio economic indicators. It should be 
mentioned that the relations of both expenditure indicators. 
Total Health Expenditures (HETO) and SNSS Expenditures (HESN), 
along with the remaining of the indicators followed the same 
pattern; however, the correlations of the latter were usually 
weaker.
29. Irarrazaval, I. Draft of PhD. Thesis - London School of Economics -London 1986.
30. The Spearman Rank Correlation between 1985 and 1987 was 0.91.
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TABLE 5.12. I
1
CORRELATION MATRIX - HEALTH INDICATORS I
MECO PACO AVLE MDIS DOCT OTHE BEDS BEOC GEMO INMO MAMO MALN EXPE GDP INCO URBN URBZ HESN HETO | 
1
MECO 1.00
1
1
PACO 0.16 1.00 1
AVLE -0.14 -0.53 ** 1.00 1
MDIS 0.23 0.58 ** -0.74 ** 1.00 1
DOCT 0.30 -0.47 0.64 ** -0.68 ** 1.00 1
OTHE 0.40 -0.15 0.17 -0.25 0.46 * 1.00 1
BEDS 0.41 * -0.26 0.17 -0.48 * 0.61 ** 0.84 ** 1.00 1
BEOC -0.13 -0.16 0.51 * -0.01 0.17 -0.06 -0.31 1.00 1
GEMO -0.20 0.18 -0.02 0.20 -0.20 0.38 0.10 0.27 1.00 1
INMO 0.31 0.41 -0.39 0.53 ** -0.36 0.39 0.14 0.04 0.52 ** 1.00 1
MAMO 0.04 0.19 -0.04 0.00 -0.09 0.16 0.11 -0.09 0.32 0.33 1.00 1
MALN -0.02 0.52 ** -0.31 0.69 ** -0.48 * -0.22 -0.59 ** 0.47 * 0.39 0.50 * 0.15 1.00 1
EXPE 0.07 -0.07 0.09 -0.15 0.11 -0.54 ** -0.26 -0.09 -0.63 ** -0.48 * -0.10 -0.18 1.00 1
GDP -0.23 -0.57 ** 0.15 -0.48 * 0.33 -0.09 0.19 -0.36 -0.46 * -0.68 ** -0.20 -0.59 ** 0.24 1.00 1
INCO 0.05 -0.44 * 0.45 * -0.56 ** 0.73 ** 0.20 0.39 0.04 -0.29 -0.32 -0.27 -0.41 0.11 0.35 1.00 1
URBN 0.00 -0.50 * 0.46 * -0.52 ** 0.42 * -0.15 0.00 -0.01 -0.71 ** -0.67 ** -0.27 -0.45 * 0.53 ** 0.67 ** 0.34 1.00 1
URBZ -0.20 -0.50 * 0.66 ** -0.66 ** 0.48 * -0.18 -0.07 0.15 -0.60 ** -0.75 ** -0.30 -0.46 * 0.41 0.57 ** 0.39 0.91 ** 1.00 1
HESN 0.74 ** -0.20 0.03 -0.20 0.58 ** 0.62 ** 0.78 ** -0.30 -0.30 0.18 -0.01 -0.43 * 0.02 0.09 0.46 * 0.17 -0.01 1.00 1
HETO 0.65 ** -0.36 0.23 -0.38 0.70 ** 0.61 ** 0.76 ** -0.25 -0.38 -0.03 -0.10 -0.53 ** 0.11 0.27 0.50 * 0.41 * 0.26 0.94 ** 1.00 I 
1
MECO Medical consultations per Inhab. MAMO
PACO Para-medical consultations per Inhab. MALN
AVLE Average lenght of stay In SNSSS hospital HESN
MDIS Medical discharges per bed HETO
DOCT Doctors per 10000 Inhabitants GDP
OTHE Other medical staff per 10000 Inhabitants INCO
BEDS Beds per 1000 habitants URBN
BEOC Bed occupation Index URBZ
GEMO General Mortality
INMO Infant mortality
Maternal mortality 
Malnutrition
Health expenditures per capita In the SNSS 
Total health expenditures per capita 
GDP per capita in 1977 $
Regional average income 
X urban population
X population living cities above 20.000
Author Calculations 
See Text for explanations
Table 5.12. shows that HETO is positively correlated to 
Average Income (INCO) and Urban Populaton (URBN), both being 
correlations significant at the 0.01 level, although not very 
strong. The association with INCO is interesting since it shows a 
relation of health expenditures to the average income of 
families. In other words, it seems to be that the State favours 
the regions where richer families live, and does not favouring 
those that contribute more, in relative terms, to the national 
growth (^^). For example, the Metropolitan region ranks between 
the first and the second place in INCO, whereas Antofagasta ranks 
in the sixth and tenth place. At the same time, Antofagasta ranks 
in the second place in GDP, whereas Santiago only ranks sixth 
place in the same variable. Antofagasta concentrates an important 
part of the copper and fisheries industry, whereas the 
Metropolitan region concentrates mainly services. It is possible 
to conceive that the State is responding to the pressures of 
individuals and other pressure groups, rather than rewarding 
those regions which contribute more to the national growth. 
Therefore, we have a situation where the second hypothesis should 
be considered, because richer regions are those receiving higher 
levels of social expenditure.
The positive correlation between health expenditures and 
urban population can be associated to the fact that doctors, 
hospitals and the medical consultations which they provide tend 
to be located in urban areas; therefore, public money will 
follow these initial allocations.
The correlations between health expenditures and 
biomedical indicators are on average weak and non-significant. 
This reveals that health expenditures are not associated with 
these indicators of basic needs. A similar finding was arrived at 
by Noyce et al.(1974) for Britain, finding a negative and non­
significant correlation between infant mortality and health 
expenditures of various types. The exception to this weak 
association is the case of malnutrition which exhibits a negative 
correlation to health expenditures; this endorses the previous
31. Note that this is, to some extent, just the opposite of what is stated in the competing hypothetesis 
No.1.: Government will channel resources to the less wealthy regions measured in terms of basic needs.
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statement of no clear relation between health expenditures and 
basic needs. Therefore, with regards to biomedical indicators we 
must reject the first hypothesis, because the Government is not 
channelling higher proportion of resources to poor regions (32).
Finally, in contrast to the previous group, the 
correlations between health expenditures and health resources are 
in general, significant (33) and positive. This is a rather 
obvious and multicolinear association, since higher health 
expenditures will represent better endowment in human resources 
and infrastructure. With regards to consultations, we note from 
table 5.12. that they have a lower non-significant correlation 
coefficients, with the exception of medical consultations. This 
shows that health expenditures are not clearly related to the 
number of consultations provided by the health services.
In sum, the correlation analysis has demonstrated that 
the allocation of health expenditures result in a rather 
regressive inter-regional allocation, favouring those regions 
with higher socio-economic standards and better health status 
indicators. At the same time poor regions show a lower 
performance in the same health indicators; in these regions 
health consultations are basically carried out through 
alternative cheaper ways of provision such as paramedical 
consultations, shorter periods of stay, etc.
B.3.- Defining a Model to Analyse the Relation Between Health 
Expenditures and Health Indicators
The definition of a regression model to analyse the 
relation between health expenditures and health indicators was a 
difficult process because of the equation form defined. Since the 
dependent variable was always health expenditures, the form 
chosen was not a traditional equation for predicting health
32. Poor regions are those with lower basic needs performance.
33. Correlations are significant at the 0.001 level.
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status, unlike many of the equations published in the literature. 
Therefore an important set of traditional resource indicators had 
to be used with great care in avoiding multicoilinearity. This 
lead to the study of over 80 regressions equations, and so to 
finally to select the six better models.
In order to obtain a better goodness of fit of the 
regression models, the equations were also estimated in semi-log 
and log-log forms. These equations produced only marginal 
increments in the adjusted R square; hence these solutions were 
not considered, since the parameters are much too difficult to 
interpret. As in the case of correlation analysis, the 
regressions were run with two alternative dependent variables. 
Total Health Expenditures (HETO) and Health Expenditures in the 
National System of Health Services (HESN). The results were again 
very similar in both cases; however, HETO showed a better 
goodness of fit.
The analysis is presented in three separate forms 
depending on the type of explanatory variables used: first,
biomedical indicators; second, resources and consultations;
third, a mixture of the three groups of indicators. In all the 
equation forms, socioeconomic indicators were introduced to 
examine the original hypotheses.
Equations No. 1 and 2 in Table 5.13. attempt to 
determine to what extent the variations in health expenditures 
can be related to biomedical indicators. We note that these 
equations capture only from 35 to 42% of the interregional 
variations in HETO, (a low proportion of the total variance), 
therefore a first conclusion is that biomedical and socioeconomic 
indicators are incapable in themselves of explaining a large 
proportion of the variations in health expenditures. In other 
words, this means that health expenditures are better explained 
by the addition of other variables not included in the present 
equation. At the same time, we note that Average Income and 
especially Urban Population are the variables with higher 
standarised partial regression coefficients (Betas), indicating 
that marginal relative changes in these variables will influence 
more the predicted value of HETO. Hence, we conclude again as in
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hypotheses Nos. 2 and 3, that the allocation of health 
expenditures are influenced by external factors such as Income 
and urban population, as opposed to being an explicit result of 
the regional status.
Equations No. 3 and 4 analyse the interregional 
variations in health expenditures using indicators of resources 
and consultations as independent variables. Most resource and 
consultations indicators are, to some extent, a result of the 
level of expenditures. For example, higher doctor availability 
will mean higher expenditures and salaries, etc. However, these 
indicators are also a product of previous allocations, since 
they are very difficult to change from one year to another for 
instance the case of beds per habitants (BEDS) and medical 
consultations (MECO). Nevertheless, resources and consultations 
are showing the regional impact of pre-existing allocations, 
therefore it is interesting to analyse to what extent the present 
regional allocations are still perpeptuating the pre existing 
regional inequalities.
We note in first place, that the equations account for 
larger proportions of total variance. However, if Bed 
Availability (BEDS), Medical Discharges (MDIS) or Medical 
Consultations (MECO) are used in the same equation there is an 
unavoidable problem of multicollinearity. Therefore, we should 
look to the importance of only one indicator of resources and 
consultations, such as MECO, BEDS, or MDIS and contrast it to the 
socioeconomic indicators. Using this approach, we note in 
equations 3 and 4 that the betas of Urbanization (URBZ) are in 
the range of the other indicators, meaning that URBZ does 
influence the regional allocation of HETO. This again supports 
hypothesis No. 3 of urban bias in the allocation of health 
resources. It is also noted that INCO does not explain much of 
the total variance due to a problem of multicollinearity.
206
TABLE 5.13.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS - HEALTH EXPENDITURES
No.DEPENDENT AREA
VARIABLE INDICATORS MDIS BEDS GEMO INMO MALN INCO URBN URBZ [Adjusted R sq.
1 HETO Biom.+Other -254.9 0.07 17.119 1 0.35
t Ratios (-2.1) (2.2) (1.1)
Betas -0.324 0.319 0.16
2 HETO 219.195 0.103 64.225 1 0.42
t Ratios (3.1) (3.6) (3.6)
Betas 0.52 0.47 0.602
3 HETO Res.+Consul. 259.563 3216.439 0.042 50.882 1 0.81
t Ratios (5.4) (10.7) (2.2) (6.3)
Betas 0.724 1.083 0.193 0.733
4 HETO 241.52 3379.794 54.108 1 0.79
t Ratios (4.9) (11.0) (6.4)
Betas 0.673 1.138 0.779
5 HETO All 178.83 3217.163 -584.7 34.404 1 0.85
t Ratios (4.0) (11.9) (-3.2) (3.7)
Betas 0.498 1.069 -0.292 0.496
6 HETO 197.237 3121.824 -523.358 0.029 34.27 1 0.86
t Ratios (4.4) (11.6) (-3.1) (1.7) (3.7)
Betas 0.55 1.037 -0.262 0.133 0.493
NOTE: In all equations HETO is the dependent variable
MDIS Medical discharges per bed
BEDS Beds per 1000 habitants
GEMO General Motrality
INMO Infant mortality
MALN Malnutrition
HETO Total health expenditures per capita
INCO Regional average income
URBN % urban population
URBZ % population living cities above 20.000
The final group of equations incorporates a selection 
from all the indicators used to explain the variations in HETO. 
In equation No.5, we observe that the most important variable of 
the equation is BEDS, which is related to the historical 
allocations of health expenditures. The regions better endowed in 
this resource are the same as in 1970 and 1987; the same can be 
said for those with a scarce endowment of beds.
There is no specific evidence that the original 
allocations are regressive in regional terms, but according to 
the historical basis as described in the beginning of the
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chapter, many areas of expenditure were basically a result of 
organised pressure groups of industrial workers and employees 
(white collar workers), and not of the very poor. The second most 
important variable in the equation is urbanizaton, which again 
reinforces the previous conclusions concerning urban bias. It is 
interesting to analyse the fact that general mortality appears 
with a negative sign, which implies that higher mortality rates 
are associated with expenditures; therefore, the expenditure 
allocations will not be related to health needs (^^).
In order to test further the original hypotheses, 
regional average income (INCO) was introduced as an explanatory 
variable in equation No. 6, obtaining only a minimal increase in 
the adjusted coefficient of determination, and a non significant 
t - s t a t i s t i c . In other words, INCO does not influence 
significantly the allocations of health expenditures.
In summary, this section has reinforced the conclusions 
obtained in sections B.l. and B.2., concerning the validity of 
hypothesis 3, which is related to the urban bias in regional 
allocation. However, this section has not provided clear 
evidence to support hypothesis No.2, which predicts that rich 
regions would obtain higher shares of expenditures.
In addition to testing the original hypotheses, it was 
desired to examine the relations between a traditional health 
indicator and other variables. This analysis is aimed to 
determine, in an alternative form, the influence of health 
expenditures and other socioeconomic indicators on the evolution 
of health status. The health status indicator chosen is life 
expectancy (EXPE), which has been widely prefered as the best 
indicator of health status (^^), According to this choice, 
variables highly correlated with EXPE, such as general mortality 
(GEMO) and infant mortality (INMO) , are not considered in the 
models.
34. It Should be noted that the marginal changes in GEMO will influence less HETO than a similar 
(proportional) change in BEDS, since the beta of the latter is larger.
35. See: F. Stewart- Planning to Meet Basic Needs.
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In table 5.14. we present five equations which attempt 
to examine the relationship between EXPE and some explanatory 
variables. It is noted in the first three equations that they 
account for a small proportion of total variance. In the first 
equation the three explanatory variables have a significant t- 
statistic, showing that EXPE is explained by. an indicator of bed 
availability with a negative sign; this means that EXPE is not 
necessarily related to in-patient hospital care but to other 
forms of preventive medicine. The equation also shows that HETO 
is the second most important variable in explaining the variance 
in EXPE. In contrast to bed availability. Total health 
expenditures (HETO) is a variable that can be affected for 
obtaining higher levels of expenditures. Finally, as may be 
predicted malnutrition has an inverse effect on EXPE; therefore a 
decrease in malnutrition is associated with extended life 
expectancy (EXPE).
TABLE 5.14 
REGRESSION ANALYSIS - LIFE EXPECTANCY
No.DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE MECO OTHE BEDS MALN URBN HETO
1 EXPE 1 -2.34 -0.28 0.00
t Ratios 1 (-4.9) (-2.7) (3.4)
Betas 1 -1.03 -0.43 
1
0.68
2 EXPE
1
1 -1.37 0.03 0.00
t Ratios 1 (-2.3) (2.2) (1.4)
Betas 1 -0.56 
1
0.38 0.39
3 EXPE
1
1 0.79 -0.86 0.05
t Ratios I (1.5) (-2.4) (4.0)
Betas 1 0.21 -0.35 
1
0.44
4 EXPE
1
1 1.15 -0.91 0.04
t Ratios 1 (2.6) (-5.0) (4.0)
Betas 1 0.31 -0.60 
1
0.44
5 EXPE
1
; 0.29 -1.30 0.02 0.00
t Ratios 1 (0.5) (-5.2) (1.2) (2.2)
Betas 1 0.08 -0.86 0.20 0.51
MECO Medical consultations per inhab.
OTHE Other medical staff per 10000 inhabitants
BEDS Beds per 1000 habitants
MALN Malnutrition
HETO Total health expenditures per capita
URBN X urban population
Adjusted R sq.
0.38
0.34
0.34
0.55
0.59
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In relation to the models estimated earlier, it is 
important to note that HETO has a significant influence in 
determining the health status of a region; therefore, its 
allocation is relevant for the health prospects of a region.
The second equation was designed to check the influence 
of urban population in explaining life expectancy. When URBN is 
introduced it causes HETO to loose its significance and 
decreases its importance in terms of contribution to the total 
variance explained. However, it shows that EXPE is not only 
explained by health status or resource indicators but by other 
socioeconomic indicators. This is in line with a variety of 
studies that use non health indicators to predict the variations 
in EXPE, for example, literacy (^^) .
Equations Nos. 3 and 4 have a similar structure of 
explanatory variables but with different proportions of total 
variance explained. However, both equations show that URBN does 
help to explain an important proportion of total variance in 
EXPE. In Equation No.4, we note that the most important is the 
Consultations of other non medical staff (OTHE), which shows a 
negative sign. At the same time, changes in medical consultations 
(MECO) influence EXPE in a positive way.
The final equation is based on equation No. 4, with the 
addition of health expenditures (HETO). It shows an overall 
better goodness of fit, although it has a weaker contribution of 
medical consultations (MECO) and urban population (URBN). We 
found again the rivalry between HETO and URBN, in this case HETO 
proves to be stronger than URBN in contributing to the total 
variance in EXPE. HETO is not only significant but, according to 
its beta, the marginal changes in it will influence EXPE in an 
important manner.
36. See: F. Stewart Op. cit.
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In sum, we must acknowledge that we have not obtained 
e q u a t i o n s  w i t h  a v e r y  large a d j u s t e d  c o e f f i c i e n t  of 
determination. This means that the variance of EXPE may also be 
explained by other non health indicators such as literacy, water 
availability, calorie consumption, etc. However, the partial 
significance of the parameters allows us to conclude that EXPE 
can be explained in an important manner through health 
expenditures and urban population, in addition to other resource 
indicators.
T h e r e f o r e ,  the r e g i o n a l  a l l o c a t i o n  of h e a l t h  
expenditures does appear to affect the overall health status of 
the population and, for this reason, great care has to be used in 
the process of allocating it, since it may reinforce or improve 
the inequality in regional health status.
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5.4.C. Section Summary and Conclusions: Resource
Allocation and its Regional Impact
This section has shown that it is possible to estimate 
the regional social expenditures for the health sector. Although 
some assumptions were needed to reach the final figures, our 
findings suggest that according to the criteria pre-defined in 
the methodology the results have a high degree of accuracy. The 
estimates indicate that more than 85% of the expenditure was 
allocated according to criterion A, that is, with a clear 
regional accounting system from the original data source.
The rest of the section is dedicated to the analysis of 
the relation between the regional allocation of social 
expenditures and regional needs. In this regard, we also test the 
feasibility of some competing hypotheses defined in Chapter 
Three.
In order to tackle this question it was necessary to 
consider some indicators of need in the health sector. The 
indicators were presented in three areas: biomedical, (including 
infant mortality, life expectancy and others); consultations, 
(including average lenght of stay in hospitals, medical 
consultations and others); Resources, (which included doctor 
availability, bed availability and others).
The data analysis was approached in three stages. In the 
first place, some measures of statistical dispersion were 
considered. This measure gave a first insight into the problems 
involved and was useful for testing the inter-regional 
disparities. In the second place, correlation analysis was used 
to examine the association between health indicators of need and 
regional expenditures. Finally, with the aid of regression 
analysis an attempt was made to define a model that helped to 
interpret the relation between health expenditures and health 
indicators.
However, despite the different approaches of each stage, 
all were aimed at the same objective, to test the relation
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between health expenditures and health indicators of need. 
Therefore, we draw some general conclusions from the three 
stages.
The findings support in a straightforward manner the 
conlcusionthat the richest regions obtain higher levels of 
expenditures; they also indicate that social expenditures in 
health reach higher levels in urban regions. Therefore, there are 
grounds to accept hypotheses two and three, which state these 
principles. However, the analysis also indicates that regions 
with poor performance in biomedical indicators are usually rural, 
low-income regions. Moreover, correlations between health 
expenditures and biomedical indicators are on average weak and 
non-significant. The only exception was malnutrition which shows 
a significant negative correlation to health expenditures. These 
facts, and other aspects refered to in the text, lead us to 
reject the hypothesis that government is channeling its funds to 
the less well off regions measured in terms of their basic needs 
(Hypothesis No.l).
In the analysis of the Health sector we had the 
opportunity to contrast our findings with similar studies for 
Britain. Most of the results obtained in the present study were 
concordant with similar findings for the United Kingdom. In 
relation to health expenditures, it was found that Chile has 
higher levels of inequality in the allocation of regional health 
expenditures than Britain. In fact, the estimates indicate that 
Chile has almost double the British level of inequality in 
regional health expenditures. Moreover, it is not only important 
to note the higher levels of inequalities in the allocation of 
health expenditures but the trends observed in their allocation.
However, it has to be said that the country does show 
some important positive signs in the Health Sector. Although 
there are some regional disparities and the regions which 
performed poorly in the past tend to maintain their position, 
the absolute levels of health indicators do show that the country 
as a whole has improved its health conditions. An indication of 
this are the low levels of infant mortality and the high levels 
of life expectancy which are almost comparable to developed
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nations.
Many of the national reforms introduced did have an 
important impact, such as in the case of targeting programmes to 
poor people. But we consider that, if the aim is to continue 
improving the health conditions, it will be necessary to take 
more seriously the regional allocation of expenditures, in order 
to redress the historical trends.
To conclude this section, let us point out to the reader 
that this section's conclusion may appear not very surprising 
considering the earlier conclusions of section 5.2.. In section
5.2. we indicated that despite serious attempts at decentralizing 
the ministerial organization and finance, most of its decisions 
are still taken in a centralized approach without much 
consideration of the regional dimension. However, it is important 
to demonstrate that the planning and budgeting procedures do not 
occur in a vacuum, but rather they produce clear allocation 
patterns as have been shown here.
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CHAPTER SIX
EDUCATION
6.1 BACKGROUND TO THE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE OF THE EDUCATIONAL 
SYSTEM IN CHILE
Since the beginning of its independent life, Chilean 
governments have shown a deep concern over educational matters. 
The 1828 constitution established that primary schools were to 
be created under municipal tuition. In 1833, the first organic 
law of primary education ruled that public schools would be 
financed by the state but administered by municipalities. It also 
defined a control system for educational activities. However, in 
practical terms the state central bureaucracy did not transfer 
much in the way of resources to the local level and, through 
the control function maintained on educational structure which 
worked in a centralized form. In 1850 the country had only 1.5 
million people, out of which 50,000 were in primary education.
At the beginning of the century, despite important efforts 
of successive governments, it was still not possible to make the 
educational system grow at a rate sufficient to offset the growth 
rate of population and the previous deficits. By 1900, the 
country had some 3 million inhabitants of which 150,000 were 
registred in primary education. This means that during this fifty 
year period, the total population of the country was doubled, 
whereas the educational system was tripled.
By 1925, primary education reached the status of a 
constitutional guarantee and was declared compulsory for all 
citizens. This meant that primary education was thought of as an 
elementary vehicle for the development of a person. At the same 
time it also meant that the state should provide free education 
to all the population in order to allow people access to the 
system. Education was also declared as a priority function of the 
state, so that among state functions education became one of 
the most important. Municipal powers were restricted once again, 
by allowing them only to provide primary education.
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Between 1950 and 1975, despite that the population grew by 
less than two times, as a result of the mid sixties educational 
reforms, primary education grew five times reaching to a peak of 
2.3 million students. During the period between 1960 and 1985 
there was a 35% increase in the number of educational buildings, 
whereas enrollment grew by 60%; this made it necessary to have 
two and three shifts in school buildings in order to cope with 
the educational demands. There are some authors that have 
challenged this huge increase in school enrollment as it might 
have resulted in a loss in the quality of education (^).
In relation to preschool education, it must be said that 
despite some isolated attempts since 1909, this level of 
schooling was not organized until the forties (^), when the state 
adopted a leading role in developing this type of education. This 
coincides with the creation of a Department of Preschool 
Education within the Ministry of Education.
However, until 1965, preschool education was really still 
being developed as a transitory step to primary education; there 
was no defined curriculum. In sum, it was appreciated as an annex 
to primary education. In 1970, the creation of the National Board 
for Nurseries (Junta Nacional de Jardines Infantiles JUNJI) marks 
an important change, as for the first time pre-school education 
was approached in an ample range considering the situation of 
children from zero to six years old.
In Chile, school meals have been provided by the National 
Board for School Assistance and Scholarships (Junta Nacional de 
Auxilio Escolar v Becas JUNAEB). Between the early sixties and 
late seventies, JUNAEB not only financed but produced school 
meals. However, after a decade following this system growing 
problems of distribution and lack of control started to occur. 
Since 1960, the JUNAEB has also run a variety of smaller 
programmes, such as scholarships for children who resided in
1.
See: Prieto, A. (1983),
2. In 1940 the Conucil for Nurseries and Christmas Committees is founded. This fact may have helped the 
institutionalization of pre school education.
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remote areas with no secondary education or the programme for 
school textbooks.
In sum, by the late seventies Chile had a well developed 
educational system, probably one of the better organized of Latin 
America. Following the educational reforms of the mid-sixties and 
into the early eighties there have been no major changes in the 
educational system. The only exception was the creation in 1974 
of the Regional Ministerial Secretariats (SEREMIs) as part of the 
decentralization proposals of the government. The SEREMIs were in 
charge of the administration and the operation of public schools. 
In turn each SEREMI had Provincial Directorates to help in the 
supervision and control of school performance in accordance to 
the ministerial regulations.
Until 1980, the Ministry was the main provider of pre 
school, primary and secondary education. The distribution of 
student enrollment per level of education was the following: 6% 
in preschool, 74% in primary and 20% in secondary (^).
With regards to the type of institution (dependencia): 80% 
of the students were registred in ministerial publicly financed 
schools, 14% were registred in private subsidized schools (free 
of charge) , and the remaining 6% were enrolled in private fee- 
paying schools.
The evolution of illiteracy may help to indicate the 
educational performance of the country. Literacy is an important 
indicator as it shows not only the capacity to read and write, 
but it can also be thought of as an indicator of the general 
level of education.
3. Secondary enrollment can be split up into general education (Cientifico Humanists) 70%, and vocational 
technical education (Tecnico profesional) 30% of secondary registrations.
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TABLE 6.1
EVOLUTION OF CHILEAN ILLITERACY RATE
YEAR
1904 49.7
1920 36.7
1930 25.3
1940 27.1
1950 19.8
1960 15.2
1970 10.7
1982 8.9
SOURCE :
INE Censos de poblacion y Vivienda
NOTE: From 1904 to 1980 figures were calculated from the
population over 10 years old. From 1982, the figure is calculated 
from the population over 15 years.
As can be seen in Table 6.1., Chile has experienced a 
considerable increase in the literacy of the population. However, 
some gross inegualities still re .imin. In 1982 the urban 
illiteracy rate was 5.8%, whereas the rural rate was 20%. This 
fact shows that the geographical dimension is an important 
variable to be considered when analysing the different 
educational levels.
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6.2. EDUCATION FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION 
A. Present Educational System
In this section we describe and discuss the most important 
features of the educational system in Chile and its recent 
developments. It is important to devote some time to this area as 
most of the issues concerning ministerial finances and 
organization will be drawn from the present organization.
As in the case of the Ministry of Health, Education also 
experienced major organizational changes in the early 1980's. The 
changes attempted to address the most important educational 
problems of the period: centralization, low quality of education, 
rigid curricula, inadequate supervision, variable attendance 
rates and others.
The institutional changes can be presented in two areas: i) 
the transfer of public schools to the administration of 
municipalities. This transfer also involved the creation of a 
subvention scheme similar to that educational vouchers applied in 
other countries; ii) The decentralization of the ministerial 
institutional functions. This involved the strengthening of the 
SEREMIs role and of other tiers of the ministerial structure.
A.I. The Transfer of School Administration to Municipalities
The transfer of school administration to municipalities was 
aimed at promoting the decentralization of ministerial tasks by 
improving administration, increasing enrolment, and upgrading the 
quality of education. The transfer process actually involved four 
steps: the creation of a municipal institution to run public
schools; the transfer of public property; the re-allocation of 
teachers, and the creation of a subvention scheme to finance the 
transfered schools.
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Municipal Organization
In order to carry out the school administration, the 
municipalities created two alternative institutions to run local 
education:
- Private Corporations for Social Development
- Municipal Education Departments
Although the first alternative was the one most widely 
supported by the central government, its legal situation is still 
dubious, as the Supreme Court of Justice has ruled out the 
qualification of these institutions as "private”. The highest 
authority of the Corporation is the local Mayor (^ ) who has the 
power to nominate an Executive Director. Moreover, most of the 
Corporations' resources come from public sector transfers.
As a result of the legal void, many municipalities created 
their own Educational Departments. Therefore, in this case 
teachers ended up as municipal employees.
The Transfer of Property
The transfer of property to the municipalities was arranged 
through a legal procedure called Comodato (^). Under this scheme 
municipalities received school buildings for a period of up to 99 
years. This transfer involved no pecuniary reimbursement from the 
municipality to the central ministry.
The Ministry of Education also signed agreements to transfer 
schools to private institutions. Some of these transfers were 
similar to the municipal ones, in the sense that a former public 
school was transfered to a charity, thus becoming a private 
subsidized school. However, this alternative was mostly used for 
the transfer of Vocational Technical Schools to entrepreneur 
associations related to the area of each vocational school.
4. It must be remembered that during the military rule all Mayors were nominated from Central government.
5. Law Decree No. 1-3063 Ministry of Interior.
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According to Varas (1983), between December 1980 and 
September 1982, 5800 schools were transfered from the ministry to 
municipalities and private institutions. However, due to the 
recessionary period being faced by the country, the process was 
te^mporarily terminated at the end of 1982.
Reallocation of teachers
The "transfer" of teachers from public schools to Municipal 
Corporations was not an easy task; there were important claims 
about the low efficiency levels of the educational system, low 
salaries and an excess of teachers. For the teachers themselves 
the transfer involved losing the status of civil servants and its 
corresponding pay scale and accepting the pay system of the 
private sector. Under this scheme all teachers were eligible to 
receive a full severance payment.
One a r g u m e n t  used by the c e n t r a l  g o v e r n m e n t  for 
decentralizing teachers was the need to provide local authorities 
with more freedom to allocate resources. If the Ministry had 
maintained its payroll the local discretion would have been 
limited severely.
Subvention Scheme for Financing Transfered Schools
The subvention scheme consisted of a payment made per 
student attending school. The aim was to encourage school 
administrators to attract more students and to keep them 
attending school, since payments were based on daily attendance.
The payment, which was the same for municipal and private 
subsidised schools, was equal to the average expenditure per 
student of the Ministry of Education in 1980. This provision was 
very attractive for private subsidised schools as their costs per 
student were estimated to be 7 0% of the Ministerial average 
costs.
According to Law Decree No. 3476 of 1980, eleven different 
levels of payments were established, each of which related to
221
alternative combinations of the type of education (i.e. 
preschool, basic, median), the level of education (i.e. in basic 
education there are 3 cycles: 1-2, 3-5,6-8), and school time 
table (i.e. day or evening). The payment per student was measured 
in terms of a unit of account that increased monthly with 
inflation fUnidad Tributaria Mensual UTM).
Due to the 1982-1983 economic crisis, the reforms were 
halted and the indexed payments were changed to a system in which 
payments were adjusted in accordance to the increase of wages and 
salaries of the public sector. However, since inflation was 
higher than wage increases, payments per students fell by about 
20% of their real value between 1982 and 1985. As a result of 
this situation, municipalities soon face serious financial 
deficits. This deficit was also increased by the loss of students 
to private subsidised schools and by the excess of teachers.
At the same time as the payment per student was loosing its 
real value, so too were teachers' salaries. Important pressures 
began to come from teachers who wanted to receive the original 
benefits they would have had as public employees (^). As a result 
of these pressures, central government became involved again in 
teachers' wages policy creating a special fiscal fund to meet 
their demands. Simultaneously, the Ministry did not allow 
municipalities to fire the "excess" teachers. According to 
ODEPLAN (1985) the excess of teachers was a real issue. The 
student/teacher ratio was 24 in municipal schools in contrast to 
40 in private subsidized schools. The low ratio in municipal 
schools was the main reason why the costs per student in 
municipal institutions were higher than in private subsidized 
schools.
In 1986 the Ministry changed policy to one which would begin 
to redress the municipal deficits. It firstly limited the 
resources to be transfered to meet the financial deficits; it 
also lifted the restriction on municipalities to firing teachers
6. At this stage there were still some teachers not being transfered to municipalities. They were not 
suffering the economic restrictions of the rest.
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(7). In 1987, the subvention law was modified to create new unit 
of account: the Unit for Subvention in Education (USE) . The new 
unit would be indexed to the changes in wages and salaries of 
public sector employees which means that it would increase below 
the inflation rate. Finally, in the same year the Ministry 
introduced a further change which would consider a "rural factor" 
in increasing the base level of payments per student (®). In the 
case of rural schools, i.e., those more than 5 kilometres outside 
the nearest urban limit, the payment per student was to be 
weighted by a factor that became greater as the number of 
students in a school became fewer (^).
A.2. Ministerial Functions and Decentralization
Prior to the 1980's reform the Ministry of Education 
concentrated on the provision of education. This included the 
administration and finances of almost 10,000 schools, 90,000 
teachers and the supervision and educational control of almost 3 
million students.
One of the most important changes in the reform was the 
separation of the Ministerial normative and administrative 
functions. The administrative function was left to the 
municipalities and the normative function remained in the 
Minist^ry. Within this latter function the Ministry would define 
the objectives, plans and programmes of study, as well as specify 
the number and lenght of classes. It also would define the ages 
and entrance pre-requisites for all educational levels. Finally, 
It had to regulate the functions and structure of the teaching 
staff.
7. Some 5,500 teachers were fired between 1986 and 1987.
In 1985, according to the Ministry of Education there were 88,000 
teachers in basic education of which 54,000 belonged to municipal schools.
8. Law No. 18 591 Art. 27 3-Jan.-1987.
9. In addition to this rural factor teachers also enjoy a hardship allowance (asignacion de zona).
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Another ministerial function was the supervision of the 
quality of education. In this regard the Ministry undertook some 
national tests to measure the quality of education in all Chilean 
primary schools (^^).
Finally, the ministry took on number of functions related to 
the control of the subvention scheme. According to Law Decree No. 
3476, the ministry was given the duty of controlling the daily 
registrations of students as the per-student payment would be 
based on this. Any discrepancy found on the books would result in 
reducing or witholding a proportional part of the monthly 
payments. The ministry also had to control any charges made to 
students or their parents .
d
Some of these last functions wre decentralized through 
SEREMIs as they defined an annual timetable of school activities 
and supervised the educational performance. However, the control 
of the subvention scheme relied mostly on the Provincial 
Directorates which were meant to control periodically the school 
registrations in both municipal and private subsidised schools.
As mentioned earlier, the administration and production of 
education relies on the municipalities. They can organize the 
municipal educational system through a "Private" Social 
Development Corporation or through Municipal Educational 
departments.
In figure 6.1. the ministerial organization is described 
from the point of view of student choices. In the mid 1980*s a 
person had three main alternatives for accessing education in 
Chile: municipal, private subsidized and private for pay schools. 
Within the public sector the only available alternative was 
municipal education, which accounted for over 68% of total school 
registrations. In the private sector there are two alternatives: 
private subsidized schools, accounting for 27% of schools
10. Sistema de medicion de la Caiidad de la educacion- SIMCE.
11. The law allows some minimun fixed charges related to initial registration fee and an annual contribution 
to the parents associations.
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r e g i s t r a t i o n s  and r e c e i v i n g  p u b l i c  f i n a n c e s  th r o u g h  
municipalities; and private for pay schools, which only account 
for 5% of total registrations. The figure shows that the consumer 
has no direct relation with the Ministry itself, was the case in 
the seventies. The dotted line only shows a financial link 
between the Ministry and municipal schools.
In relation to pre-school education, in the early 1970*s 
there were three main providers of pre-school education: The 
Ministry of Education, JUNJI and various private institutions 
(12). The Ministry offered pre-school education in its own 
primary schools to children between 5 to 6 years accounting for 
58% of total pre-school registrations. The JUNJI was an 
institution directly accountable to the ministry offering 
education to children from 0 to 6 years; it accounted for 10% of 
total pre-school education. Lastly, private pre-school education 
accounted for the remaining 32% of total registrations. Overall, 
there were almost 100,000 children attending pre-school 
education. This figure implies a coverage of 6.5% of the 
children between 0 to 6 years.
After the 1980's reforms, the organization looks very much 
like the rest of the educational system for this period. In 
addition to the three described instances, some privately 
subsidised institutions were introduced which accounted for 
almost 37% of the total pre-school enrollments in 1986. These 
pre-schools are now also managed by the municipalities, as they 
were transfered simultaneously with the rest of the schools.
12. Since 1925, labour legislation requires that a nursery must be provided in every factory or institution 
which has recruited more than 20 women with small children.
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FIGURE 6.1.
The Developments of the Ministry of Education Organization
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In the early 1980's JUNJI was re-structured. It was now 
conceived of as a delegated institution, tha is, as a semi- 
autonomus public organization accountable to the Ministry of 
E d u c a t i o n ). At the same time JUNJI also concentrated more on 
the nutritional aspects of pre-schooling, giving 80% of the daily 
calories to those children attending its schools. The programme 
was also re-defined with a targeting aim to focus on poor 
children. Therefore, some selection procedures were defined to 
achieve this aim. However, JUNJI continues to be financed through 
budget allocations without being incorporated to the fee-for 
students scheme of subventions.
Parallel to JUNJI there is a private foundation related to 
municipal voluntary organizations (Fundacion Nacional de Avuda a 
la Comunidad FNAC) which also runs nursery schools. The finance 
of this institution comes from public sources through the Social 
Fund. As in JUNJI's case, FNAC is also targeted at poor children.
Finally, there are now an important number of private 
subsidised nursery schools, which accounted for 22% of children 
enrollments in 1986. The ministry pays to private subsidised 
pre-school a monthly subvention, which is in fact a grant to 
finance the activities of these schools
The National Board for School Assistance (JUNAEB) also 
experienced a redefinition of its objectives. The main aims of 
the programme were to i) reduce drop-out and to increase school 
attendance rates by attracting students through the meals 
offered and ii) to provide nutritional support for the low income 
children. In the late 1970's the broad social policy aim of 
targeting was increased; the selection procedure used included 
the use of the national means test (Ficha CAS) and the teacher 
opinion about the student health situation. JUNAEB has attempted 
various combinations of indicators in addition to these two: 
indicators of low weight at birth, school achievement and others. 
Some of these have proved to be too complicated for most 
administrators. The aim here was to move away from the rather
13. In the Chilean common day language there is some confusion about this evolution as it is presented as 
decentralization but in our terms it is a case of delegation.
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"urban” distribution of resources, and so JUNAEB defined some 
rural quotas for school meals. The weakness of this approach is 
the high probability of stigmatising students as only some 
students of a class will be entitled.
JUNAEB is case of a semi-autonomus institution that entitled 
to make public tenders for the production and distribution of 
school meals. From 1976 JUNAEB started making some changes in 
its financial and production system. It firstly started by 
delegating the production and supplies to private companies. Then 
it moved to organize public tenders handing over all the 
production and distribution of the programme to the private 
sector. However, JUNAEB retains its financial and control 
functions.
As a result of the economic crisis, JUNAEB continued and 
even increased its expenditures during this period. However, in 
1986 the Ministry reduced the amount of resources transfered to 
JUNAEB. The result of this was a decrease in 8% in the total 
number of luncheons served between 1985 and 1986. In an attempt 
to redress this tendency some municipalities beganto contribute 
to JUNAEB in order to have a better provision of school meals in 
their area.
In 1986 JUNAEB school meals programme covered 35% of the 
children enrolled in basic education (^^).
A.3. Enrolment and coverage
In Table 6.2. it is possible to observe the development of 
Pre-school Education in the last years. We note that there has 
been an important increase in the number of children attending 
this type of education. In 1987, the proportion of children 
attending pre-school education in relation to all children of the 
revelevant ages was 20%; this is an increase in 6.4 percentage 
points since 1980 .
14. This figure is 10 percentage points above 1980.
Source: JUNAEB.
15. According to the Superintendencia of Education in 1970 the coverage of pre-school education was 3.9%.
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TABLE 6.2.
PRESCHOOL ENROLLMENT BY INSTITUTION
1980-1986
Private
JUNJI M.Educat.MunicipalSubs(died FNAC Private TOTAL
1980 47690 91501 8368 23386 27525 198470
1981 47614 19518 71803 12890 27736 23625 203186
1982 47529 17058 70827 29853 32086 19259 216612
1983 44917 16309 72903 37102 37748 20055 229034
1984 47847 18685 84974 54523 43410 18001 267440
1985 53578 20280 93883 67833 40548 20256 296378
1986 71758 20568 94506 75542 43507 22654 328535
1987 72417 220030 43500 335947
Private
Coverage 
Chi Id.0-6
JUNJI M.Educat.Mun icipalSubs idied FNAC Private TOTAL years
1980 24.0 46.1 0.0 4.2 11.8 13.9 100.0 13.6
1981 23.4 9.6 35.3 6.3 13.7 11.6 100.0 13.7
1982 21.9 7.9 32.7 13.8 14.8 8.9 100.0 14.4
1983 19.6 7.1 31.8 16.2 16.5 8.8 100.0 14.9
1984 17.9 7.0 31.8 20.4 16.2 6.7 100.0 16.9
1985 18.1 6.8 31.7 22.9 13.7 6.8 100.0 18.4
1986 21.8 6.3 28.8 23.0 13.2 6.9 100.0 19.7
1987* 21.6 — 65.5 — 12.9 - - - 100.0 20.0
SOURCE: Informe Social ODEPLAN 1986 
Compendio Estadistico 
Superintendencia de Educacion 
* M.Educat.+ Municipalities+Priv.Subs.
In the same table the share of the different 
institutions offering pre-school education can also be seen. It 
can be noted that as a result of the municipalization process 
the share of the Ministry of Education decreases dramatically 
after 1980, whereas the municipal and private subsidised schools 
begin to absorb a greater share. At the same time, both JUNJI and 
FNAC have maintained their relative shares.
The distribution of pre-school enrolment in 1986 showed that 
almost 57% of the enrolments were in public institutions
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accountable to the Ministry of Education. A further 36% of the 
enrolments were in publicly financed private institutions. 
Therefore, the overall situation is that almost 93% of pre-school 
education in Chile is publicly financed.
Despite the increases in pre-school education the system 
covers only 20% of the children, and there are increasing 
pressures for more places to assist women participating in the 
labour force.
The development of Basic Education is analysed in Table 6.3. 
We observe again trends similar to those in the case of pre­
school education. From 1980 onwards most ministerial education 
has been transfered, mostly to municipal and private subsidized 
schools, ending in 1987 with no schools depending directly upon 
the Ministry. In contrast to pre-school education it is possible 
to notice that private subsidised education has increased its 
share in the total. This is probably a response to the incentives 
created by the subvention scheme (^^).
In relation to the coverage of basic education it is 
necessary first to explain this concept. The official ages for 
basic education are between 6 and 13 years old. Therefore, the 
coverage is often calculated as the porportion of children 
enrolled in primary education in relation to the total number of 
children between 6 and 13 years old. This usually gives in the 
Chilean case coverages above 100%. An alternative to avoid this 
problem is to measure coverage in basic education considering in 
the denominator the total number of children between 6 and 14 
years old; this has been done in several studies. The objective 
here is to count the children who have repeated a year of 
schooling or have entered late into the system. In any case we 
are more concerned with an indicator that shows the availability 
of education and its evolution. Therefore, as long as it is 
consistent over time we do not question in depth what the exact 
denominator should be (^^) .
16. There is a futher type of basic education specifically for children with learning problems. Special 
education accounts for IX of total enrollments.
17. In section 6.4. we use another further definition of basic education coverage. The origin of this is the 
different age intervals considered in the population projections.
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1 TABLE 6.3. |
1 BASIC EDUCATION ENROLMENT BY INSTITUTION | 
1 1980-1986 1 
1 (Thousands of children) |
Ministry Private
Education Municipal Subsidied Private TOTAL 1
I 1980 1743.9 306.2 136.4 2186.5 1
1 1983 215.0 1309.3 448.5 112.3 2085.1 1
1 1984 196.2 1249.4 511.6 88.6 2045.8 1
I 1985 .... 1406.8 549.2 106.4 2062.4 1
1 1986 173.1 1172.6 594.9 107.5 2048.1 1
1 1987 1299.3 592.3 115.7 2007.3 1
Ministry Private
Education Municipal Subsidied Private TOTAL 1
1 1980 79.8 0.0 14.0 6.2 100.0 1
1 1983 10.3 62.8 21.5 5.4 100.0 I
1 1984 9.6 61.1 25.0 4.3 100.0 1
1 1985 .... 68.2 26.6 5.2 100.0 1
1 1986 8.5 57.3 29.0 5.2 100.0 1
1 1987 0.0 64.7 29.5 5.8 100.0 1
SOURCE: Informe Social ODEPLAN 1986 
Compendio Estadistico 
Superintendencia de Educacion
In Table 6.4. it is possible to observe the different 
measures of basic education coverage for the last seven years. We 
note that both methods follow the same pattern. From 1980 to 1987 
the system has decreased from 108.8 to 104.7% in its coverage. 
The Ministerial response for this declination is the decrease in 
the birth rate since 1970 and an important reduction in drop out 
and repetition rates.
Median education (secondary) in Chile has two main 
alternatives: i) A scientific humanistic curriculum which
involves a cycle of four years preparing the students for further 
education; ii) Technical vocational curriculum which involves a 
cycle of five years giving its graduates a technical 
qualification upon completion.
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TABLE 6.4.
COVERAGE IN BASIC EDUCATION
Coverage Coverage Ministerial 
Chi Id.6-13 Chi Id.6-14 Coverage 
years years
1980 108.8 96.5
1983 106.1 94.0 95.2
1984 104.7 92.7 96.7
1985 105.7 93.7 97.8
1986 104.7 92.8 96.2
1987 — 96.3
SOURCES
Informe Social Odeplan 
Compendio Estadistico 
Superintendencia de Educacion
The developments in median education after 1980 appear in 
table 6.5. In 1987 total enrolment reached a peak of 695,000 
students, which gives a coverage of 79.3. It is interesting to 
note in the table the rapid progress made by private subsidied 
education, which again seems to be a result of the new subvention 
scheme for secondary education.
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TABLE 6.5.
MEDIAN EDUCATION ENROLMENT BY 
(1980-87) 
(fhousands of students)
INSTITUTION
M. Educat.Private 
Municipal Subsidied Private TOTAL
I 1980 406.4 86.0 49.3 541.7
1 1983 410.2 151.9 51.2 613.3
1 1984 400.9 184.2 52.1 637.2
I 1985 397.2 216.6 54.2 668.0
1 1986 394.1 233.9 52.1 680.1
1 1987 414.7 227.8 53.3 695.8
M. Educat.Private 
Municipal Subsidied Private TOTAL COVERAGE j
1 1980 75.0 15.9 9.1 100.0
1 1983 66.9 24.8 8.3 100.0 70.7 I
1 1984 62.9 28.9 8.2 100.0 73.3 1
1 1985 59.5 32.4 8.1 100.0 76.2 1
1 1986 57.9 34.4 7.7 100.0 77.3 1
1 1987 59.6 32.7 7.7 100.0 79.3 1
NOTE: M.Educat. - Municipal includes Scientific-humanistic 
and Technical Vocat.
SOURCE: Informe Social ODEPLAN 1986 
Compendio Estadistico 
Superintendencia de Educacion
The overall figures of total enrolment for the three years 
under analysis appear in Table 6.6. It can be seen that almost 
two thirds of all students are in basic education, whereas median 
education includes around 20%. Higher education has around 5% of 
all students. It is interesting to keep these figures in mind as 
in the next section we will discuss the shares of expenditure 
which each level of education receives from the Ministry.
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I DISTRIBUTION OF
TABLE 6.6. | 
TOTAL ENROLMENT IN EDUCATION j
1985 1986 1987 I
1 Pre-School 202,252 209,970 228,117 1
1 Special 31,017 29,749 31,272 1
1 Basic 2,062,344 2,048,107 2,007,503 I
1 Median 667,797 680,038 695,863 I
1 High. Educat. 150,715 152,875 156,755 I
j TOTAL 3,114,125 3,120,739 3,119,510 1
(% Percentages)
1985 1986 1987 1
1 Pre-School 6.5 6.7 7.3 I
1 Special 1.0 1.0 1.0 I
1 Basic 66.2 65.6 64.4 I
1 Median 21.4 21.8 22.3 1
1 High.Educat 4.8 4.9 5.0 1
I TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 I
SOURCE:
Superintendencia de Educacion
To conclude this section it is interesting to have an 
insight into the average educational level of the Chilean 
population. This information was obtained from the sample survey 
CASEN in 1987 . The educational levels were calculated for
people above 15 years old. The estimated national average was 
found to be 8.6 years of schooling. This figure denotes an 
important increase in the years of schooling as some earlier 
figures indicate that in 1970 the average years of schooling were 
4.3.(^^). However, there are still important differences to be 
tackled; the estimated urban schooling average was 9.2 years 
whereas the rural average was only 5,7 years.
18. Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval op, cit.
19. Compendio de Informée ion Estadistica 
Superintendencia de Educacion.
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A.4. Higher Education
Although universities are formally related to the Ministry 
of Education they are independent bodies with their own internal 
regulations. For this reason it was decided to introduce them in 
a separate section.
Before the latest university reforms of 1981 there were 
eight national universities covering around 7.2% of the 
population between 18 and 24 years old; they received around 30% 
of total Ministerial expenditures (^O) .The two main state 
universities, the University of Chile and the State Technical 
University, were national universities with their headquarters in 
Santiago and some regional branches elsewhere.
In general, it was thought that the regional branches were 
poorly administered from the central headquarters. Another 
opinion was that universities had no incentives to increase 
enrolment or quality as their finances were based on budget 
allocations.
The reforms introduced in Law Decree No.4 of 1981 had three 
main aims: i) to open more alternatives to higher education, ii) 
to decentralize main state universities and iii) to change the 
financial scheme of universities.
The new law authorised the creation of new alternative 
institutions of higher education: private universities.
Professional Institutes (Polythecnics) and Centres of Technical 
Instruction. All of them were freely allowed to set their own 
tuis_tion fees and the courses to be offered but were obligated 
to submit their programmes for Ministerial approval. In the case 
of Private Universities and Professional Institutes, in order to 
ensure a minimum quality of education, they were required to 
arrange for external examiners during the first five graduating 
classes. The Centres of Technical Instruction were established to 
provide technical degrees in a variety of areas through courses 
lasting 2 years.
20. In 1974 universities received more than 45% of the Ministerial budget.
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In Table 6.7. we can observe the evolution of enrolment in 
the different types of higher education. While universities have 
grown by 28% since the creation of the private universities, 
professional institutes have doubled their enrolment during the 
same period. The most spectacular development is in the case of 
the Centres of Technical Instruction, which in 1987 accounted for 
more than 3 0% of higher education enrollments.
1 TABLE 6.7. | 
I TOTAL ENROLMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION j
Universities Profess. Centres TOTAL i
Institutes Tech.Inst 1
j 1981 99428 14041 0 113469 1
I 1982 108049 25244 39702 172995 1
1 1985 113625 32233 50425 196283 1
1 1986 127362 29160 57852 214374 I
1 1987 127099 29656 67583 224338 I
I 1988 125529 33787 73832 233148 1
(% Distribution)
Universities Profess. Centres TOTAL I
Institutes Tech.Inst 1
1 1981 87.6 12.4 0.0 100.0 I
I 1982 62.5 14.6 22.9 100.0 1
1 1985 57.9 16.4 25.7 100.0 I
I 1986 59.4 13.6 27.0 100.0 1
1 1987 56.7 13.2 30.1 100.0 1
I 1988 53.8 14.5 31.7 100.0 I
SOURCE: Compendio Informéeion Estadistica 
Superintendencia de Educacion
The decentralization aim was appoached by giving 
"indépendance" to each regional branch of the two main state 
universities. Therefore, most branches were transformed into 
either regional universities or professional institutes. In the 
cities where the two unversities had branches they were usally 
amalgamated into a single institution.
The new financial scheme for universities changed the old 
system of budgetary allocations to five different financial 
sources: i) direct transfers, ii) indirect transfers, iii)
student loans iv) research grants and v) tuition fees. The first
■ 236
three are publicly financed whereas research grants have a mixed 
finance and tuition fees are private charges to students. In 1987 
the three public allocations to universities were distributed in 
the following form: direct transfers 65%, indirect transfers 11% 
and student loans 24%. However, the initial legal setting 
designated that by 1987 the three publicly financed transfers were 
going to have an equal share of one third each.
Direct transfers were related to the old system of budget 
allocations to universities. In 1980 the government decided that 
the historical shares of the budget allocation for each 
university were to be used to allocate this item in the future 
(21). The original aim here was to begin to move away from the 
historical allocations by giving each year a greter share of 
resources to the other two public sources of finances. Through 
this procedure the system was to become more responsive to the 
real demand for higher education. It was stated that by 1986 the 
direct fiscal contribution would be only a third of the total 
university revenues. However, the 1982 - 1983 financial crisis 
hit the educational budget and important cuts were made in all
the financial sources; at the same time the direct transfer was
frozen in 1982.
Indirect transfers are per-student payments given by the 
government to each university or professional institute 
recruiting students (1st. year) from the top 20.000 scores in the 
Aptitude Test (2%) . This scheme was aimed to encourage 
universities to raise the quality of the education offered and to 
compete in attracting students.
This scheme ended up favouring traditional universities 
rather than regional universities as the traditional universities 
were more able to attract the best students. This area departed 
largely from the initial aims of Law Decree No. 4 which stated
that by 1987 indirect transfers should have been a third of the
21. In the case of regional universities they were to receive proportionally their share in their original 
State university budget.
22. The aptitude test is a national test that is a pre requisite to enter the university. On average, only 
28% of the 130,000 students taking the test annually will have a place in a university.
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public resources to universities which in practice contributed 
only 11%.
Student loans (23) also departed from the original legal 
settings the programme has not yet reached to cover a third of 
the publicly financed transfers to universities, Throu^ghout the 
entire period since university loans have been offered, resources 
have been insufficient. In 1987 only 33% of the students applying 
for a loan obtained 100% of their request; the rest received only 
a proportion of their payments.
Law Decree No. 4 was modified in 1987 to create a student 
loan fund. Through this scheme each university administers its 
own funds instead of the Ministry. For this purpose an initial 
capital base was established for each institution. Special 
Treasury bonds were created for this objective. The distribution 
of these bonds was based on the historical shares of student 
loans per higher education institution. Each university has now 
the authority to allocate the loans according to their own rules.
The two other financial sources now available are tuition 
fees and research grants. Research grants are managed by the Fund 
for Development of Science and Technology. All universities 
compete for these funds on a project basis. In 1987, almost 78% 
of the research grants were allocated to the eight "original" 
universities. Tuition fees now reflect the actual cost of 
teaching.
6.2.B. Public Expenditure in Education
In Table 6.8. it is possible to observe the trends of public 
educational expenditures for the last 10 years. The two series 
considered have a common origin, both having been elaborated by 
public institutions. Both series have been adjusted by the 
National Institute of Statistics consumer price index and follow 
the same patterns.
23. Student loans only cover tutition fees.
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TABLE 6.8.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN EDUCATION
1 PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN (EDUCATION EXPENDITURES j
(EDUCATION (per CAPITA
((Millions of 1989 pesos( (1989 pesos) (
(YEAR 1M.Educat.COMPTROLLER (M.Educat.COMPTROLLER (
1 1978 141,002 13,036 (
1 1979 169,174 15,414 j
1 1980 153,470 13,771 j
1 1981 I 196,512 197,394 ( 17,349 17,426 (
1 1982 1 226,781 211,383 j 19,688 18,351 j
1 1983 I 160,868 177,291 ( 15,437 15,131 j
1 1984 I 189,557 180,808 ( 15,904 15,170 (
1 1985 I 185,400 189,085 ( 15,295 15,599 j
I 1986 1 180,740 176,776 j 14,&62 14,340 j
I 1987 1 169,030 159,287 ( 13,483 12,706 j
I 1988 1 164,935 j 13,020
Source:
1. Compendio de Informéeion Estadistica 
Superintendencia de Educacion
2. Contraloria General de la Republica 
Informes Gestion Financiers 1986 and 1987
NOTE: Deflated by the National Institute of Statistics C.P.I,
As in the case of health it can be noted that the peak in 
the period considered was reached in 1982 when educational 
expenditures accounted for 5% of G.D.P. or above 220 billions of 
Chilean pesos. It is interesting to note that educational 
expenditures grew, according to Ministerial sources, by 15% 
between 1981 and 1982 while the country experienced a 14% 
decrease in its G.D.P. This again lead us to consider the 
expenditures in this sector as countercyclical. However, as 
economic recession carried on to 1983, public finances were 
severely constrained producing a drastic decrease of 20% in 
education expenditures. A result of this was the freezing of 
subventions by mid 1982.
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The trends of per capita expenditures in education can be 
followed in Figure 6.2. As expected they follow the same pattern 
of total expenditures but show a somewhat more drastic decrease 
during the crisis period. The ministerial estimates of education 
expenditures are in general above the Comptroller estimates but 
as they use the same deflators there are no significant 
differences. Both show the 1982 fall and the 1985 decreasing 
trend as a result of the reduction in the indirect transfers to 
universities.
6.2.C. Expenditure Structure
In this section we discuss the economic and institutional 
expenditure structure of the Ministry of Education. As in the
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previous chapter, it was necessary to eliminate some transfers 
and deflate the original figures in to obtain the figures of 
Table 6.9. (^^). The aim of this section is to provide a general
background to the ministerial finances which will be discussed in 
more depth in Section D.
Economic Expenditure Structure
Personnel: As a result of the introduction of the subvention 
scheme and the resulting transfers of schools to municipalities 
all teachers are paid from the municipalities. Therefore, the 
proportion of expenditures being spent on personnel by the 
Ministry has been decreasing since the introduction of this 
scheme.
The expenditures in this area were halved between 1986 and 1987 
as a result of the succesful completion of the transfers of 
schools to municipalities. After this year the only teachers to 
remain in the ministerial payroll were those performing functions 
within the central bureaucracy.
Social Welfare Provisions: Social Welfare Provisions represent a 
negligible proportion of educational expenditures. They are 
concentrated in maternal leaves and severance payments.
Transfers: As has been explained earlier, it is important to 
clarify the purpose of transfers. In the case of the Ministry of 
Education most transfers, either to private or to public 
institutions, are given to institutions performing educational 
functions formerly carried out or financed from the Ministerial 
budget. Therefore, no double accounting occurs as the transfers 
are to finance activities outside the public sector budget. 
Nowadays many of these institutions have been delegated or 
deconcentrated. Therefore, the Ministerial financial role is 
constrained to transfering the resources to them.
24. Due to a printing constraint Table 6.9. is presented in two pages. The first page includes the actual 
expenditure figures and the second the percentage distribution.
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TABLE 6.9.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN 
(Millions of $ 1987)
EDUCATION
1985
Directs. Educt.&Cult. 
G.Sec.& Ad.Education Services JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL j
Personnel 1157.6 16572.6 698.5 247.7 1914.8 0.0 0.0 20591.1 1
G.& S. Cons. 1619.7 0.0 285.8 195.3 349.0 0.0 0.0 2449.8 1
Soc.Wel.Prov. 3.9 0.0 10.4 0.0 14.8 0.0 0.0 29.1 1
Transfers 10500.5 1140.3 246.1 8965.4 1342.5 71162.7 32479.0 125836.5 1
Cap.Inv. 246.5 0.0 40.2 33.8 32.9 0.0 0.0 353.5 i
Finan.Inv. 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 1
Other 221.5 71.2 14.9 10.6 16.7 35.7 0.0 370.7 1
TOTAL 13749.7 17784.1 1297.4 9452.7 3670.7 71198.5 32479.0 149632.1 1
1986
Directs. Educt.&Cult. 
G.Sec.& Ad.Education Services JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL 1
Personnel 1166.0 12982.3 725.2 251.0 2119.4 0.0 0.0 17243.8 1
G.& S. Cons. 1260.3 0.0 267.0 165.3 366.8 0.0 0.0 2059.4 1
Soc.Wel.Prov. 1.9 0.0 15.2 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 47.1 1
Transfers 556.3 1220.0 603.1 8306.8 1459.8 81976.8 31176.0 125298.8 1
Cap.Inv. 230.9 0.0 134.7 26.0 25.3 0.0 0.0 416.9 1
Finan.Inv. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1
Other 34.5 87.5 9.2 679.2 1.6 120.2 0.0 932.3 1
TOTAL 3249.9 14289.8 1754.4 9428.4 4002.8 82097.0 31176.0 145998.4 1
1987
Directs. Educt.&Cult. 
G.Sec.& Ad.Education Services JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL 1
Personnel 1866.2 1863.3 699.3 251.0 2159.8 0.0 0.0 6839.6 1
G.& S. Cons. 570.2 3.2 224.3 163.8 344.3 0.0 0.0 1305.8 1
Soc.Wel.Prov. 1.1 0.0 104.0 0.0 17.0 0.0 0.0 122.1 1
Transfers 600.1 3733.4 838.7 7048.9 1368.2 83326.0 28848.9 125764.2 1
Cap.Inv. 62.5 0.0 38.1 29.7 18.8 0.0 0.0 149.1 1
Finan.Inv. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1
Other 12.7 21.5 22.8 21.4 1.0 183.4 0.0 262.8 1
TOTAL 3112.8 5621.4 1927.2 7514.8 3909.1 83509.4 28848.9 134443.6 1
SOURCE:
Author Calculations based on:
Estados de Ejecucion Presupuestaria del Sector Publico 
Contraloria General de la Republica
242
TABLE 6.9.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN 
(% Structure)
EDUCATION
1985
Directs. 
G.Sec.& Ad.Education
Educt.&Cult
Services JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL
Personnel 8.4 93.2 53.8 2.6 52.2 0.0 0.0 13.8
G.& S. Cons. 11.8 0.0 22.0 2.1 9.5 0.0 0.0 1.6
Soc.Wel.Prov. 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transfers 76.4 6.4 19.0 94.8 36.6 99.9 100.0 84.1
Cap.Inv. 1.8 0.0 3.1 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.2
Finan.Inv. 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 1.6 0.4 1.1 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.2
TOTAL 9.2 11.9 0.9 6.3 2.5 47.6 21.7 100.0
1986 G.Sec.& Ad
Directs.
Education
Educt.&Cult 
Servi ces JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL
Personnel 35.9 90.8 41.3 2.7 52.9 0.0 0.0 11.8
G.& S. Cons. 38.8 0.0 15.2 1.8 9.2 0.0 0.0 1.4
Soc.Wel.Prov. 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Transfers 17.1 8.5 34.4 88.1 36.5 99.9 100.0 85.8
Cap.Inv. 7.1 0.0 7.7 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.3
Finan.Inv. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 1.1 0.6 0.5 7.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6
TOTAL 2.2 9.8 1.2 6.5 2.7 56.2 21.4 100.0
1987
Directs. 
G.Sec.& Ad.Education
Educt.&Cult
Services JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL
Personnel 60.0 33.1 36.3 3.3 55.3 0.0 0.0 5.1
G.& S. Cons. 18.3 0.1 11.6 2.2 8.8 0.0 0.0 1.0
Soc.Wel.Prov. 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1
Transfers 19.3 66.4 43.5 93.8 35.0 99.8 100.0 93.5
Cap.Inv. 2.0 0.0 2.0 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1
Finan.Inv. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 0.4 0.4 1.2 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2
TOTAL 2.3 4.2 1.4 5.6 2.9 62.1 21.5 100.0
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Capital and Financial Investment: These two areas -of expenditure 
have a negligible impact on the budget. However, it should to be 
remembered that municipalities are now investing in school 
maintenance.
Institutional Expenditure Structure
Under the heading institutional expenditure structure we 
have put tog^ether some ministerial Departments performing 
related activities. The purpose of this aggregation is to help 
the reader to not be confused by so many small institutions.
General Secretariat and Administration: This area includes the
Undersecretariat, Superintendency of Education and Budget Office 
(25). The expenditures are concentrated in personnel and goods 
and services for consumption as these institutions are the 
central bureaucracy of the Ministry (^^). The regional 
ministerial branches (SEREMIs) are administratively dependent 
to the Undersecretariat.
Directorates of Education: This area includes the Directorates
for Primary, Secondary and Professional Education, and the 
Directorates for Extra-mural Activities and Higher Education. 
This area is related to the old ministerial structure which 
administered and planned the provision of all educational levels. 
Under the new ministerial structure most teachers have been 
transfered to municipalities. Therefore, the Directorates of 
Education are concentrated now in the normative role of the 
Education Ministry (2?).
25. Until mid 1987, Super intendency of Education was the official name of the present Directorate of 
Planning and Budgeting. However, this new structure applies only to the internal ministerial organization. 
In terms of the Budget Law it still makes its allocation to the Super intendency and the Budget Office 
separately.
26. In 1985 the Undersecretariat received some extraordinary funds to compensate the salaries of municipal 
teachers. For the subsequent years the Ministry of Finance created a special allocation to tackle this 
problem.
27. In 1987 the General Directorate of Education made some extraordinary transfes to accomplish the 
regulation of Law Decree No. 3166.
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Educational and Cultural Services: These services include the
Directorate for Public Libraries, The National Council of T.V., 
The Construction Society for Educational Buildings, the Council 
of Rectors (University Chancellors) and the Fund for Development 
of Science and Technology. These last two institutions are 
related to higher education.
The expenditure structure of these services is related to 
personnel, goods and services, and transfers. With regards to 
this last item it must be said that most transfers here are to 
finance private subsidiary services such as private museums and 
others.
JUNAEB: According to the new role of the National Board for 
School Assistance described in the previous section, this 
department now only regulates and finances the private production 
of school meals. Therefore, its expenditures are basically 
transfers to the private sector to pay for the delivery and 
production of school meals.
JUNJI: The National Board for School Nurseries is an institution 
which has not been grossly changed through the implementation of 
the 1980's reforms. Therefore, an important part of the 
administration and production of the nurseries is still managed 
from the central headquarters of JUNJI. This means that it still 
has a higher proportion of labour costs. However, JUNJI has 
transfered the production of the meals given to children 
attending to its centres to private companies. Therefore, 
transfers to the private sector are also an important area of 
expenditure.
Subsidies: The subsidies programmes are the transfers that the
Ministry of Education makes to municipalities or private 
subsidied schools. This programme acconuts for more than half of 
the ministerial budget. Its share has been growing as a result of 
the culmination of the municipalization process (^®).
28. This has affected simultaneously the budgets of the General Secretariat and Administration and the 
Directorates of Education, producing a proportional decrease of their expenditures as their roles are being 
delegated to municipalities.
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Higher Education: This programme transfers the public resources 
to universities according to the three financial sources 
explained earlier.
To conclude this section it is interesting to review the 
distribution of educational expenditures per level of education. 
In Table 6.10. it can be noted that basic education accumulates 
more than 50% of the Ministerial expenditures; however, this is 
proportionally lower than its average share of 65% of total 
registrations (^9). if this same analysis is made for higher 
education, it is noted that it accumulates more than 20% of total 
ministerial expenditures, while it produces less than 5% of total 
registrations. According to ministerial figures the per capita 
cost of a student in higher education is six times more expensive 
than a basic education registration. This raises a number of 
questions related to the fairness in the allocation of the 
educational budget and to what extent a developing country can 
afford an expensive university scheme when many of its more 
fundamental needs are still not satisfied.
According to Raczynski's (1986) estimates there has been a 
significant change in the distribution of education expenditures 
per educational levels. In 1970 basic education accounted for 34% 
of educational expenditures whereas higher education accounted 
for 31%. The present ministerial estimates show that these shares 
had changed in an important way by the end of 1980's when basic 
education and higher education received 52% and 22% of total 
education expenditures respectively. These changes were part of a 
ministerial policy to increase the expenditures on basic 
education and so to provide better service and especially, to 
increase the coverage.
29. See Table 6.6.
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TABLE 6.10.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES PER LEVEL OF EDUCATION
(Thousands of 1988$)
1985 1986 1987 I
Pre-School 9,823 10,735 10,738 I
Basic 88,525 82,715 78,877 1
Median 33,114 32,091 27,585 1
High. Educat. 34,073 35,925 32,830 1
Other 1,178 1,055 1,964 1
TOTAL 166,712 162,522 151,994 1
(% Percentages)
1985 1986 1987 1
Pre-School 5.9 6.6 7.1 1
Basic 53.1 50.9 51.9 1
Median 19.9 19.7 18.1 1
High.Educat. 20.4 22.1 21.6 1
Other 0.7 0.6 1.3 1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 1
SOURCE:
Superintendencia de Educacion
6.2.D. Budgeting and Planning
This section discusses how the Ministerial budget is 
organised. It also looks at the relations between planning and 
budgeting as this is an important area to consider for policy 
implementation. As in the case of the health sector, we will 
give an outline of the different phases of the educational budget 
giving special detail to the new subvention scheme and the 
budgetary allocations to universities.
The Educational budget also follows the patterns and 
procedures of the national one as it is constrained by the same 
time table and deadlines.
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Formulation
The Superintendency of Education, which acts as the 
ministerial planning and budgeting office, prepares at the 
beginning of May each year a set of instructions for the budget 
preparation of each a g e n c y . The instructions require a 
description of the agencies norms, policies and functions. They 
also ask for a description of the institutional goals, which 
should include ways of assessing them. To the knowledge of the 
author the description of objectives in education seems to be one 
of the most exhaustive of all social sectors. Moreover, in a 
budget annex each agency must justify all its expenditures with a 
maximun breakdown for each item. For example, there is a special 
section for describing all the purchases related to computing 
equipment, computing services and related requirements.
The Superintendency instructions define an expenditure 
framework according to the Budget Office proposals. Any savings 
apart from these estimates will be allocated in a more open way 
by the agencies in a so called "expansion budget".
In the case of the educational sector, more than 99% of its 
budget comes from the Treasury Fiscal Contribution. Therefore, 
the problem of revenue estimates is not a great concern as in the 
case of other social ministries that have important revenues of 
operation.
The preparation of the budget blueprint by each agency 
follows closely the Superintendency instructions. All the 
objectives, functions and goals are cautiously defined. In some 
cases an effort is made to demonstrate the goal achievement of 
the previous years. In the area of personnel, agencies must 
explain their requirements for professionals and other 
bureaucrats. This is despite the law fixing the total personnel 
endowment per agency.
The Superintendency of Education will consolidate the bluw 
prints of each agency's budget and put each in line with the 
Budget Office initial estimates. After this stage there should be 
an internal round of discussions between the Superintendency and
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the agencies regarding the last minute changes. However, as some 
officials said, "this will dependend on the authority 
willingness". This means that discussions will not always take 
place, depending upon who is running the Superintendency and how 
close to the Budget Office schedule they are.
As a result of this procedure there is usually no 
possibility for the agencies to employ different tactics to 
obtain higher allocations. Any deliberate underestimation will be 
assessed by the Superintendency.
In relation to the subventions to municipal and private 
schools, the Subvention Department prepares a detailed report 
including information about daily attendance and registrations 
for the past three years. From this basis it estimates the next 
year *s expenditures considering the historic trends , the 
expected developments of the population structure and any new 
schools to be opened. With this information the Superintendency 
estimates the annual expenditures of this area.
University budgets are a completely separate issue. The 
Budget Office (Ministry of Finance) defines the total amount of 
resources to be distributed through the three financial sources. 
Overall, universities are free to set their own budgets and will 
bargain directly with the Budget Office over the structure of it; 
this is especially relevant in the case of universities 
contracting debts. Therefore, as far as university budgets are 
concerned the universities will by-pass the ministerial budget 
office. Universities have the obligation to inform the 
Ministry of Education of their total expenditures but this does 
not even entail sending a complete budget to them.
The case of Educational and Cultural Services is similar to 
that of the universities in the sense that they are free to spend 
their budget allocations. As delegated institutions the ministry 
can only advise in their finance plans. However, delegated 
institutions must make some concessions to the ministry as it 
manages the cash flow to the services from the Treasury. 
Therefore, although they have no direct power to ask for changes 
in the Services' budgets, the ministerial Budget Office can
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extert a great deal of pressure on them.
Authorisation
Once the budget is consolidated by the Superintendency it 
is sent to the Budget Office (Ministry of Finance). After the 
budget is approved the Superintendency prepares a "Report on the 
budget variations". This document discusses the departures of the 
final approved budget in relation to the version sent to the 
Ministry of Finance. This report will usually include a number of 
norms for spending agencies in order to adjust the original 
expenditure figures to the approved ones.
Implementation
Unlike the health budget, in the case of education we found 
considerable restrictions in the implementation phase. There are 
monthly meetings between the ministry and the budget office for 
programming the cash flow. Most times the monthly expenditures 
need to be justified again although they had been explained in 
the original budget. It is even necessary to discuss the last 
cash flow in December when it is common to receive the remaider 
of the annual budget allocation.
Under these circumstances the Superintendency also makes 
provisions by witholding part of the prospected expenditures to 
the agencies in order to have cash for an unpredicted financial 
circumstance.
The main explanation for this rather different approach to 
the management of educational expenditures by the Budget Office 
is the following: In 1987, the subvention programme for
municipalities and private schools accounted for more than 60% of 
the ministerial b u d g e t ? this is almost 2% of the national 
G.D.P. For this considerable area of expenditure the Budget 
Office (M. Finance) has only an estimated annual expenditure but 
no legal ceiling. According to the subvention law, a payment
30. This proportion has been growing since the implemantation of the "municipalization" law in 1980. In 
1981, this area of expenditure was 23% of the ministerial budget.
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should be made for any children attending school,.providing that 
the other pre-requisites are fulfilled. Therefore, the Budget 
Office keeps tight control over the expenditures in subventions. 
Every month it requires a plain about the development of school 
attendances and its related prospective payments.
There is no comprehensive evaluation phase of the 
educational budget. However, it has to be acknowledged that there 
are some attempts to include a description of goal achievement in 
the budget; But these explanations are scarcely considered by the 
bureaucrats.
In sum, the educational budgetary process and specially the 
formulation phase has an incremental approach. Most expenditure 
explanations will be continued from one year to another. The
Superintendency will only take notice of changes introduced in
relation to the previous years. As in the health sector, we found 
again here that the overall budgetary procedures are known by 
most agencies.
Having described the ministerial budget we will now discuss 
in more detail the budgetary implications of the subvention 
scheme and university budgets.
Subvention Scheme for Financing Transfered Schools
In section 6.2.A. we described the basic elements of the 
subvention scheme and its latest developments. It is interesting 
to discuss now some of the implications that this system of 
payment entails. There are two issues to consider here.
In relation to the levels of payments, it should be
mentioned that they are related to the levels and types of
education and a regional hardship compensatory allowance. Which, 
according to the former Director of Planning and Budgeting, is 
totally insufficient to offset the different prices and transport 
costs the regions face. In this area the Ministry has recently 
made a step forward with the introduction of the rural factor 
compensating small rural schools for their proportionally smaller 
enrollments. However, this new regulation applies only to those
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schools having less than 60 students. Therefore, there are a 
wide range of unforseen situations, especially relative to median 
education, which have no relevant financial incentive for 
offseting regional hardships (^1). in sum, if there is a genuine 
desire to have expenditure allocations more in line with regional 
needs, this problem should be accounted for.
Another problem in this area is related to the 
contributions that municipalities can make for their own 
municipalized schools. These contributions had their origin in 
the 1982 -1983 economic crisis when the subventions per student 
were frozen and it was required to compensate teachers' salaries 
with their own funds and additional contributions from central 
government. After the crisis a number of municipalities continued 
with this policy in order to maintain better facilities. Through 
these resources some schools were able to buy computer equipment, 
improve their libraries, build gymnasiums, and improve their 
facilities in general. Nevertheless, as can be guessed, poor 
municipalities were unable to grant these additional resources 
for improving facilities; in fact, any surplus resources were 
used to make some structural improvements to the educational 
buildings or, in some smaller rural municipalities, were used to 
build new median education schools.
31. There is again a problem of economies of scales here. It will usually be more expensive (in per capita 
terms) for a municipality to run a single median school than running five or six of them simultaneously. In 
the latter case, the municipality can easily hire teachers for less frequent subjects such as Gymnastics, 
Arts, Music and others. It can define a rota system for these "specialised" teachers among its median 
schools. In the case of a small municipality it will have to afford to contract teachers for these subjects 
on a part time basis making special allowances for attracting them.
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Regarding this latest issue we accept a principle of "local 
autonomy" by which each municipality should be free to use their 
resources in the areas they desire. But, we have to consider that 
the starting point is very unequal. Some rich municipalities may 
be able to spend on improving school facilities whereas most poor 
municipalities will have to begin by improving the physical 
conditions of the buildings or by hiring more teachers. 
Therefore, if the government is really concerned with redressing 
the pre-existing regional educational inequalities, or at least 
defining some similar starting points, it ought to consider a 
poverty-compensatory element in the calculation of the subvention 
per student.
In addition to the previous statement, it is important to 
bear in mind that the coverage of basic education has reached a 
very high level of over 93% in any of the measures included in 
Table 6.4. Therefore, any marginal increase in coverage, which is 
very similar for all regions, will not imply an important 
increase in the availability of resources to each municipality. 
So, if the real concern is to increase student attendance and 
diminish early drop-outs, we need to define a special financial 
incentive considering the cost of attempting to recuperate early 
school leavers (32).
Finally, it can be noted that although the subvention scheme 
can be thought of as a fund involving considerable amounts of 
regional (i.e. municipal) discretion, the central government 
controls its tightly.
32. According to some field work experience the recuperation of an early school leaver after a year off of 
school will cost on average double that of a "normal student". The "recuperated" student will need special 
dedication including more teaching hours, special materials and additional specialists, such as 
psychologists and others.
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During the 1982-1983 economic crisis the central government 
set a clear precedent by which it became the only institution to 
tackle and solve problems. It firstly ruled out municipal 
discretion in dealing with teachers by making a national
agreement with teachers involving extraordinary funds. It also
decided to freeze the subventions for a period to solve central 
government financial hardships and by transfering part of the 
burden to municipalities. The central government also changed the 
subvention law to require from every private subsidized school to 
be opened a formal permission by the regional ministerial 
secretariat (SEREMI). This permission is beyond a requirement of 
some minimal educational standards as the SEREMI has the power to
decide whether or not a school is needed. This was a method of
stopping further increases in subventions. Finally, the central 
government also kept close control over the ministerial budget 
by discussing periodically the cash flow of the approved monthly 
allocations for expenditures. In our view therefore, willy-nilly, 
the government has introduced a clear signal to municipalities: 
central government is in the last resort responsible for 
municipalized education, especially during financial hardship. 
This situation may alter the central-local relations. As Jones 
(1978) has pointed out, local decision makers will try to place 
the responsibility for their spending decisions on the centre and 
will concentrate on pressing central government for more 
resources.
Universities
The basic elements of university finance and organization 
were described in section 6.2.A. In summary, the reforms were 
aimed originally to increase the fiscal resources available to 
universities through a scheme promoting competence and 
incentives. However, the 1982 - 1983 economic crisis made drastic 
reductions in the actual expected expenditures. This meant that 
most of the fiscal allocations continued to be distributed 
according to their historical basis, thus helping to carry on 
with the pre-existing inequalities of the sector.
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At the same time, the only contention for resources to took 
place was among the eight traditional universities (^^), which 
received the lion's share of the resources (75% in 1987). 
Although we consider the creation of regional universities an 
interesting step towards a regional development capacity, it is 
not sensible to think that these universities are in a position 
to compete with the traditional ones; they cannot attract the 
best students and they have low historical allocations. In fact 
these new allocations have above all decreased their historical 
shares in public expenditures.
One alternative that may help regional universities would be 
to allow regions to transfer part of their resources from the 
regional investment fund to their universities on a project 
basis. The regional investment fund in this way would be 
approached not only as providing capital investment but also 
human.
Planning
The Superintendency of Education used to be the main 
planning and budgeting office of the Ministry. As in the case of 
the Ministry of Health, the Superintendent was the third in the 
hierarchy after the Minister and the Undersecretary. However the 
planning structure has now changed to mainly four departments of 
equal status accountable to the Undersecretariat. We describe 
each of them separately.
Directorate of General Education: Its main role is to define 
the educational policies for pre-school, basic and median 
education. Under this directorate is the Centre for Research 
and Teacher Training. This Centre has played an important 
role in the past in the definition of educational policies.
Directorate of Extra-mural Activities: This area organizes 
and plans all the extra-programmâtic activities for 
children, such as cultural competitions and others.
33. The eight traditional universities are the pre-reform (1980) diversities.
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Directorate of Higher Education: The main task of this 
Directorate is to define the policies toward higher 
education. It keeps close control of the development in 
higher education through the approval of new institutions it 
also gathers financial information about them.
Directorate of Planning and Budgeting: This is the new name 
for the Superintendency of Education. Its main activities 
comprise the control and financial planning of the 
subvention scheme through its department of subventions.
Some activities related to the administration of the 
subvention scheme include controlling the payments of 
subventions and children attendance.
Through the consolidation of the agencies' budgets the 
Directorate of Planning can develop most of its planning capacity 
by influencing and adjusting their budgets in line with the 
ministerial aims. However, as has been mentioned earlier this 
tends to be a rather routine activity aimed to put in line the 
agencies proposals with the initial ministerial expenditure 
limits. Therefore, the formal "link" between planning and 
budgeting appears to be related to the Planning Directorate 
capacity to consolidate other agencies budgets.
We found again that educational planning and policy 
definition seemed to be a separate issue from finance and 
budgeting. The Planning and Budgeting Directorate has spent a 
considerable time designing ways to control the subvention scheme 
including methods to prevent the adulteration of attendance 
lists. It has also devoted some time to an analysis of the extent 
to which the subvention scheme has helped to increase the 
attendance and coverage of the different levels of education. 
These initiatives, although valuable ones, have been constrainted 
very much on the administrative side. From the educational view; 
there is now in Chile a widespread consensus that the main 
educational problem is not principally quantity but quality of 
education. This has been shown by the studies of the ministerial 
Centre for Research and Teacher trainning and indeed many other 
studies by private research institutes. Moreover, there is now a
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national test for the (quality of education in all schools. But 
there has not been a joint attempt to link educational 
performance or an indicator of educational quality to financial 
rewards. This is difficult not only because of teachers' inertia 
but mostly because of the ministerial incapability of approaching 
simultaneously educational and financial problems.
To conclude this section we would like to stress the 
system's weaknesses and strengths.
The first problem outlined here is related to financial 
uncertainty. As we mentioned, the Directorate of Planning and 
Budgeting must renegotiate every month the cash flow with the 
Budget Office (Ministry of Finance). This process of re­
negotiations and changes to original budget ends up in the 
Directorate of Planning and Budgeting making its own provisions 
in order to offset potential financial hardships. As is common to 
expect, most uncertainties are transferred to lower-tier 
agencies, thus producing the problem of repetitive budgeting.
A second problem, we find again, is that of unaware 
incrementalism. Although in the case of Education incrementalism 
is confined to the main ministerial agencies, they have not taken 
advantage of it (^^). Every year agencies justify all their 
expenditure items in great detail. This is despite the fact that 
these explanations will usually not be considered by the budget 
officers.
A third problem is that of the reduced links between 
budgeting and planning. The Directorate of Planning and Budgeting 
tends to look at an agency's budget in a financial perspective 
failing to consider its actual policy implications. At the same 
time, the agencies are happy seeing that their budgets have not 
been dramatically changed. But according to some officials, the 
agencies fear to make changes in the actual structure of the 
budget.
34. However, the subvention programme takes a rather rational approach of studying past expenditures in the 
previous years. But it does not take previous commitments as granted.
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Although the new subvention scheme has transfered an 
important amount of financial discretion to the regional level 
(i.e. municipalities), it has weakened the Ministry's power to 
implement alternative policies through the resources for 
education. The Budget Office (Ministry of Finance) now controls 
to a much greater extent the procedures for allocating the 
resources for school education as it manages a large proportion 
of public expenditures. In sum, the Ministry has the potential to 
change some elements in the allocation scheme of subventions in 
order to implement the suggestions concerning the quality of 
education prepared by the Centre for Research and Teacher 
Training and others. But to make these changes and produce 
simultaneously a link between policy proposals and finances it is 
necessary to convince firstly the ultimate manager of the 
educational resources, the Budget Office (M. of Finance).
One positive aspect of budget formulation is its 
transparent and clear procedure. This approach help the agencies 
to know what to do and how to approach the formulation of the 
budget. In fact, some agencies are even taking provisions against 
possible uncertainties due to the central level withholding their 
resources. Part of this "transparent" procedure are some efforts 
to make the budgeting process more rational and available to the 
agencies. Furthermore, we have not come across any other social 
sector in which such an effort is made to communicate and explain 
to the agencies the changes between the last proposal of the 
budget and the approved one.
Another interesting aspect of the finance and organization 
of the Ministry of Education is its potential capacity to 
consider means against ends simultaneously. As an apparent 
inheritance of the budgeting attempts made by the ministry in the 
early 1970's, they consider it important to justify their 
expenditure figures not only in accounting terms (^^) but also in 
terms of goal achievements and beneficiaries. It may be true that 
this information is still overlooked by the bureaucrats but we 
see the root for a more comprehensive way of organizing and 
assessing the ministerial finances. There is also an area of
35. i.e. defining the prices used and the appropriate items of expenditures.
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great potentiality in the subvention scheme, in so far as the 
allocation procedures are beginning to be made more in line with 
the policy proposals that the Ministry itself suggests.
6.2.E. Discretionary Powers over Resources and Decisions
In this section we follow the methodological approach for 
testing the discretionary powers over public resources described 
in Section 4.4. This method implies a qualitative approach 
towards to measuring these aspects.
For the analysis of this problem, three forms of government 
intervention are outlined in Table 6.11.: Regulation, Finance and 
Production.
E.l. Regulation
In this form of government intervention, we defined earlier 
three categories: Central, Regional and Shared regulation. In the 
case of the educational sector it is necessary to add another: 
Delegated regulation. This applies mostly to semi-autonomus 
agencies which were created as ministerial services but were 
lately given autonomy as delegated institutions. These agencies 
have the following common features : they have headquarters
separate from the Ministerial ones; most of them are not 
organised on a regional basis or, if they do have regional 
branches, they will not use the Ministry of Education 
infrastructure; and fnally, their directors are usually appointed 
directly by the President with the advice of the Minister of 
Education.
In relation to the definition of the educational agencies* 
tasks and functions it was found that most of them are centrally 
defined. The exception to this rule are the delegated 
institutions which are allowed to define their own tasks but are 
still under the broader education regulations.
The other exception are universities, which are autonomous 
institutions that have to ''relate to the government through the
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Ministry of Education". Therefore, each university is able to 
define its own structure and functional organization. 
Universities were considered in category Regional; meaning that 
they are considered to be the most discretionary educational 
agencies . This applies also to their source of authority
control (37).
The source of the agencies * autonomy was found to be more 
diversified than the definition of functions. Most ministerial 
agencies are considered to have as the origin of their authority, 
the central government. However, as in the case of the Ministry 
of Health, the Regional Ministerial Secretariats (SEREMIs) 
dependent upon the undersecretariat have a mixed source of 
authority: the central ministry and the region; therefore they 
were considered under the category: Shared.
The main difference with the previous rows in Table 6.11. 
are the cases of JUNAEB and JUNJI. These are semi-autonomus 
institutions that were made independent from the Ministry of 
Education. Therefore, their authority lies mostly in themselves 
but their basic functions were defined by the Ministry.
Regarding the control of agencies' functions, the 
discretionary levels are presented just as in the previous row of 
Table 6.11. The only difference here is the case of the programme 
of subsidies. As is known, the subsidies are the subvention 
payments to all levels of education. Although the educational 
tasks and programmes are defined centrally the control of these 
functions are performed by the provincial directorates of 
education that extend from the SEREMIs. Therefore, control is a 
shared responsability.
36. During the Military government the Rectors (Chancellors) of most universities were appointed directly 
by the President of the Republic. Despite that this was an important loss for university autonomy, this 
situation did not changed dramatically the structure of the relations between universities and the Ministry 
of Education.
37. Public universities are subject to financial auditing by the Comptroller but this is not seemed as 
harming its autonomy.
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TABLE 6.11.
DISCRETIONARY POWERS OVER RESOURCES AND DECISIONS IN EDUCATION
Govt. Intervention Forms 
REGULATION
|G.Sec.& Adm.|Directorates 
1 (Education
1 1 
I 1
(Educat. & Cult.( 
(Services (
1 1 
1 1
JUNAEB ( 
1
1
1
JUNJI ( SUBSIDIES 
1
1
1
Hg. Educat. (Hg. Educat.( 
( 1
{ 1 
1 1
TOTAL
Who Defines Tasks
1 1 
1 Centre | Centre
I 1
( Delegated (
1
Centre ( Centre
1
( Centre Regional
1 1 
( Regional ( Centre
Source of Authority 1 Shared | Centre ( Delegated ( Delegated ( Delegated ( Centre Regional ( Regional ( Shared
Control 1 Shared | Centre 
1 1
( Delegated ( 
1 1
Delegated ( 
1
Delegated ( Shared 
1
Regional ( Regional ( 
1 1
Shared
FINANCE
PRODUCTION
1 1 
1 CMF 96%1 CMF 100% 
1 BF 4%|
1 1 
1 1 
1 1
1 1 
1 1
1 1 
( CMF 96% ( 
[ BF 4% ( 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1
1 1 
1 1
1
CMF 8% ( 
SPF 92% ( 
1 
1 
1
1
1
CMF 64% 
SPF 36%
1
( FSSA 100% 
1 
1 
1 
1
1
1
BF 100%
1 1 
I BF 100% (
( 1 
( 1 
( 1 
1 1 
( 1 
1 1
CMF 16% 
SPF 7% 
FSSA 55% 
BF 22%
Personnel
1 1 
1 Centre | Centre
1 1 
( Centre (
1
Shared ( Centre
1
( Regional Regional ( Regional ( Regional
Field Administration 
Levels
1 2 1 1 
1 1
1 1  ( 
1 1
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4 Local
E .2. Finance
In the area of finance, we work with the five pre-defined 
forms of financing social programmes. The analysis will be based 
on the column referring to the total forms of finance for the 
Ministry of Education.
Centrally Managed Finance (CMF) is related to those funds 
over which the region has no discretion as their allocation is 
decided upon by the centre. Only 16% of the educational 
resources are considered to be in this category. This is an 
important departure from the Ministry of Health in which 70% of 
its resources were estimated as CMF. The low proportion of CMF in 
Education,gives a clear initial indication that in financial 
terms the regions do enjoy more discretionary powers in this 
area. The institutions having their finances managed centrally 
correspond basically to the central bureaucracy of the Ministery.
Specific purpose funds are related to funds transfered to 
an institution with a pre-defined specific objective being the 
elegibility criteria defined centrally. In this case the 
institution or its regional branch has discretion for selecting 
the individual beneficiary. This is the case of JUNAEB* s 
programme of school meals and JUNJI*s feeding programme for its 
nurseries. SPF accounts for 7% of total educational expenditures, 
an identical proportion to that of the Ministry of Health.
The Funds for Subsidising a Specific Activity (FSSA)
accumulate the largest share of educational expenditures, being 
equivalent to 55% of total educational expenditures. In this case 
the region or the regional educational agency has more discretion 
to spend their resources within some defined activities. The 
large share of FSSA in total educational expenditures, as opposed 
to the total expenditures of other sectors, is explained by the
subvention programme. In contrast to the FAPs (Fee for Service
Scheme in Health), the subvention programme in education does 
consider personnel costs. This implies that regions are able to 
manage a greater proportion of the budget.
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Finally, Block Funds (BF) accumulate 22% of total 
educational expenditures. This is 20 percentage points above the 
share of BF in health. We have considered under this category the 
resources that the state transfers to universities. It is 
important to note here that although universities (located in the 
capital or in regions) have large discretionary powers to manage 
their resources, this does not imply that the resources are 
necessarily allocated in a way to redress the regional 
inequalities.
E .3. Production
As can be seen in Table 6.11., the ministerial bureaucracy 
recruit personnel and defines its policies at central level. 
This is also true in the case of most delegated agencies which 
have no regional branches. The main difference in the production 
scheme of education arises in subsidies, as all school teachers 
are now recruited and managed at a regional level (i.e. 
municipal). However, there are still some interferences by the 
central level into personnel policies. The ministry as a whole 
has been categorized as regional as more than two thirds of the 
personnel working in the educational sector are managed in a 
discretionary manner either by municipalities or universities.
Finally, in relation to the levels of field administration 
we note considerably more levels than in the case of the health 
sector. This is due to the municipalization process of education 
that allowed the municipalities to run the local schools. 
However, it ought to be remembered that the Chilean 
municipalization process is less complex than the new British 
scheme. In the Chilean case most of the administrative functions 
related to the production and finance of education are performed 
by the municipal corporations or municipal departments of 
education. In the British case most of the school management is 
carried out by the school boards.
It would have been interesting to consider other dimensions 
of the production of education in Chile, but there are no 
relevant research studies on this area. According to some 
educational experts, a feature of the Chilean curriculum is its
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national application. This implies that all public schools follow 
the same programme regardless of where they are located and the 
socio-economic background of the students. However, some 
ministerial officials mentioned that the ministry is now taking 
important steps to assure the decentralization of the national 
curriculum which has been so far applied throughout the country. 
Local schools have still complained that the ministerial 
"minimal" curriculum is too long to be properly complemented by 
local additional courses. There are also simultaneous fears of 
stepping aside of the ministerial curriculum as the performance 
tests are prepared on a national basis.
To finish this section we summarise the findings for the
three forms of government intervention. Before preceding with the 
summary it is important to reiterate that universities are 
considered as regulated semi-autonomus institutions. Therefore, 
their very inclusion in the educational budget makes 
automatically a tendency toward decentralization within the 
continuum previously defined.
In relation to regulation the central ministry plays an 
important normative role in defining the broader policies to be 
applied in the sector. In fact, in a unitary state it is 
difficult to think that the ministry can decentralize completely 
its regulation functions. However, part of the functions attached 
to regulation, according to our definition, such as the control 
of agencies, are done in a delegated approach. Overall, 
considering the delegated, central and deconcentrated approaches 
found within the ministry, we consider that the ministry has 
mostly a deconcentrated approach to regulation.
In the case of finance, it is possible to note a clear
difference to the Ministry of Health. From our estimatites, we 
found that only 16% of the funds were defined as centrally 
managed finances. Therefore, 84% of the educational funds are 
managed in a way in which the regions may exert some influence on 
their allocation.
Finally, in the area of production we also found a 
departure from the Ministry of Health, as all teachers are now
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recruited and managed by the municipality. At the same time most 
educational services are delivered through lower tiers of field 
administration. Therefore, we consider this function as a 
decentralized one.
6.2.F. Summary and Conclusions: Organization and Finance of 
Education
In section 6.2. we have described the organization and 
finace of the educational sector in Chile. One of the most 
i m p o r t a n t  r e c e n t  d e v e l o p m e n t s  in the s e c t o r  is the 
municipalization of basic ônd Median education (primary and 
secondary). This significant change implied four major aspects:
i) The definition of a local organization to manage the schools; 
the alternative defined here were private Corporations for Social 
Development or Municipal Educational Departments.
ii) The transference of educational buildings to municipalities 
was done through a legal arrangement of a "non-payment leasing" 
to municipalities.
iii) Reallocation of teachers: This involved the re-hiring of 
most ministerial teachers by the local authorities.
iv) The creation of a financial scheme to finance the transfered 
schools. In this area the government created a subvention scheme 
that involves a payment per-student attending schools, a system 
similar to educational vouchers.
An additional important transformation of the educational 
system during the last decade was the redefinition of the 
ministerial role as a normative institution. This implied not 
only the transfer of school administration to other institutions 
but also a delegation of a number of educational related 
activities.
Regarding the developments in enrolment and coverage in the 
different levels of education we observed important increases. 
From 1980 to 1987 the coverage of pre-school education rose from 
14% to 20% of the relevant population. In the case of median 
school between 1983 and 1987 it rose by almost 9 percentage 
points. However, basic education coverage has been stagnant as it
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has reached its maximum levels of coverage. Therefore, the 
marginal increases have been more difficult to achieve.
In this area we suggested that it is necessary to define a 
payment per-student (subvention) that reflects the different 
regional costs of living. It should also consider the municipal 
capability or incapability to contribute to education with their 
own resources. In addition, we also suggested that it is 
necessary to consider within the subvention scheme a financial 
incentive that makes more attractive to schools the enrollment of 
early school leavers. Furthermore, through the subvention scheme 
it is even possible to envisage a mechanism by which the schools 
receive a financial incentive for their proportional improvements 
in the quality of education. The information for implementing 
this suggestion is now available.
In relation to the ministerial budgeting and planning 
schemes we acknowledged its transparent and organised procedures 
that may appear as an application of a rational method. However, 
we found that because of the considerable amount of resources 
managed by the Ministery of Education, the Budget Office (M. of 
Finance) controls tightly the ministerial expenditures. This 
situation affects the ministery and the ministerial agencies, 
producing considerable uncertainty in the short term availability 
of resources and their implementation of policies. In addition to 
these problems we also found, as in the case of health that 
after giving formal approval to the expenditures the Ministry of 
Education does possess increasing amounts of discretion. This is 
specially clear in the areas of finance and production of 
education in which the delivering agencies enjoy a great extent 
of regional discretion.
In sum, we consider that education does enjoy considerable 
amounts of discretion for the management of its resources and 
decisions. But it has not made total use of this as it has been 
tightly controlled by the Ministry of Finance as a result of the 
1982-1983 economic crisis. It is perfectly possible now for the 
Ministry of Education to start linking its financial allocations 
to the educational aims and being able therefore to solve part of 
the existing educational problems.
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6.3. DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF EDUCATIONAL POLICIES
This section aims to review the redistributive impact of 
education expenditures in relation to the poor population. As 
explained in section 4.3., the poor population was defined to be 
the lower 30% of the income distribution. In the case of 
education expenditures only two programmes are defined as 
poverty-targeting programmes, these are JUNAEB*s school meals 
and JUNJI's pre-school nurseries.
Despite the fact that poverty targeting programmes account 
for only 9% of the ministerial expenditures, the government has 
defined poverty-targeting as an aim that encompasses all social 
programmes. Therefore, we will be assessing the proportion of 
direct education expenditures which reach the lower 30% of the 
population.
In order to evaluate the state transfers in education 
(education expenditures) reaching the population it was necessary 
to define four methodological approaches according to the 
different types of educational programmes. Most of the 
information used in this section comes from Haindl and Weber 
(1986) and Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval (1989). As mentioned 
previously, before these studies are based on two country wide 
sample surveys for 1985 and 1987. The survey asked every student 
attending school about the type of education, his/her year in 
school and also the name and address of the school. This 
information was cross-referenced with the ministerial list of 
schools indicating towhich schools the rural factor and 
compensatory deficits applied. In the case of higher education it 
also asked every student attending a university or a professional 
institute if they were receiving a student loan.
School Education
As was mentioned earlier the cost for the maintenance of a 
student in a public or private subsidised school depends on four 
componenets:
- Subvention unit for the eleven different levels.
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- Hardship allowance (^®)
- Rural factor (if applicable)
- Ministerial transfer to compensate the municipal 
educational deficit.
Therefore, the following formulae was applied for each 
child attending to public or a private subsidised school.
State —
Transfer | Subvention unit Hardship Rural Compensatory
to an = I according to the * allowance + factor+ deficits 
individual| educational level
Higher Education
In the case of Higher Education the estimation process was 
carried out differently. For each student enrolled in higher 
education the direct and indirect transfers were allocated 
according to the total amount of transfers received by each 
university divided by the number of students enrolled in it.
The state cost of student loans was estimated to be the 
difference between the 1% annual real interest rate charged to 
students and the market interest rate.
JUNAEB
Through JUNAEB*s information the average cost of a school 
breakfast or lunch was obtained. These costs were transfered into 
monthly costs (39). The resulting figures were imputed to every 
child receiving breakfast, lunch or both meals.
38. The hardship allowance and the rural factor take account of the additional costs arising in the country­
side for producing the same educational services as the cities. Therefore, they imply additional resources 
but not necessarily more services available.
39. The daily cost were transformed into monthly by multiplying them by 20. This considers that a month 
will have on average 20 working days.
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JUNJI
The procedure for JUNJI was similar to that of JUNAEB. The 
average estimated cost of a monthly tuition for a child was 
obtained directly from JUNJI. This cost was then imputed to every 
child attending one of JUNJI's pre-school nurseries.
Once the per capita monthly costs of each educational 
programme were obtained it was possible to estimate the 
proportion of the state expenditure on education being received 
by the population or each income decile.
Before analysing the actual redistributive effects of 
educational expenditures it is necessary to estimate the 
proportion of total public expenditures accounted for by the 
direct social expenditures (*0).
Table 6.12. shows the estimates of the proportion of direct 
social expenditures in education in relation to public 
expenditures. In contrast to the health sector, contributions in 
education are really a negligible amount as education is by 
definition a free service. Another difference arises regarding 
the administration costs which are also a small proportion of 
public expenditures in this sector. However, this is basically 
due to an accounting procedure rather than a reality. What 
happens here is that all the administration costs involved in 
school education are included within the programme of subsidies 
and it is not possible to disaggregate them.
The bottom line of Table 6.12. shows that direct social 
expenditures in education capture on average 95% of total public 
expenditures in the same sector. This figure appears as a very 
high proportion of total expenditures. Therefore, our estimates 
of the redistributive effects for this sector will be more 
representative of the total public sectoral expenditures than in 
any other sector.
40. In other words, the proportion of the taxpayers financed expenditures.
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TABLE 6.12.
ESTIMATES OF DIRECT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES AS A PROPORTION OF 
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN EDUCATION 
(Millions of 1987 $)
1985 1987
a) Total public expenditure in Education 
- Contributions paid
149,632
328
134,444
1,012
b) Fiscal Social Expenditures in Education 
- Administration costs
149,304
6,572
133,432
6,103
c) Direct social expenditures in Education 142,732 127,329
0 / 8 )  % 95.4 94.7
Author calculations based on:
Table 6.9.
Ley de Presupuestos del Sector Publico 1985 -1987
Haindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
The redistributive effects of education expenditures are 
shown in table 6.13. As was done for the health sector, we 
estimated the proportion of the direct social expenditures 
reaching to the lower 30% of the population. These figures were 
obtained by comparing the share of the bottom 30% in relation to 
the total direct expenditures in education.
In table 6.13. it is possible to note that the two poverty 
targeted programmes have different levels of progressiveness 
although both of them have experienced increases in this regard. 
As was mentioned in section 6.2.A. JUNAEB has been redefining its 
selection procedures for its schools meals programmes during the 
last years. This has produced a move toward progressiveness. In 
JUNJI's case, it has also made some efforts in relation to the 
selection procedures. But it is constrained by the original 
location of the school nurseries, which are located not in the 
poorest areas. Therefore, it is more difficult to increase 
progressiveness in this programme.
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TABLE 6.13.
REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF EDUCATION EXPENDITURES 
(Millions of 1987 $)
Total Share of
1985
1987
Direct Exps.Bottom 30%
Pre-school 6,953 3,129 45.0 1 Slightly Progressive
Basic Ed. 64,999 30,550 47.0 (Slightly Progressive
Median Ed. 26,999 9,911 36.7 (Slightly Progressive
Hg. Educ. 33,947 4,074 12.0 (Regressive
Sch. Meals 9,834 5,999 61.0 (Progressive
TOTAL 142,732 53,667 37.6 (slightly Progressive
Pre-school 9,746 4,785 49.1 (slightly Progressive
Basic Ed. 58,415 28,682 49.1 (slightly Progressive
Median Ed. 22,810 8,280 36.3 (slightly Progressive
Hg. Educ. 28,849 2,337 8.1 (Regressive
Sch. Meals 7,509 5,106 68.0 (Very Progressive
TOTAL 127,329 49,174 38.6 (slightly Progressive
TYPE OF PROGRAMME
Author calculations based on:
Table 6.9.
Haindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
Basic and median education are both categorised as slightly 
progressive programmes. This is an important achievement for 
programmes that are not poverty-targeted and have high coverages 
of the beneficiary population. As can be seen in table 6.13., 
although both programmes belong to the same category they do show 
different percentages of progressiveness. This can be interpreted 
by the fact that basic education has been compulsory for a long 
period achieving very high levels of coverage among the poor. 
Whereas, median (secondary) education has been expanding only in 
the last two decades and is still not well developed in many poor 
areas especially in the country-side.
It is interesting to recall here our early suggestion 
regarding possible changes in the subvention scheme. A financial 
incentive for additional recruitments of early school leavers 
will certainly make the expenditures in education more 
progressive.
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Higher education has always been included in the 
traditional definition of social expenditure in Chile. One can 
always challenge that approach by arguing that higher education 
has never been defined as a redistributive programme but as a way 
to increae the nation's human capital and secure its development. 
However, higher education is one of the most regressive 
programmes of all social sectors. In fact, during the period 
under analysis its distribuiton has worsened. This may be due to 
the changes in the student loans' management. These changes 
involved the transference of the loans' resources to the 
universities making them financially responsible for their 
recuperation. Therefore, some universities have opted for a 
criteria of loan recuperability instead of redistributive impact 
when allocating student loans.
Overall we found that, although a minor proportion of 
educational expenditures are poverty-targeted programmes, the 
total expenditures do show a degree of progressiveness. However, 
the degree of progressiveness seen here is lower than that of 
health which does not have a single poverty-targeted programme. 
Therefore, if the government is keen to maintain this aim it 
should consider some measures to increase the redistributive 
effects of educational expenditures.
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6.4. REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES
6.4.A. Data Constraints and Methodology
The regional expenditures in education were estimated 
according to the methodology described in section 4.4. Overall, 
it was possible to regionalize 77% of the total expenditures 
according to criterion A which represents the higher level of 
quality in the estimations.
Regional Allcocation by Institutions
General Secretariat and Administration: This area includes the
Undersecretariat, Superintendency of Education and the Budget 
Office. These institutions are related to the ministerial 
administrative bureaucracy both at national and regional levels. 
There is no specific information about the regional allocation of 
the expenditures on these institutions. They were allocated 
according to the national distribution of school registration 
(Criterion C) as the bureaucracy's duty is basically to 
administrate and manage the subventions to school education (^^).
Directorates of Education: This area includes the Directorate for 
General Education, Higher Education and Extra-mural Activities. 
As in the previous case there was no consistent basis to 
regionally allocate these expenditures besides a sectorally 
related indicator.
These directorates perform basically a planning and policy 
definition role for all levels of education. Therefore, its 
activities benefit all the children attending school education in 
the country. Accordingly, the criterion to regionally allocate 
these expenditures was defined to be the regional distribution of 
school registrations (Criterion C). In contrast to the previous 
case, we used here the distributution of total registrations, 
(not only in public schools) , as the activities of this
41. The alternative indicator in this case was personnel as in the case of the Ministry of Health. However, 
this was dissmised as almost two thirds of education personnel is now hired by the municipalities «xi not by 
the central level.
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Directorate benefit all the students attending both private and 
public schools.
TABLE 6.14.
CRITERIA OF REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF EDUCATIONAL EXPENDITURES
1985
G.
Directs. 
Sec.& Ad.Education
Educt.&Cult.
Services JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL
Crit. A 
Crit. B 
Crit. C 
Crit. D
100 100
100
92
8
100
100 100 69
8
21
1
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
% Min. Budget 9 12 1 6 2 48 22 100
1986
G.Sec.& Ad
Directs.
Education
Educt.&Cult.
Services JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL
Crit. A 
Crit. B 
Crit. C 
Crit. D
100 100
100
88
12
100
100 100 78
8
13
1
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
% Min. Budget 2 10 1 6 3 56 21 100
1987 Directs.
G.Sec.& Ad.Education
Educt.&Cult.
Services JUNAEB JUNJI Subsidies H. Educ. TOTAL
Crit. A 
Crit. B 
Crit. C 
Crit. D
100 100
100
94
6 100
100 100 84
8
7
1
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
% Min. Budget 2 4 1 6 3 62 21 100
NOTE: See text for explanations
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Educational and Cultural Services: These services include a 
variety of activities related to education and culture but not 
assimilable directly to the rest of the activities of the 
ministry. They account for only 1.2% of the ministerial 
expenditures. The only two more specific ones, (the Conucil of 
University Rectors and the Fund for Development of Science and 
T e c h n o l o g y ) , were added to university expenditures and 
regionalized accordingly. For the remainder of the educational 
services we used a general indicator for their regional 
allocation: the regional distribution of population (Criterion
D) . We assumed here that the benefits of these services follow 
the regional distribution of the population. This is very likely 
in most cases, especially in the National Council of T.V.
JUNAEB: In the case of JUNAEB's school meals the regional
allocation was slightly more complicated. From the ministerial 
statistical sources it was possible to obtain the regional 
distribution of the number of breakfasts and luncheons served 
during the year. JUNAEB provided us with the information to find 
the unitary average regional cost of each type of school meal. 
Therefore, we estimated the regional expenditure in school meals 
by multipllying the number and and types of school meals served 
in a region times its average costs. These figures were lately 
adjusted to the Comptroller expenditure figures. This procedure 
corresponds to Criterion B as we had a specific indicator to 
estimate the regional allocation. On average 92% of JUNAEB 
expenditures were regionally allocated according to Criterion B.
The regaining 8% of JUNAEB's expenditures were related to the 
programmes of scholarships and student homes. As there was no 
statistical information for these smaller programmes apart from 
the national figures, they were regionalized according to the 
regional structure of the expenditure in school meals. In this 
case this constitutes an indirect indicator. Criterion C.
JUNJI: The case of JUNJI's regional allocation process was very 
similar to that of JUNAEB. JUNJI provided the statistics for the 
number of children attending the three different programmes of 
nurseries and the average cost of each one. With this information
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we estimated the total regional expenditures in these programmes. 
These results were also adjusted to Comptroller figures. The main 
difference with the JUNAEB case was that the average costs 
provided had a national basis instead of a regional one. We 
consider this regional allocation under Criterion B.
Subsidies: The Subvention Office within the Directorate of
Planning and Budgeting keeps a close follow-up on the subventions 
paid for each educational level and the compensatory factors when 
they are applicable. From their statistical information it was 
possible to compute the total expenditures on this programme per 
region. This is considered as Criterion A.
Higher Education: The expenditures in higher education were 
regionally distributed according to the allocation that each 
university receives from the Ministry of Finance. The three forms 
of public transfers were considered here. Since the location of 
each university is known, the regionalization of its expenditures 
consisted in summing up all the university expenditures for each 
region. This allocation was categorised under Criterion A.
However, this allocation assumes that the expenditures made by 
the university in a certain region benefit the same region. It is 
known that in the case of universities located in Valparaiso and 
Bio-Bio an important proportion of its students are from 
Santiago. Therefore, it is possible that some of these students 
will return to their original region. Unfortunatelly, there is no 
information on the original place of residence of the students 
attending these universities. In sum, it is feasible to think 
that this regional allocation of university expenditures 
underestimates its regional regressiveness; but there is no 
additional information to adjust this problem.
The estimates of the regional educational expenditures 
appears in columns BMED,BMHE and SCHE in table 6.15 to 6.17.
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6.4.B. Regional Expenditures and Regional Needs
This section addresses the second main topic of this 
research. The link between regional social expenditures and 
regional needs. In the first section we discussed the procedures 
and financial strategies that the Chilean government makes to 
allocate its social expenditures.
To discuss and analyse the relation between regional 
expenditures and regional needs we must define indicators of 
both. In the previous section we explained how the regional 
allocation of expenditures was approached and the steps involved 
in its estimation. Therefore, it is necessary now to spend some 
time introducing and describing the needs indicators.
In the case of education, as in most social sectors, it is 
difficult to define a precise indicator of need as they embrace 
wider aspects such as cultural affairs. Moreover, most studies 
trying to define a good indicator of need are usually constrained 
by the information available. This research was also influenced 
by these constraints.
The list of educational indicators selected and its index 
appear in Table 6.15 to 6.17. Each of these indicators are 
introduced now:
Basic and Median Education Coverage:
Perhaps one of the best approximations to a needs indicator 
in education would have been an indicator of the proportion 
of children in school age not reregistered in schools. 
However, this indicator is usually approached oppositely as 
an indicator of coverage (instead of non-coverage). The 
Ministry of Education does not calculate regional coverage 
rates. They were estimated following the ministerial criteria 
but with some constraints due to some restrictions in the 
regional population projections of age group. Basic education 
coverage was estimated dividing total registration for that 
educational level by the population from 5 to 14 years old. 
In the case of median education the age group was from 15 to
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19 years old .
In addition to basic and median moverage we estimated the 
total coverage of the educational system considering total 
enrolment and the population from 5 to 19 years old.
The educational indicators can consider additional 
dimensions beside those showing access to education. In this 
regard we included indicators which shcfed the educational 
performance of children. This dimension can also speak out an the 
needs of those actually enrolled in education. These indicators 
are processed by the Ministry of Education.
Promotion rate: This is the number of students that approved 
after the final year examination. The rate considers the 
number of approved students divided by the total number of 
students at the end of the year.
Failure rate: This is the number of students who did not pass 
the final year examinations. The rate is computed by dividing 
the number of failed students by the total number of students 
at the end of the year.
42. This does not coincide with the official age gruops of 6 to 13 in basic education. In the case of median 
education the official age definition is from 14 to 17 years old.
Therefore, our coverage estimates are not fully comparable to the ministerial national figures. However, our 
figures were computed in a systematic way following the minsterial procedure.
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Drop-out rate: This is the number of students who, because of 
their formal or informal withdraw from the school, are not 
in conditions to be examined. The rate is computed by 
dividing the number of students withdrawn in relation to the 
total number of students at the end of the year (^^).
Attendance rate: This is the proportion of students attending 
school in relation to the total number of registered 
students. This rate is calculated on a monthly basis.
Student-teacher ratio: The ratio between the number of
students divided by the number of teachers is a traditional 
indicator of human resources availability in education.
In addition to the educational indicators we included 
other socio-economic indicators in this area. The purpose of this 
was to provide information to test the competing hypothses 
defined earlier; the indicators are:
GDP Regional G.D.P. per capita
INCO Regional average income
URBN % urban population
URBZ % population living in cities above 20,000 
inhabitants.
Finally, in relation to expenditure indicators we 
defined three alternative indicators. The aim here was to be able 
to test the relations between the different major areas of 
expenditures. All these indicators were defined in per capita 
terms.
BMED: Includes all school education (pre-school, basic and
median), related services and the general ministerial 
expenditures. It excludes the expenditures in higher 
education.
43. Because of a change in the definition of the drop-out rate since 1986, the estimates for 1985 are not 
fully consisten with those of 1986 and 1987.
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BMHE: Includes all the expenditures of BMED as well as the
expenditures of higher education.
SCHE: Includes only school educational expenditures (pre­
school, basic and median) and the expenditures on the school 
meals programme.
B.l. Preliminary Data Analysis
In this preliminary data analysis it is important to pay 
considerable attention to the regional patterns of the different 
indicators in an attempt to provide some initial conclusions 
about the associations between them. The information for this 
sector appears in tables 6.15. to 6.17.
In relation to the indicators of educational performance it 
is possible to note that the regions showing promotion levels 
above the national average are basically those previously defined 
as urban, including Tarapaca, Antofagasta,Atacama, Valparaiso, 
Magallanes and Metropolitan. By an obvious contrast the regions 
showing failure levels above the national average are those 
defined as rural and intermediate. Drop-out rates follow a 
somewhat erratic pattern. It is surprising to see that the two 
most densely populated regions had consistently above average 
drop-out drop-out. This problem has been usually associated with 
rural children helping their families during the crop season. 
However, this argument can still be considered valid as most 
rural regions also show above average drop-out rates.
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TABLE 6.15.
EDUCATION INDICATORS - 1985
(Index Total=100)
1...
PROM FAIL DROP ATTE BACV
■-EDUC
MECV
INDIC
COVE S/TR
1......
GDP
OTHERS---
INCO URBN URBZ
1.... EXPENDITURE
BMED BMHE
.... 1
SCHE
Tarapaca 103.5 71.6 99.9 98.9 95.7 111.8 99.5 92.9 136.5 85.7 113.3 127.3 114.9 118.4 116.6
Antofagasta 94.1 90.7 94.3 101.3 96.3 121.6 103.1 99.7 200.3 83.2 118.5 119.9 125.8 143.7 130.4
Atacama 99.2 103.7 93.9 101.6 102.2 115.4 106.1 105.5 148.7 82.8 110.3 83.9 138.2 117.1 139.4
Coquimbo 101.9 92.6 75.1 103.0 103.0 93.6 100.1 97.8 61.1 69.0 90.2 63.7 123.8 106.8 121.7
Valparaiso 102.7 84.4 110.7 100.1 95.6 112.5 99.9 94.3 99.4 90.8 109.3 101.4 79.4 89.1 76.4
O'higgins 98.7 103.7 89.6 100.6 99.4 90.5 97.4 105.4 122.9 79.4 78.9 43.1 103.5 80.8 100.4
Maule 98.6 124.7 110.4 102.3 104.8 82.0 99.4 96.3 65.7 83.3 68.8 57.4 105.9 87.5 104.5
B i oB i 0 98.5 133.6 110.7 99.8 102.7 94.6 100.4 93.3 79.9 88.6 92.5 81.6 114.4 108.8 113.1
Araucania 93.9 133.6 99.1 100.3 108.1 81.9 101.2 91.6 55.6 94.3 69.6 41.3 128.6 107.8 130.7
Los Lagos 100.5 113.5 108.0 99.8 103.0 75.7 96.6 91.9 66.9 98.2 71.5 46.0 114.5 107.3 115.0
Aysen 102.0 102.2 97.9 100.4 98.5 71.0 92.6 80.2 81.5 93.8 95.8 63.8 214.2 167.2 240.0
Magallanes 103.1 64.2 97.6 102.2 90.1 100.3 92.6 83.7 260.1 117.5 110.8 105.8 118.9 104.7 149.2
Metropol. 103.4 81.4 112.7 98.8 97.8 109.8 100.6 109.9 110.0 117.0 116.0 135.5 83.0 94.9 80.2
INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
COUNTRY TOTAL 88.5 8.8 7.5 89.5 85.6 53.4 74.7 23.6 29406 42788 83.3 71.4 9639 12344 21815
AVG 88.5 8.8 7.5 90.1 85.4 51.8 74.1 22.6 33673.2 38952.8 79.8 58.8 11604.7 14247.5 27145.6
STD 2.8 1.9 0.8 1.1 3.9 8.4 2.7 1.9 17068.2 5681.6 14.9 22.6 3036.0 2991.0 8508.9
COEF.VAR. 3.1 21.3 10.3 1.3 4.6 16.2 3.6 8.4 50.7 14.6 18.7 38.5 26.2 21.0 31.3
PROM Promotion rate in school education S/TR Student - teacher ratio
FAIL Failure rate in school education GDP GDP per capita
DROP Drop - out rate in school education INCO Regional average income
ATTE Attendance rate in school education URBN % urban population
BACV Basic education coverage URBZ % population living in cities above 20,000
MECV Median education coverage BMED Educational expenditures per capita
COVE Total education coverage BMHE Educational expenditures per capita including higher educ
SCHE Expenditures in school education per capita
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TABLE 6.16.
EDUCATION INDICATORS - 1986
(Index Total=100)
9 8 6
---EDUC.INDIC.- -OTHERS- •EXPENDITURE |
PROM FAIL DROP ATTE BACV MECV COVE S/TR GDP INCO URBN URBZ BMED BMHE SCHE
Tarapaca 102.6 71.2 105.2 99.0 97.3 109.8 100.3 91.4 133.7 83.8 113.0 127.3 119.0 117.3 118.5
Antofagasta 103.0 76.8 76.8 100.8 98.1 125.0 105.1 104.5 190.5 78.2 118.1 119.9 129.3 150.6 130.6
Atacama 100.5 107.3 62.8 101.1 104.9 115.6 108.0 108.7 142.0 78.9 110.3 83.9 139.7 120.4 93.0
Coquimbo 101.1 91.3 85.0 102.1 104.7 93.1 101.1 102.6 61.3 68.5 90.1 63.7 125.2 109.7 120.8
Valparaiso 100.8 77.7 115.5 100.3 97.7 110.3 100.9 96.3 100.5 92.1 109.2 101.4 79.7 88.9 81.0
O'higgins 98.2 121.7 98.6 100.8 103.0 89.2 99.4 103.3 122.1 78.2 79.2 43.1 101.8 79.6 99.0
Maule 97.9 123.6 102.6 101.3 105.4 80.3 99.2 97.1 65.8 83.4 69.3 57.4 103.5 86.2 101.9
BioBio 97.8 121.2 113.1 100.6 103.5 94.4 100.9 96.2 77.6 85.3 92.5 81.6 113.2 108.6 111.6
Araucania 94.8 148.4 126.4 99.7 109.1 82.7 102.0 94.2 55.2 92.4 69.3 41.3 129.6 109.6 127.9
Los Lagos 98.0 116.4 116.7 99.4 104.2 73.7 96.5 93.0 68.1 99.2 71.9 46.0 116.9 109.5 117.1
Aysen 99.3 105.5 108.1 100.2 98.4 73.2 92.7 83.7 81.1 92.6 96.1 63.8 230.4 180.2 235.4
Magallanes 105.0 63.5 55.3 101.3 90.8 96.2 91.9 89.4 252.7 113.8 110.6 105.8 122.6 109.4 144.8
Metropol. 101.0 75.3 133.9 99.0 98.7 111.0 101.6 105.6 111.7 119.1 115.8 135.5 82.5 93.6 82.9
INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
COUNTRY TOTAL 88.8 7.7 3.5 90.4 83.6 54.5 73.9 24.1 30552.9 45227.1 83.6 71.4 9263 11844 24517
AVG 88.8 7.7 3.5 90.8 84.6 52.6 73.9 23.5 34366.0 40545.3 80.1 58.8 11353.0 13333.2 29506.3
STD 2.3 1.9 0.8 0.8 3.9 8.7 3.1 1.7 16854.4 6251.3 14.8 22.6 3288.2 3091.3 9269.8
COEF.VAR. 2.6 24.9 22.9 0.9 4.6 16.6 4.2 7.1 49.0 15.4 18.5 38.5 29.0 23.2 31.4
PROM Promotion rate in school education S/TR Student - teacher ratio
FAIL Failure rate in school education GDP GDP per capita
DROP Drop - out rate in school education INCO Regional average income
ATTE Attendance rate in school education URBN % urban population
BACV Basic education coverage URBZ % population living in cities above 20,000
MECV Median education coverage BMED Educational expenditures per capita
COVE Total education coverage BMHE Educational expenditures per capita including higher educ
SCHE Expenditures in school education per capita
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TABLE 6.17.
EDUCATION INDICATORS
(Index Total=100)
9 8 7
---EDUC.INDIC.-
1987
OTHERS- ■EXPENDITURE-
PROM FAIL DROP ATTE BACV MECV COVE S/TR GDP INCO URBN URBZ BMED BMHE SCHE
Tarapaca 101.8 71.0 113.3 99.1 97.2 117.6 102.4 92.2 132.0 104.0 112.8 126.8 127.1 119.0 122.3
Antofagasta 102.4 80.0 75.6 100.3 101.7 126.7 108.4 111.8 191.6 96.6 117.8 120.7 127.9 154.1 126.1
Atacama 100.4 105.4 77.1 100.7 103.2 113.4 106.3 110.2 143.4 98.8 110.1 83.8 137.0 120.2 133.1
Coquimbo 101.4 86.6 90.0 101.3 103.7 93.7 100.5 107.3 61.4 75.3 90.3 64.3 122.5 109.0 117.8
Valparaiso 101.2 80.1 108.3 100.7 96.8 108.4 100.0 98.3 100.5 95.1 109.0 100.4 80.8 89.7 85.3
O'higgins 99.1 116.1 89.7 101.0 105.4 88.2 100.6 100.9 123.0 79.8 79.4 43.7 92.7 72.2 93.1
Maule 99.0 118.3 87.4 100.3 103.7 80.3 97.9 98.6 65.9 90.9 69.4 57.2 99.7 83.4 98.5
BioBio 98.4 117.2 108.3 101.3 103.9 95.2 101.4 101.4 78.2 81.6 92.5 81.8 110.3 107.1 109.8
Araucania 95.3 148.3 128.1 99.0 106.1 82.1 99.6 95.9 55.4 89.9 69.4 41.9 125.8 107.1 122.1
Los Lagos 97.9 117.9 120.7 99.1 103.9 75.1 96.4 95.1 68.7 76.3 72.0 46.2 120.1 112.3 122.8
Aysen 98.4 111.3 121.1 100.1 98.0 73.2 92.4 88.9 80.8 127.8 96.6 64.5 218.6 170.2 218.2
Magallanes 104.0 72.3 47.3 100.4 91.7 95.0 92.4 98.5 250.2 116.6 110.5 105.9 122.0 110.3 135.0
Metropol. 100.7 75.5 133.2 99.2 96.0 110.4 99.7 100.6 111.1 118.0 115.6 137.6 85.2 95.0 83.1
INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
COUNTRY TOTAL 89.9 6.9 3.2 91.3 82.5 55.8 73.6 24.5 31766.0 47803.4 83.8 70.4 8349 10724 24491
AVG 89.9 6.9 3.2 91.5 83.2 54.1 73.5 24.5 35725.7 45990.0 80.3 58.2 10082.4 11957.9 29526.0
STD 2.0 1.6 0.8 0.7 3.5 9.2 3.2 1.6 17386.6 7652.4 14.8 22.4 2755.6 2746.2 8024.4
COEF.VAR. 2.2 23.0 23.8 0.8 4.2 17.0 4.4 6.4 48.7 16.6 18.4 38.4 27.3 23.0 27.2
PROM Promotion rate in school education S/TR Student - teacher ratio
FAIL Failure rate in school education GDP GDP per capita
DROP Drop ‘ out rate in school education INCO Regional average income
ATTE Attendance rate in school education URBN X urban population
BACV Basic education coverage URBZ X population living in cities above 20,000
MECV Median education coverage BMED Educational expenditures per capita
COVE Total education coverage BMHE Educational expenditures per capita including higher educ
SCHE Expenditures in school education per capita
The interregional disparities among these indicators show 
that promotion rate has a very low coefficient of variation; this 
deserves a short explanation. In 1965 the government decreed 
that all children fulfilling a minimun attendance level during 
the year were to be promoted to the next year even if they had 
failed in the final examinations. This was firstly established 
for the first two years of basic (primary) education and then 
extended to the first four years (**) .The aim here was to retain 
the children in the educational system despite bad performance in 
order to avoid an early leave due to repitition. Therefore, it is 
not surprising to find somewhat similar levels of promotion 
throughout all regions.
The student to teacher ratio indicates the human resources 
availability in education. The regional pattern here is one of 
urban and intermediate regions having above average endowments 
of teachers.
There is a very positive pattern in the case of school 
attendance. The table shows very little interregional dispersion 
on this indicator and a high national average of 90%, which has 
been growing during the period under analysis. The positive 
development of this indicator can be associated to the new 
subvention scheme which encourages schools to maintain high rates 
of attendancy in order to receive higher payment levels. 
However, there are still no empirical studies to prove this as of 
yet.
The regional patterns of educational coverage for basic and 
median education appear to follow some unexpected opposite 
courses. Basic education coverage shows a very low interregional 
dispersion whereas median education shows a coefficient of 
variation that is on average four times that of basic education. 
Moreover, the greater basic education coverages are obtained 
mostly in rural and intermediate regions, whereas high median 
coverage is obtained mostly in urban regions. The explanation for 
this situation is the following. As Raczinsky (1986) argues.
44. Ministery of Education • Supreme Decree No. 27,954 and No. 38,063.
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basic education has been expanding systematically throughout the 
country since the early sixties when it was already well 
established in most important cities. It firstly started 
expanding to the poor areas in important urban areas but as these 
began to be covered rural areas were also included. In recent 
years we observe the opposite trend, due partly to some 
demographic factors but also to the higher drop out rates in big 
cities. In the case of median education it has developed mostly 
in urban areas where it was possible to find large groups of 
children who had finished basic education (primary). This was 
certainly not the case of rural areas in which there was no 
secondary school at all and the children needed to go to the 
nearest urban centre to obtain secondary education. This 
situation is now beginning to reverse as many rural 
municipalities have establised their own secondary schools in 
order to keep the potential subventions arising from those 
additional enrolments within their boundaries. For example 
Araucania, which is a rural region, has increased its median 
coverage at the same rate as the national level, but still lies 
below the national average of 55.8% (^^).
As was explained in the previous section, we defined three 
indicators of educational expenditures. The first one (SCHE) 
includes only school education expenditures. The second (BMED) 
includes school education and ministerial bureaucracy 
expenditures. The third one (BMHE) includes school education, 
ministerial expenditures and higher education expenditures. 
Overall, the three expenditure indicators show similar regional 
patterns but different absolute levels.
45. In order to avoid possible confusions in the interpretation of basic and median education coverage we 
defined a single measure of total educational coverage. This variable proved to be useful when analysing the 
associations and correlations between variables.
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It i$ possible to gain an idea of the interegional 
disparities in educational expenditures by looking at their 
coefficients of variation. We note that they are in the range 
between 20 to 30, which is nearly the same as the health sector. 
Therefore, we can conclude that educational expenditures show at 
least an interegional disparity level as bad as the health 
sector, since these levels of coefficients of variations were 
already signaled as too high.
In relation to the patterns observed we noticed in the 
tables that the two regions having lower levels of expenditures 
any of the three indicators are Valparaiso and Santiago. This is 
an interesting departure from previous findings as this fact 
indicates that there is apparently no relation between 
educational expenditures and urban population. Therefore 
hypothesis No.3, which assumes a relation between these two 
variables, may be rejected (^^).
From the opposite point of view, the regions with above 
average expenditures are also urban and intermediate regions such 
as Tarapaca, Antofagasta and Aysen . Therefore, it is not
possible to draw conclusions about the feasability of hypothesis 
No.3 on the evidence presented thus far.
The same can be said concerning hypothesis No. 2, which 
relates higher expenditures to richer regions. The only two 
regions that are consistently defined as "rich" under both 
indicators (GDP and INCO) are Magallanes and Metropolitan. The 
former registers systematically above average educational 
expenditures in the three indicators used, whereas Metropolitan 
does just the reverse.
46. This finding might have appeared somewhat different if we would have been able to include the 
educational expenditures made from the municipal own resources in addition to the subventions.
Unfortunatelly there is no statistical information about this aspect. However, some evidence suggest that 
rich municipalities are the ones contributing more to their own schools.
47. Araucania (rural region) can also be incorporated in this group.
286
B.2. Associations Between Variables
The preliminary data analysis provided us with some 
interesting outlines of the regional patterns of educational 
indicators. However, the evidence is not sufficient to make 
conclusions concerning our competing hypotheses. In this section 
we attempt to address this issue through the analysis of the 
linear associations between the variables.
The starting point in this analysis is to test the 
associations between educational expenditures and the socio­
economic indicators. On the right hand side of table 6.18. it is 
possible to observe the correlations coefficients amongst the 
different indicators of educational expenditures: BMED, BMHE and 
SCHE against the socio-economic indicators of regional well being 
(GDP per capita and Average Income) and the two indexes of 
urbanization. The findings are very clear: there are no
significant linear associations between these two sets of 
variables.
Therefore, these results imply that we can not make any 
conclusions about hypotheses Nos. 2 and 3. In other words, this 
means that it is not possible to say that rich regions are or are 
not obtaining higher shares of educational expenditures or, in 
the case of the third hypothesis, that social services are 
product of urbanization and therefore urban regions enjoy or do 
not enjoy higher levels of expenditures.
Although this conclusion may look rather dissapointing it 
does contribute to clarify the scope of our discussion in this 
sector. It is possible to conclude therefore, that educational 
expenditures are probably associated to other socio-economic 
indicators not considered here and they are not associated with 
regional well being or urbanization (^®). In practical terms, 
this means that the regional allocation of educational 
expenditures neither favours nor disfavours rich and urbanized 
regions. This is an interesting finding which allows us to 
disregard two of our earlier hypotheses.
48. At least in the way we have defined them here.
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TABLE 6.18
CORRELATION MATRIX - EDUCATION INDICATORS
PROM FAIL S_TR DROP ATTE BACV MECV COVE BMED BMHE SCHE GDP INCO URBN URBZ
PROM 1.00
FAIL -0.82 ** 1.00
S_TR 0.14 -0.21 1.00
DROP -0.28 0.44 * -0.41 * 1.00
ATTE 0.14 -0.21 0.33 -0.61 ** 1.00
BACV -0.69 ** 0.84 ** 0.13 0.23 -0.04 1.00
MECV 0.43 -0.61 ** 0.54 ** -0.15 0.04 -0.41 1.00
COVE -0.16 0.10 0.65 ** 0.04 0.00 0.42 * 0.65 ** 1.00
BMED -0.14 0.22 -0.50 * 0.07 -0.04 0.04 -0.38 -0.29 1.00
BMHE -0.02 0.00 -0.37 0.10 -0.16 -0.12 -0.02 -0.07 0.87** 1.00
SCHE 0.00 0.01 -0.48 * -0.17 0.12 -0.17 -0.38 -0.49 * 0.92 ** 0.79 ** 1.00
GDP 0.51 * 0.61 ** 0.11 -0.23 0.16 -0.72 ** 0.56 ** -0.03 -0.05 0.14 0.07 1.00
INCO 0.34 -0.43 * -0.06 -0.19 -0.08 -0.59 ** 0.08 -0.40 -0.02 0.01 0.22 0.35 1.00
URBN 0.61 ** -0.76 ** 0.20 -0.09 -0.06 -0.71 ** 0.83 ** 0.24 -0.02 0.30 0.01 0.67 ** 0.34 1.00
URBZ 0.57 ** -0.73 ** 0.17 0.01 -0.23 -0.68 0.80 ** 0.23 -0.24 0.13 -0.19 0.57 ** 0.39 0.91 ** 1.00
PROM Promotion rate in school education S_TR Student - teacher ratio
FAIL Failure rate in school education GDP GDP per capita
DROP Drop - out rate in school education INCO Regional average income
ATTE Attendance rate in school education URBN % urban population
BACV Basic education coverage URBZ % population living in cities above 20,000
MECV Median education coverage BMED Educational expenditures per capita
COVE Total education coverage BMHED Educational expenditures per capita including higher educ
SCHE Expenditures in school education per capita
2 TAILED SIGNIFICANCE: * 0.01 ** 0.001
In relation to the associations between educational 
expenditures and educational need indicators, it is interesting 
to analyse firstly the most traditional indicators of access to 
education. It is found that there is a significant negative 
correlation (0.01% level) between school education expenditure 
and total education coverage. This association should be 
interpreted with care; it means that the regional expenditures in 
school education are found to be higher in those regions with 
lower educational coverage. In other words, school expenditures 
favour those regions with poorer coverage in education. An 
example may ilustrate this situation: Aysen appears in Tables
6.15 to 6.17. as the region having the highest index in school 
expenditures per capita; for the three years it has indexes above 
210 while the next region following appears with an index of only 
140. At the same time Aysen also shows indexes of total coverages 
of 92 which are the lowest of all regions during the three years 
under analysis. This implies that school expenditures are really 
being allocated in a way that favours those regions in greater 
need (49).
Therefore, we are in a situation in which there is some 
empirical basis to accept the first hypothesis, which states that 
the government will channel a higher proportion of its funds to 
the less well off of regions measured in terms of their basic 
needs insatisfaction. It can be considered that there are 
certain conditions met which may imply accepting the first 
hypothesis, despite the fact that the correlation coefficient is 
not very high.
In table 6.18. it is also possible to observe that 
educational expenditure indicators are negatively correlated to 
the student-teacher ratio. This indicator is usually taken as an 
indicator of human resources endowment. A high student-teacher 
ratio indicate that the region has a worse endowment of teachers 
as more students will be dependent upon the same teacher. 
Therefore, the correlation found here means that higher 
educational (BMED) and school expenditures (SCHE) are associated
49. Need as defined through the indicators in use.
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with lower student to teacher ratios. This means a greater 
endowment of teachers. Following our earlier example, we found 
again that Aysen had consistently lower student-teacher ratios. 
In 1985 it had only 19 students per teacher as opposed to the 
national average of almost 24. In sum, this new finding 
contradicts our earlier statement as educational expenditures, 
in this case, favour a region which has an already better 
endowment of human resources.
It is difficult to elaborate a hierarchy of social 
indicators and we do not attempt to do it here. But it should be 
noted that in a study commisioned by the Ministry of Education at 
the Chilean Catholic University in 1984, it was found that there 
is no relation between student performance and physical and human 
endowments in schools. In fact, table 6.18. also shows that 
there is no relation between student-teacher ratio and promotion 
and failure rates. Therefore, we are bound to interpret this 
association between higher educational expenditures and better 
teacher endowment as a result of an administrative or historical 
process rather than as a result of a specific relationship 
between the two.
Summarising this section we conclude that in the case of 
educational expenditures there is no statistical basis to link 
the regional allocation of expenditures to urbanization or 
regional well being.
At the same time, we consider that there is some indication 
that educational expenditures are allocated in a way that favours 
regions in need of expanding their coverages.
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B.3. Defining a Model To Analyse the Relation Between Education 
Expenditures and Educational Indicators
In this section we test further our initial hypotheses 
related to the regional allocation of educational expenditures. 
Again, as in the case of the health sector, it was a difficult 
task to define a regression model that assisted in the 
explanation of the relation between educational expenditures and 
educational needs. Table 6.19 includes only the most interesting 
regression equations in relation to the subject of study; they 
were selected from the total regressions equations estimated.
Every regression equation which defined educational 
expenditures as dependant variable was run for the three 
alternative definitions of educational expenditures : school
education expenditures (SCHE), school and ministerial 
expenditures (BMED) and ministerial and higher education 
expenditures (BMHE). Overall, the three alternative forms 
provided very similar findings, but in the case of using BMHE as 
a dependant variable it consistently showed lower goodness of 
fit. This may originate in the fact that BMHE incorporates higher 
education expenditures, but in the explanatory variables, none of 
the indicators include this dimension as it was not possible to 
define need indicators in the area of higher education. The 
regression functions were defined with the specific aim of 
testing the hypothesis described earlier. This implied that 
almost all the models considered had to have an indicator of 
urbanization, regional well being and a sectoral need indicator. 
In addition to theseindicators, we also incorporated the variable 
school attendance (ATTE) as school and ministerial expenditures 
(BMED) are probably influenced by this variable as a result of 
the subvention scheme.
In relation to the models estimated here it is necessary to 
introduce a general caveat. Because most educational indicators 
available for the analysis usually represent a different 
dimension of the same problem they were found to be highly 
correlated amongst each other. For example, within the indicators 
of educational performance it was found that promotion and 
failure rates were correlated to each other and both with the
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two indexes of urbanization and regional well being. Something 
similar occurred with the indicators of educational coverage. 
Therefore, it was very difficult to test the competing 
hypotheses, which by definition must consider the indicators of 
urbanization and well being, without avoiding a problem of 
m u l t i c o l l i n e a r i t y . However, we attempted to define the 
regressions equations using as explanatory variables those which 
presented lower degrees of multicollinearity (^0).
In table 6.19. it is possible to observe a set of 
regressions using educational expenditures as dependant 
variables. The first two equations use as dependant variables the 
expenditures in school education and the central ministry of 
education.
The first equation captures 44% of the interregional 
variations of school and ministerial expenditures. In this case 
it is noted that the predicted educational expenditures per 
capita are most influenced by median coverage, as it has the 
higher (negative) beta. This means that educational expenditures 
are allocated to those regions having a lower coverage of median 
education. In the same equation it is noticed that urban 
population (URBN) also presents a high standardised partial 
regression coefficient (Beta) implying that the allocation of 
resources favours urban regions. Finally, the betas also show 
that educational resources are inversely related to average 
regional income.
50. As Kmenta (1971) has argued multicollinearity is a problem of degree not of kind. The meaningful 
distinction here is not between the prescence or absence of multicollinearity but between its various 
degrees. A high degree of multicolinearity will arise whenever one or usually more than one explanatory 
variables are highly correlated, (some textbooks will mention that variables should be perfectly 
correlated), with another explanatory variable or linear combination of other explanatory variables. 
Multicollinearity will affect the stability of the estimated parameters making them unreliable. For these 
reasons we have constrained our analysis to the equations which can be assumed to have low degrees of 
mu11icol Iinearity.
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TABLE 6.19.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS * EDUCATION EXPENDITURES
VARIABLE (PROM FAIL DROP ATTE MECV COVE BMED INCO URBN |Adj. R Sq.
1
1 BMED
1
1 181.73 -482.85
1
-0.14 257.03 1 0.4413
t Ratios 1 (0.5) (-5.8) (-2.3) (4.9) 1
Betas 1 0.06 -1.37 -0.31 1.23 1 
1
2 BMED
I
1 1544.31 614.29 -717.91
1
-0.08 201.43 1 0.302
t Ratios I (3.8) (1.4) (-3.2) (1.1) (3.6) 1
Betas 1 0.97 0.21 -0.70 -0.19 0.96 1
3 SCHE
1
1 1940.40 -1310.44
1
-0.04 666.63 j 0.4869
t Ratios 1 (2.0) (-5.9) (-0.3) (4.7) 1
Betas 1 0.24 -1.33 -0.04 1.14 1 
1
4 SCHE
1
1-1425.74 -914.41 -1822.72
1
227.48 1 0.2741
t Ratios 1 (-2.0) (-1.6) (-4.1) (2.0) 1
Betas 1 -0.40 -0.22 
1
-0.64 0.39 1 
1
PROM Promotion rate in school education INCO Regional average income
FAIL Failure rate in school education URBN % urban population
DROP Drop - out rate in school education BMED Educational expenditures per capita
ATTE
MECV
COVE
Attendance rate in school education 
Median education coverage 
Total education coverage
SCHE Expenditures in school education per capi
It is interesting to note that this regression obtained a 
better goodness of fit with URBN and not with the more demanding 
definition of urbanization, which considers the proportion of 
population living in cities. Therefore, according to this first 
regression the regions obtaining proportionally higher 
educational resources are those that, although they are urban, do 
not have their population concentrated in large cities (i.e. 
Santiago and Valparaiso), and simultaneously have not the lower 
coverages in median education. Overall, regarding our hypotheses 
we can conclude that this regression partially supports the 
findings of the previous section in the sense that resource are 
being allocated to regions with deficit in educational coverage 
(Hypothesis No.l). In addition to the previous findings it gives 
also an indication of a positive relation between urban 
population and re^^source allocation (Hypothesis No.3, urban bias 
in resource allocation). Finally, it also gives some evidence to 
reject the second hypothesis, that social expenditures are
293
related to well being. Moreover, this equation presents a new 
dimension to the earlier findings which implied a simultaneity 
between needs indicators and urbanization. In earlier sections 
and especially the previous chapter, there always found to be a 
negative relation between needs indicators and urbanization, as 
urban regions were usually above average in most indicators.
Equation No. 2 supports the basic explanations given in 
No.l. However, in this case we introduce a new indicator of need: 
failure rate. This indicator is in apparent competition with 
total coverage in education but it contributes to support the 
same findings. Nevertheless, this new indicator produces the 
effect that the overall regression goodness of fit decreases 
capturing only 30% of the total variance. The high regression 
coefficient of failure rate implies that expenditures are 
allocated to those areas in which students are performing badly. 
Simultaneously, the equation also shows that expenditures are 
also allocated to the regions with lower educational coverage. 
Therefore, we have now more grounds to accept hypothesis No.l, 
which states that the government will channel its resources to 
the regions in most need (^l). The equation also shows that urban 
population is a good predictor of educational expenditures, as 
explained in equation No.l.
Equation No.4 is a development of equations Nos. 2 and 3. 
In this equation we tested new educational indicators and 
withdrew average income (INCO), as its contribution to the total 
variance in earlier similar equations was negligible. The 
equation does support the earlier findings with the new variables 
incorporated. Promotion rate is a significant variable in the 
equation and its negative sign implies that it does influence the 
allocation of educational resources to those regions which have 
lower promotion rates. Therefore, it definetively supports 
hypothesis No. 1. In relation to hypothesis No.3, the evidence 
here still supports the earlier findings, (although with a weak 
t-test), that educational expenditures are influenced by the 
urbanization level of regions.
51. Need as it was measured here.
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In sum, through the analysis of the regressions which have 
educational expenditures as a dependent variable, it is possible 
to conclude with the present evidence that there are grounds to 
acknowledge that the allocation of educational resources is 
favourable to those regions showing bad performance on the 
educational indicators (Hypothesis No.l accepted). The findings 
also support, although with weaker evidence, that urban 
population is also an important predictor of educational 
expenditures (Hypothesis No. 3 accepted).
In addition to testing the original hypotheses we were 
interested in analysing the influence of educational expenditures 
and other educational indicators in relation to two educational 
performance indicators. This can be seen in table 6.20.
In equation Nos. 1 and 2 it is possible to note that, in 
the first place, the main predictor of promotion is urban 
population; this is more significant than other educational 
indicators included in the equation. In other words, marginal 
changes in urban population (URBN) will have a greater influence 
on the promotion rate than similar changes in the other 
explanatory variables included in these regressions. In the
second place, coverage and drop-out rates also show high betas, 
meaning that they will influence in a significant way the 
promotion rate, but on a lower level than URBN. The negative sign 
of promotion is a rather obvious situation as more drop-outs will 
mean fewer students promoted from one year to another. In the 
case of coverage, it seems that there is an inverse relationship 
between promotion and coverage. A larger coverage means that 
more children not previously enrolled in education have joined 
the system. This probably induces a lower rate of promotion as 
the student population becomes more universal and less selective. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that educational expenditures 
will not influence promotion rate. (Literally, more expenditures 
mean lower promotion rates).
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1 TABLE 6.20. | 
1 REGRESSION ANALYSIS - EDUCATION INDICATORS |
|no.DEPENDENT
1 VARIABLE DROP MECV COVE BMED INCO URBN IAdj. R Sq. j
1 1 PROM -0.21 -0.31 0.00 0.11 1 0.51 1
1 t Ratios (-1.6) (-3.1) (-3.1) (5.8)
1 Betas -0.19 -0.39 -0.39 0.68
1 2 PROM -0.30 -0.21 0.00 0.20 1 0.49 1
1 t Rat ios (-2.2) (-2.7) (-2.5) (4.7)
1 Betas -0.26 -0.77 -0.39 1.22
1 3 FAIL 0.27 0.00 0.00 -0.11 1 0.72 1
1 t Ratios (3.8) (3.5) (0.3) (-8.3)
1 Betas 0.42 0.32 0.03 -0.86
DROP Drop-out rate in school education
MECV Median education coverage
COVE Total education coverage
INCO Regional average income
URBN % urban population
BMED Educational expenditures per capita
In equation No. 3 failure rate was used as a dependent 
variable. The equation shows just the opposite of the earlier two 
equations, but in this case, with a much higher goodness of fit.
In sum it is interesting to find that urbanization exerts 
an important influence on the performance of educational 
indicators; this is in addition to educational expenditures. It 
is possible to envisage that this variable actually expresses the 
variability of some indicators not available, such as age, the 
institutionalization of the regional educational system, external 
influences on education and others.
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6.4.C. Section Summary and Conclusions : Equity and
Decentralization in Education
This section was intended to discuss the regional 
allocation of educational expenditures and its relation to needs. 
To do this it was necessary to allocate the expenditures 
following the methodology defined in chapter 4. Overall, it was 
possible to obtain a good estimate of the regional allocations as 
77% of the total regional expenditures were allocated according 
to criterion A, which corresponds to the more demanding 
definition for the regional allocation.
Once the regional estimates of expenditures were obtained 
they were processed using three alternative definitions : i)
school education, which included only expenditures in schools and 
school meals; ii) school and ministerial expenditures, which 
included the earlier definition and the expenditures of the 
central ministerial bureaucracy; iii) school and ministerial 
expenditures and higher education expenditures, to this 
definition we added the state expenditures in higher education. 
In general all definitions showed similar patterns, although 
the first two were more closely related to educational 
indicators.
The analysis of regional expenditures and regional needs 
was constrained to the indicators available. It was possible to 
include indicators of educational performance, educational 
coverage, school attendance and others. All these indicators were 
analysed in relation to the three competing hypotheses defined in 
chapter 4.
The analysis of the data was approached, as in the health 
chapter in three stages: from simple data analysis, to 
correlation analysis and then regression analysis. In this last 
stage we found increasing difficulties in defining a model with 
no presence of multicollinearity. But as was mentioned this is a 
problem of degree not of kind; therefore we chose those 
regression equations estimated as having the minimun presence of 
this problem.
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Overall, the findings support the hypothesis that 
educational expenditures proportionally favour those regions 
which simultaneously show a high level of unmet educational needs 
insatisfaction (52) (Hypothesis No.l). The findings also gave 
grounds to accept that there is a considerable bias in 
educational resource allocation towards urban populations 
(Hypothesis No.3). However, the statistical evidence here was not 
as significant as in the previous case. In relation to Hypothesis 
No.2, which states a direct relation between social expenditures 
and regional well being, there was not sufficient statistical 
evidence to either accept or reject it.
It should be mentioned that the process for obtaining these 
findings was not as clear as in the health sector, where the 
patterns were clear from the very first steps of data analysis. 
In the case of education, it was necessary to test the occurrence 
of the same hypothesis in various forms in order to be more 
secure of the resulting findings.
52. High level of unmet educational needs as defined for the present section.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
HOUSING
7.1. BACKGROUND TO THE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE OF HOUSING 
PROVISION IN CHILE
The first housing movements in Chile were registered at 
the beginning of the century with the Housing Councils for 
workers (Conseios Habitacionales para Obreros) (1906) (Haramoto, 
1980). After this initiative a number of institutions were 
created with the specific purpose of providing housing for 
certain groups of the population, or the families affected by 
national calamities such as earthquakes, etc. In 1948 legislation 
was passed to promote private housing construction. The growing 
awareness of housing issues and the increasing deficit influenced 
the creation of the Corporation for Housing fCorooracion para la 
Vivienda CORVI) in 1953, from that year national plans for the 
housing sector were produced.
Later, in 1965 the Ministry of Housing was created to 
coordinate many public housing institutions under one head. 
Finally, in 1975 the Ministry was so that the surviving semi- 
autonomous housing institutions were suppressed and their 
activities taken over by the ministry as a whole; in this 
reorganization regional branches were created.
Each of the governments in the last thirty years has taken 
a different approach to housing. However it is possible to 
consider three broad styles, although there are some overlaps:
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A) Subsidy to Supply: (1945 - 1960) (^ )
This is the oldest type of state intervention in the 
housing market in Chile; it basically consists in a reduction or 
exemption of taxes to building companies or the owners of houses 
considered "economic or social". An example of this is the 
"Pereira Law" of 1948 or its new version the Law Decree No 2 of 
1959; they both established tax allowances for houses not 
exceeding 14 0 square metres.
The amount of resources transferred in this form are 
unknown, but, according to Arellano (1982), the tax service 
estimated that for 1968 these tax allowances (expenditures) were 
equivalent to 11% of the public expenditure for housing and 
urbanisation. It is acknowledged by some housing specialists (^ ) 
that the house size is not the best mechanism to direct state 
subsidies to those in need.
Parallel to this general approach to housing there were 
special provisions for the poor, which consisted principally in 
the programme of slum eradication, a programme organized through 
CORVI and, the Housing Services Corporation (CORHABIT). It 
usually provided small houses in accordance to a point scheme per 
family, and sometimes promoted the self-construction of the 
houses.
B) Subsidy to Credit: (1960 - 1974)
This approach subsidized loans or mortgages and it was 
envisaged in two forms. Firstly, the state intervened in the loan 
market offering some opportunities to finance housing through the 
creation of the National Savings and Loan System (SINAP). The
1. The dates are only a guidance to understand the periods concerned.
2. See: J.P. Arellano op. cit. and T. Castaneda and R. Quiroz op. cit.
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other possibility was to finance loans directly through CORVI, 
which from 1959 was allowed to use some provisional surpluses to 
build houses that were allocated to the people contributing to 
the public social security schemes.
The general policy for housing during the 1964 -70 period 
was that housing is a basic need to which every family should be 
entitled; houses should be paid for partially or totally by the 
new owner.
Although it was not a defined aim of SINAP, it began 
eventually to subsidize borrowers by not adjusting loans fully 
for inflation and offering interest rates lower than the market 
rate. The main problem of this approach lay in its regressivity: 
larger loans obtained larger subsidies, despite the fact that the 
rate of interest was higher for big loans, but still below the 
market cost (Arellano, 1982). This problem was exacerbated in the 
late 60 *s when the payments of debts were adjusted at a rate 
below the general price index.
During this period the Ministry of Housing was founded 
with an aim to coordinate the different housing institutions of 
the public sector. This included the Urban Improvements 
Corporation (CORMU), which was responsible for land purchase and 
general urban projects; the Housing Services Corporation 
(CORHABIT), incorporating the administrative and financial branch 
of housing and the Housing Corporation, which was the building 
unit.
Two other important initiatives were developed during this 
period. The "site operation" fOoeracion Sitio), was oriented 
towards low income groups and provided a 160 square metres, semi­
serviced plot, with the possibility of being fully serviced in a 
second stage. The site operation had its own application system, 
based on saving shares of which a minimum was required. The 
programme was severely criticized as an institutionalization of 
slums, since only the urbanized plot was provided, and the house 
was eventually built by the owner, or a temporary house was 
purchased. In response to this, some studies demonstrated that 
the most important desire of slum dwellers was the security of
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having a plot to live on, rather than a definitive house. The 
"Site Operation" was the continuation of the programme for slum 
eradication.
The other important initiative was the programme of 
popular savings, which started as a programme to re-organize the 
different saving plans in existence at the time. It offered 
different saving alternatives according to income levels. This 
programme was organized by CORHABIT.
The organization of the housing sector is shown in Figure
7.1. It is possible to observe that the consumer had no direct 
link with the Ministry but through its operating agencies. The 
main housing provider was CORVI, which was organized on a 
national basis, but without a clear regional structure. For those 
aiming to obtain a house from the private sector the main 
alternative was to apply for a "soft" loan from one of the 
building societies (Asociaciones de Ahorros v Prestamos) 
participating in the National Savings and Loan System 
(SINAP) (3).
C) Subsidy to Demand: (1974 onwards)
Housing policies since 1974 have involved an important 
change relative to earlier periods. Two main policy objectives 
were defined for this period: i) To limit the public sector role 
in financing housing projects and liberalize the financial 
market, ii) To target government subsidies to people in most need 
by providing them with housing through a subsidy mechanism 
(similar to a voucher scheme).
According to Castaneda and Quiroz (1985) the immediate 
implications of these policies was the re-establishing of 
indexation according to the general price index of those paying 
mortgages to the public housing schemes. The liberalization of 
the financial market implied very strong competition with the
3. The present organization of the housing sector during the mid- 1980's is explained in the next 
section.
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Building Societies, which were until that time almost in a 
monopolistic situation. These changes produced an end to the 
semi-public financial schemes, which were replaced by private 
banks.
The subsidy to demand system was primarily a lump sum 
given by the state to a prospective home buyer who fulfils 
certain requirements and succeeds in the application procedure. 
They operated as a voucher scheme. There were three different 
housing schemes operating under this approach: Urban Slums
Programme, Housing Subsidy, and the Savings and Finance System. 
Each of them is explained in the next section.
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7.2. HOUSING FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION
7.2.A. Present Housing System
According to the new institutional structure a number of 
specific housing policies were enunciated. All of them stemmed 
from the principle of subsidiarity advocated by the Government 
during this period.
Policies
As mentioned earlier, one of the foundations of the social 
policies during the present government was the principle of 
subsidiarity, from it the policies were enunciated;
- Housing policies were aimed to transform the country into 
a country of housing owners. If necessary, low income 
families should be subsidized to achieve this aim.
- In this regard, the action of the state would occur only 
when the private sector was incapable of not interested in 
undertaking certain actions. This was especially important 
for housing of the poor and urban development.
- Because the role of the state was important in this area, 
there was a commitment to improve the system of contract and 
finance of housing demand.
From these postulates some lines of action were followed:
- The government would provide "integral” solutions to the 
housing problem, providing houses with all the mains 
services.
This is a clear reaction against earlier government 
programmes of slum clearance, which usually ended up not 
providing the basic services for a long period of time.
- The state would subsidize those families unable to obtain
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a house by their own means, but at the same time it would 
stimulate family savings.
According to Foxley, Arellano and Aninat (1979) housing 
programmes had traditionally a very regressive distribution. 
Therefore, it is understandable that the government was trying to 
redress this trend.
- The Ministry made a compromise in relation to the 
decentralisation of the country, and took some measures to 
restructure the sector and provide better services in the 
field.
- The Ministry sought a reduction in the housing standards, 
which were making the costs of building excessively high
(4).
- With regards to urban development, in 1984 the urban city 
limit was declared free, allowing the free expansion of the 
cities into agricultural or neighbouring areas.
Organization
In 1976 the Ministry of Housing was re-structured, 
aggregating semi-autonomous housing corporations and services 
(such as CORVI, CORAHABIT, CORMU) under the sole management of 
the ministry. These changes were aimed to simplify the operation 
of the ministry, to avoid double activities and to accomplish the 
regionalization process in which the country was involved.
4. Arellano estimated for (1975 1978) that the construction costs were for the U.K. only 69% of
those of Chile; similar calculations were made for the U.S. and France, obtaining 66% and 88% 
respectively. However, there are other Latin American countries that have housing costs even higher 
than the Chileans. See Arellano 1982.
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The new structure can be synthetised as follows (^):
a) The Ministry of Housing kept its role of policy 
formulation and monitoring, and also took control of the 
technical housing standards. The Ministry was deconcentrated 
through the Regional Ministerial Secretariats (SEREMIs), 
which were direct representatives of the minister in the 
region and simultaneously in close association with the 
Regional Governor as advisors in housing policy matters.
b) The former housing corporations such as CORVI, were 
unified in the Regional Services for Housing and Urbanism 
(SERVIU)(G). These institutions had the task of executing the 
policies, plans and programmes which the ministry had defined 
for them. Additional tasks were related to the process of 
allocating subsidies and the reorganization of public tenders 
to build houses with public resources.
In sum, the Ministry through the SEREMIs performed the 
normative function in relation to housing. At the same time 
SERVIUs performed the financial and administrative side of public 
housing. At a regional level, SERVIUs enjoyed a great degree of 
autonomy in defining the sites and the specific characteristics 
of the housing projects. But above all they were accountable to 
the SEREMIs which were the regional representatives of the 
minister.
At the central level, the Housing Policy Unit was 
responsible for planning the national ministerial activity in 
housing matters as well as the annual investment in the different 
programmes; it also monitored the activities of the regions 
including the construction work for other public services or 
public funds (Mandates). There was also the Urban Development 
Unit which planned the national and regional activities related 
to urban infrastructure and formulated the regulatory plans of
5. Ministry of Housing and Urbanism: Annual Report 1975 pp.l2
6. In early stages the SERVIUs had a direct role in construction tasks, (purchasing land, planning 
and building). These activities are now mostly performed by private agencies.
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cities. Finally there was the Study and Housing Promotion Unit 
which, apart from carrying out different studies, processed all 
the information related to the housing subsidy.
Housing Programmes
Housing programmes passed during this period through long 
phases of experimentation with their general features and modes 
of operation. The main aim has been to make the programmes more 
redistributive and operable in a more flexible mode. In this 
description we will concentrate on the housing programmes in 
actual operation.
Until the early 1970's the Ministry of Housing was still 
the main provider and producer of houses fully connected to mains 
services for low income groups. Since 1976, the Ministry has 
changed its policy to a system which stressed competitive bidding 
to private builders. This system required that the builders find 
the land and design and finance the project. Building companies 
have now to compete for customers who have been are financed 
through the governmental subsidy programmes.
The selective aim of the programmes was mostly addressed 
by linking the selection procedures for the housing programmes to 
the national means test (Ficha C.A.S.). In this regard 
municipalities became an important institution for identifying 
housing needs and providing support to those applying to the 
housing programmes.
There are now three basic housing programmes operating in 
the country:
Urban Slums Programme
The general objective of this programme is to allow 
families living in slums or families living in houses of 
relatives (concealed households) (alleaados) to gain access to 
housing. The state subsidy consists of 190 UF (^ ) which can be
7. UF (Um'dad de Fomento) is an accounting unit indexed with inflation. In December 1989 1UF=US$ 
21.6
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credited against the cost of a house built by the private sector.
The state subsidy covers up to 75% of the cost of the 
house. The total value of the house cannot exceed 300 UF and the 
average size of the house must be around 36 Sq. Mts. (®) These 
constraints are to discourage middle income families from 
applying to this programme. The difference between the total cost 
of the house and the state subsidy can be covered by the 
family's savings or by a mortgage which can usually be arranged 
with SERVIUs (^ ) or with a private bank.
The selection procedure for this programme consists of 
each applicant completing a form containing questions about 
family structure, socio-economic variables and savings. The 
allocation formula includes the following aspects:
- Number of people in the household: Each person living in 
the household scores a number of points.
- Family savings: Per each UF presented as a credit one 
point is scored.
- Poverty level: Family score in the national means test.
- Additional savings: The property of a plot can also be 
presented as savings according to the fiscal valuation of 
land.
- Additional scoring factors will take account of:
- Stability and persistence of family savings.
- Total amount of subsidy applied for. In this case 
credit will be given to those asking for a relatively 
lower propotion of subsidies.
8. This house will include all mains services: water, electricity and sewerage,
9. SERVIU's mortagages charge usually 8% annual interest over inflation (UF). They can be taken for 
a period of up to 20 years.
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This programme has two main streams: Applicant System and 
Direct Subsidy. The first alternative operates via the individual 
family application for a subsidy under the urban slum
programme. The direct subsidy operates when a municipality 
decides to clear or upgrade a slum (Camoamento) because of 
health or environmental risk or because of a necessity to use the 
land for other purposes. In this case, all the families selected 
benefit from the programme without participating in the national 
selection process. However, the other features of the urban slums 
programme still hold in this case.
Table 7.1. shows that this programme is building an 
average of 24,000 houses for poor families each year; although 
during the recessionary years, the programme suffered important 
financial constraints.
TABLE 7.1.
HOUSES BUILT UNDER URBAN SLUMS PROGRAMME
Year No.
1986 24,876
1987 26,985
1988 20,405
SOURCE: Informe Social ODEPLAN 1987-1989
Housing Subsidy System.
This subsidy aims to facilitate access to housing for 
those families who are unable to acquire a house through their 
own savings, but are not in an extreme condition of poverty.
The application to this subsidy follows the same score 
scheme as the slum programme, except it does not consider the 
family score in the national means test. The difference between 
the two programmes is that in this programme there are three 
subsidy brackets as shown in Table 7.2.
10. It is also possible to apply as organised groups. This is used by housing cooperatives.
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TABLE 7.2.
HOUSING SUBSIDY SYSTEM 
Subsidy Brackets
Total amount of subsidy Maximun market price of the
house
200 UF - 400 UF
170 UF 400 to 580 UF
150 UF 580 to 850 UF
In contrast to the slums programme, in the housing subsidy 
system mortgages are mostly taken in the private market with 
higher interest rates, but with preferential borrowing rates 
partially subsidied by the state. As in the slum programme, the 
Ministry publishes in a national newspaper the list of 
successful applicants. Families obtaining the subsidy receive a 
subsidy voucher (Certificado de subsidio) which remains valid for 
22 months. The beneficiary is able to buy a house in the private 
market and pay for it with the subsidy voucher and additional 
savings or bank loans. The validity period of the voucher is 
usually extended as many families are unwilling to take a credit 
indexed with inflation while their salaries were not. This 
situation was acute during the recessionary period. The delay in 
effectively using the vouchers was also influenced by the slow 
response of the construction industry and the hesitation of banks 
to grant small loans.
11. In 1982 the government took as reference price of the house the market price and not its fiscal 
valuation. The aim was to restrain the possibility of people obtaining houses with lower fiscal 
valuation but higher market value. This practice worsened systematically the redistributive impact 
of the programme.
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Savings and Financing System for Housing (S.A.F.)
The savings and financing system for housing is aimed to 
encourage the saving habits of the population and facilitate the 
access to housing of middle income families.
To apply for subsidy a person must subscribe to a 
savings contract for housing in any financial institution. 
Through this contract the person commits himself to a minimun 
amount of savings during a defined period. The application 
procedure is very much the same as the other programmes with a 
national selection procedure based on the scores in areas such as 
previous savings, family size, persistence or permanence of 
savings and amount of credit required.
An additional difference in this case is that the maximun 
value of the house is set at 2,000 UF (about US$ 43,000). There 
are two subsidy brackets under this programme. The total amount 
of subsidy that a family receives depends on the size of the 
loan applied for. In this way the system compensates those 
applying for smaller credits which use less indirect subsidy 
through the interest rate. This can be seen in Table 7.3.
TABLE 7.3.
SAVINGS AND FINANCING SYSTEM FOR HOUSING (S.A.F.)
Subsidy Brackets
Total amount of subsidy Amount of credit required
0, 50, 90 or 130 UF - 500 UF
0, 30, 70 or 110 UF 500 to 1000 UF
Table 7.4. shows the developments in the Housing Subsidies 
and the Savings and Financing Programmes simultaneously. It can 
be noted that the number of subsidies available for allocation in 
each annual round has more than tripled during the decade. The 
table also helps to depict the effort that the state has made for
312
each programme. Each year the state has allocated 20,000 to 
25,000 subsidies to lower middle and upper middle socio-economic 
groups through the Housing Subsidies and S.A.F. (^^); at the same 
time it has given a similar figure for low income families 
through the Urban Slums Programme. Table 7.4. shows the ratio 
between the subsidies allocated and paid. For example, it can be 
noted that in relation to those subsidies allocated during 1985, 
only 68% of them were paid, (actually used by the beneficiaries) 
two years later. This implies that the beneficiaries were still 
having difficulties using their entitlements.
Figure 7.1. shows a summary of the operation of the 
housing sector. The consumer (i.e. a person demanding a house) 
has three main alternatives which are provided through the 
ministerial operative regional branches: the SERVIUs. In addition 
to that for low income families, it is also possible to apply to 
the Urban Slums Programme through the municipalities. Some 
programmes, such as the Sanitary Infrastructure, are directed 
from the municipalities to the people. Therefore, these 
institutions seek to enroll the beneficiaries; for this reason 
the arrows are drawn in the opposite direction. Finally, the 
consumer has access to housing through the private market and 
private finance. On some occasions the consumer will receive the 
help of a government subsidy.
In addition to the housing programmes directly financed 
and controlled by the housing ministry, there are two additional 
programmes with important impact in this area: Sanitary
Infrastructures and Main Services Programmes.
12. Around 10 to 15% of the total subsidies allocated annually to middle socio-economic groips are 
SAFs.
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TABLE 7.4.
HOUSING SUBSIDIES (*) ALLOCATED AND PAID 
UNTIL DECEMBER 1987
No. Subs.No.Subs.
TOTAL
Allocated Paid All./Paid %
1978 10,000 8,373 83.7
1979 10,327 9,152 88.6
1980 12,804 10,606 82.8
1981 24,104 8,495 35.2
1982 9,638 9,022 93.6
1983 16,938 16,005 94.5
1984 22,543 20,354 90.3
1985 29,838 20,360 68.2
1986 27,287 8,808 32.3
1987 34,240 1,801 5.3
197,719 112,976 57.1
: Ministerio de la Vivienda
Memoria Anual 1987 
(*> Includes subsidies allocated through 
the Savings and Financing System
Sanitary Infra^^structures
This programme was initiated in 1982 through municipal 
finance; in subsequent years it has received additional resources 
from the World Bank. A small proportion of this programme has 
been financed by the ministry. In some cases municipalities have 
transfered resources as a "mandate" to SERVIUs allowing them to 
o r g a n i z e  and s u p e r v i s e  the c o n s t r u c t i o n  of s a n i t a r y  
infrastructures because they have the expertise. The programme 
is directed to those families living in slums or shanty towns 
with no possibility of access to other programmes.
The beneficiaries of this programme are entitled to a plot 
of 100 to 160 sq.mts., which includes a built-in sanitary 
infrastructure with an area of no less than 6 sq.mts. The 
sanitary infrastructure is connected to the housing mains 
services: electricity, drinking water and sewerage; it has a 
built-in bathroom (W.C. and shower) and a wash basin. The design 
of the infrastructure must allow for future constructions to be 
based upon it (^^).
13. Many municipalities and non-governmental organizations have implemented programmes to help 
families to upgrade their sanitary infrastructure starting from the initial housing facilities.
314
The cost of this infrastructure is about US$ 2,400 (110
UF) including the plot and the construction. The subsidy finances 
75% of the value of the infrastructure, the rest being met by the 
beneficiaries' savings or a SERVIU's loan.
The programme operates in a way similar to the direct 
subsidy. There are no applications. The municipality decides upon 
and plans for an area or slum to be cleared or upgraded. In 
1987, 12,000 sanitary infrastructures were built in the country.
Mains Services Programmes
In addition to the housing programmes, the ministry has a 
programme to regularize housing property and land tenure. In many 
instances this programme served as a first step towards a family 
house, as the site can be considered as savings. In 1987,
the Ministry regularized over 23,000 property titles. As part of 
the minsterial functions there are other programmes related to 
urban pavements and footpaths, urban equipment and community 
centres.
The main services programme for drinking water, sewerage 
and electricity are run by the Ministry of Public Works. These 
programmes have had a sig^nificant redistributive impact in the 
last years as they have especially been concentrated in rural 
areas. However, as these programmes are financed by another 
ministry they are not considered here.
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7.2.B. Total Public Expenditure on Housing
The developments in total public expenditures in housing 
can be observed in Table 7.5. The figures presented were obtained 
from Yanez (1983) and Yanez and Aguilo (1988) and the 
Comptroller. They all show a very similar trend as all of them 
were deflated by the National Institute of Statistics C.P.I. From 
the table it is possible to note that housing expenditures have 
suffered a tremendous decrease since 1974 when they accounted 
for 2.6% of the G.D.P.
In contrast to the social sectors previously considered, 
housing need not act as a flow of services. Housing is in reality 
a stock which offers a flow of services to those who are involved 
with it (14). This rather different approach to housing as a 
stock has an interesting implication from the public expenditure 
point of view: housing expenditures are public investments to be 
made once per life time for a family. In other words, after 
allocating the house to a family by subsidising around 75% of its 
cost, the state ceases its responsibilities in relation to that 
family (1^). This alternative is not possible in other services 
as people have a "social right" or entitlement to continue 
education or continue receiving health care.
This issue was discussed with specialists in the Budget 
Office (Ministry of Finance). They did acknowledge this argument 
as one of the reasons why housing is one of the sectors most 
vulnerable to cuts. An additional explanation is related to the 
process of providing houses. The production of public housing in 
Chile is almost entirely in the hands of the private building 
companies, therefore, a reduction in housing expenditures will 
not affect state bureaucracy.
14. At the same time it should be considered that housing expenditures are a flow.
15. Besides recovering the housing loan if applicable.
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Source:
1. Yanez (1983) and Yanez y Aguilo (1988);
2. Contraloria General de la Republica 
Informes Gestion Financière 1987
NOTE: Deflated by the National Institute of Statistics C.P.I
Figure 7.2. depicts the developments of housing 
expenditures per capita. The figure shows a peak during the 
early seventies with a great fall by 1975. Another fall is also 
seen in 1982-83 during the recessionary period. Overall, it is 
possible to summarize thus, that housing has followed a pro­
cyclical pattern during the last fifteen years. In other words, 
housing has been severely constrained during the recessionary 
years. Our analysis suggests that this sector might have been 
chosen specifically to counter-balance the fiscal restrictions on 
public expendiures during the recessionary years.
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7.2.C. Expenditure Structure
This section was approached as in previous chapters 
following the methodology described earlier. In this case, the 
process of transfer elimination proved to be a very important 
step as transfers accounted for origin a l l y  around 50% of the 
ministerial expenditures.
Economic Expenditure Structure
Personnel: As can be seen in Table 7.6., personnel was
concentrated mostly in the undersecretariat which recruits and 
pays almost all the staff of the Housing Ministry, both at the 
national and regional levels. As most of the building tasks were 
left to the private sector, personnel accounts for only a small 
proportion of ministerial expenditures.
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Goods and Services for Consumption: This item was related to 
office expenditure on stationery and related materials. It 
accounted for only 2% of ministerial expenditures.
Transfers: This area originally included important transfers from 
the undersecretariat to the SERVIUs. These have been consolidated 
to avoid double counting. The remaining transfers were payments 
to the private sector for services rendered to the ministry.
Capital Investment: This item was the bulk of the ministerial
expenditures accounting for 70 to 80% of the budget.
Financial Investment : In this area it was necessary to
consolidate (eliminate) the loans that the ministry granted to 
most of the beneficiaries of its housing programmes. In this 
case, we departed from other public expenditure studies in Chile 
which treated financial investment as expenditures despite the 
fact that this money would be recuperated.
Capital Transfers: Capital transfers were another form of capital 
investment which for accounting reasons were included in this 
item.
Other: Two expenditure items were included here: the payment of 
public debt and the payments related to the difference in 
interest rates of the subsidized loans.
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TABLE 7.6.
THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ON HOUSING
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Institutional Expenditure Structure
Undersecretariat: This area gathered almost all the ministerial 
bureaucracy financing personnel and the activities of most 
ministerial departments. It also integrated the expenditures on 
the payments related to subsidized loans.
SERVIUs: SERVIUs are the operative branches of the ministry. 
Around 85% of SERVIUs expenditures in capital investment were 
devoted to housing programmes. The remaining 15% was spent in 
smaller urbanization programmes such as street pavements and 
others.
Metropolitan Park: The metropolitan park is the main park of 
Santiago. It is under the Ministry of Housing management (^^).
7.2.D. Budget and Planning
In this chapter we will concentrate on the description and 
analysis of the specific budgeting and planning aspects 
particular to housing, without explaining those aspects with 
common features to the previous areas.
Formulation
The Ministry of Housing has an important part of its 
expenditures financed through its own resources. Around 40% of 
the housing activities are financed through loan recuperation, 
sale of assets and others. Therefore, revenue estimation is an 
important stage. In this case the Budget Office has little 
information itself and must rely on the ministerial sources. The 
ministerial Financial Division consolidates the regional 
estimates of loan recuperation. These figures are sent later to 
the Budget Office. It is in relation to these estimates that the 
Budget Office determines its final allocations.
16. Metropolitan park was included in this sector because it is part of the Ministry administrative 
organization, despite that it is not related to housing itself.
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In relation to the expenditure formulation of the budget, 
the Financial Division prepares a financial basis which is given 
to all the ministerial departments. This document applies mostly 
to non-investment expenditures. In this area the budget follows 
the incrementalist approach described earlier. In relation to 
capital investment we need to explain this area more fully as it 
has some consequences for the ministerial organization.
On the one hand, paving, sanitary infrastructures, urban 
property titling and other smaller programmes follow the 
procedure of national investment projects. The SEREMIs identify 
and evaluate the projects and present them for approval at the 
central level. The ministry in conjunction with ODEPLAN approves 
a certain number of projects independent of the resources 
available (^^). Each region later receives a precise amount of 
resources which allows it to finance a proportion of the approved 
projects. The total amount of resources available for this type 
of programme depends strongly on the allocation of the Budget 
Office and therefore, on the financial situation of the country. 
In this respect, we consider this area of expenditures to follow 
a rational approach to decision making, as means are contrasted 
to ends, and alternative approaches are also considered. This 
area accounts for approximately 10% of the ministerial 
expenditures.
On the other hand, in relation to the housing programmes 
(subsidies) the Budget Office determines the total amount of 
resources available for each of the housing subsidies. This 
quantity is defined considering the ministerial goals (for 
example : to provide at least 10,000 annual subsidies in the 
housing system), special circumstances arising that may press for 
additional expenditures (earthquakes, floods, others), and 
principally the state of the national public finances. Therefore, 
in this area the ministry does not need to spend much time in the 
budget formulation as its expenditure ceilings are defined by the 
Ministry of Finance.
17. This is according to the Basic Statistical System for Investment described in Chapter 2.
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Authorization
The formal authorization of the national budget implies 
the approval of the ministerial budget.
Implementation
In the case of non-housing expenditures, they are subject 
to a cash flow agreed upon with the budget office, after which 
further negotiations are possible.
The resources for capital investments are also given to 
the ministry in accordance with a cash flow agreed upon with the 
Budget Office. Since part of these expenditures are approved on a 
project basis and there is a clear expenditure ceiling for the 
rest, there are usually no financial uncertainties in this area 
(18).
Evaluation
There is no official budget evaluation phase. However, the 
Ministerial Annual Reports assesses the number of houses built in 
relation to the proposed goals.
Before discussing the links between planning and budgeting 
it is necessary to introduce briefly the financial implications 
of the allocation process of the housing subsidies programmes.
In the Urban Slums Programme each must complete a form 
with all the required information. After this, an official 
calculates the score of the applicant. All this information 
introduced into the Regional Applicants' Register. This register 
holds the information of all those applying for an urban slums 
programme. Depending on the population sizes the registers cover 
regions, municipalities or an aggregation of municipalities.
18. The Budget Office withholds a certain proportion of the funds related to the delay of the 
subsidies actually being paid.
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The ministry of housing allocates a fixed proportion of 
resources to each applicants' register. However, this approach 
means that areas with lower demands for housing, and
therefore smaller applicants' registers, that benefit 
proportionally more than the areas with higher demands for 
housing.
In relation to the Housing Subsidy System and the S.A.F., 
the allocation procedure contains a slight difference. There are 
no areal application registers as all applicants are introduced 
on to the same national list, allowing them to compete against 
each other in relation to their application scores regardless of 
their place of residence. Through this procedure the ministry 
aims to achieve territorial equity . The consideration of
family savings and the size of the loan required as a score 
components, regardless of other socio-economic indicators, 
contributes to the fact that families successful in their 
applications are usually better-off than their counterparts.
In financial terms, this procedure implies that the 
Financial Division transfers resources to the regions in relation 
to the subsidies to be paid into each of them according to the 
national rules of application. Therefore, the regional discretion 
is related to the management of loans portfolio and the time­
table of the actual subsidies payment, despite the fact that the 
subsidies resources appear within each SERVIU budget.
19. Areas are Regions, aggregation of municipalities, and municipalities.
20. The ministry has not acknowledged the concept of territorial equity but it has made clear a 
desire to provide equal standards of provision for people in similar needs.
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Planning
In contrast to other social sectors, due to the very 
nature of housing activities there is constant feedback between 
planning and budgeting. It is almost compulsory in this sector to 
have a tight follow-up of the progress made in the building 
contracts arranged and the payments related to them (^l). in the 
areas where most building responsibilities rely on the private 
sector it is also possible to have a precise follow-up on the 
relation between planned and actual expenditures.
However, in other areas not related to building functions 
the links between planning and budgeting are weaker. The Housing 
Policy Division has a longer time horizon than the annual budget 
rounds. Therefore, despite the fact that its studies will 
influence the budget allocations in one way or another, in the 
long run it is not usually concerned with budgetary discussions, 
policy proposals and goal achievement each year. It does have the 
strategy of "ministerial tasks", which means defining a precise 
problem or aspect to be reviewed and studied for a period of 
time; once the study is finished, the task becomes to decide how 
to implement it and, at this stage the links with the Finance 
Division are needed.
In conclusion, housing appears to have characteristics of 
a mixed sector. It shares some of the features of other 
ministries, such as an incremental approach some of the budgeting 
procedures. At the same time, few links between policy 
formulation and budgeting are observed. Within the ministerial 
departments, the bureaucrats tend to seek these links at the last 
minute, just before the desired policy is to be implemented.
21. Service programmes and sanitary infrastructures.
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From the other side, due to the nature of housing 
activities involving precise outcomes and costs, it is easier and 
more necessary to have a permanent link between finances and 
planning. Simultaneously, the decision making process also 
follows a rational pattern as an important proportion of the 
expenditures in this area are subject to Cost Benefit Analysis.
However, this "rational" style also constraisn other 
valuable approaches to planning. In this regard serious 
complaints have been made by the beneficiaries of the housing 
programmes against the house layout, size and organization. 
Minimun cost solutions are usually far from a transactive model 
of planning.
Finally, in relation to the procedure for allocating 
housing subsidies it is necessary to emphasize that it is a 
transparent and known system for most applicants. However, the 
actual individual allocation of subsidies, although it includes 
poverty and other socio-economic indicators, is according to a 
national criterion which constrains local autonomy and can 
produce some regressive regional patterns in the final allocation 
of resources. This issue will be discussed in section 7.4.
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7.2.E. Discretionary Powers Over Public Resources and Decisions
In this section we analyse the regional discretionary 
powers in the management of public resources following the 
methodological approach defined in section 4.4. As in the 
previous section, in this section we will emphasize only those 
aspects which appear for the first time, avoiding the repetition 
of earlier explanations for the same type of phenomena. The 
discussion is summarised in Table 7.7.
E.l. Regulation
The definition of the institutional tasks is undertaken at 
a central level, as has been the case for most of the 
institutions analysed so far. Regarding the source of authority 
and the control of functions, the undersecretariat and SERVIUs 
have a shared responsability in this area. This means that these 
institutions are the regional representatives of the central 
ministry and accountable to both the central level and to the 
regional authorities.
The case of the Metropolitan Park of Santiago is an 
exceptional case of a delegated institution accountable to the 
central ministry but with a large degree of discretionary power.
E.2. Finance
Centrally managed finance are the funds over which the 
regions have almost no discretion. In this case, this type of 
funding represents 21% of the ministerial budget and is 
concentrated principally in the ministerial bureaucracy.
Specific purpose funds, which account for 70% of the 
ministerial budget are funds transfered to the regions with a 
single objective, the elegibility criteria being defined 
centrally. This is the case with most housing subsidies as they 
are allocated centrally according to a national allocation 
selection process. The regions have the financial discretion to 
manage only the loans allocated to the subsidies, but not the 
subsidies' levels or quantities themselves.
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TABLE 7.7.
DISCRETIONARY POWERS OVER RESOURCES AND DECISIONS ON HOUSING
1 Govt. Intervention Forms 
I REGULAT ION
(Undersecret. SERVIUs (Metropolitan
(Park
1
TOTAL
|Who Defines Tasks ( Centre Centre
1
( Centre Centre
(Source of Authority ( Shared Shared ( Delegated Shared
(Control ( Shared Shared ( Delegated 
1
Shared
(FINANCE ( CMF 91% 
( BF 9%
SPF 85% 
BF 15%
1
( SPF 100% 
1 
1 
1
CMF 21% 
SPF 70% 
BF 9%
1 1 1 1 1 
(PRODUCTION ( ( ( ( 
1 I I  1 1
(Personnel ( Centre Shared
1
( Centre Centre
(Field Administration 
(Levels
( 2 2 ( N/A 
1
2
NOTE: See text for explanations
FINANCE: CMF Centrally Managed Finance 
SPF Specific Purpose Fund 
OF Block Fund
PRODUCTION: Levels of Field Administration
1 Central
2 Regional
Block fund is the case of funds which can be used within a 
broader area; 9% of the ministerial expenditures fall into this 
category. These funds are related to small programmes of paving, 
legal registration and others. In this situation the regions have 
the discretion to decide the allocation of the resources between 
these smaller programmes.
Overall, we found that the ministry of housing has a fair 
amount of discretion in financial aspects as more than two thirds 
of its budget is managed in a more decentralized manner.
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E .3. Production
As can be seen in Table 7.7., personnel follows the 
pattern of the other sectors. Recruitment needs to be approved at 
a central level in most cases. The SERVIUs enjoy a limited 
discretion in selecting the right person at a regional level, but 
the rules and salaries are determined by the centre.
The Ministry of Housing is organized on only two levels of 
field administration: national and regional. However, it should 
be pointed out that municipalities are becoming involved in the 
process of housing subsidies' applications by advising people at 
this stage. But, they act only as a "mail box" for the SERVIUs.
In sum, the Ministry of Housing enjoys important levels of 
discretion in administrative and managerial terms. However, most 
of these discretionary powers are regulated by national 
instructions, mechanisms or procedures. Therefore, we consider 
that the ministry follows overall a deconcentrated model.
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7.2.F. Summary and Conclusions; Organization and Finance in
Housing
In relation to the finance and organization of the housing 
sector, there are four relevant aspects that about which 
conclusions can be drawn upon the discussion presented in this 
section.
Firstly, it is important to consider the administrative 
re-organization of the sector. Before the foundation of the 
Housing Ministry, one of the main sectoral problems was the lack 
of coordination between a variety of housing agencies. After the 
foundation of the ministry, most agencies were suppressed leaving 
most of their functions to the new ministry. Nevertheless, 
transformations were not complete. An important change was made 
when the Ministry left its role as housing provider to low income 
families to the private sector. The central ministry now took 
charge of the normative role while the SERVIUs or regional 
ministerial agencies became the operative regional unit. These 
units supervised and controlled the housing projects assigned to 
private companies. However, the ministry remained still the main 
financer of housing for low income families through a number of 
special subsidies.
Secondly, the allocation procedures for the housing 
programmes have mixed criteria which produce contradictory 
results. The housing programmes are presently allocated according 
to a national scoring system which integrates variables such as 
family size, family savings, poverty levels and others. In most 
cases the score system applies nationally, so that people from 
different regions compete for a subsidy irrespective of their 
places of residence. The scoring system is designed in a way to 
give more chances to poor families.
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The allocation procedure for housing subsidies does not 
have a clear aim. On the one hand, it tries to make the 
distribution of housing expenditures more progressive by 
including components such as family size and poverty levels. 
However, other components such as family savings, permanence of 
savings and a score reward for those requiring for smaller loans 
may produce exactly the opposite effect. This issue will be 
analysed in the next section.
On the other hand, there is no clear regional criterion 
and local autonomy is not encouraged. In the urban slums
programme there are fixed area quotas per applicant registers. In 
the housing subsidy system and S.A.F. applicants compete 
nationally. We estimate that overall both alternatives favour 
rich regions. In the first case if is an error of omission, in 
that rich areas people will benefit in a higher proportion; in 
the latter case it is because of the criteria and scores for 
selection. An alternative procedure would be to define a specific 
purpose fund in which its regional allocation is related to a 
relevant indicator of housing needs. Once regionally allocated, 
the regions would be able to define the relevant procedures for 
selecting individual beneficiaries following some general central 
guidelines, for example, progressiveness.
Thirdly, the sector has experienced considerable decreases 
in its public expenditures per capita since the early 1970's. In 
addition to this, the sectoral expenditures have been more 
severely curtailed during the latest recessionary periods. 
Therefore, the sectoral expenditures have followed a pro-cyclical 
pattern contrary to the ones observed in health and education.
Fourthly, in relation to the budget and planning 
procedures of the Housing Ministry, we found that its expenditure 
estimations are not very important as most expenditure levels are 
determined by the Budget Office. The Budget Office (Ministry of 
Finance) defines the expenditure ceilings of all ministerial 
programmes. This implies that the ministry has no need to justify 
its programmes and budget formulation is a simple problem. In 
addition to this, the Budget Office imposes no additional 
restrictions on the ministry, therefore there is no case for
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repetitive budgeting here (22).
At the same time, it is also possible to find here most of 
the incremental and "transparent” features found elsewhere. 
However, due to the characteristics of the housing activities, 
which include known costs, time periods of building and others, 
it is possible to use a much more systematic and rational 
approach to budgeting and planning.
Finally, in relation to the discretionary powers for the 
management of resources and decisions, we concluded that the 
ministry enjoys an important degree of discretion in 
administrative terms. This fact may appear as contradictory to 
the previous aspect. However, as the Ministry of Finance has 
defined clear expenditure levels for the sector, it is left with 
more independence defining the sectoral interregional allocation. 
Thus we were led us to categorise housing as a deconcentrated 
model.
22. This is basically because the Budget Office has defined a clear expenditure ceiling for the 
ministry and, because of this, it does not need to control tightly its cash flow.
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7.3. REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF HOUSING POLICIES
This section reviews the redistributive effects of housing 
policies. As was mentioned earlier one of the most recurrent 
criticisms of housing policies in the last decades has been its 
lack of progressiveness in that had favoured the middle and upper 
middle socio-economic groups.
Despite this fact the government has defined only two 
housing programmes as poverty-targeted ones: Urban Slum
Programmes and Sanitary Infrastructure. In these cases the main 
requirement for qualifying as an applicant to the programme is to 
have a low score in the national means test (Ficha C.A.S.) (i.e.
to be poor). In the rest of the programmes, a degree of 
progressiveness is expected to be reached through the score 
system, which takes into account the relative economic capacity 
of the families.
The methodological approach to evaluate these housing 
subsidies is the following:
Urban Slums Programme:
The public subsidy on this programme was estimated by dividing 
the total cost of the houses built under this scheme during a 
year by the number of beneficiaries during the same year. From 
this estimated unitary cost of a house built under the Urban 
Slums Programme it was necessary to substract 25% of its costs. 
This was done because the programme financed only 75% of the 
total cost of the house. The resulting figure was transformed 
into a monthly flow of income by applying an annual rate of 11% 
which represented the rent or the flow of services of the house
(23).
There was no information about the proportion of non-paid 
susbsidised loans. So it was impossible to estimate this 
additional cost for the public purse.
23. This rate is used in the Chilean National Accounts for estimating the imputed rent or the annual 
service of a house.
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Housing Subsidy System and S.A.F.:
In these programmes the estimation of the subsidy related to the 
cost of a house (direct subsidy) was calculated as in the case of 
the Urban Slums Programme.
The indirect subsidy, or the difference between the market 
interest rate and the subsidised rate was estimated in a similar 
way as the direct subsidy. From ministerial sources it was 
possible to obtain the total expenditures on this item during a 
year. This figure was divided by the number of beneficiaries 
during the same year. The resulting figure was also transformed 
to a monthly flow of income following the procedure described 
above.
TABLE 7.8.
ESTIMATES OF DIRECT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES AS A PROPORTION OF 
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN HOUSING 
(Millions Of 1987 $)
1985 1987 i
|a) Total public expenditure in Housing 
1 - Loan recuperation
44,550
13,151
47,948 1 
13,171 I
|b) Fiscal social expenditures in Housing 
1 - Administration costs
31,399
7,913
34,777 1 
4,987 I
|c) Direct social expenditures in Housing 
1 %
23,486 29,790 1
1 c) / a) % 52.7 62.1 1
Author calculations based on:
Table 7.6.
Ley de Presupuestos del Sector Publico 1985 -1987
Haindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
In order to estimate the redistributive effects of housing 
policies it was necessary to have an estimate first of the direct 
social expenditures as a proportion of total public expenditures. 
These estimates appear in Table 7.8. In contrast to other social 
sectors, housing has an important proportion of its expenditures 
financed from its own resources, i.e. not budget allocations or
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fiscal free contribution. In this case, these resources are 
related to the recovering of loans offered from the ministry to 
the beneficiaries of its programmes. The table shows that direct 
social expenditures capture 53 and 62% of total public 
expenditures. These results indicate that our findings about the 
redistributive impact of housing expenditures representative of 
more than half of total expenditures on the sector.
Table 7.9. shows the redistributive effects for the total 
Ministry of Housing . The results indicate that housing
programmes are slightly progressive since they fall into the 
category within which the bottom 30% of the population receives 
between 30 to 50% of the sectoral expenditures. It is possible to 
observe at the same time that between 1985 and 1987 there was a 
slight increase in progressiveness due to the redefinition of the 
selection procedures.
TABLE 7.9.
REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF HOUSING EXPENDITURES 
(Millions of 1987 $)
Total Share of 
Direct Exps.Bottom 30%
X |TYPE OF PROGRAMME
1985 TOTAL 23,486 8,220 35.0 (slightly Progressive
1987 TOTAL 29,790 10,776 36.2 (slightly Progressive
Author calculations based on:
Table 7.6.
Haindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
Overall, it can be concluded that despite considerable 
governmental rhetoric about making housing more progressive there 
is still a long way to go regarding this issue. This is endorsed 
by the fact the the bottom 30% will only receive a bit more than 
a proportional share of the housing expenditures.
24. Due to information constraints it was not possible to estimate the redistributive effects of 
housing expenditures per programme.
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7.4. REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF HOUSING EXPENDITURES
7.4.A. Data Constraints and Methodology
In order to test the competing hypotheses defined in 
Chapter 3 it is necessary to produce a regional estimate of 
housing expenditures and compare these figures with indicators of 
sectoral needs and other socio-economic indicators. The procedure 
for estimating the regional allocation of housing expenditures 
follows the same approach described in earlier chapters (See 
Table 7.10.).
Criteria for Regional Allocation of Housing Expenditures by 
Institutions .
Undersecretariat: The Undersecretariat centralizes most of the
bureaucratic activities of the ministry, both at national and 
regional levels. Almost all personnel is paid through the 
Undersecretariat. There is no statistical information that may 
help to allocate these expenditures on a direct basis. Therefore, 
it was necessary to define a sectoral related indicator. The 
indicator used was the distribution of SERVIUs expenditures as 
the Undersecretariat provides all the administrative support for 
these operative agencies at a regional level. (Criterion C).
SERVIUs: The regional housing services are the operative branches 
of the SEREMIs or regional ministerial offices. There is a very 
accurate basis for the regional allocation of SERVIUs 
expenditures as each of them has its own budget. Therefore, to 
estimate the regional allocation of SERVIUs expenditures it was 
only necessary to eliminate the transfers between SERVIUs and the 
Undersecretariat. The estimates obtained for this institution are 
according to criterion A.
25. As the Metropolitan Park is located in Santiago, all its expenditures can be easily assuned to 
reach the population of the Metropolitan Region.
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TABLE 7.10.
jCRITERIA OF REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF HOUSING EXPENDITURES j
j 1985 Undersec. SERVIUs Met.Park TOTAL
|Crit. A 
jcn't. B 
jcrit. C 
jcrit. D
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0 8 3  j 
1 7  j
(TOTAL 1 0 0  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0  1
1% Min. Budget 17 82 1 1 0 0  I
I 1986 Undersec. SERVIUs Met.Park TOTAL
jCrit. A 
(Crit. B 
jcrit. C 
jCrit. D
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0 79 1
21 I
jTOTAL 1 0 0  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0  j
1% Min. Budget 21 78 1 1 0 0  j
I 1987 Undersec. SERVIUs Met.Park TOTAL
jCrit. A 
jCrit. B 
(Crit. C 
jcrit. D
1 0 0
1 0 0
1 0 0 70 1 
30 1
jTOTAL 1 0 0  1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0  1
Min. Budget 29 70 1 1 0 0  j
NOTE: See text for explanations
7.4.B. Regional Expenditures and Regional Needs
In this section we discuss the link between the estimated 
regional expenditures on housing and sectoral needs. To approach 
this task it is necessary to consided the indicators of need in 
this area. The indicators to be used should be available on a 
regional basis and for the three years under analysis. 
Unfortunately, these rather simple requirements constrained 
dramatically the number of indicators available.
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The indicators used in this sector are the following:
Sewerage: This indicator was calculated as the proportion 
of the population covered by sewerage services in relation 
to total population. The information was provided by the 
statistical division of the Ministry of Public Works.
Water: This indicator measures the proportion of the
population with access to drinking water in relation to 
total population. This indicator was estimated from the 
data supplied by the Ministry of Public Works.
In addition to the housing needs' indicators the group 
of socio-economic indicators was also included to provide 
information for the testing of the hypotheses.
GDP: Regional GDP per capita 
INCO: Regional average income 
URBN: % Urban population
URBZ : % Population living in cities of above 20,000
habitants.
The final group of indicators include the regional 
expenditure information. As in previous chapters we defined 
alternative measures of the sectoral regional expenditures.
SERVIU: Includes the expenditures in the regional housing 
services which finance most housing programmes.
MINVU: Includes the expenditures of SERVIUs and the rest 
of the ministerial bureaucracy.
As can be observed, we have been unable to find enough 
sectoral needs' indicators to show the real dimension or 
requirements for housing. The closest possible were sewerage and 
water which might have indicated the need for housing mains 
services but not necessarily for housing as such. In fact, under 
the present organization these services are run by the Ministry
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of Public Works and not by Housing. This information constraint 
will limit our analysis to two of the three hypotheses 
previously defined, leaving aside hypothesis No. 1, (which states 
that the government will channel a higher proportion of its 
resources to regions with higher levels of unmet need).
A good indicator of housing needs would have been to 
o b t a i n  a r e g i o n a l  e s t i m a t e  of the h o u s i n g  deficit. 
Unfortunatelly, after a long analysis of the features and 
information requirements for this indicator we concluded that if 
was not possible to obtain a regional estimate of it . In
1983, the Ministry estimated a housing deficit of 750,000 
dwellings . To reach this figure, the Ministry had first to
estimate the housing stock at that date; this was done by adding 
to the actual housing stock (Census 1982) the number of houses 
initiated to be built after the census and until June 1983. It 
also added an estimation of the houses built during the same 
period which were not officialy registered in the municipal 
registers. From the resulting figure it was necessary to 
substract an estimate of the number of obsolete or extinct houses 
at that time. The final estimated housing stock is then 
contrasted to the estimated number of households. However, as can 
be noticed these three last steps are highly controversial. There 
are a number of claims that the unofficial building rate and the 
obsolescence rate are both under or over estimated, depending on 
the arguments being put forward.
26. A measure of overcrowding was also not available at a regional level,
27. The estimated nimber of households for that year was 2,5 millions.
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TABLE 7.11.
HOUSING INDICATORS - 1985 (Index TOTAL=100)
1 SEWE WATER GDP INCO URBN URBZ SERVIU MINVU 1
[Tarapaca 134.1 122.6 136.5 85.7 113.3 127.3 88.0 87.3 1
[Antofagasta 90.8 110.3 200.3 83.2 118.5 119.9 59.8 59.3 1
[Atacama 70.5 107.3 148.7 82.8 110.3 83.9 89.8 89.1 1
[Coquimbo 66.7 76.0 61.1 69.0 90.2 63.7 82.1 81.5 1
[Valparaiso 106.6 103.9 99.4 90.8 109.3 101.4 108.2 107.4 1
[O'higgins 57.8 68.6 122.9 79.4 78.9 43.1 97.3 96.6 1
[Maule 52.9 63.9 65.7 83.3 68.8 57.4 71.9 71.4 1
[BioBio 70.0 86.6 79.9 88.6 92.5 81.6 73.3 72.7 I
[Araucania 47.8 66.2 55.6 94.3 69.6 41.3 83.2 82.6 1
[Los Lagos 48.9 68.8 66.9 98.2 71.5 46.0 36.8 36.5 I
[Aysen 50.4 88.0 81.5 93.8 95.8 63.8 152.8 151.7 1
[Hagai lanes 136.3 120.0 260.1 117.5 110.8 105.8 143.6 142.5 1
[Metropol.
1
141.9 124.1 110.0 117.0 116.0 135.5 130.3 131.2 1
1
[INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1
[COUNTRY TOTAL 59.9 75.9 29406 42788 83.3 71.4 3016 3675 1
[AVG 82.7 92.8 114.5 91.0 95.8 82.4 93.6 93.1 1
[STD 34.1 22.0 58.0 13.3 17.9 31.7 31.8 31.7 1
jCOEF.VAR. 41.3 23.7 50.7 14.6 18.7 38.5 33.9 34.1 1
1 HOUSING INDICATORS - 1986
[Tarapaca 129.9 120.4 133.7 83.8 113.0 126.9 100.7 99.7 1
[Antofagasta 89.8 107.6 190.5 78.2 118.1 120.2 84.0 83.1 1
[Atacama 79.2 105.2 142.0 78.9 110.3 84.0 86.7 85.9 1
[Coquimbo 67.6 75.1 61.3 68.5 90.1 63.9 91.7 90.8 1
[Valparaiso 105.1 101.1 100.5 92.1 109.2 100.9 118.1 116.9 1
[O'higgins 58.3 68.2 122.1 78.2 79.2 43.3 130.1 128.8 1
[Maule 57.7 62.7 65.8 83.4 69.3 57.4 75.2 74.5 1
[BioBio 70.7 85.6 77.6 85.3 92.5 81.7 73.4 72.6 1
[Araucania 47.5 64.8 55.2 92.4 69.3 41.5 67.8 67.1 1
[Los Lagos 47.9 66.9 68.1 99.2 71.9 46.1 63.9 63.3 1
[Aysen 49.9 85.0 81.1 92.6 96.1 64.0 268.2 265.6 1
[Magallanes 138.7 118.9 252.7 113.8 110.6 105.8 268.4 265.8 1
[Metropol.
1
140.8 124.7 111.7 119.1 115.8 136.5 110.9 112.3 1
1
[INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1 SEWE
[COUNTRY TOTAl 62.6 79.1 30553 45227 83.6 70.9 2713.4 3468.6 1 WATER
[AVG 83.3 91.2 112.5 89.6 95.8 82.5 118.4 117.4 1 GDP
[STD 33.3 22.0 55.2 13.8 17.8 31.7 66.7 66.0 1 INCO
j c O E F . V A R . 40.0 24.1 49.0 15.4 18.5 38.4 56.3 56.2 1 URBN
1 HOUSING INDICATORS - 1987 URBZ
[Tarapaca 127.7 119.2 132.0 104.0 112.9 126.8 122.4 121.4 1
[Antofagasta 91.5 113.8 191.6 96.6 117.8 120.7 75.7 75.1 1 SERVI
[Atacama 84.9 97.9 143.4 98.8 110.2 83.9 113.6 112.7 1 MINVU
[Coquimbo 76.2 81.1 61.4 75.3 90.3 64.3 82.5 81.9 1
[Valparaiso 105.4 103.1 100.5 95.1 109.0 100.5 98.8 98.0 1
[O'higgins 59.6 70.2 123.0 79.8 79.4 43.7 109.8 109.0 1
[Maule 63.9 63.3 65.9 90.9 69.4 57.3 90.0 89.3 1
[BioBio 62.8 85.1 78.2 81.6 92.6 81.9 79.6 79.0 j
[Araucania 53.6 66.6 55.4 89.9 69.4 41.9 71.4 70.8 1
[Los Lagos 46.3 66.2 68.7 76.3 72.0 46.2 52.7 52.3 1
[Aysen 42.0 85.5 80.8 127.8 96.6 64.6 141.9 140.7 I
[Magallanes 121.0 115.4 250.2 116.6 110.5 106.0 94.4 93.7 I
(Metropol.
1
140.9 124.7 111.1 118.0 115.6 140.0 121.5 122.6 I
1
[INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1
[COUNTRY TOTAL 64.8 79.1 31766 47803 83.8 70.4 2680 3825 1
[AVG 71.7 79.5 97.5 83.4 83.1 71.9 83.6 83.1 1
[STD 40.4 36.9 63.7 35.9 36.5 41.1 39.6 39.4 1
[COEF.VAR. 56.4 46.4 65.4 43.1 43.9 57.1 47.3 47.4 I
GDP per caita in 1977$
above 20,000
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Moreover, in 1985 the Ministry of Housing provided a new 
estimate of the housing deficit equivalent to 380,000 dwellings. 
This considerable decrease in the deficit was produced not only 
through building more houses during the period but through a 
change to the definition of deficit. It passed from a normative 
definition to an "expressed" definition (^®), which took into 
account only those households included in the housing subsidies 
application registers. The same year, MacDonald (1987) following 
the traditional normative definition estimated a housing deficit 
of 750,000 dwellings.
B.l. Preliminary Data Analysis
In this and the following sub-section, we will concentrate 
on testing two of the hypotheses defined in Chapter 3: No. 2, 
that rich regions will obtain higher shares of social 
expenditures and No. 3, related to the urban bias in the 
allocation of social expenditures.
In the initial analysis of the patterns of housing 
indicators from Table 7.11., it is possible to notice that both 
measures of housing expenditures are closely associated with more 
urbanized regions such as Tarapaca, Valparaiso, Magallanes and 
Metropolitan. In addition to these, Aysen (intermediate region) 
also shows above average levels of expenditures. In contrast, 
rural regions such as Araucania and Los Lagos had lower levels of 
housing expenditures per capita during the period under analysis.
Therefore, there are grounds to suggest that hypothesis 
No.3 of an urban bias in the allocation of expenditures is to be 
accepted. This can be explained by the fact that because of the 
present Ministerial organization it is easier to apply and to 
find advice in relation to housing subsidies in urban areas. An 
additional explanation is related to the difficulties in
28. For a more detailed explanation of these concepts, see: 
Bradshaw, J. "The concept of social need"
(New Society 30, March 1972).
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organizing a housing market and building companies in smaller 
less densely populated regions. Raczynski (1986) provides some 
evidence supporting this case.
In regard to the associations between housing expenditures 
and regional well being, it can be observed that there is also a 
relation between these variables. Higher GDP per capita tends to 
coincide with regions having higher housing expenditures per 
capita. The exception is the case of O'Higgins; this is due to a 
constraint on the regional GDP definition which includes most 
copper surpluses in O*Higgins, which contains one of the main 
copper mines. In the case of average income, moreover, the 
pattern is less clear but it does coincide with two of the 
richest regions according to this indicator: Magallanes and 
Metropolitan. Therefore, the evidence again supports the 
existence of a positive relation between higher levels of well 
being and higher expenditures on housing. As explained in 
previous sections, this fact may originate in the scoring system 
for allocating housing expenditures, which weights family savings 
and the savings capacity of the family. In fact, this outcome is 
not unexpected, as section 7.3. showed housing expenditures are 
only slightly progressive.
Regarding the interregional disparities. Table 7.11. shows 
that housing expenditures have very high coefficients of 
variation. In fact the coefficients estimated are the highest 
obtained so far. This can be observed in Table 7.11. where the 
index shows Magallanes and Aysen obtaining more than double the 
national average of housing expenditures per capita. For example 
in 1986, housing expenditures per capita were more than four 
times higher in Magallanes than Araucania, which is the region 
showing lowest coverage for sewerage.
In summary, the evidence of the preliminary data analysis 
has suggested that two of the competing hypotheses can be 
accepted, as resources are allocated according to the urban-high 
well being regional pattern.
In addition to our findings, it interesting to quote some
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estimations by Raczynski (1986) about the housing deficit. 
According to her estimations, the housing deficit was affecting 
27% of all Chilean families. The regions with higher housing 
deficits were Coquimbo, Maule, Bio-Bio and Araucania. These 
findings allow us to consider that housing expenditures are not 
being allocated to those regions with higher proportions of unmet 
basic needs (Hypothesis No. 1) , that is. Hypothesis No. 1 seems 
to be rejected. However, as this reference is for a single year 
and not within our period of analysis, we cannot develop further 
conclusions from here (29).
B.2. Associations between Housing Variables
In this sub-section we attempt to test further the 
hypotheses. As has been done in previous chapters, we start by 
analysing the correlation coefficients of the indicators related 
to the hypotheses to be tested; these are: urban indicators and 
well being indicators (GDP and INCO).
TABLE 7.12.
CORRELATION MATRIX - HOUSING INDICATORS
SEWE WATER GDP INCO URBN URBZ SERVIU MINVU
I SEWE 1.00
IWATER 0.90 ** 1.00
I GDP 0.62 ** 0.69 ** 1.00
I INCO 0.48 * 0.47 * 0.35 1.00
I URBN 0.79 ** 0.95 ** 0.67 ** 0.34 1.00
I URBZ 0.90 ** 0.95 ** 0.57 ** 0.39 0.91 ** 1.00
ISERVIU 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.19 1.00
|MINVU 0.30 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.33 0.20 0.99** 1.00
2 TAILED SIGNIFICANCE; * 0.01 ** 0.001
SEWE % Pop. Covered Sewerage URBN % Urban population
WATER % Pop. Covered Water URBZ % Pop. living cities above 20,000
GDP GOP per capita SERVIU SERVIUs expenditures per capita
INCO Regional average income MINVU Housing expenditures per capita
29. Raczynski's estimations are based on other authors' previous calculations of the housing deficit 
for 1976. It vis ery probable that the patterns obtained in those estimates are still being 
maintained.
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As can be seen on Table 7.12., the only significant 
correlation within this set of variables is a positive 
correlation between total housing expenditures and average 
income. This outcome endorses previous findings that housing 
expenditures are allocated in a form that benefits proportionally 
more those regions with higher well being levels (hypothesis 
No.2). It is interesting to note that the significant correlation 
is to average income and not GDP. As mentioned earlier, average 
income closely represents the average disposable income of 
families, (the amount of money they have to spend) , whereas GDP 
is more related to the regional productivity or contribution to 
the national output. This means that it is a more abstract 
variable which does not necessarily indicate money resources 
directly appropriable by the families.
In sum, this association between average income and 
housing expenditures appears as a result of the scoring system of 
the selection process that weights in a significant manner the 
family savings.
In relation to the needs indicators used (sewerage and 
water), they show significant correlations with regional well 
being and especially urbanization. This is a somewhat expected 
outcome as sewerage collectors and drinking water pipes are 
usually designed to cover urban areas and are being extended to 
the countryside only when good urban coverage has been achieved. 
The correlation matrix shows no significant linear association 
between housing expenditures and sewerage and water. This is 
again an expected outcome as sewerage and water are financed by 
the Ministry of Public Works. Therefore, as stated in the 
previous sub-section, we cannot draw any conclusion about the 
truth of hypothesis No.l, which relates higher sectoral 
expenditures to needs.
Summarizing this section, it is possible to conclude that 
our findings suggest with clear evidence that the richest regions 
obtain higher levels of social expenditures in housing 
(hypothesis No.2). We reached this conclusion through two 
alternative procedures.
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At the same time, we also conclude that -higher housing 
expenditures are also found in urban regions (hypothesis No.3), 
However, the evidence in this case was weaker than above.
7.4.C. Section Summary and Conclusions: Resource Allocation and
its Regional Impact
In section 7.4. we have proceeded to estimate the regional 
allocation of housing expenditures. This was done following the 
methodological steps described in earlier chapters. Overall, more 
than 75% of the expenditures were allocated according to 
Criterion A, which represents the higher accuracy level.
In order to test the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 4, 
three sets of sectoral indicators were defined: sectoral needs
indicators, socio-economic indicators and housing expenditure 
indicators. Regarding the first group, due to an information 
constraint, it was not possible to compute the most relevant 
sectoral need indicators, such as housing deficit. For this 
reason, the analysis was constrainted to testing only two of the 
hypotheses defined earlier.
At the same time, due to the information constraints, the 
statistical analysis was performed in the two first stages. This 
means that the hypotheses were tested through the preliminary 
data analysis noting the regional patterns of the indicators and, 
through correlations looking at the associations between 
variables. No regression analysis was performed as the few needs 
indicators available were highly correlated with socio-economic 
indicators.
The statistical analysis gave grounds to accept two 
hypotheses: No.2, that richest regions obtain higher levels of
housing expenditures per capita and. No. 3, that housing 
expenditure is concentrated in urban regions.
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Overall, it is possible to summarize that these latest 
statistical conclusions are not isolated facts as they are 
endorsed by our previous findings in sections 7.2. and 7.3. In 
this sense, it is not surprising to find a positive statistical 
association between housing expenditures and average income as 
the application process helps to select families with higher
savings. This is also supported by the fact that ministerial 
expenditures are only slightly progressive, as the bottom 30% of 
the population receives 35 to 36% of the housing expenditures.
30. This process serves as a basis for the later regional budget allocations.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
SOCIAL SECURITY AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES
8.1. BACKGROUND TO THE ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE OF SOCIAL
SECURITY IN CHILE
This section attempts to summarize the most interesting 
features of the developments of the Chilean social security 
system during the last 100 years. It firstly describes the early 
developments of the system. Then it discusses the structure of 
the system, its benefits and organizational settings in the 
sixties, when the system had achieved a high level of coverage 
and stability. The section concludes by remarking on the system's 
weaknesses and the manner in which these waeknesses were dealth 
with in the early 1970's.
Early Developments
As a result of the early development of the industrial 
sector (mining and related activities), Chile fostered a well 
developed social security system which is one of the oldest of 
Latin America. Early social security legislation can be traced 
back to the 1820's with the introduction of retirement schemes 
for the military forces. In 1858 legislation was introduced 
initiating the first steps to organize a civil servant pension 
scheme. Later, in 1911 a powerfull pressure group, the railroad 
workers, won retirement pensions. However, a more general and 
comprehensive social security legislation was passed in 1924. 
These regulations served as a basis for the social security 
system of the country. They included compulsory social insurance, 
employers responsibility for occupational accidents and a 
compulsory savings programme to pay retirement pensions and life 
insurance for white collar workers (^).
1. A good account of the Chilean development in social security until the early seventies can be found in: 
Mesa-lago, C. (1978) Social Security in Latin America 
University of Pittsburg Press.
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According to Midgley (1984), Chile was one of the first 
countries of the thirld world to have social insurance schemes 
catering to a significant number of workers. These types of 
schemes were altogether uncommon before the second world war in 
thirld world countries.
The Social Security System in the 1960*s
Until the late 1970*s the Chilean social security system was 
a pay-as-you-go scheme in which contributions paid by the active 
workers and their employers financed the passive or retired 
workers. The system was organised in thirty-five pension funds 
(Caias de Prevision) covering different groups of workers or 
areas of economic activity. Three pension funds concentrated 
about 90% of total affiliations; these were: Social Insurance
Service fServicio de Seauro social (SSS)), Private Employees 
Pension Fund (EMPART) and Public Sector Employees Pension Fund 
(ÇANAEMPU).
Following Mesa-lago's (1978) study the Chilean social 
security system can be divided into five occupational groups 
which were closely related to the pressure groups that pushed for 
the creation of those schemes:
- Armed forces: Covered by a special pension fund for them. The
police also had its own pension fund.
- Civil Servants: Covered through CANAEMPU and some other ad-hoc
funds, (municipal employees, railroads, and others).
- White collar workers: Covered by private employees pension fund
(EMPART) and some other ad-hoc funds ( Nitrate industry 
workers. Gas company. Merchant marine and others)
- Blue collar workers: Covered by the Social Insurance Service.
- Self employed: Covered by a small ad-hoc pension fund.
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The System's Benefits
The benefits and the conditions for receiving them varied 
widely between blue and white collar workers fobreros and 
emoleados) and the area of economic activity (public employees, 
banks, armed forces, municipal workers, etc.). The levels of 
provision and the coverage were also related to the political 
influence of each of the pressure groups. In the case of old age 
pensions, there were more than thirty different pension schemes 
with different eligibility criteria. For example, the minimun 
age for retirement was 65 years in the case of men affiliated to 
EMPART and SSS, but in other cases retirement was related to the 
years of service which in some cases were as few as fifteen. The 
benefit levels were also different, in the SSS the maximun 
pension was 75% of the base salary whereas in EMPART the level 
was 100%. Inflation adjustments were also uneven. Private sector 
employees received periodic adjustments but this was true only 
for public sector higher ranks employees. Finally, payroll 
contributions also differed greatly according to the different 
occupational groups.
In addition to the benefits discussed the system also 
included family allowances (asianacion familiar) which consisted 
of an income transfer paid to each affiliated person (active or 
retired) in relation to the number of dependent family members. 
This transfer was financed through specific payroll contributions 
and distributed through each of the social security pension 
funds. As in the case of old age pensions, the level of family 
allowances varied considerably. To the extent that some 
occupational groups were not even entitled to them (blue collar 
workers in the SSS). The system was also organised to provide an 
unemployment subsidy fsubsidio de cesantial in the form of 
periodic monthly payments for a lenght of time. This subsidy was 
financed by payroll contributions from the employer and the 
worker. As in the previous cases the level of benefits provided 
varied considerably. Finally, the system also provided health 
and maternity benefits through the S.N.S. and SERMENA.
One of the major achievements of the Chilean social security 
system was its widespread coverage of the working population,
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which reached 70% in 1970. The system also provided an ample 
coverage of the different areas of social security including not 
only old age pensions, but invalidity pensions, sickness 
benefits, injuries compensation, maternity leave, family 
allowance, and unemployment subsidies.
Organizational Setting
The institutional and organizational setting of the Chilean 
social security scheme in the early 1970*s was a complicated one. 
There was no single state agency supervising the planning and 
coordination of the social security system as a whole. Most of 
the public and quasi-public pension funds were under the 
supervision and control of the Superintendency of Social 
Security, created in 1965. The Armed Forces pension funds were 
coordinated by the Ministry of Defence. At the scone time the 
Ministry of Health supervised the payments related to maternity 
leave and sickness benefits. The President of the Republic had 
the power to nominate the director of each public pension fund, 
but the governing body was composed of various delegates from the 
beneficiaries (labour force), employers and the Ministry.
In addition to the pension funds other institutions played a 
role in providing some complementary benefits. Compensation Funds 
(Caias de Comoensacion) are private welfare organizations which 
were in charge of paying family allowances financed by employers 
contributions. These institutions administered the resources of 
family allowances of various pension funds affiliated to them and 
offered additional benefits such as loans for housing and 
education. The supervision of these compensation funds was 
carried out through a Special Commission. Other such agencies 
were the Occupational Risk Institutions (Mutuales de Seauridad) . 
These institutions were created by the private sector to provide 
insurance coverage for accident rehabilitation and related 
services to workers.
Figure 8.1. shows a summary of the organization of social 
security in the early 1970*s. Most social security programmes 
were provided through public, semi-public and private pension 
funds which received contributions from workers and employers and
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from the state. Pension funds also transfered resources to 
private compensation funds and occupational risk institutions to 
provide them with special benefits related to family allowances 
and working injuries compensations. The Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security supervised the functioning of the pension funds 
through a specially created institution, the Superintendency of 
Social Security. Finally, the figure also shows the transfers 
from the Treasury to the pension funds to finance their 
operational deficit.
The Finance of Social Security and its Major Constraints
In relation to the finance of social security, it can be 
said that the system was financed through three alternative 
sources:i) payroll contributions from employers and workers, ii) 
state contributions which involved some earmarked taxes as well 
as direct subsidies to cover deficits and, iii) investment 
revenues. These financial sources represented 70%, 25% and 5%
respectively of the system's total revenues.
Government contributions went mostly to the following 
pension funds: S.S.S., railroad workers' and armed forces' funds. 
They also contributed to finance the family allowances.
As mentioned earlier because of the increasing benefits 
distributed through the pension funds the payroll contributions 
rose dramatically between the 1920's and the 1970's (^).
Various reasons have commonly been given to explain the poor 
economic performance of the pension funds (^):
As concerns revenue:
2. For example: in the S.S.S. payroll contributions were 5% of the base salary in 1925-37 but rose to 51.4% 
in 1975. In the banking pension funds payrolI contributions increased from 28% to 54% during approximately 
the same period.
3. Some of these explanations are also found in Mesa Lago (1978).
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1.- Evasion: Evasion resulted from employers paying lower 
contributions in relation to the actual salary of the workers 
(^ ) •
2.- Low return from investments: Pension funds used to invest
their funds on buildings that were let at subsidised rents 
to the beneficiaries of the funds.
As concerns expenditure:
3.- Increased expenditures due to early retirements
4.- Duplication of pensions
According to Mesa-Lago (1978) because the system was created 
as a response to the different pressures of workers for a social 
security scheme instead of resulting from a governmental global 
initiative, the system was featured by considerable inequities 
within it. As a result of this bleak diagnosis and the 
considerable financial hardship that it impossed to the state, 
the Alessandri government (1958-64) established at the end of his 
period a commission to study the social security system. The 
study compared the benefits of the system with other schemes 
finding that the Chilean social security system was one of the 
most discriminatory and regressive in the world. It found that 
contributions as a whole were channeled to the highest income 
groups through priviliged funds separated from the common general 
funds (Mesa-Lago, 1978). The study recommended a reform of the 
direction of universal benefits and move away from the cumbersone 
system of social privileges for specific groups. Some of these 
suggestions were headed by subsequent governments attempting to 
unify the social security system and reduce its inequalities, 
however, for the most part political opposition made these 
reforms impossible.
4. Most pensions were based on the average salary of the last five years before retirement. The level of 
contributions during the period of employment for most people were usually "arranged" between the employer 
and the worker. The arrangement consisted in the employer contributing according to a lower salary, and the 
worker receiving a higher salary because of the unpaid contributions.
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Initial Reforms in the Late 1970's
The Chilean social security system was derived from a two 
phase reform. The first took place between 1974 and 1980 and was 
aimed to unify most of the benefits related to social security 
payments. The second reform took place in 1981, comprising the 
introduction of a new social security system for the country, 
this later phase is described in the next section.
In the first phase of reforms one of the most important 
changes was the unification of family allowances. This was 
accomplished by changing the finance of these payments from 
private contributions to a sole fund financed by the Treasury. A 
uniform level of payment was then defined for all workers, which 
implied a reduction of the benefits for white collar workers and 
a consequent increase for blue collar workers. This benefit was 
also extended to non-insured poor families through the Assistance 
programmes.
The Unemployment Subsidy was also unified for all 
occupational groups. The finance of this subsidy was also 
transfered to the Treasury.
Finally, in 1979 the government unified the adjustment 
criteria of pensions and the retirement ages for all occupational 
groups and pension funds. This unification implied the 
elimination of the exclusive system of inflation adjustment for 
high ranking public employees. At the same time it reduced 
considerably the dispersion of payroll contribution rates, which 
were on average fixed at 35%. The contribution rates were further 
reduced in 1981 to a flat 20% rate for all pension funds.
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8.2 FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION
8.2.A. Present Organization
In this section we describe the organization of social 
security and assistance programmes in Chile. For practical 
reasons both areas are presented separately in order to give a 
clear picture of each.
A.I. Social Security
This section details the developments of the Chilean social 
security system since 1980. Firstly, we describe the most 
important features of the new private pension schemes. Secondly, 
we discuss the costs for the public budget that this 
transformation has meant. Lastly, we summarize the organizational 
settings.
The New Private Pension Funds
The most important change in the social security system 
involved the creation of private for profit Pension Funds 
Administration Institutions fAdministradoras de Fondos de 
Pensiones. AFP) (^ ) . This represented a change from the pay-as- 
you-go pension system to one of individual capitalization of 
funds.
AFPs managed the individual pension fund accounts of each of 
the workers affiliated with it. There were a number of strict 
regulations in relation to the investment of the funds and the 
information provided periodically to each of the affiliated 
workers. Each of these regulations was supervised by the newly 
created Superintendency of AFPs. In addition to the official 
regulations, the State guaranteed a minimun return from the funds 
deposited in AFPs. If they did not reach a required minimun level 
they had to dissolve. The system also involved a guaranteed 
minimum pension for those contributors whose accumulated funds 
were insufficient for that minimum (^).
5. Law Decree No. 3,500.
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Under this scheme mandatory payroll contributions for old 
age pensions were set at a flat 10% rate. An additional 3.4% was 
also defined as an insurance premium covering disability and 
survivor pensions (?). The new pensions were to be equal to 70% 
of the average salary for the last 10 years adjusted by 
inflation. The retirement ages were also fixed for all 
occupational groups to 65 years for men and 60 for women.
AFPs are permitted to collect from their affiliates a fixed 
monthly charge related to the administrative cost of manging the 
individual account. There was also a proportional charge in 
relation to the total amount of resources managed in each 
individual account and a fixed charge related to those who were 
transfering from one institution into another.
One interesting achievement of the AFPs has been the real 
returns obtained; they averaged 14% per annum between 1981 and 
1988, about three percentage points higher than those from the 
financial system. However, as a result of the commission 
structure, which includes a fixed commission, the returns have 
varied by levels of taxable income. Higher income levels have 
received higher returns, and contributions from low income 
workers have been eroded by these fixed charges, producing the 
effect that an important proportion of low income workers have 
been forced to rely on the guaranteed minimun pension. This 
feature has attracted criticism but as the total funds 
accumulated by each AFP has grown considerably, so have the 
revenues obtained through the percentual commissions, thus 
helping to lower the fixed commissions as more revenues have been 
collected by each AFP.
6. The amount of the minimun pension was 85% of the minimun wage.
7. These mandatory contributions made the new system very attractive as workers changing from the old to the 
new system experienced an average increase of 10% in their disposable income. The total nunber afiliated to 
the new system rose from 480 thousands in May 1981 to 2.3 million in December 1985.
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The Public Costs of the Reform
The reform of the social security system has imposed large 
fiscal costs on the public budget. These costs can be presented 
in three areas:
1.- Public transfers to finance the pension funds* deficits: 
These deficits arose mainly from the poor economic 
performance of pension funds. However, they were largely 
increased as a result of the rapid transferences of active 
workers from the old system to the new one. The pension 
funds were unable to finance the pensions of the workers who 
had already retired because the contributing base was 
systematically decreasing. Therefore, the state had to cover 
this difference until the old system was extinguished by 
demographic factors.
2.- Payment of the "recognition bonds":
The recognition bonds were an estimation of the amount of 
a c c u m u l a t e d  funds to be p a i d  u p o n  r e t i r e m e n t  of 
beneficiaries who had contributed to the (old) pension funds 
and had decided to transfer to the AFPs. These recognition 
funds earned a 4% inflation adjusted annual return until 
they had been paid. In other words, this bond was a 
"recognition" of the contributions made to the old system 
and transfered to the new one (®).
8. Estimates by ODEPLAN (1986) reckoned that the peak of expenditures on recognition bonds will be reached 
by the year 2000. Whereas, public expenditures to finance operational deficits of pension funds will reach 
its peak in the late 1990s. In 1987, these later expenditures were 3.4% of GDP.
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3.- Public supplements to meet the minimun pension:
These public transfers were applicable in relation to those 
workers with insufficient accumulated funds to cover the 
minimum pension (^).
As a result of the Executive decision, the armed forces were 
not affected by the new organization of the social security 
system. This meant that the Treasury would continue to finance 
the operational deficits of these pensions funds even after the 
demographic extintion of the rest of the "old" pension funds. At 
the same time this important area of the social security system 
would continue to function with the prevailing inequalities.
Organizational Settings
Figure 8.1. shows a summary of the developments in the 
organization of social security by the mid 1980*s. The basic 
structure of the 1970's was maintained. However, the creation of 
the pension funds administration institutions (AFPs) proposed a 
new alternative to the consumer. Compensation funds still played 
an important role in providing some complementary benefits 
(family allowances) to those beneficiaries affiliated to them 
through a pension fund or AFP.
However, an important regarding the structure of the
1970's was related to the fact that unemployment subsidies and 
family allowances were now Treasury financed (non contributory) 
instead of financed by pension funds. Therefore, pension and 
compensation funds received these resources directly from the 
Treasury to provide the benefits. A further difference was 
related to the creation of Assistance Programmes which were 
Treasury financed programmes provided through municipalities 
under the regulations of the Superintendency of Social Security.
9. Some estimates elaborated by Yanez (1985) indicated that in the next century an important proportion of 
the retired population will be relying on the state guaranteed minimun pensions. According to his estimates, 
the state will be paying 430 thousand pensions by 2030. However, these estimates are very sensitive to the 
changes in the commission rates and the returns of the funds.
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A.2. Assistance Programmes
Assistance programmes were created to eliminate some of the 
inequities of a social security sytem which provided benefits to 
selected occupational groups. They were aimed to cover especially 
vast groups of low income workers who were are usually uninsured. 
There were three programmes in this area:
Assistance Pensions (PASIS) :
The assistance pensions were created in 1975. This programme 
benefited people over 65 years old and the disabled of 18 years 
or older. This benefit was poverty-targeted and its beneficiaries 
were selected through the national means test considering the 
regional maximum quota fixed by central government. PASIS were 
non-contributory pensions financed directly from Treasury funds 
and paid through municipalities. In 1985 over 320 thousand PASIS 
were paid.
Family allowances for low income families:
Family allowances for low income families were created in 1981 
with the aim of covering children of poor households which 
were not receiving a contributory family allowance. It consisted 
of a fixed monthly payment given to the parents or the curators 
of each child no older than 15 years, including any expected 
babies. For smaller children, this benefit was tied to school 
attendance and health controls. Family allowances were poverty- 
targeted subsidies entirely financed by Treasury allocations and 
paid through municipalities. In 1985, almost one million family 
allowances for low income families were paid.
Special Employment Programmes:
Special employment programmes were created in 1975 to help to 
redress the growing trends in unemployment. In 1982-1983 during 
the peak of the economic recession the programme benfitted 450 
thousand people. The programme was designed to assist any persons
10. Law Decree No. 869 1975.
11. Law 18,020.
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from 18 to 65 years old who were unemployed or seeking 
employment. In exchange for a weekly payment the beneficiaries 
had to accept a of 35 hours per week. The works
were organized through municipalities and they usually comprised 
road and park maintenance. In some cases they were also related 
to various municipal administrative tasks. There were two 
alternative programmes: the Minimun Employemt Programme (PEM) and 
the OccupTitional Programme for Householders (POJH) (^^). PEM 
offered a lower level of payment and benefited mostly, younger 
people and women working thorugh "local mothers groups" (Centros 
de madrés). POJH was restricted to householders and provided 
higher levels of payments. By 1985, due to the improved 
economic situation, the employment programmes were benefiting 350 
thousand people.
Assitance programmes all shared the common feature of being 
entirely financed through Treasury allocations and distributed 
through municipalities. This fact can be observed in figure 8.1.
12. In addition to these two employment programmes there were other smaller programmes organised on a 
project basis.
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8.2.B. Total Public Expenditure
The growth of public expenditures on labour and social 
security can be observed in Table 8.1. The figures in the table 
include only the ministerial expenditures on its general services 
and social security. Unfortunately, there were no time series on 
assistance programmes as some of them were only recently created. 
The figures presented in the table were all deflated by the 
National Institute of Statistics C.P.I.
The expenditure trend in social security can be better 
observed in Table 8.2. It is noted that after a considerable fall 
from the level of 1970 expenditures there are two peaks: 1974- 
1975 and 1981-1983, when total social security accounted for 
10.8% of GDP. These peaks coincide with the worst parts of the 
recessionary periods. Therefore it can be concluded that social 
security expenditures show a counter cyclical effect.
TABLE 8.1.
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ON LABOUR AND SOCIAL SECURITY
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN 
LABOUR AND SOC. SECURIT 
(Millions of 1989 pesos
YEAR (YANEZ COMPTROLLER (YANEZ COMPTROLLER
1970 1 401,420 [ 42,852
1973 1 225,896 ( 22,909
1974 I 285,091 j 28,435
1975 1 315,677 j 31,266
1976 1 261,216 ( 25,185
1977 I 284,545 j 26,969
1978 1 310,535 445,728 j 28,710 41,209
1979 I 368,718 411,692 i 33,596 37,512
1980 I 391,970 459,862 ( 35,171 41,263
1981 I 479,339 490,942 ( 42,317 43,342
1982 I 530,736 573,936 j 46,076 49,826
1983 I 483,639 458,494 ( 41,277 39,131
1984 J 495,725 462,549 ( 41,593 38,809
1985 j 473,449 449,489 j 39,058 37,081
1986 447,736 36,321
1987 446,835 35,643
LABOUR and SOC. SECURITY 
EXPENDITURES per CAPITA 
(1989 pesos)
Source:
1. Yanez (1983) and Yanez y Aguilo (1988);
2. Contraloria General de la Republica 
Informes Gestion Financiers 1987
NOTE: Deflated by the National Institute of Statistics C.P.I
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The increases in the social security expenditures after 1980 
can be explained as basically due to the implementation of the 
n e w  s o c i a l  s e c u r i t y  s y s t e m  w h i c h  c o m p r i s e d  a d d i t i o n a l  
expenditures to finance the pension funds deficit stemming from 
the transfers of active workers to the new AFPs. However, at the 
same time, after the recessionary period, the pension payment 
levels were frozen (in nominal terms) in mo s t  public sector 
pension funds producing a smooth but systematical decrease in the 
sectoral expenditures specifically after 1983.
FIGURE 8.2.
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8.2.C. Expenditure Structure
The social security and assistance programmes expenditure 
structures are shown in Table 8.2. In producing this table it 
was necessary to consolidate important areas of transfers between 
pension funds and other public institutions. As usual, we follow 
the methodological approach defined in Chapter 4. The figures 
obtained from the process of transfer elimination were all 
deflated using the Yanez special public sector price index.
Economic Expenditure Structure:
Personnel: Due to the nature of the social security area, which 
comprised mostly cash transfers to people, personnel was not a 
relevant area of expenditure and it was concentrated mostly in 
the administrative area.
Goods and services for consumption: This area of expenditure was 
related to office equipment and stationery, accounting for only 
1% of total expenditures.
Social Welfare Provisions: Social welfare provisions consisted of 
all the social security payments made by the pension funds to 
their affiliates. These included old age pensions, disability and 
survivor pensions and other related benefits such as family 
allowances and sickness benefits. This area of expenditure was 
the most important area and accounted for 70 to 80% of total 
sectorial expenditures. These provisions have been increasing 
their share of the total budget as a result of the debts related 
to the new social security system.
Transfers: This area originally included the transfers made by
each of the 31 pension funds to the National Fund of Health 
(FONASA) and to other small funds which provided benefits of a 
mixed mode of finance, (i.e. finance through the Treasury and 
through their resources.
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These transfers were all eliminated and accounted for in the 
"recipient" institutions, as defined in our methodology. However, 
assistance programmes and the Fund for Family Allowances were 
considered as transferences and were not consolidated. In the 
former case, these transfers were classed latter as transfers to 
the private sector, i.e. individuals. In the latter fund, only 
the proportion of the expenditures to finance family allowances 
and unemployment subsidies in private pension funds (AFP) 
remained as transfers, as the rest of these funds were already 
included in the pension funds' expenditures.
The other areas of the economic expenditure structure represent a 
negligible proportion of the sectoral expenditures. However, it 
is necessary to explain that, as in the case of housing, we do 
not consider financial investments as expenditures since they are 
part of the pension funds* assets.
Institutional Expenditure Structure
Ministerial Bureaucracy : Ministerial bureaucracy included a 
number of small institutions in terms of expenditures, which were 
summed under this heading. The institutions can be classified 
into two areas: i) Labour policy and planning: Undersecretariat 
of labour. Directorate of labour. National Training Service and 
Directorate of Pledge Credit. In this latter case, as explained 
earlier, financial investment was not considered as expenditure. 
This is again a departure from other studies of Chilean public 
expenditures; ii) Institutions related to social security : 
Undersecretariat of Social Security, Superintendency of AFP and 
National Institute of Social Security Normalization, (this 
institute managed a number of small pension funds in 
dissolution).
Pension Funds: Pension funds' expenditures accounted for 83 to 
88% of total ministerial expenditures. This was the area of 
greatest expenditure in the social sectors and was in 1987 6.7
times the total budget of the Ministry of Housing or 3.5 times 
the health budget. Total pension funds' expenditures have been 
increasing their share of the budget as a result of the public 
debt related to the introduction of the new social security
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system. Within pension funds* expenditures, the greatest expense 
was incurred through the armed forces* pension funds which are 
deemed to continue to increase as this is the only sector not 
affected by the recent reforms.
Assistance programmes: Assistance programmes included the
Family Allowance programme for low income families, Assitance 
Pensions and Special Employment Programmes. These accounted for 
11 to 17% of total social security expenditures. The share of 
these programmes has decreased over the last years because 
Special Employment Programmes have been cut as a result of the 
impT^oved economic situation of the country and the subsequent 
decline in the unemployment rate. Assistance pensions and family 
allowances have been frozen in their payment levels. In addition, 
the Ministry of Finance has established ceilings in the number of 
pensions and family allowances to be paid.
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TABLE 8.2.
THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ON SOCIAL SECURITY 
(Millions Of $ 1987)
S. TOT P E N S I 0 N F U N D S Sub (ASSISTANCE PROGS. Sub.
1985 MINIS Armed For EMPART S.S.S. Pub.EmplOther F.U.P.FTotal |S.U.F.(4) PASIS(4)Empl.Progs. Total j TOTAL
Personnel 1334 571 986 1494 477 474 0 4003 I 0 0 0 0 ( 5337
C.& S. Cons. 293 621 1240 2117 505 312 0 4796 1 0 0 0 0 ( 5089
Soc.Wel.Prov 0 88175 41710 86369 53280 31411 0 300945 1 0 0 0 0 ( 300945
Transfers 168 217 12158 84 23 26 29675 42183 1 12582 21264 37397 71244 ( 113595
Cap.Inv. 25 73 15 34 28 20 0 170 I 0 0 0 0 ( 195
Finan.Inv. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 i 0
Other 179 420 0 0 251 129 0 800 1 0 0 0 0 ( 979
TOTAL 1999 90078 56108 90099 54565 32372 29675 352897 1 12582 21264 37397 71244 ( 426140
S. TOT P E N S I 0 N F U N D S Sub (ASSISTANCE PROGS. Sub.
1986 MINIS Armed For.EMPART S.S.S. Pub.EmplOther F.U.P.FTotal (S.U.F.C4) PASIS(4)Empl.Progs. Total (TOTAL
Personnel 1416 519 895 1308 463 1883 0 5068 I 0 0 0 0 ( 6484
G.& S. Cons. 355 723 900 1592 438 623 0 4275 1 0 0 0 0 ( 4631
Soc.Wel.Prov 0 88287 41830 77264 51452 29883 0 288716 1 0 0 0 0 ( 288716
Transfers 639 188 3 2 16 6844 22977 30029 [ 9775 20262 22030 52067 ( 82734
Cap.Inv. 33 37 6 16 19 45 0 123 1 0 0 0 0 1 157
Finan.Inv. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 0 0 0 I 0
Other 80 182 0 0 220 233 0 635 1 0 0 0 0 1 715
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0
TOTAL 2524 89936 43633 80182 52608 39510 22977 328846 ( 9775 20262 22030 52067 ( 383437
S. TOT P E N S I 0 N F U N D S Sub (ASSISTANCE PROGS. Sub.
1987 MINIS Armed For.EMPART S.S.S. Pub.EmplOther F.U.P.FTotal (S.U.F.C4) PASIS(4)Etnpl .Progs. Total (TOTAL
Personnel 1756 486 751 1073 459 2284 0 5052 I 0 0 0 0 j 6808
G.& S. Cons. 390 506 767 1447 370 645 0 3736 1 0 0 0 0 ( 4126
Soc.Wel.Prov 0 86313 43276 74426 51159 35483 0 290657 0 j 290657
Transfers 918 574 3 3 20 1018 19585 21203 ( 7449 17733 15762 40944 j 63066
Cap.Inv. 45 21 4 5 4 53 0 88 1 0 0 0 0 ( 133
Finan.Inv. 1 0 0 0 0 179 0 179 1 0 0 0 0 ( 181
Other 85 501 0 0 70 143 0 713 1 0 0 0 0 ( 797
TOTAL 3195 88401 44801 76955 52082 39805 19585 321628 ( 7449 17733 15762 40944 ( 365767
SOURCE:
Author calculations based on:
Estados de Ejecucion Presupuestaria del Sector Publico 
Contraloria General de la Republica 1985-1986-1987 
Leyes de Presupuesto del Sector Publico 
Oficina de Presupuestos 1985-1986-1987
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TABLE 8.2. (Continuation)
THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ON SOCIAL SECURITY 
(% Structure)
SUB-T P E N S I 0 N F U N D S Sub (ASSISTANCE PROGS. Sub.
1985 MINIS Armed For.EMPART S.S.S. Pub.EmplOther F.U.P.FTotal |S.U.F.(4) PASIS(4)Empl.Progs. Total j TOTAL
ersonneI 66.7 0.6 1.8 1.7 0.9 1.5 0.0 1.1 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1-3
.& S. Cons. 14.7 0.7 2.2 2.3 0.9 1.0 0.0 1.4 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.2
oc.WeI.Prov 0.0 97.9 74.3 95.9 97.6 97.0 0.0 85.3 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 70.6
ransfers 8.4 0.2 21.7 0.1 0.0 0.1 100.0 12.0 I 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 j 26.7
ap.Inv. 1.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 I 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0
inan.Inv. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0
ither 9.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.2 I 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.2
OTAL 0.5 21.1 13.2 21.1 12.8 7.6 7.0 82.8 I 3.0 5.0 8.8 16.7 ( 100.0
SUB-T P E N S I 0 N F U N D S Sub (ASSISTANCE PROGS. Sub.
1986 MINIS Armed For.EMPART S.S.S. Pub.EmplOther F.U.P.FTotal (S.U.F.<4) PASIS(4)Empl.Progs. Total (TOTAL
'ersonnel 56.1 0.6 2.1 1.6 0.9 4.8 0.0 1.5 j 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.7
S. Cons. 14.1 0.8 2.1 2.0 0.8 1.6 0.0 1.3 j 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1.2
(OC.Wel.Prov 0.0 98.2 95.9 96.4 97.8 75.6 0.0 87.8 j 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 I 75.3
ransfers 25.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 100.0 9.1 j 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 j 21.6
:ap.Inv. 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.0
Mnan. Inv. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.0
)ther 3.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.2 [ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.2
•OTAL 0.7 23.5 11.4 20.9 13.7 10.3 6.0 85.8 1 2.5 5.3 5.7 13.6 j 100.0
SUB-T P E N S I 0 N F U N D S Sub (ASSISTANCE PROGS. Sub.
1987 MINIS Armed For.EMPART S.S.S. Pub.EmplOther F.U.P.FTotal (S.U.F.C4) PASIS(4)Empl.Progs. Total (TOTAL
Personnel 55.0 0.5 1.7 1.4 0.9 5.7 0.0 1.6 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 . 9
«.& S. Cons. 12.2 0.6 1.7 1.9 0.7 1.6 0.0 1.2 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 1 .1
Soc.Wel.Prov 0.0 97.6 96.6 96.7 98.2 89.1 0.0 90.4 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 79.5
rransfers 28.7 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 100.0 6.6 j 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ( 17.2
Cap.Inv. 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 j 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0
Finan.Inv. 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0
Dther 2.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.2 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.2
rOTAL 0.9 24.2 12.2 21.0 14.2 10.9 5.4 87.9 j 2.0 4.8 4.3 11.2 j 100.0
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8.2.D. Budget and Planning
In this section we concentrate on describing the main 
features of the budgetary and planning process in social security 
and assistance programmes. In order to avoid repeating ideas 
introduced in the review of the other social sectors, we 
concentrate now on only those aspects exclusive to this sector.
Formulation
The budget formulation can be presented according to the 
three expenditure areas introduced in the previous section: 
Ministerial Bureaucracy, Pension Funds and Assitance Programmes.
Regarding the ministerial bureaucracy, the formulation phase 
followed the traditional incrementalist approach of most social 
sectors, determining their total expenditures according to an 
aggregative model that consolidated the agencies proposals (^^).
In relation to the pension funds, the general approach was 
also very incrementalist and aggregative. As a consequence each 
pension fund put its greatest effort into the estimation of the 
two sources of change in the annual expenditures: recognition
Bonds and retirements. Each pension fund had recorded the ages of 
all beneficiaries , therefore it was not difficult to
estimate the new expenditure commitments for the next year. The 
Budget Office (Ministry of Finance) would then closely scrutinize 
the justification of the new additional expenditures on 
recognition bonds and old age pensions.
13. The Undersecretan'at also prepared a financial basis (Budget Circular).
14. And former beneficiaries in the case of recognition bonds.
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The case of Assistance Programmes is a complex one as there 
was more than one institution behind them. The resources for 
financing assistance programmes were originally registered in the 
Treasury special account for subsidies. However, these resources 
were managed by the Superintendency of Social Security but in 
contrast to other cases, the resources were not incorporated into 
the Superintendency or Ministerial Budget. Nevertheless, the 
municipalities and the SSS were the institutions that finally 
provide the payments to the beneficiaries.
As a result of the different institutions associated with 
the assistance programmes the formulation of its budget did not 
seem to be a very important activity. The budget was usually 
prepared by the Superintendency of Social Security using the 
municipal information concerning the total number of subsidies 
paid in the previous year. However, the final estimates were 
decided upon by the Budget Office as these expenditures were 
under their direct jurisdiction. In 1987, the Budget Office 
imposed regional ceilings on the number of subsidies to be paid; 
the consequences of these changes are discussed bellow.
Authorization
The authorization phase followed the pattern of the national 
budget. Therefore, each pension fund depend upon the formal 
approval of the national budget.
Implementation
The budget execution did not present important problems to 
the agencies. The budget office followed the old system of 
a l l o c a t i n g  m o n t h l y  o n e - t w e 1vth of the total approved 
expenditures.
The only changes that occured in the implementation phase 
were related to special inflation adjustments decreed by the 
executive. These additions were transfered directly to each of 
the agencies.
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Evaluation
There was no evaluation phase of the social security budget 
apart from the financial auditing of the Comptroller.
After this summarised review of the social security budget 
it is important to dedicate some time to discussing some recent 
developments in the allocation of Assistance Programmes. In 1987, 
the Ministry of Finance initiated the "regionalization” of the 
Assistance Pension and Family Allowances for low income families
. Under this new scheme the ministry fixed the number of 
pensions and family allowances to be paid in each region 
according to the previous year's allocations (^^). Therefore, 
from 1987 onwards the Ministry of Finance transfered the 
resources to each region in accordance to the maximum number of 
pensions or family allowances to be paid. This was a departure 
from the original aims of these programmes as they were supposed 
to benefit all the people who had applied and fulfilled the 
defined requirements. The ministry stated that through this new 
system the regions were going to have freedom to allocate their 
resources according to their own needs.
In addition to the previous changes the Ministry of Finance 
introduced a "saving” scheme within the regional allocations for 
these programmes. According to this new procedure, the savings 
produced through an assitance pension not to be continued or a 
beneficiary no longer fulfilling the requirements could be 
transfered to the regional investment fund to be spent according 
to the regional priorities. The other half of these "savings” 
were to be returned to the Ministry of Finance.
Planning
Planning took place in two separate areas: labour and social 
security. Regarding the first one, the Undersecretary of Labour 
was in charge of analysing and reviewing the developments of
15. This was a result of a study commissioned under ministerial tasks.
16. This means, that the total nunber of subsidies allocated in 1986 were automatically defined as the 
maximun authorised.
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labour legislation. At the same time the Directorate of Labour 
supervised the fulfilment of labour legislation. The regional 
ministerial branches (SEREMIS) were also dedicated to these 
activities. Due to the nature of these active vities, they did not 
involve the management of important financial resources.
In relation to social security, the Superintendency of 
Social Security and the National Institute for Social Security 
Normalization were involved in the financial planning to meet 
their committments. However, due to the fact that pension funds 
were gradually being phaed out there was not much attraction in 
planning and studyng new policies. This fact was endorsed by a 
superintendency officer, claiming that their planning horizon 
covered only one year.
In the case of assistance programmes, the Superintendency of 
Social Security acted only as a bank transfering the resources to 
municipalities to provide the benefits. However, the 
administration and selection procedures were defined by the 
Ministry of Interior. Therefore, in this area we found a mishmash 
of resource allocation and the administration of resources.
To conclude this section, we describe the most important 
weaknesses and strenghts of the system. As in many other sectors, 
we found a case of "unaware incrementalism" in which most 
ministerial bureaucracy was obliged to follow a wide range of 
procedures for formulating its budget which were in the end 
overlooked by the Budget Office as these procedures were repeated 
year after year. Moreover, most of the traditionally budgeted 
items represented a tiny proportion of the sectoral expenditures.
Another problem was found in the mixture variety of 
institutions responsible for assistance programmes. The financial 
resources were formally allocated to the Treasury Subsidies 
Programme, but they were practically administrated by the 
Superintendency of Social Security. However, they were in the end 
provided through municipalities. This vague definition of 
responsibilities produced overlap in decision making and a lack 
of accountability. It is an obvious necessity to introduce some
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coordination within these institutions which operated these 
programmes, ideally creating a single institution responsible the 
entire area.
It is difficult to summarize the situation of pension funds. 
As they have been gradually phased out not many improvements can 
have been expected to take place. However, it can be mentioned 
that the complex network of transfers and the variety of funds 
amongst them makes very difficult the possibility of obtaining 
accurate estimates of the real expenditures of each of them.
Finally, we consider the "regionalization" of assistance 
programmes as a positive step toward regional discretional power 
at a regional level. However, this new procedure seems to be an 
alternative way of reducing social expenditures rather than 
effectivelly "allowing regions to allocate resources according to 
their own needs". In fact similar steps have been taken in other 
social ministries which have also resulted in reducing 
expenditures. Nevertheless, as this procedure has been recently 
implemented in this sector its results remain to be seen.
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8.2.E. Discretionary Powers Over Public Resources and Decisions
In this section we discuss the discretion or autonomy of the 
regions in managing and deciding the social programmes undertaken 
within its territory. In Table 8.3. we have further summarised 
the institutional headings of the previous section: ministerial 
bureaucracy, pension funds and assistance programmes. Each of 
these institutional aggregations combined agencies with very 
similar characteristics (^^) .
E.l. Regulation
The definition of the agencies tasks or functions occured at 
a central level for all the institutions under the ministerial 
bureaucracy. Assistance programmes were highly dependent on 
central decisions as they were not an institution but a fund that 
received a financial transfer or subsidies that were managed by 
a group of institutions.
Pension funds have been defined as delegated institutions 
for the effects of government regulation. Although most public 
and semi-public pension funds were ultimately accountable to the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Security they also were supposed to 
respond to their beneficiaries and were created as a result of 
them. At the same time the mere fact that its directors were 
appointed by the President of the Republic gave them a different 
stand to other ministerial institutions. All these features 
allowed them an autonomy in relation to the source of authority 
and control. In relation to the source of authority and control 
of the other institutional aggregations, the ministerial agencies 
were structured in the same way as most other social sectors' 
bureaucracies. Central headquarters had regional agencies which 
were accountable to the central headquarter and to the regional 
governor. Therefore, they have a shared regulation. Assistance 
programmes were slightly more centralized since their authority 
relied on the ministry's capacity to encourage or constrain their 
coverage.
17. In the case of pension funds and assistance progranmes the institutional organization was nearly 
identical.
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1 TABLE 8.3.
I DISCRETIONARY POWERS OVER RESOURCES AND DECISIONS IN SOCIAL SECURITY j
1 Govt. Intervention Forms Ministry Pension Funds Assistance ( TOTAL j
Programmes 1 1
(REGULATION 1 1 
1 1
(Who Defines Tasks Centre Delegated Centre
1 1 
(Centre-Delegat.(
(Source of Authority Shared Delegated Centre (Centre-Delegat.(
(Control Shared Delegated Shared (Shared’Delegat.( 
1
(FINANCE CMF 99% CMF 100% SPF 100%
1 1 
( CMF 86% (
BF 1% ( SPF 14% (
( BF 0% ( 
1 1
(PRODUCTION
1 1 
1 1 
1 1
(Personnel Centre Centre Shared
1 1 
( Shared (
(Field Administration 2 1 3 1 2 1
(Levels 1 1
NOTE: See text for explanations
FINANCE: CMP Centrally Managed Finance 
SPF Specific Purpose Fund 
BF Block Fund
PRODUCTION: Levels of Field Administration
1 Central
2 Regional
3 Municipal
E.2. Finance
In terms of the forms of financing the different sectoral 
activities, we found only two alternatives; centrally managed 
finances and specific purpose funds. A minute proportion of the 
funds were considered as block funds but they accounted for 0.01% 
of the sectoral budget.
I
Centrally managed finance accounted for 86% of total 
expenditures in social security and assistance programmes. 
Although the ministerial agencies enjoy certain amounts of 
discretion in terms of their regulation powers, their finances 
were totallly determined by the central allocations of the 
ministry.
Pension funds were also found to be centrally financed 
despite being defined as delegated institutions. As a result of
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the weak financial situation of the funds, due to their original 
insolvency and the changes introduced after 1981, the pension 
funds became increasingly dependant on the budget allocations of 
the Ministry of Finance. Our estimates suggest that approximately 
two thirds of the pension funds* expenditures stemmed from 
Treasury transfers. In fact, most negotiations of pension funds* 
levels and benefits (in the **old** system) between pensioners and 
trade unions were with representatives of the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Security and the Ministry of Finance simultaneaously. 
Pension funds themselves had neither the power nor the resources 
to finance additional benefits from their own sources.
This classification of pension funds as centrally managed 
finances produced an instantaneous shift to an overall 
increasingly centralized pattern of finances in this sector. 
Moreover, as pension funds accounted for more than a quarter of 
total social expenditures, this also produced a significant 
effect in the classification of all social expenditures.
Assistance programmes were found to match the features of 
specific purpose funds. These resources were transfered to a 
region for a single pre-defined objective of which the central 
level had defined the elegibility criteria and the number of 
beneficiaries. In this case, the regional discretion consisted of 
selecting the individual beneficiaries according to the central 
rules (IB).
18. According to a new legislation introduced in 1987, the “savings” brought about through paying fewer 
pensions or family allowances, due to death or to people no longer qualifying as “poor”, can be spent 
according to a regional decision. These can be considered as regionally managed finance. However, there is 
no reference data about the occurrence of such savings.
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E .3. Production
Although most ministerial and pension funds personnel were 
recruited and managed centrally, the bureaucrats who provided and 
deliver the assistance programmes were mostly organized on a 
local basis. Thus an overall view of the personnel involved in 
social security and assistance programmes would correspond to a 
shared organization in which both the centre and the local level 
have influence in personnel decisions.
Regarding the levels of field administration, it can be said 
that this sector had fewer levels than the other sectors 
reviewed. This was a clear result of the important presence of 
pension funds which functioned as national institutions with no 
regional or local presence.
In sum, we found that social security and assitance 
programmes followed a more centralized model, especially in the 
case of ministerial bureaucracy and assitance programmes. This 
occured despite the fact that pension funds were defined as 
delegated institutions in terms of regulatory powers, the reality 
being that they were centrally financed and their services were 
carried out for the most part on a central level as well.
376
8.2.F. Summary and Conclusions: Organization and Finance of 
Social Security in Chile
To begin this summary it is important to remember that for 
the first time we are dealing with a social sector which involved 
not a single ministerial framework. Labour, social security and 
assistance programmes are separate activities which are 
conventionally presented together, but in practical terms their 
organization and finances are not necessarily planned and 
designed as a whole.
The sector has experienced an important restructuring since 
1975. The first reforms attempted to redress a number of the 
inequities of the old social security system. This implied the 
unification of most non-pensionable benefits (family allowances, 
unemployment subsidies and sickness benefits). This was achieved 
by transforming these benefits into a state subsidy rather than a 
a contributory benefit; in this way the Ministry of Finance 
acquired has the power to set the benefit levels. At the same 
time contribution rates and retirement age were also unified.
However, the most important reform was the creation of 
private pension funds (AFPs) in 1981. These new private schemes 
were based on the individual capitalization of workers* 
contributions instead of the old pay-as-you-go scheme. The 
introduction of this new scheme caused important additional 
expenditures for the public budget. The state became responsible 
for financing the deficit created in the old pension funds as 
most of the active workers shifted to the new system and ceased 
contributing to pay the pensions of passive or retired workers. 
At the same time, the state also paid a "recognition bond" to 
those workers shifting to the new system as a way of recognising 
their contributions to the old system.
The unification of social security benefits was also 
achieved through the creation of assistance programmes. These 
programmes sought to provide the same type of social security 
benefits to the non insured population, which was around 30% of 
the working force in 1987. The assistance programmes included
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family allowances, assistance pensions and special employment 
programmes. These programmes were poverty-targeted and were 
designed as a way to help families in most need.
The total sectoral expenditures showed a countercyclical 
pattern during the 1980's. This was basically due to the creation 
of assistance programmes which followed this pattern by 
definition. In fact shortly after 1984, the special employment 
programmes began to be reduced as a result of the improved 
economic situation of the country.
Regarding the budgeting and planning procedures of the 
sector, we found that the ministerial bureaucracy and pension 
funds followed an incrementalist approach taking account of only 
marginal additions. In contrast to previous cases, in the case of 
pension funds we do found a clear reason to approach budgeting 
incrementally as their functions and historical expenditures are 
generally justified over time; therefore, it is necessary to 
explain only the marginal annual changes.
Assitance programmes initially followed the same style of 
incremental budgeting, but after ceilings were imposed by the 
Ministry of Finance, these programmes changed to a style of fixed 
budget in which justifications were almost irrelevant. In this 
regard, we consider that the "regionalization" of assistance 
programmes was related more to a cut in social expenditures 
rather than a real increase in the discretionary powers over 
these resources. The regional capacity to manage these resources 
remained the same, but they had now to face limited resources and 
waiting lists. Through this procedure the centre transferred to 
the regions its own uncertainty due to the cuts or stagnation of 
expenditures.
Although the Ministry of Labour had important planning 
agencies, they were mostly concerned with the implementation and 
evolution of labour policies rather than with pension funds. 
Instead the Superintendency of Private Pension Funds became an 
important institution in regulating the developments of all 
private pension funds. As a result of the 1981 reforms, the 
pension funds had been on a dissolution phase, therefore the only
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planning activities to have been carried out in this area were 
related to the financial aspects for the payment of old age 
pensions. There were no innovations to test or plan here. In this 
form the Ministry of Labour and Social Security adopted the role 
of other social sectors related more to regulation and 
normalization of the services provided through private agencies 
(AFPs in this case) rather than planning the provision or 
production of the services.
In relation to assistance programmes, we found that none of 
the different institutions in charge of their finance and 
delivery took a leading role in planning the developments of 
these programmes. Most changes introduced here were a result of 
Ministry of Finance decisions to cut expenditures or to enhance 
certain groups of beneficiaries but these decisions did not take 
account of the local instances of delivery. In this regard, we 
believe there is an urgent necessity to consolidate these 
programmes under a single agency which manages its budget and 
plans its developments.
The agencies' discretionary powers for the management of 
public resources and decisions were found to be more constrained 
than in other sectors. This conclusion was reached despite the 
fact that pension funds were defined as delegated institutions, 
i.e., as having semi-autonomus status. The bulk of the sectoral 
resources were centrally managed as were their regulatory powers.
Overall, we conclude that decentralization has not proceed«c/ 
in Social Security and Assistance Programmes. The only steps 
pointed in this direction are understood more as a
restriction in social security expenditures than an actual 
transfer of resources to lower governmental tiers. At the same 
time, it is not realistic to expect dramatic improvements along 
these lines, as pension funds were created on a national 
centralized structure. However, the demographic extinction of 
pension funds may allow a more decentralized social security 
system to be established.
19. (In the case of assitance programmes).
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8.3. REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMMES
This section is aimed to review the redistributive impact of 
social security expenditures and assitance programmes. In other 
words, we attempt to estimate the proportion of the total 
sectoral expenditures that have reached the lower 3 0% of the 
population.
As has been described in an earlier section, the 
redistributive effects of the Chilean Social Security system has 
been an important issue since the mid 1950*s. One of the first 
studies of this area estimated that 41% of the social security 
costs were paid by the non-insured through taxes and employers 
contributions, most of which were transfered to the consumer 
through higher prices (^O). The Prat commission also detected a 
considerable transfer of costs among groups of insured so that 
white collars workers and civil servants profited at the expense 
of blue collars workers (^^). These and other studies led Mesa 
Lago (1978, 55) to conclude that **the cost of Social Security is 
increasingly being paid by the non-insured, also among the 
insured, revenue from the non-insured goes increasingly to those 
groups which, because of their higher income and fewer insured, 
need it least**.
Although social security programmes had been created with a 
clear redistributive aim they were not poverty-targeted as 
assistance programmes are. However, as has been explained in 
previous chapters, poverty-targeting was an official aim which 
encompassed all social expenditures. Therefore, we test to what 
extent social security and assistance programmes are benefiting 
the lower 30% of the population.
The valuation of the state transfers in social security and 
assistance programmes was approached in a straight forward 
manner. Every person interviewed in the CASEN survey was asked
20. Klein and Saks mission quoted in Mesa Lago (1978) op.cit.
21. Prat Conmission quoted in Mesa Lago (1978) op.cit.
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about their monthly income and the sources of it. Regarding this 
last question the respondants were asked to specify if it was 
salary or work income, rents, assets revenue, pensions, or 
assistance programmes.
Table 8.4. shows the estimates of direct social expenditures 
as a proportion of total public expenditures on social security 
and assistance programmes. For 1985, direct social expenditures 
captured almost 74% of total public expenditures in the sector. 
This proportion was estimated after deducting the contributions 
paid by the affiliated to pension funds and the administrative 
costs. In sum, this means that for 1985 our analysis of the 
redistributive effects of social expenditures is based upon a 
high proportion of total expenditures. However, in the case of 
1987, there was no information about social security expenditures 
and the analysis is therefore constrained to assistance 
programmes exclusively. In this case, these programmes were 
totally financed from the Treasury and there were no 
contributions for financing them. Direct expenditures on 
assistance programmes captured almost 80% of total public 
expenditures on these programmes.
TABLE 8.4.
ESTIMATES OF DIRECT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES IN SOCIAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES 
(Millions of 1987 $)
1985 1987<*)
a) Total public expenditure on Social 426,140 40,944
Security and Assitance Programmes
- Contributions paid 97,998
b) Fiscal social expenditure on Social 328,142 40,944
Security and Assitance Programmes
* Administration costs 14,372 8,407
c) Direct social expenditure on Social 313,770 32,537
Security and Assitance Programmes
c) / a) X 73.6 79.5
(*) See text for explanations
Author calculations based on:
Table 8.2.
Ley de Presupuestos del Sector Publico 1985 *1987
Haindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
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Table 8.5. gives an outlook of the redistributive effects of 
social security and assistance programmes. Overall, we found that 
for 1985, sectoral expenditures were regressive as the lower 30% 
of the population captured only 23% of the total public 
expenditures. This outcome was heavely influenced by the 
regressivity of pension (social security) expenditures in which 
the lower 30% captured only 13% of the total expenditures on that 
programme. The considerable degree of progressiveness observed in 
assistance programmes was not enough to offset the pattern of 
social security expenditures as these were more than four times 
greater than the former.
I TABLE 8.5 
1 REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
1 (Millions of
AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES EXPENDITURES! 
1987 $) 1
Total Share of 
Direct Exps.Bottom 30%
X jTYPE OF PROGRAMME j
I 1985 Pensions 254,805 33,772 13.3 (Regressive j
Sp.Employ.Prgs. 28,376 20,601 72.6 (Very Progressive j
SU F 10,513 7,044 67.0 (Very Progressive j
PAS IS 20,076 10,841 54.0 (Progressive (
Sub-Tot.Assis.Prgs 58,965 38,486 65.3 (Very Progressive (
TOTAL 313,770 72,257 23.0 (Regressive (
I 1987 Sp.Employ.Prgs. 10,407 6,910 66.4 (Very Progressive (
SU F 7,337 5,297 72.2 (Very Progressive (
PAS IS 14,793 9,231 62.4 (Progressive (
Sub-Tot.Assis.Prgs. 32,537 21,438 65.9 (Very Progressive (
Author calculations based on:
Table 8.2.
Kaindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
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The information for 1987 allowed us only to make comparisons 
regarding the redistributive effects of assistance programmes. It 
is possible to note that the categories were maintained; Special 
Employment Programmes and Family Allowances for low income 
families were both categorized as very progressive. Overall, 
assistance programmes were classified as very progressive 
programmes in both years. The marginal gains in progressiveness 
between 1985 and 1987 were achieved through improvements in 
family allowances and assistance pensions. As a reminder these 
two programmes experienced a reformulation in 1987, in which the 
central level defined regional ceilings in the number of 
subsidies to be awarded per region.
In sum, despite the fact that assistance programmes were 
found to be very progressive, the total effect of social security 
and assistance programmes was found to be regressive. This means 
that these programmes are unable to improve the income 
distribution, i.e. to distribute the benefits more equally. In 
this sense the new private pension schemes (AFPs) were certainly 
not designed to make the income distribution more even, but they 
have at least contributed to decrease the cross regressive 
subsidies between occupational groups which occured in the past.
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8.4 REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF EXPENDITURES
8.4.A. Data Constraints and Methodology
This section explains the steps taken for producing the 
estimates of the regional expenditures in Social Security and 
Assistance Programmes. According to the information provided in 
Table 8.6., for the three years under analysis 99% of the 
sectoral expenditures were allocated according to Criterion A. 
This criterion represents a good accuracy level. Although the 
original data was not presented in terms of regional budgets, it 
was possible to allocate them in regional terms using alternative 
sources.
Ministry:
The ministerial bureaucracy concentrates all ministerial agencies 
which plan and implement policies related to the labour force. 
There was no specific information to allocate these expenditures. 
Therefore, they were allocated according to the regional 
distribution of the labour force. This corresponds to an indirect 
criterion (Criterion D).
Pension Funds:
In the case of pension funds, we are faced with a very similar 
situation to that of social welfare provisions in the National 
Fund of Health (FONASA). Each pension fund sent a monthly report 
to the Superintendency of Social Security describing the number 
of pensions paid, types of pensions (there are five types of 
pensions) and the amount of resources involved in these payments. 
This information was provided on a regional basis. However, as in 
the case of FONASA, the Super intendency did not compile annualy 
this information at a regional level. Therefore, as the 
calculation of the annual average is a very cumbersone process 
which would not have contributed greatly to the general accuracy 
of the final outcomes, we selected a representative month.
After studyng the monthly evolution of the total number of 
pensions paid and the amounts of resources involved, it was 
possible to conclude that only minor seasonal variations 
occurred. Therefore, we chose July as the representative month,
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as in the case of FONASA. The objective here was to obtain the 
regional structure of social security expenditures and use that 
structure to allocate the Comptroller’s estimates of the total 
annual expenditures on this item (22).
In sum, in the case of pension funds, we have a regional 
allocation of expenditures that is in accordance to criterion A, 
since these funds are based on original information with a clear 
"in and for" specification.
Assistance Programmes:
The National Institute of Statistics and the Social Insurance 
Service (SSS) has compiled statistics about the number of 
subsidies paid in assistance programmes per region. With this 
information and estimations of the unitary costs of each subsidy 
or the payment levels involved (23), we were able to estimate the 
regional structure of the expenditures on assitance programmes 
for each of the three years under analysis. This regional 
structure was later used to allocate the Comptroller annual 
estimates of expenditures on these programmes. These estimations 
were considered under criterion A.
22. An additional caveat must be introduced here in relation to family allowances and recognition bonds paid 
through pension funds. The pension funds did not report the regional distribution of these payments. 
Moreover, most were paid through private compensation funds. Therefore, these payments, which accounted for 
9% of pension funds' expenditures, were allocated according to the regional distribution of pension funds' 
expenditures.
23. This information was supplied by the SSS.
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The final estimates of the regional sectoral expenditures 
are presented in Tables 8.7. to 8.9. As has been done in earlier 
chapters the figures are presented for different alternatives:
i) assistance programmes' expenditures, ii) ministerial and 
social security expenditures (pension funds) and iii) Total 
expenditures on Ministerial bureaucracy, assitance programmes and 
social security.
1 TABLE 8.6.
(CRITERIA OF REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF 
1 ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES
SOCIAL SECURITY AND j
1 1985 Ministry Pen.Funds Ass.Progs. TOTAL j
jCrit. A 100 1 0 0 9 9  j
jCrit. B
jCrit. C 100 1 j
jCrit. D
(TOTAL 100 100 1 0 0 1 0 0  (
(% Min. Budget 1 83 17 1 0 0  (
( 1986 Ministry Pen.Funds Ass.Progs. TOTAL j
(Crit. A 100 1 0 0 99 [
(Crit. B
(Crit. C 100 1 (
(Crit. D
(TOTAL 100 100 1 0 0 1 0 0  (
(% Min. Budget 1 86 14 1 0 0  j
( 1987 Ministry Pen.Funds Ass.Progs. TOTAL j
(Crit. A 100 1 0 0 9 9  j
(Crit. B
(Crit. C 100 1 j
(Crit. D
(TOTAL 100 100 1 0 0 1 0 0  (
(X Min. Budget 1 88 11 1 0 0  j
NOTE: See text for explanations
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8.4.B. Regional Expenditures and Regional Needs.
This section discusses the relationship between regional 
expenditures on the sector and regional needs. To tackle this 
task it is necessary to define some indicators of sectoral needs.
In earlier chapters, we discussed the difficulties related 
to defining a specific sectoral indicator of need. It is 
necessary to recall this issue again, specifically in this 
sector, as social security and assistance programmes can embrace 
more than one dimension of need. At the same time, as in other 
sectors, we are also constrained by the indicators available.
The indicators selected were the following:
Affiliation: This indicator reflects the proportion of the labour 
force affiliated to a social security scheme, either 
a pension fund in the old system or AFP.
Contributing: This indicator presents a more restrictive 
definition in comparision to the previous one. In 
this case, we computed the proportion of the labour 
force who contributed (no arrears) to a social 
security scheme.
For example, in 1987 more than 76% of the labour 
force was affiliated to a pension scheme; however, 
only 48% were up to date in their contributions.
Unemployment: The unemployment rate was obtained from the
National Institute of Statistics sample surveys.
Retirement: This indicator was estimated as the proportion of
population above 65 years old in relation to total 
population. This indicator represented the overall 
need for pensions.
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EAP: This was the proportion of Economically Active population in 
relation to total regional population.
AFP: This was the proportion of the working force affiliated to
a private pension fund (AFP).
In addition to the sector specific indicators, we also 
included a group of indicators which helped to test the 
hypotheses described in Chapter 3. These indicators are:
GDP: Regional GDP per capita 
INCO: Regional average income 
URBN: % urban population
URBZ: % Population living in cities with more than 20,000 
inhabitants.
Finally, in relation to expenditure indicators, we defined 
three alternative indicators which showed the different 
dimensions of social securtity and assistance programmes .
EXSS: Included the ministerial expenditures on the central 
bureaucracy and social security expenditures.
EXAP: Included only the regional allocation of 
assistance programmes expenditures.
EXMSS: Included ministerial, social security and 
assistance programmes expenditures.
The indicators described are presented on Tables 8.7. to 
8.9. The tables also show their average, standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation.
24. All these indicators are presented in per capita terms.
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TABLE 8.7.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES INDICATORS - 1985
(Index Total=100)
AFIL CONT UNEM RET I EAP AFP GDP INCO URBN URBZ EXSS EXMSS EXAP
Tarapaca 130.9 138.2 108.8 72.8 95.9 123.7 136.5 85.7 113.3 127.3 98.1 93.0 67.9
Antofagasta 120.1 124.7 94.2 76.8 92.0 128.1 200.3 83.2 118.5 119.9 85.2 86.7 93.8
Atacama 128.4 129.5 61.2 81.1 88.2 128.2 148.7 82.8 110.3 83.9 60.9 68.1 103.3
Coquimbo 91.7 88.1 108.0 106.5 85.2 80.4 61.1 69.0 90.2 63.7 68.4 78.5 128.4
Valparaiso 95.0 93.1 101.9 116.2 103.5 91.9 99.4 90.8 109.3 101.4 157.8 149.2 107.6
O'higgins 100.3 98.7 60.5 104.5 94.1 101.0 122.9 79.4 78.9 43.1 86.1 83.2 68.7
Maule 86.1 84.2 86.3 102.6 94.2 79.2 65.7 83.3 68.8 57.4 64.7 69.5 92.6
B i oB i 0 93.8 94.2 80.7 95.9 89.6 92.3 79.9 88.6 92.5 81.6 86.0 89.4 105.9
Araucania 72.7 68.0 57.5 113.5 87.0 67.1 55.6 94.3 69.6 41.3 66.6 75.4 118.5
Los Lagos 86.1 83.1 54.8 108.3 89.9 82.9 66.9 98.2 71.5 46.0 61.0 78.3 163.3
Aysen 95.2 89.4 38.0 70.0 110.2 81.5 81.5 93.8 95.8 63.8 43.6 60.7 143.6
Magallanes 125.2 128.7 73.3 92.6 118.3 114.8 260.1 117.5 110.8 105.8 100.1 95.8 73.7
Metropol. 106.4 107.7 125.7 96.7 110.3 110.9 110.0 117.0 116.0 135.5 115.9 110.9 86.3
INDEX 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
COUNTRY TOTAL 68.1 44.2 12.0 5.8 33.2 32.9 29406 42788 83.3 71.4 29113 35155 5877
AVG 69.7 45.1 9.7 5.6 32.1 32.4 33673.2 38952.8 79.8 58.8 24512 30792 6120
STD 12.0 9.2 3.0 0.9 3.3 6.5 17068.2 5681.6 14.9 22.6 8290.7 7680.2 1624.8
COEF.VAR. 17.2 20.4 30.9 15.7 10.4 20.1 50.7 14.6 18.7 38.5 33.8 24.9 26.5
AFIL % workers afilisted to pension scheme (Afil./work force)
CONT % Workers contributing to pension scheme
UNEM Unemployment rate
RET I % Pop. above 65 years (pop.65+/tot.pop)
PART % Participation in work force (Work force/Tot. Pop.)
AFP % Workers contributing to AFPs in relation to work force
GDP GDP per capita
INCO Average regional income
URBN % urban population
URBZ % pop. living in cities above 20,000
EXSS Public expenditures in Social security
EXMSS Public expenditures in Mins. Labour, Soc.Sec. and Assistance Progs.
EXAP Public Expenditures on Assistance Programmes
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TABLE 8.8.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES INDICATORS
(Index Total>100)
1986
AFIL CONT UNEM RETI EAP AFP GDP INCO URBN URBZ EXSS EXMSS EXAP
Tarapaca 107.4 111.8 107.2 74.1 112.3 123.1 133.7 83.8 113.0 126.9 101.5 96.5 64.2
Antofagasta 111.0 115.3 89.0 78.3 99.0 129.4 190.5 78.2 118.1 120.2 87.6 87.3 84.5
Atacama 120.0 118.1 67.0 81.3 93.5 126.8 142.0 78.9 110.3 84.0 54.1 59.1 88.6
Coquimbo 88.3 84.2 87.8 106.8 89.5 82.7 61.3 68.5 90.1 63.9 64.3 73.3 129.5
Valparaiso 97.5 93.6 139.0 115.3 98.3 90.2 100.5 92.1 109.2 100.9 164.2 157.3 116.5
O'higgins 93.7 91.5 65.7 104.6 100.8 99.0 122.1 78.2 79.2 43.3 64.5 65.6 70.8
Maule 79.7 76.5 74.9 101.5 99.8 78.2 65.8 83.4 69.3 57.4 58.7 64.1 96.7
BioBio 92.3 92.1 72.0 96.0 91.3 92.8 77.6 85.3 92.5 81.7 81.3 84.0 100.6
Araucania 69.8 65.1 80.1 114.1 91.1 67.7 55.2 92.4 69.3 41.5 54.8 64.0 120.7
Los Lagos 83.5 78.2 56.6 108.2 92.3 83.2 68.1 99.2 71.9 46.1 49.5 61.8 138.3
Ays en 92.3 88.1 31.3 70.8 115.4 85.8 81.1 92.6 96.1 64.0 35.5 44.5 97.9
Magallanes 111.9 113.9 44.4 93.3 125.7 114.7 252.7 113.8 110.6 105.8 180.8 162.7 50.1
Metropol. 112.2 115.3 121.6 96.7 105.7 111.2 111.7 119.1 115.8 136.5 121.2 117.1 92.0
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
COUNTRY TOTAL 71.9 46.2 8.8 5.9 34.6 37.1 30553 45227 83.6 70.9 26677 31105 4224
AVG 69.7 44.2 7.0 5.6 35.0 36.7 34366.0 40545.3 80.1 58.5 22942 27211 4062
STD 10.2 7.8 2.5 0.8 3.6 7.2 16854.4 6251.3 14.8 22.5 11500.1 11113.4 1042.7
COEF.VAR. 14.7 17.6 36.1 15.1 10.4 19.6 49.0 15.4 18.5 38.4 50.1 40.8 25.7
AFIL % workers afilisted to pension scheme (Afil./work force)
CONT % Workers contributing to pension scheme
UNEM Unemployment rate
RETI X Pop. above 65 years (pop.65+/tot.pop)
PART % Participation in work force (Work force/Tot. Pop.)
AFP % Workers contributing to AFPs in relation to work force
GDP GDP per capita
INCO Average regional income
URBN % urban population
URBZ % pop. living in cities above 20,000
EXSS Public expenditures in Social security
EXMSS Public expenditures in Mins. Labour, Soc.Sec. and Assistance Progs.
EXAP Public Expenditures on Assistance Programmes
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TABLE 8.9.
SOCIAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES INDICATORS
(Index Total=100)
1987
AFIL CONT UNEM RETI EAP AFP GDP INCO URBN URBZ EXSS EXMSS EXPA I
1Tarapaca 111.6 116.9 94.7 74.4 109.3 121.1 132.0 104.0 112.9 126.8 99.6 95.1 58.0 1
[Antofagasta 117.1 120.4 118.7 79.5 96.2 126.0 191.6 96.6 117.8 120.7 88.5 87.2 76.6 i
[Atacama 114.5 113.0 64.9 82.3 100.4 126.5 143.4 98.8 110.2 83.9 55.6 57.8 71.5 1
[Coquimbo 85.5 82.0 102.0 106.5 94.2 84.5 61.4 75.3 90.3 64.3 66.9 71.7 107.7 1
[Valparaiso 105.3 102.4 88.0 115.2 92.8 90.4 100.5 95.1 109.0 100.5 164.1 158.2 117.1 [
[O'higgins 93.7 91.9 60.7 104.8 102.4 99.7 123.0 79.8 79.4 43.7 67.5 68.0 69.4 1
[Maule 81.7 78.9 68.0 100.9 98.6 79.4 65.9 90.9 69.4 57.3 59.9 64.2 95.0 1
[BioBio 89.3 89.0 111.3 96.3 96.1 93.1 78.2 81.6 92.6 81.9 84.3 85.9 97.8 1
[Araucania 71.9 66.1 71.6 113.7 89.1 65.8 55.4 89.9 69.4 41.9 56.3 63.4 117.1 1
[Los Lagos 87.2 82.5 44.8 108.6 92.8 84.3 68.7 76.3 72.0 46.2 52.1 61.2 130.3 1
[Aysen 86.3 77.7 32.1 70.8 122.0 82.9 80.8 127.8 96.6 64.6 32.2 38.3 79.2 1
[Magallanes 111.3 114.0 58.4 93.1 124.5 112.6 250.2 116.6 110.5 106.0 231.2 208.0 32.4 1
[Metropol. 109.8 112.6 124.8 96.6 105.3 111.2 111.1 118.0 115.6 140.0 116.9 114.9 99.9 [
[TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1
[TOTAL 76.4 48.4 7.9 5.9 34.7 41.7 31766 47803 83.8 70.4 25656 29176 3266 1
[AVG 74.4 46.5 6.3 5.6 35.3 41.0 35725.7 45990.0 80.3 58.4 23191 26345 2894 [
[STD 10.9 8.4 2.2 0.8 3.7 7.8 17386.6 7652.4 14.8 22.6 13375.1 13047.1 857.9 [
[COEF.VAR. 14.6 18.1 34.8 14.9 10.4 19.1 48.7 16.6 18.4 38.7 57.7 49.5 29.6 1
AFIL % workers afilisted to pension scheme (Afil./work force) 
CONT % Workers contributing to pension scheme 
UNEM Unemployment rate
RETI % Pop. above 65 years (pop.65+/tot.pop)
PART X Participation in work force (Work force/Tot. Pop.)
AFP % Workers contributing to AFPs in relation to work force
GDP GDP per capita
INCO Average regional income
URBN % urban population
URBZ % pop. living in cities above 20,000
EXSS Public expenditures in Social security
EXAP Public Expenditures on Assistance Programmes
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B.l. Preliminary Data Analysis
In this section and in the two sections to follow, we 
concentrate on discusing and testing the hypotheses presented in 
chapter 3. These hypotheses are related to the consequences of 
the regional allocation of social expenditures.
In Tables 8.7. to 8.9. it is possible to observe that social 
security expenditures (EXSS) and total sectoral expenditures 
(EXMSS) showed a very similar regional pattern. For the three 
years under analysis the Valparaiso, Magallanes and Metropolitan 
regions showed above average levels in sectoral expenditures. 
This was related to the regional pattern of GDP per capita in 
which the same three regions and the more urbanized regions 
showed above average levels. Therefore, we observed some 
positive links between regional sectoral expenditures and regional 
well being, (Hypothesis 2). In the case of assistance programmes 
expenditures, we found an almost opposite pattern. In this case 
Coquimbo, BioBio, Araucania and Los Lagos all showed above 
average levels, all of which are intermediate or rural regions 
with lower GDP per capita. The exception to this case was 
Valparaiso, which also ranked high in total sectoral 
expenditures. However, assistance programmes accounted for a 
small proportion of total expenditures (11 to 17% of total 
sectoral expenditures), therefore, they were not sufficient 
contradiction of the change the evidence supporting the 
occurrence of hypothesis 2.
The data also showed that total sectoral expenditures were 
related to urbanization. Three of the five regions with above 
average levels on this indicator were the regions with higher 
total expenditures per capita. This fact provided some initial 
evidence for supporting hypothesis 3, which states that social 
expenditures were concentrated on more urbanized regions.
In relation to other sectoral indicators it is possible to 
note that affiliation, contribution and AFP all showed a similar 
regional pattern. Urban regions provided above average levels of 
social security coverage in any of the three alternative 
measures. The regional patterns included the northen mining
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regions and the regions whose main activities were services. This 
coincides with the historical fact that these two areas of 
economic activity have enjoyed the greatest levels of protection. 
This finding was consistent with similar outcomes obtained by 
Mesa Lago (1978) in the early sixties. In fact there seemed to be 
a relation between larger sizes of regional economically active 
population and better social security coverage.
It is difficult to analyse the relationship between sectoral 
expenditures and basic needs with the information provided in 
Tables 8.7. to 8.9. Unemployment appeared to be higher in urban 
regions, which coincides with higher allocations of social 
security expenditures. Therefore, there is initial evidence to 
suggest that sectoral expenditures were related to one dimension 
of need in this area.
The sectoral expenditures showed an important level of 
interregional disparities. This was especially clear in the cases 
of ministerial and social security expenditures (EXSS). In 
contrast, expenditures on assistance programmes showed a lower 
level of interregional disparities. This situation can be 
explained by the fact that pension funds were above 83% of the 
sectoral expenditures. This means that regional allocations of 
sectoral expenditures were heavily influenced by pension 
expenditures. Therefore, the regions with economic sectors highly 
protected through out the past (^^) were still receiving higher 
allocations per capita. This was clearly the case with the oil 
industry, which is concentrated in Magallanes which and has 
traditionally enjoyed better pension benefits.
In sum, the preliminary data analysis has provided an 
indication that the richest regions obtained higher levels of 
social expenditures per capita (hypothesis 2) and that social 
expenditures were concentrated in more urbanized regions 
(hypothesis 3) . In relation to hypothesis 1, we cannot conclude 
with the evidence presented up to this point, whether the 
government was or was not channelling higher proportions of its
25. Protected economic sectors usually enjoyed better levels of pensions and benefits from the social 
security system.
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expenditures to the regions with higher levels of basic needs 
insatisfaction.
B.2. Associations Between Social Security and Assistance
Programmes Variables.
Table 8.10. contains the correlation matrix of the sectoral 
variables. From the table it is possible to note that the 
ministerial and social security expenditures (EXSS) were 
significantly correlated to GDP per capita. This supports our 
earlier findings suggesting the validity of hypothesis 2, that 
richer regions obtained higher proportions of social security 
expenditures. It is interesting to note that assistance 
programmes' expenditures also showed significant but negative 
correlations to GDP. This means that assistance programmes 
favoured proportionally the poorer regions. In other words 
assistance programmes were progressive in regional terms. 
However, as assistance programmes* accounted for less than a 
quarter of the total sectoral expenditures, the overall effect 
was that of a positive correlation between total sectoral 
expenditures and an indicator of regional well being ,
supporting the case of hypothesis 2.
The correlation matrix also showed significant positive 
correlations between social security expenditures (EXSS) and 
total sectoral expenditures (EXMSS) and both indicators of 
urbanization. This was basically a result of urban working forces 
tending to be better organised and informed about the social 
security system resulting in higher coverage levels. This fact 
was also comparable to the conclusions of Mesa Lago (1978) who 
found that rural provinces (i.e. regions) had a higher proportion 
of the labour force engaged in agriculture, which was poorly 
unionized and politically passive. In Table 8.10., it is possible 
to observe that all indicators of social security coverage 
(affiliation, contributions and AFP) were significantly 
correlated to both indicators of urbanization.
26. It should be noted that due to the negative relation between assistance programnes expenditures and GDP, 
the correlation between total sectoral expenditures (EXMSS) and GDP was weaker (but still significant) than 
that of social security expenditures (EXSS) and GDP.
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TABLE 8.10. 
CORRELATION MATRIX - SOCIAL SECURITY INDICATORS
AFIL CONT UNEM RETI EAP AFP GDP INCO URBN URBZ EXSS EXMSS EXAP
'L 1.00
NT 0.99 ** 1.00
EM 0.16 0.25 1.00
TI -0.58 ** -0.58 ** 0.10 1.00
P 0.36 0.33 -0.31 -0.41 * 1.00
P 0.90 ** 0.88 ** 0.01 -0.54 ** 0.41 * 1.00
P 0.78 ** 0.79 ** -0.01 -0.43 * 0.53 ** 0.72 ** 1.00
CO 0.30 0.26 -0.18 -0.17 0.70 ** 0.32 0.35 1.00
BN 0.85 ** 0.86 ** 0.38 -0.56 ** 0.40 0.74 ** 0.67 ** 0.34 1.00
BZ 0.76 ** 0.81 ** 0.55 ** -0.46 * 0.37 0.67 ** 0.58 ** 0.39 0.91 ** 1.00
SS 0.40 0.44 * 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.28 0.55 ** 0.34 0.53 ** 0.60 ** 1.00
MSS 0.33 0.37 0.42 * 0.20 0.28 0.18 0.48 * 0.28 0.50 * 0.56 ** 0.99 ** 1.00
AP -0.49 * -0.45 * 0.26 0.24 -0.59 ** -0.69 ** -0.49 * .0.41 * -0.31 -0.31 -0.22 -0.07 1.00
Tailed Significance: * 0.01 ** 0.001
IL % workers afilisted to pension scheme (Afil./work force)
INI % Workers contributing to pension scheme 
lEM Unemployment rate
II % Pop. above 65 years (pop.65+/tot.pop)
lRT % Participation in work force (Work force/Tot. Pop.)
P % Workers contributing to AFPs in relation to work force
IP GDP per capita
ICO Average regional income
IBN % urban population
IBZ % pop. living in cities above 20,000
CSS Public expenditures in Social security
IMSSPublic expenditures in Ministry of Labour, Soc. security and Assit, progs. 
CAP Public expenditures on Assistance Programmes
In sum, the correlations discussed provided sufficient 
evidence to accept hypothesis 3 which states that social 
expenditures had been concentrated in urban regions.
In relation to the first hypothesis which states that the 
government channelled a higher proportion of its resources to the 
less well off regions, (as measured in terms of basic needs 
insatisfaction), we required a selection of indicators of the 
for social security expenditures. The most simple indicator for 
this case was the proportion of population above retirement age. 
A positive correlation between social security expenditures 
(EXSS) or total sectoral expenditures (EXMSS) and retirement 
would make evident that expenditures were allocated in 
relation to those in this specific need. However, the correlation
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matrix did not exhibit such an outcome. In fact, the outcomes 
allowed no conclusions to be drawn regarding this issue as there 
were no significant correlations in this case. Some individual 
evidence suggested the contrary. For example, Araucania ranked 
first in retirements during the three years under analysis but it 
also showed simultaneously one of the lower expenditure levels in 
social security.
In addition to the previous discussion, it is interesting to 
note that assistance programmes expenditures were negatively 
correlated to the different indicators of social security 
coverage. This implies that the assistance programmes benefited 
those regions in which the working population was formally 
organized (2?).
In summary, the analysis of the associations between 
sectoral expenditures and indicators of needs supported the 
earlier findings suggesting that social security expenditures 
were concentrated in more urbanised regions (hypothesis 3). 
However, despite some evidence in the case of assistance 
programmes, the correlation analysis did not allow a clear 
conclusion to be made regarding a positive relation between total 
sectoral expenditures and basic needs.
27. This was an original aim of these programnes.
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B.3. Defining a Model to Analyse the Relation Between Social
Security and Assitance Programmes Expenditures and Sectoral
Need Indicators
In this section we attempt to define a model that helps to 
explain the relation between sectoral expenditures and needs 
indicators. At the same time the models defined serve to test the 
hypotheses discussed earlier. In a similar approach to earlier 
chapters, we have defined sectoral expenditures as the dependent 
variable in all the regressions, since this equation form makes 
possible a test of the hypotheses. In this sector the same 
regressions were run for social security expenditures (EXSS), 
total social security and assistance expenditures (EXMSS) and 
assistance programmes (EXAP).
Overall, it was found that regressions having EXSS and EXMSS 
as dependent variables showed very similar results. However, when 
using total sectoral expenditures (EXMSS) as the dependent 
variable the equations had a lower goodness of fit. Therefore, 
the final analysis is based on the equations which have EXSS as 
dependant variable.
After the initial analysis, it was found that, because EXAP 
was a component of total sectoral expenditures which have a very 
different objective than social security expenditures, the 
outcomes of the regressions using this variable as the dependant 
variable were very poor. Therefore, it was decided to define 
different forms of models to analyse the relations between this 
specific area of expenditure and the sectoral indicators.
Because many of the indicators available for analysis on 
this sector were related to one another or were specific 
dimensions of the same general aspect (^®), the problem of 
multicollinearity arose again as an unavoidable constraint in the 
quality of the estimations. Moreover, in some occasions it was 
necessary to use equations with some degree of multicoilinearity 
in order to be able to test the initial hypotheses. As a result
28. For example af illation, contribution and AFP all represented the same dimension of social security 
coverage.
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of this situation, equations 1 to 5 on Table 8.11. are presented 
in an order in which the first items have higher levels of 
multicollinearity and the last ones have lower levels.
TABLE 8.11.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS • SOCIAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE PROGS. EXPENDITURES
No.DEPENDENT
VARIABLE AFIL UNEM RETI EAP GDP INCO URBN URBZ (Adjusted R sq. 
1
1 EXSS -404.58 8720.59 0.37 664.93
1
1 0.69
t Ratios (1.9) (5.9) (3.9) (5.0) 1
Betas -0.40 0.66 0.56 0.88
1
2 EXSS 9333.60 0.27 498.02
1
1 0.66
t Ratios (6.2) (3.3) (4.8) 1
Betas 0.71 0.41 0.66
1
3 EXSS 204.73 8029.80 0.18
1
337.39 1 0.58
t Ratios (1.1) (4.7) (1.0) (4.0) 1
Betas 0.20 0.61 0.12 0.67 j 
1
4 EXSS 7238.83 0.18
1
401.26 1 0.57
t Ratios (4.6) (1.0) (6.3) 1
Betas 0.55 0.12 0.80 1 
1
5 EXSS 0.18
1
275.41 1 0.34
t Ratios (0.8) (3.8) 1
Betas 0.12 0.55 1 
1
6 EXAP 309.68 -0.02
1
-36.57 1 0.33
t Ratios (2.8) (-1.2) (-2.2) 1
Betas 0.51 -0.22 -0.46 1 
1
7 EXAP 345.47 -0.02
1
-47.05 1 0.30
t Ratios (3.0) (-0.4) (-2.9) 1
Betas 0.57 -0.08 -0.59 1 
1
8 EXAP 221.56 -0.05 -45.95
1
1 0.24
t Ratios (2.2) (-1.3) (-2.2)
Betas 0.36 -0.25 -0.38 1
1
AFIL % workers afiliated to pension scheme (Afil./work force) 
UNEM Unemployment rate
RETI X Pop. above 65 years (pop.65+/tot.pop)
EAP Economically Active Population
GDP GDP per capita
INCO Average regional income
URBN X urban population
URBZ X pop. living in cities above 20,000
EXSS Public expenditures in Social security
EXAP Public Expenditures on Assistance Programmes
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Equations one and two help to endorse the findings of the 
previous sub section (B.2.). Regional social security allocations 
were influenced by urban population (hypothesis 3) and by an 
indicator of regional well being (hypothesis 2); this arose as a 
result of the significative t-ratios of urban population and GDP. 
However, in addition to the previous findings the high t ratio of 
the retired population posed another aspect linked to the fact 
that social security expenditures were related with to least one 
of the indicators of need.
In equation three to five, we successively eliminated the 
variables which introduced multicollinearity problems. It is 
possible to note simultaneaously that the overall goodness of fit 
of the regressions decreased in an important manner. However, the 
urban indicator (urbanization) helds its importance over other 
indicators; this was shown by its significant t-ratios. This
means that the marginal changes on the urbanization rate 
influence the regional allocation of expenditures in a 
considerable way.
The change of average income instead of GDP as indicator of 
regional well being made the regression lose an important 
proportion of the overall variance to be explained.
On the other hand, the withdrawal of the variables 
correlated to retirement (^9) caused it to lose strength in the 
overall equation. This can be observed by the decrease in its 
betas.
In sum, the outcomes of the five first equations suggest 
that there was a clear manifestation of social security 
expenditures being allocated in relation to urban population 
(hypothesis 3) . At the same time the results also supported a 
situation in which the richest regions are received higher levels 
of sectoral expenditures per capita (Hypothesis 2). However, this 
was clear for only one of the indicators of regional well being. 
Finally, an initial relation between social security expenditures
29. GOP and affiliation.
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and one of the sectoral indicators (retirement) appears to be 
caused by multicollinearity problems rather thari an effective 
association between these variables.
Although assistance programmes expenditures accounted for 
less than 15% of sectoral expenditures it is interesting to test 
the same original hypothesis regarding this single area. 
Equations six to eight show that these expenditures had a 
progressive regional allocation which was linked to one of the 
most important indicators of need in the area: the unemployment 
rate. This conclusion was explained by the consistent significant 
t-ratios of unemployment. From the table it can also be noticed 
that because of the negative signs of the inidcators of 
urbanization on these equations, we were able to conclude that 
assitance programmes were not allocated in relation to urban 
population as was the case of the rest for these sectoral 
expenditures. These two features gave assistance programmes a 
very different perspective from the rest of the sectoral 
expenditures.
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8.4.C. Section Summary and Conclusions
In this section we have proceeded to estimate the regional 
expenditures on social security and assistance programmes. 
According to the final outcomes, it was possible to allocate the 
total sectoral expenditures on this area; this was done in 
conformity with the most demanding criterion of regional 
allocation • This fact makes an interesting contribution to
the study of the regional impact of social expenditures. Earlier 
sectoral studies (^1) have been unable to give a regional 
dimension to social security expenditure. Therefore, they have 
omitted more than a quarter of total social security 
expenditures. The main difference between this study and the 
former studies is the treatment and access to the pension funds 
monthly reports found on the archives of the Superintendency of 
Social Security .
The second part of this section was dedicated to the 
analysis of the regional expenditures and its relation to the 
hypotheses defined earlier in chapter 3. Following the procedure 
of previous chapters the hypotheses were tested on three stages: 
preliminary analysis considering some statistics of dispersion; 
the association between variables using correlation analysis; and 
finally an attempt to build a model that helps to explain the 
relation of the variables (regression analysis). In order to test 
the hypotheses it was also necessary to define some sectoral 
indicators.
30. 99% of social security and assistance programmes expenditures were allocated according to criterion A.
31. Rackzinsky,D. (1986) and Mesa Lago (1978) only allocate the regional expenditures of a proportion of all 
pension funds.
32. It should be noted that even the Superintendency has failed to process these regional monthly rapports.
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The findings provided numerical and statistical evidence 
demonstrating that social security expenditures were more 
concentrated in urban areas (hypothesis 3) and especially in 
cities of more than 20,000 inhabitants. This outcome, which is 
also endorsed by partial earlier studies of Mesa Lago (1978), 
appeared to be a result of the structure and organization of the 
old social security system which was developed mostly as a result 
of more organized urban workers of minning and serwices.
At the same time the findings suggested a positive relation 
between one of the indicators of regional well being and social 
security expenditures. In other words, the results indicated that 
richer regions or those with higher levels of well being obtained 
higher proportions of social security expenditures (hypothesis
2) . It is interesting to note that the indicator with more 
significance here was GDP. This indicator shows the regional 
contribution to the overall production of the country in per 
capita terms. The indicator is biased towards formal and 
quantifiable areas of production with common underestimations of 
local and home production. Therefore, although this outcome does 
support a case for accepting hypothesis 2, it also helps to 
further endorse hypothesis 3.
The analysis did not provide clear evidence concerning the 
the first hypothesis, which states that the governement channels 
a higher proportion of its resources to the less well off regions 
measured in terms of their basic need insatisfaction.
Two practical problems appeared here: On the one hand there 
was an intrinsic difficulty in defining and computing statistical 
indicators of the need for social security. On the other hand, 
once some indicators had been identified they proved to have 
increasing levels of multicollinearity among them.
However, the statistical information did suggest that at 
least a part of the sectoral expenditures were related to 
sectoral needs. Assitance programmes were allocated in a higher 
proportion to those regions having lower levels of labour force 
organization (low social security coverage). This was one of the 
official aims of these programmes.
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In summary, according to the form on which social security 
expenditures appear to be allocated, it seems to be that these 
expenditures did not help to redress regional inequalities nor 
to improve the conditions of those regions in a relatively bad 
situation. This conclusion should not surprise the reader, since 
we have mentioned earlier that 86% of the total sectoral 
expenditures were managed centrally with no necessary 
consideration of the regional situation. In fact the 
organization of pension funds, which comprised almost a third of 
total public expenditures did not take consideration of the 
regional dimension but of the pressure groups or workers 
federations that created them.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
Introduction
This study has set out to tackle wide ranging largely 
unresearched issues. It has attempted to bring t o g e t h e r  the 
background history to the social services to describe their 
organizational structure and finance, and to analyze the 
distributional impact of expenditure on each of these services. 
In this chapter we summarize the research findings, appraise the 
research and consider future research posibilities and, finally, 
consider the implications of the findings for social and regional 
policy.
The chapter is structured in three sections. The first 
section outlines the most important findings of the study. The 
second section discusses the research methods and their 
implication for future research. The final section addresses the 
policy implications of the research.
9.1. THE FINANCE AND ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN SOCIAL MINISTRIES
After the analysis of the finances and organization of each 
of the social ministries, we discuss the common features of them 
attempting to define a model that may help to explain the general 
case of the bureaucratic organization of the social services in 
the country.
This section is divided in four sections. The first areas 
follow the structure of the early sectoral chapters. Section
9.1.A. introduces the most relevant aspects regarding the 
organization and finance of the social services, 9.I.B. describes 
the redistributive effects of social expenditures and 9.I.C. 
analyses the impact of the regional allocation of social 
expenditures. The last part of this section includes an outline 
of the most important findings of the research.
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9.1.A. Social Expenditure and the Organization of the Social 
Sectors
A.I. Total Public Expenditures in the Social Sectors
The development of total social expenditures during the 
last two decades can be observed in Table 9.1. and in Figure 9.1. 
The expenditure shows two peaks; for 1974 and 1981-1982. Both of 
them coincide with the developments of the sectors described 
earlier. After the fall due to the economic recession of the 1974 
-1975s, social expenditures began to grow from 1977 reaching a 
peak in 1982 when social expenditures per capita were almost at 
the same level as that of 1970. In 1981 social expenditures grow 
by more than 19%; they continued to grew in 1982, although at a 
lower rate, despite a GDP fall of more than 14%. However, this 
interesting countercyclical pattern was reversed in 1983 when 
social expenditures experienced a fall of 13% which was 
simultaneous with a 1% decrease in the GDP.
TABLE 9.1.
TOTAL SOCIAL EXPENDITURES
TOTAL 
OCIAL EXPENDITURES 
Millions of 1989 $)
YEAR
Source:
YANEZ COMPTROLLER YANEZ COMPTROLLER)
1970 809,834 86,451
1973 537,781 54,538
1974 672,517 67,077
1975 592,321 58,667
1976 546,930 52,732
1977 630,217 59,731
1978 660,479 735,870 61,063 68,033 1
1979 761,063 755,406 69,345 68,829 1
1980 760,612 784,965 68,248 70,434 1
1981 924,365 865,569 81,605 76,415 1
1982 950,664 954,763 82,531 82,887 1
1983 841,435 774,577 71,815 66,108 I
1984 862,068 795,075 72,330 66,709 1
1985 851,291 797,995 70,229 65,832 1
1986 775,353 62,899 1
1987 773,947 61,736 1
TOT. SOC. EXPENDS, 
per CAPITA
(1989 pesos)
Yanez (1983) and Yanez y Aguilo (1988); 
Contraloria General de la Republica 
Informes Gestion Financière 1987
NOTE: Deflated by the National Institute of Statistics C.P.I
U05
FIGURE 9. 1.
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In sum, it can be argued that although the trends of social 
e x p e n d i t u r e s  have not been i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y  a f fected by the 
economic cycle, they have tended to be reduced due a persistent 
poor performance of the economy resulting in decreases of public 
revenues. During these periods the social expen d i t u r e s  were 
unable to compensate for the negative effects of the economic 
cycle on poor families.
It is interesting to note that many of the transformations 
in the organization and finance of the social programmes are not 
n e c e s s a r i l y  a r e s u l t  of a p l a n n e d  p r o c e s s  f or p o l i c y  
implementation, but a result of the evolution of the economy as 
whole. As has been mentioned in the case of health and social 
security, the "regionalization" of social p r o g r a m m e s  in both 
sectors h a v e  really been thought of as a cost containment 
devices.
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TABLE 9.2.
TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES ON SOCIAL SERVICES 
(Millions of 1987 $) (Expenditure Structure %)
1 1985 (HEALTH EDUCATION HOUSING SOC.SEC. TOTAL (HEALTH EDUCATION HOUSING SOC .SEC. ( TOTAL (
1 Personnel ( 33,800 20,591 3,170 5,337 62,898 ( 37.8 13.8 7.1 1.3 [ 8.9 (
|G.& s . cons. j 19,379 2,450 897 5,089 27,815 ( 21.7 1.6 2.0 1.2 ( 3.9 (
1Soc.Wei.Prov. j 24,885 29 300,945 325,859 ( 27.8 0.0 0.0 70.6 j 45.9 j
1 Transfers ( 6,279 125,836 708 113,595 246,418 ( 7.0 84.1 1.6 26.7 j 34.7 j
|Cap.Inv. [ 1,537 353 35,637 195 37,723 1 1.7 0.2 80.0 0.0 j 5.3 j
1F inane, inv. 1 0 1 3 0 4 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 [ 0.0 (
jCap.Transf. 258 258 ( 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 j 0.0 j
jPubl.debt ( 18 18 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.0 j
1Previous year ( 3,562 3,562 ( 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 ( 0.5 (
(other j 28 371 3,877 979 5,254 ( 0.0 0.2 8.7 0.2 j 0.7 j
(Total ( 89,487 149,632 44,550 426,140 709,810 j 12.6 21.1 6.3 60.0 j 100.0 j
( 1986 (HEALTH EDUCATION HOUSING SOC.SEC. TOTAL (HEALTH EDUCATION HOUSING SOC .SEC. j TOTAL j
(Personnel [ 34,797 17,244 3,207 6,484 61,732 ( 38.4 11.8 7.5 1.7 ( 9.3 j
(G.& S. cons. j 19,569 2,059 838 4,631 27,096 j 21.6 1.4 2.0 1.2 [ 4.1 I
(Soc.Wei.Prov. ( 25,105 47 288,716 313,868 j 27.7 0.0 0.0 75.3 j 47.4 j
(Transfers ( 5,732 125,299 444 82,734 214,209 ( 6.3 85.8 1.0 21.6 { 32.3 (
(Cap.Inv. [ 1,422 417 33,172 157 35,167 ( 1.6 0.3 77.6 0.0 ( 5.3 [
(Financ. inv. j 33 0 203 0 236 j 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 j 0.0 j
(Cap.Transf. 120 120 j 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 ( 0.0 j
(PubI.debt 1 23 23 j 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.0 j
(Previous year [ 3,515 3,515 1 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.5 (
(other j 359 932 4,775 715 6,781 ( 0.4 0.6 11.2 0.2 j 1.0 (
(Total j 90,554 145,998 42,758 383,437 662,747 j 13.7 22.0 6.5 57.9 I 100.0 j
j 1987 (HEALTH EDUCATION HOUSING SOC.SEC. TOTAL [HEALTH EDUCATION HOUSING SOC.SEC. j TOTAL (
(Personnel ( 34,745 6,840 3,103 6,808 51,495 ( 38.5 5.1 6.5 1.9 ( 8.1 (
(G.& S. cons. ( 23,263 1,306 839 4,126 29,533 ( 25.8 1.0 1.7 1.1 ( 4.6 j
(Soc.Wei.Prov. j 19,291 122 290,657 310,070 j 21.4 0.1 0.0 79.5 j 48.6 j
(Transfers ( 7,018 125,764 530 63,066 196,377 j 7.8 93.5 1.1 17.2 j 30.8 (
(Cap.Inv. ( 1,335 149 33,602 133 35,220 1 1.5 0.1 70.1 0.0 j 5.5 (
(Financ. inv. ( 538 0 573 181 1,292 ( 0.6 0.0 1.2 0.0 ( 0.2 (
(Cap.Transf. 1,161 1,161 j 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 ( 0.2 (
(PubI.debt 1 27 27 ( 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.0 I
(Previous year ( 3,176 3,176 1 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 j 0.5 (
(other j 831 263 8,140 797 10,031 [ 0.9 0.2 17.0 0.2 ( 1.6 (
(Total ( 90,223 134,444 47,948 365,767 638,382 j 14.1 21.1 7.5 57.3 j 100.0 (
Author calculations based on: 
Tables 5.4.,6.9.,7.6., and 8.2.
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At the same time not all of the sectors has experienced the 
same developments on their expenditures; while health was 
categorized as countercyclical, the contrary was found for 
housing. In this regard, it is important to consider the relative 
sizes of each; this is shown on Table 9.2. in terms of the 
sectoral share in relation to the total sectoral expenditures.
Any marginal changes on social security expenditures 
influence the total of social expenditures to a considerable 
extent. Nevertheless, not only the size of the sector is what 
matters for determining the developments of its expenditures but 
also the type of expenditures. In the case of social security 
there is an obligation on the state towards these expenditures 
as the government changed the social security system, taking on 
an important part of the pension funds' operational deficits and 
the cost involved in the transition to the new private system. In 
the case of housing, the government has not been bound to a level 
of expenditures or to a number of houses to be built each year 
apart from some rhetorical statements. On the other hand, both 
health and education have a number of claimants or beneficiaries 
per year, which the government cannot reduce. Therefore, in the 
case of social security, health and education it is necessary to 
use diff erent procedures to decrease expenditures, like freezing 
benefit levels or organizational transformations like the 
"regionalization" of programmes. In the case of housing the 
changes in the overall expenditure levels can be more radical.
The economic expenditure structure of the Chilean social 
sectors is summarized in Table 9.2. It was generally expected to 
find that social services spend a large part of their budgets on 
personnel as they are labour intensive activities. However, this 
is not observed in this table, since most social services and 
social programmes are now financed through transfers which are, 
in practical terms funds, to finance or subsidize a specific 
activity. Therefore, it is from these global transfers that the 
agencies finance most of their expenses, including personnel.
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A.2. Finance and Organization of the social sectors 
Re-oraanization and changes
The organization of the social sectors has experienced 
important changes during the 1980s. These can be summarized in 
three areas : i) Re-definition of the sectoral roles, ii) Re­
organization of the territorial structure and finance of the 
services and iii) Selectivity and targeting in social programmes.
i) Re-definition of the sectoral roles:
One of the most important recent changes involves the re­
definition of the social services* roles passing from the state 
being mainly a producer of the services itself to a regulator or 
financer of the services.
This was achieved by ''privatizing*' the production of 
services. Using Glennerster's (1985) finance-provision (^) 
distinction it is necessary to differentiate between those 
services that are publicly financed but privately produced or 
contracted-out from those that are both privately financed and 
produced.
In the Chilean reality we have examples of both cases. In 
the case of contracted-out services it is possible to quote the 
changes in the school meals programme that now relies on private 
catering companies for the production of the meals but is still a 
programme financed by the state. Similar examples can be found in 
housing where the state is no longer the builder of houses or the 
Central Supply Warehouse (Ministry of Health) that now organizes 
public tenders to produce privately the milk to be distributed 
through the complementary feeding programme.
In the case of privately financed and produced services, it
1. In relation to the definitions given in earlier chapters, Glennerster*s "finance-provision" distinction 
is equivalent to a "finance-product ion" distinction, according to our terminology.
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is convenient to differentiate again between "old" public 
services that are fully privatized and a new state regulation 
that allows the private sector to intervene in areas in which it 
was not allowed before (^). In the Chilean reality there are very 
few examples of the former case; e.g. the sale of a public 
hospital to a private institution. However, there are many 
examples of the latter situation, like the creation of the 
private pension funds (AFPs), the new private health insurance 
schemes (ISAPREs), and the new private universities. The latter 
situation has been strongly pursued according to the neo-liberal 
policies implemented during the 1980s which aim to reduce the 
state involvement in the social sector. An intermediate case is 
that of municipalized schools and outpatient clinics. These 
services were transfered from the ministerial bureaucracy to 
municipalities. All of them are still publicly funded through 
subvention schemes or F.A.P.s, but most of them are managed by 
the municipal "private" corporations for social development.
Overall, the "privatization" (^ ) moves of social services 
have made the ministerial bureaucracies responsible for quality 
controls and policy definition rather than the actual delivery of 
services. However, in most cases this important shift of the 
ministerial role, has not been fully acknowledged by the 
bureaucracies. The bureaucratic efforts are still concentrated in 
elaborating clear and justified budgets which contain 
explanations for each single item of goods and services for 
consumption. Nevertheless, these days most of the sectoral 
budgets will go through transfers to "privatized" services on 
which there is not much specific quality control.
2. In this case more than a change in the finance-production distinction, it is more appropriate to 
acknowledge a change in the state regulations for the organization of private social services.
3. Instead of privatization, the word "subsidiasization" can be used meaning that the state has transfered 
some of its responsibilities to subsidiary institutions. (See: Principle of Subsidiarity on Chapter 2).
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ii) Reorganization of the territorial structure and finance of 
the services.
This issue involves two aspects. Regarding the structure of the 
services, the division of roles between normative (or Regulatory) 
and finance-production was duplicated at a regional level. The 
regional ministerial secretariats (SEREMIs) perform the normative 
and policy definition functions at the regional level controlling 
the quality of the contracted-out services. The nationally 
organized health services (Servicios de Salud) will perform the 
more administrative tasks related to the organization of a 
vaccination campaign.
In relation to the finance of the service there are two 
consequences. On the one hand, some pre-existing national social 
services were regionalized. The aim here was to have a better 
accountability of public funds, while at the same time the 
central level still controlled regional discretion or internal 
reallocations of the budgets. An additional constraint was 
related to the fact that the "regionalization" of these national 
programmes was mostly done considering the historical regional 
allocations rather than the regional sectoral needs or other 
indicators. Therefore, an interesting opportunity for trying to 
redress the regional inequalities was lost. This is the case with 
the National System of Health Services and the creation of the 
new regional universities as a result of the regionalization of 
the two biggest national universities. In both cases, the 
structure of the historical regional allocation was defined as 
the main criterion for future allocations.
On the other hand, at a programme level (^ ) there has also 
been a regionalization of the funds or the number of benefits to 
be allocated in each region. As in the previous case, the 
d i s c r e t i o n  t r a n s f e r e d  to the r e g i o n s  t h r o u g h  these 
regionalization moves has been rather minimal as the criteria for 
selecting benficiaries are all centrally defined. The gains in 
regional discretion are restricted to some potential savings that 
the regions can make from the allocated expenditures by
4. Each social sector can have a variety of social programmes.
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distributing less subsidies. In fact, in the regionalization of 
assistance pensions and family allowances we have claimed that it 
is more a case of cost containment rather than an effective 
transference of power because ceilings were imposued with the 
basis of only historical allocation.
Overall, the government has claimed that these changes have 
really meant a decentralization of social sectors. However, as 
most of the authority and discretion still remains at the central 
level it is more appropiate to define these changes as 
déconcentration. In practical terms, through this reorganization, 
the government obtained efficient regional agencies of the 
central level.
iii) Selectivity and Targeting Social Programmes:
In accordance to the neo-liberal policies implemented in the last 
decade there has been an important change towards a more 
residualistic model of welfare.
In this new approach to welfare, selectivity of beneficiaries has 
an important role. For this reason a national means test has been 
introduced as a pre-requisite for all assistance programmes and 
for accessing other services free of charge.
Targeting poor families has also been attempted through the 
creation of self-selective benefits which are attractive only to 
this group. This is the case of the sanitary infrastructures that 
provide a six square metres construction connected to mains 
services. The overall achievements on this regard are analysed in 
section 9.3.
These three features, ( i . , ii. and iii.), are fully 
concordant with the free market style of planning that Chile has 
had since the mid 197OS. On this approach, the state reserves its 
role to a subsidiary function in social policies.
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Budgeting and Planning
As can be expected in the analysis of the budgeting and 
planning approaches in the Chilean social sectors we have found 
not a single planning model but a blending of the theoretical 
models described in Chapter 1. For practical purposes, we 
describe their features separately:
i) Incrementalism:
Perhaps the most recurrent characteristic of all social 
sectors is the appearance of features of the incremental model. 
They are in fact only features, since the bureaucrats are seeking 
to approach the budget and the planning process on a rational 
approach without acknowledging fully the advantages of the 
incremental model. For this reason, we have called this approach 
"unaware incrementalism".
Despite the fact that in all social sectors the budgets are 
organized on a very rational and systematic approach, which 
includes justification of all expenditure items, the practice is 
that the bureaucrats themselves put more strenght in justifying 
those areas on which there are changes from one year on to 
another or those areas on which there are no imposed ceilings. 
One reason is that they know that the Budget Office will 
concentrate on them. For example, in each of the Health Services 
they have to justify the expenditures in personnel despite the 
fact that the number of proffesional employed in each service are 
fixed by law. However, they know that it will be necessary to 
explain fully the over salary rate for doctors.
Therefore, social budgeters are not taking advantage of the 
incremental model. They could have concentrated on discussing and 
justifying only the policies and expenditures differing from 
those presently in effect achieving an important simplification 
in the policy making process and having more time to concentrate 
in the relevant areas of budgeting.
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Our estimates suggested that more than 60% of the social 
sector budgets are prepared on this "unaware incrementalist 
approach". This comprises the expenditures on personnel, goods 
and services for consumption, social welfare provisions and other 
smaller areas of expenditure. Therefore, important efficiency 
gains (^ ) could be obtained by leaving aside the justification of 
the most traditional areas of expenditure within each social 
sector, for example the central bureaucracy of each ministry. 
The suggestion is not aimed to exclude these institutions or 
areas of expenditures from the budget, but rather defining its 
historical allocation plus a annual inflation allowance (^ ) as 
"approved expenditures" allowing the sector to concentrate more 
deeply on the marginal changes and future proposals.
Planning activities also have become incremental after the 
abandonement of the national development plans in the late 
1970* s. One of the main planning instruments of the present 
decade have been the Ministerial Programmes which define specific 
tasks for implementing or studying marginal changes in the 
organization or finance of the sectors. This implies the 
abandonement of the overall systematic ("rational") plans for 
sectoral development. The ministerial programmes respond to the 
necessity of replying to the problems detected by the 
practitioners, in this sense they have a "down to earth" origin 
which secures an interest in solving them.
Ministerial Programmes are far less ambitious than national 
or sectoral development plans, but they have contributed in an 
important manner to introduce changes in the organization of the 
sector through a process of smaller succesive transformations.
5. In terms of time availability.
6. To be defined by the Budget Office.
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ii) Rational Comprehensive;
When the bureaucrats interviewed were asked to describe 
their ideal conception of planning; most of them ended up 
enumerating the features of the rational comprehensive model: 
Goal setting, identification of policy alternatives, evaluation 
of means against ends, etc. The majority believe that this is the 
way in which planning and budgeting are really taking place in 
Chile.
According to our analysis, it can be said that investment 
expenditures do follow a rational approach. Each sectoral capital 
investment project has to be processed through the Basic 
Statistical System for Investment (SEBI) which consist 
estimating the costs and benefits of the project and possible 
alternatives. However, our estimates suggested that capital 
investment is only 5 to 6% of total social expenditures.
Nevertheless, some of the elements of the rational 
comprehensive approach can be found in other areas of 
expenditure. Clearly, the year after year repetition of 
instructions through the ministerial financial basis or buget 
circulars allows the agencies to have a widespread knowledge of 
the budgeting procedures. These transparent and known procedures 
help the agencies to expect more certain outcomes from the 
processes in which they are involved. These are clear features of 
the rational model.
In sum, we have argued that around 60% of the social 
services budgets have some primary incremental features, at the 
same time, we suggested that about 5% of the social expenditures 
had a clear rational comprehensive approach. The remaining 30% 
has a mixture of both models; this area includes of transfers 
payments (^).
Transfers are resources that an institution passes on to one 
of its agencies or related institutions to perform delegated
7. See Table 9.2.
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functions. In this category we include funds that are transfered 
through diverse mechanisms and specifications like the transfers 
of the Central Supply Warehouse to the private sector to purchase 
milk for the Complementary Feeding Programme.
These transfers are usually budgeted considering the 
historical expenditures on them and justifying only the changes 
from one year on to another. However, the explanation of the 
previous expenditure trends is much more complex than in the 
"unaware incremental approach". They consider not only the 
development of the expenditures but also the evolution of 
registrations and demographic trends in the case of subventions 
or the expected performance of the economy and poverty levels in 
the case of assistance programmes.
iii)Transactive:
Throughout the discussion of the sectorial budgeting and 
planning approaches, we often described how the ministerial 
bureaucrats do not take into account the opinion of the 
prospective beneficiaries when designing a social programme nor 
do they ask the users about their results. Therefore, under the 
present organization it is not possible to see social planning in 
Chile as a process of mutual learning.
Most budgets and plans are decided centrally without taking 
into consideration the regional and agencies expectations. For 
example in the case of health and education both ministries have 
a predefined stage which should consist on a round of internal 
discussions for setting an agreed budget. However, these 
discussions are rarely held because of the pressures for 
elaborating the budget according to the Budget Office time table. 
On the other hand, the planning procedures, when they exist, are 
defined in a sophisticated way to be understood only by 
technicians.
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iv) Advocacy and Radical:
During the military government, planning was approached as 
an in-house process in which only the most senior technicians 
participate. At the same time, as a logical result of a non- 
democratic government, there was no alternative to present 
alternative plans to the ones officially approved. In sum, it is 
not possible to find features of advocacy and radical types of 
planning.
Overall, the Chilean organization of the social sectors 
corresponds to one of a strong bureaucratic tradition in which 
the operation of the system is regulated by a variety of norms 
and procedures that have been established (formally and 
informally) through out its historical existance. These 
procedures and regulations assure the routine functioning of the 
system almost automatically. An important role in the maintenance 
of this scheme is played by the Budget Office (Ministry of 
Finance) as they have the power to introduce changes on the 
budget. The Budget Office is mostly concerned with trying to 
avoid increasing and unpredicted pressures on the public budget. 
Therefore, they give discretion in the management of resources 
only when they are certain that they control the agencies' 
expenditure levels.
In other words, the bureaucratic-historical model of the 
Chilean social services includes some elements of the rational 
comprehensive model as its procedures are transparent and known 
by the agencies. At the same time it incorporates features of the 
incremental approach since only marginal changes departing from 
the historical trends are analysed more in depth. However, it 
cannot be categorized as mixed scanning since these procedures 
form a complicated and rigid network which does not permit 
operation with the flexibility of mixed scanning. Moreover, there 
is no conscious distinction between fundamental and incremental 
decisions.
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Regarding the other features of planning, it is necessary to 
mention that Chile has maintained its planning style of free 
market with a subsidiary state through out the period. At the 
same time social planning has been viewed as a social 
developmental approach but with a sectoral perspective rather 
than a unified one. This means that social policy is more 
concerned with the developments of each social service rather 
than social development as a whole.
Discretionary powers over public resources and decisions
Table 9.3. presents a summary of the sectoral findings 
related to the discretionary levels that each service enjoys for 
managing its resources and taking decisions.
1 TABLE 9.3. | 
1 DISCRETIONARY POWERS OVER RESOURCES AND DECISIONS |
|Govt. Intervention Forms ( HEALTH ( 
1 1
EDUCATION HOUSING ( SOC.SEC. [ 
1 1
TOTAL I
(REGULATION
1 1
1 1 
1 1
1 1 
1 1 
1 1
[who Defines Tasks
1 1 
( Centre ( Centre Centre
1 1 
(Centre-Delegat.( Centre (
(Source of Authority ( Centre ( Shared Shared (Centre-Delegat.( Centre (
(Control ( Centre ( 
1 1
Shared Shared (Centre-Delegat.[ 
1 1
Shared (
(FINANCE
1 1 
( CMF 70%( CMF 16% CMF 21%
1 1 
( CMF 86% ( CMF 64% (
( SPF 7%( SPF 7% SPF 70% ( SPF 14% ( SPF 15% (
( FSSA 21%j FSSA 55% BF 9% ( BF 0% ( FSSA 15% (
( BF 2%| 
1 1
BF 22% 1 I 
1 1
BF 6% 1
(PRODUCTION
1 1
1 1 
1 1
1 1 
1 1 
1 1
(Personnel
( 1 
( Centre ( Regional Centre
1 1 
( Shared ( Shared (
(Field Administration 1 2-3 [ 3 2 1 2 ( 2-3 (
(Levels 1 1 1 1
NOTE: See text for explanations
FINANCE: CMF Centrally Managed Finance 
SPF Specific purpose Fund 
FSSA Fund Subsiding Specific Activity 
BF Block Fund
RMF Regionally Managed Finance
PRODUCTION: Levels of Field Administration
1 Central
2 Regional
3 Area
4 Local
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Regarding the regulation function or the state's capacity to 
define what activities may or may not been undertaken, we found 
that this activity is mostly performed at central level. As a 
logical consequence of the unitary organization of the country, 
the definition of functions or tasks and the source of agencies' 
authority relies on the central level. However, the control of 
the agencies activities is more dispersed: in some cases this
function is carried out by the institution's field agencies.
In relation to the finance of the social services, it can be 
seen in Table 9.3. that almost two thirds of the total resources 
available are centrally managed. This means that the social 
ministries have no discretion in the allocation of that 
proportion of their resources. At the same time, 30% of of social 
expenditures are funds over which agencies and regions have more 
discretion either through the selection of individual 
beneficiaries or in the allocation of resources. Finally, only 6% 
of the resources correspond to block funds, over which the 
regions have much more discretion in management as they can even 
determine its intersectoral allocation. Overall, we found that, 
in spite the interesting mechanisms of finance introduced in the 
last years, the social sectors rely very heavily on the budget 
allocations at the central level.
In this aspect, we acknowledged in the sectoral chapters 
that some of the new schemes for allocating social budgets more 
in line with the sectoral needs are interesting improvements. 
This is the case of the fee for service scheme in the health 
sector (FAPs), the educational subvention, and others. However, 
although these funds have an important share in some sectors the 
overall effect is not sufficient to change the centralized 
patterns of expenditure allocation.
Finally, the production of social goods and services is 
approached in a much more decentralized manner. Personnel is 
managed on a centre-regional shared basis. Whereas most social 
institutions have regional, area, or even local agencies.
In sum, we conclude that Chilean social services are 
organized on a deconcentrated model. This is explained by the
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fact that the discretion of field agencies is mostly constrained 
to the production of services while the regulation and the 
finance are still in the hands of the centre.
H o w e v e r ,  as we m e n t i o n e d  in the first c h a p t e r  
déconcentration constitutes an important step towards achieving 
adequate levels of provision at regional levels. Nevertheless, 
this was be improved by giving more discretion to them.
The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Organization and Finance of 
Social Services.
Following the approach taken in earlier sectoral chapters, 
we summarize the earlier discussion by highlighting the system 
strengths and weaknesses.
Before proceeding with this categorization, it is important 
to mention that the social ministries have experienced a 
significant change regarding their roles. During the last decade, 
social ministeries have passed from a productive role of social 
goods and services to become the regulatory institutions of 
social services mostly publicly financed but privately provided.
The major weaknesses can be described as part of the 
bureaucratic-historical model discussed above. This model is 
characterised by a rigid and bureaucratic mode of operation in 
which important efforts are wasted to fulfil the required 
bureaucratical procedures. This is the case with the annual 
justification of large parts of the budget which are late over­
looked.
At the same time this rigid structure of operation does not 
allow consideration of the opinion of beneficiaries of the 
programmes nor it is possible to receive a feed back from them.
An additional constraint of the present organization of the 
social services is the lack of links between planning and finance 
(especially the budget). Both areas have worked separately. 
Finance has responded to the tight directions of the Budget 
Office whereas planning mostly responds to the ideas of
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specialists. In this sense, we consider that, according to the 
new definition of ministerial functions being based mostly on a 
normative role, it is very important that these functions are 
approached simultaneously. Some of the more recent changes in the 
operation and allocation of resources for specific social 
programmes have been introduced taking into account only the 
financial constraints of the country rather than their full 
redistributional and inter-regional implications. In other cases 
contradictory aims were pursued. In the sectoral chapters we 
mentioned these cases; for example the regionalization of 
assistance programmes which is finally aiming to reduce the 
expenditures on this programme.
Considering now the positive aspects, it is acknowledged 
that some of the previous weaknesses can be thought as strenthgs 
of the system. The bureaucratical-historical model, although 
rigid, provides an important degree of stabilitv for the 
functioning of the system. This is achieved through the existance 
of transparent and known procedures that guide the budget 
elaboration and policy implementation.
Another interesting feature is the possibility of studying 
and implementing specific changes in the social services through 
the ministerial programmes. As was mentioned before, these 
programmes involve the analysis or revision of a specific area of 
a service or a programme. Although this system has some 
incremental features, in the sense that only marginal changes can 
be introduced, it has the strenthg of allowing the bureaucrats to 
really concentrate on a specific area with a pre-defined task and 
time table. U n f o r t u n a t e l l y , after 1988, the ministerial 
programmes have lost most of their political support.
Finally, an additional virtue of the Chilean social services 
in the late 1980*s is their déconcentration. During the last 
decade most social services have created regional, area, and even 
local branches for service delivery. Although this process has 
been subject to some rhetorical confusions involving the 
government claims of vast decentralization and the opposition 
claims of scarcely any transference of political power to the 
regions.
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9.I.B. Redistributive Effects of Social Expenditures
In this section, we summarize the previous estimations of 
the redistributive impact of social expenditures. Table 9.4. 
describes the proportion of total social expenditures that are 
captured by measure of the direct social expenditures. In the 
case of 1985, it is possible to obtain that figure after 
subtracting the contributions paid, the loans recuperated, and 
the administration costs. We found that direct expenditures 
capture a high proportion of total social expenditures; this 
means that the conclusions about the redistributive impact will 
be the most representative of the public involvement in the 
social sectors (®).
TABLE 9.4.
ESTIMATES OF DIRECT SOCIAL EXPENDITURES AS A 
SOCIAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 
(Millions of 1987 $)
PROPORTION OF TOTAL
1985 1987(*)
a) Total social public expenditures 709,810 313,559
- Contributions paid and 
Loan recuperation 141,215 52,032
b) Total Fiscal social expenditures 
- Administration costs
568,595
49,343
261,528
30,681
c) Direct social expenditure 519,251 230,847
c) / a) % 73.2 73.6
(*) In 1987 the estimates for Social Security 
include only Assistance Programmes
Author calculations based on: 
Tables 5.6., 6.12., 7.8. and 8.4.
Table 9.5. shows the overall redistributive effects of 
social expenditures. It can be noticed that in 1985, the bottom
8. For 1987, the situation is rather different. Since there were no estimates for social security 
expenditures. The total expenditures under analysis are only a proportion of the total social expenditures. 
Therefore, the proportional coverage of direct social expenditures is taken in relation to that sub-total, 
which is different from the one obtained for 1985.
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30% of the population received 29.6% of the total social 
expenditures. This is a bit less than its proportional share. 
Therefore, although by a very small margin, social expenditures 
are classified as regressive for that year. This outcome is 
heavily influenced by the regressive effects of social security. 
For 1987, we observe small gains in progressiveness in all 
programmes, except in social security which is not shown.
If we assume that social security maintained the same level 
of progressiveness as that of 1985, we may conclude that the 
marginal increases in progressiveness of the other programmes 
resulted in an overall neutral redistributive effect for 1987.
In sum, we conclude that the governmental rhetoric towards 
progressiveness and targeting has been effective in obtaining 
only small changes on this regard. We consider that is difficult 
to expect dramatic developments in this aspect as there are no 
legal grounds to introduce poverty-targeting aims to social 
programmes that were created under different circumstances aiming 
to produce horizontal rather than vertical redistribution.
TABLE 9.5. 
REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF SOCIAL 
(Millions of 1987 $)
EXPENDITURES j
Total Share of 
Direct Exps.Bottom 30%
% (TYPE OF PROGRAMME j
I 1985 Health 39,263 19,307 49.2 (Slightly Progressive |
Education 142,732 53,667 37.6 (slightly Progressive (
Housing 23,486 8,220 35.0 (slightly Progressive (
Soc.Sec. & Ass.Prgs. 313,770 72,257 23.0 (Regressive (
TOTAL 519,251 153,451 29.6 (Regressive (
1 1987 Health 41,191 22,967 55.8 (Progressive (
Education 127,329 49,174 38.6 (Slightly Progressive (
Housing 29,790 10,776 36.2 (slightly Progressive (
Ass.Prgs. 32,537 21,438 65.9 (Very Progressive (
Author calculations based on:
Tables 5.7., 6.13., 7.9. and 8.5.
Haindl & Weber 1986
Haindl, Budinich and Irarrazaval 1989
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9.I.e. Regional Allocation of Social Expenditures 
C.l. Quality of the estimates
The aim of estimating the regional allocation of social 
expenditures was to be able to test the initial hypotheses that 
assumed specific associations between social expenditures and 
well being, urbanization and basic needs. For these reason, it 
was important to produce accurate estimates of these allocations. 
In Table 9.6., we summarize the criteria used overall.
TABLE 9.6.
j CRITERIA OF REGIONAL ALLOCATION j
1 OF TOTAL SOCIAL EXPENDITURES |
1985 1986 1987 j
|Crit. A 90 92 92 1
|Crit. B 3 2 3 1
|Crit. C 6 5 4 1
|Crit. D 1 1 1 1
(TOTAL 100 100 100 1
NOTE: See text for explanations 
Source:
Tables 5.8., 6.14., 7.10., and 8.6.
Around 90% of the total expenditures were allocated 
according to Criterion A. This criterion represents the most 
accurate level of estimates as the figures elaborated under this 
approach have a clear regional basis, from the original data 
source. The remaining 8 to 10% of total expenditures were 
allocated according to a less precise basis, including secondary 
information. Overall, we conclude that the estimates produced 
have a high level of accuracy.
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C.2. Regional expenditures and Hypothesis testing
In this section, we attempt to summarize earlier sectoral 
findings regarding the occurence of the hypotheses defined in 
Chapter 3. The outcomes are presented in Table 9.7.
It has to be remembered that each of the three hypotheses 
were analysed for each sector in three consecutive stages: 
preliminary analysis of the patterns, correlation, and regression 
analysis. Table 9.7. shows the number of times that the 
hypotheses were accepted, rejected or undetermined for each of 
the three stages. Due to multicollinearity problems, the 
estimated regression models should be interpreted as explanations 
of the general patterns of allocations rather than as predictive 
models. Similarly, in some cases it was thought inappropriate to 
estimate such regression models due to multicollinearity problems 
or lack of appropriate explanatory variables.
j HYPOTHESES IN RELATION TO THE
TABLE 9.7. 
REGIONAL ALLOCATION OF SOCIAL expenditures!
[Hypotheses in j
[relation to resource [Health 
[allocation [
Education Housing Soc.Sec. TOTAL [
I .................. 1.........
1 1 
[ 1 Basic needs bias [ R R - 
1 1
- A A - - - - - - R [
[ 1 
[2.- Well being - rich[ A A A  
[ bias [
1 1
- - - A A A A A  A A [
[ 1 
[3.- Urban bias [ A - A
1 1
- * A A - A A A  A A I
NOTE: A Hypothesis Accepted 
R Hypothesis Rejected 
- Undetermined situation 
See text for explanations
From the results of Table 9.7. it is possible to note that 
health shows one of the most clear examples of a regressive 
interregional resource allocation. In this case the hypotheses 
concerning well being and urban bias in the allocation of
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resources are both accepted while the hypothesis relating health 
expenditures to basic needs is rejected.
In the case of education it may be noticed that there are a 
number of undetermined situations which do not allow us to draw 
clear conclusions about the overall allocation of resources. 
However, the evidence suggests that hypothesis 1 can be accepted, 
meaning that the government is allocating its educational 
resources according to the regional needs for that sector. In the 
case of housing and social security it is possible to observe 
that they both have similar results. Hypothesis 2, that states a 
positive association between social expenditures and well being, 
is accepted in both cases. At the same time there are some 
indications that there is simultaneously an urban bias in the 
allocation of expenditures (hypothesis 3). However, in both cases 
there is no statistical evidence either to reject or to accept 
hypothesis 1.
In addition to the specific social sectors, we have 
incorporated, in Table 9.7., one estimator of the total regional 
allocation of social expenditures. It includes total health 
expenditures; school, ministerial and higher education 
expenditures; housing expenditures and total expenditures on 
social security and assitance programmes. Therefore, this 
definition is close to that of public social expenditures as it 
includes the total expenditures on each of the sectors (^).
The overall public expenditures in the social sectors tend 
to favour more those regions in which there is a higher 
proportion of urban population and are at the same time richer. 
Simultaneously, public social expenditures does not tend to be 
allocated in relation to the regional indicators of need.
In sum, it can be said that the "Total", which describes the 
developments of public social expenditures, has a negative 
interregional impact favouring the urban and better-off regions.
To conclude this section, we would like to compare the
9. The actual estimates of the total regional social expenditures per capita can be seen in Annex 2.
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findings of Table 9.7. with those of 9.3. Through this exercise 
we attempt to put tog^ether the conclusions about the regional 
allocation of social expenditures and the organization and 
discretion of social sectors.
From the comparision of both tables it is possible to 
observe that those ministries having a more centralized 
organization are that ones that simultaneously show the worse 
performance in terms of the interregional impact of the social 
expenditures (i.e. Hypotheses 2 and 3 accepted and Hypothesis 1
rejected). These are the cases of health and social security,
this is also applicable to total expenditures as well .
By contrast, it can be said that ministeries showing a more 
decentralized structure are the ones that simultaneously show a 
better interregional impact of social expenditures (i.e.
Hypothesis 1 accepted and hypotheses 2 and 3 rejected). The only 
ministry that follows closely this structure is education. In the 
case of housing, although it has some elements in common it is 
constrained as more than two thirds of its finances correspond to 
specific purpose funds over which the regional discretion 
consists only in selecting the individual beneficiaries.
4
Following these findings it is interesting to pay attetion 
to the organizational features of education. As was described in 
Chapter Six, education has one of the most decentralized 
structures of all ministeries. Only 16% of its finances are 
centrally managed and it operates with more levels of field 
administration. At the same time part of the regulatory tasks are 
also performed at the regional level. The financing scheme of 
education has forced the school to be concerned about school 
attendance, as payments are related to it. Similarly, the
widespread coverage of the system in all areas of the country has 
helped to incorporate the poor and rural population into the 
system.
Overall, it is possible to summarize these findings:
10. The column Total on Table 9.7. is perfectly comparable with that of Table 9.3. Both of them have the 
same total figures behind them.
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i. The ministerial organization and the discretionary powers 
that the ministries enjoy do have an important influence in 
the interregional impact of social expenditures.
ii. T h e r e  seems to be a r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  
decentralization and more discretionary powers with a 
positive interregional effect of social expenditures (i.e. 
social expenditures do not favour rich regions but rather 
those in need).
Therefore, it is important to realize that through the 
organizational and financial decentralization it seems possible 
to obtain a better interregional redistributive impact of social 
expenditures. The few changes obtained in the Chilean case have 
been achieved despite the fact that the centre is still playing a 
substantial role in the financial area and that there has been no 
transfers of political power to the regions.
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9.I.D. Outline of the main research findings
1. An initial achievement of this research is that of having 
explained the organization and the finance of the social servies 
in Chile following a consistent methodology. This simple 
accomplishment is important as there are no previous accounts of 
this type in the country.
2. Throughout the analysis of the organization and finances of 
the social sectors it has been possible to learn that there are 
a number of common features in all of them, which have been 
summarized in the "bureaucratic-historical" model. This model is 
featured by a rigid structure of operation, non existent or weak 
links between planning and budgeting, practical consideration of 
marginal changes only, and no consideration of the beneficiaries 
of the programmes (non-participatory).
3. A methodological contribution is the development of an 
approach to study and estimate the regional impact of public 
expenditures. This methodological approach draws from earlier 
specific contributions of Short and Yanez, which have been 
adapted to the present research and complemented with additional 
criteria.
4. A conceptual contribution of this research is the definition 
of a framework of analysis of the regional discretionary powers 
over resources and decisions. This methodology can help to locate 
the organizational setting within the decentralization continuum. 
With this approach we shift from the endless discussion aimed 
only to categorize the different organization in relation to the 
different concepts of decentralization.
5. The historical account of the development of the social 
services organization showed that the services experienced three 
major transformations in the early eighties. i. The re­
definition of the sectoral roles shifting from a producer of 
social services to a regulator of contracted out services, ii. 
Re-organization of the territorial structure of the services 
which involved the creation of regional field offices, iii. Re­
definition of the overall state involvement in the social
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services shifting from a more universalistic model of welfare to 
a more selective one on which programmes are poverty-targeted.
6. In relation to the overall evolution of the public 
expenditures in the social services it was found that they follow 
in general a countercyclical pattern increasing in periods of 
economic constraints. However, this finding was applicable only 
to the exact recessionary periods, because soon after the most 
important effects had passed, the social expenditures were 
constrained.
7. Despite the governmental rhetoric about regionalization and 
decentralization, the changes introduced in the finance and 
organization of the social services has had effects on specific 
programmes but has not produced a dramatic impact on the overall 
organization of the services. This can be explained by the fact 
that the regulation and source of the services' authority is 
mostly decided centrally. At the same time, more than two thirds 
of the sectors' finances are still centrally managed. However, it 
has to be acknowledged that there have been interesting 
improvements in the creation of regional field offices 
(Déconcentration).
8. Although the government has made an important effort in trying 
to concentrate its social expenditures on the poor population; 
the results showed that they have an overall neutral effect as 
the lower 30% of the population receives the same proportion of 
expenditures.
9. The analysis of the regional allocation of social expenditures 
showed that they have a rather regressive regional allocation. 
This is explained by the fact that rich and more urbanized 
regions receive higher levels of social expenditures per capita. 
At the same time, regions with higher levels of basic needs
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unsatisfied obtain proportionally lower levels of social 
expenditures per capita. Comparing the social sectors, health 
obtained the most regressive regional allocation followed by 
social security and housing. The sector with the most 
progressive inter-regional allocation of social expenditures was 
education.
10. Following the result described in No. 6 above, it was found 
that there appears to be a relation between the features of the 
organization of the services and the patterns of regional 
allocation of expenditures.
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9.2. RESEARCH RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
In this section we aim to discuss the most important lessons 
that can be drawn from the experience of having done this 
research. These lessons are in two areas : The first one is 
related more directly to the reseach constraints and problems 
that were found throughout the development of the study. The 
second area delineates areas of future research that may enhance 
or improve the findings of the present work.
9.2.A. Research Retrospect
1. "Adminstrative antrophology" or relying in the informants.
As a result of the methodology followed to obtain the information
about the insights of the organization and finances of the social
services, we had to rely very heavily in the information provided 
by the officials interviewed.
It is known that the bureaucrats usally attempt to describe their 
work in the best way possible. We attempted to question every 
subject in various ways in order to obtain the necessary feed­
back. However, despite these efforts our results are dependent on 
the information supplied.
2. Social Security is a special case
In the definition of the research problem in Chapter Three, we
explained that the study encompassed all the major social 
services. At the same time we have stressed that this is one of 
its important contributions as there are no previous overall 
studies. However, having done the research, it is possible to 
realise that social security has a completely different 
structure in contrast to the rest of the services.
The bulk of the social security resources are considered as a 
right for the contributing workers rather than a benefit as in 
the rest of the social services. Above all, the pension funds are 
in a process of being gradually phased out.
432
3. Accuracy of the estimates
One of the research aims was to produce an estimate of the 
regional social expenditures and contrast those figures with 
social indicators. As mentioned in Section 9.1. around 90% of the 
estimates were produced according to the most demanding criterion 
of accuracy. However, there are areas in which it is difficult to 
estimate the real "in and for" effect that some expenditures are 
producing in a region. For example, it is difficult to estimate 
the proportion of research expenditures that is reaching the 
region in which a university is based, and how much is reaching 
other regions. Similar situations can be found in most of the 
social services.
9.2.B. Research Prospects
Following the previous section, it is appropriate now to 
delineate some areas of interest that could have helped to 
enhance the understanding of the research problem, but were not 
considered within the original aims of the study. However, they 
can be considered as topics for future research.
1. Socio-political approach
As was mentioned in the methodological chapter, we opted for 
analysing the research theme under a pragmatic approach described 
as "administrative-anthropology". The aim here was to be able to 
understand and describe the organization and the finance of the 
Chilean social service, and relate its structure to its regional 
impact. The administrative arrangements existing during the late 
1980's were taken as given.
There are no doubts that the study would have gained in an 
important way by analysing in depth the socio-political aspects 
related to the organization of the social services. It would have 
been quite interesting to analyse the role of pressure groups, 
trade unions and political parties in the developments of the 
social services. Moreover, it would have been possible to spend a
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considerable amount of time discussing the political developments 
of the country, the socio-political conditions under the military 
rule and the prospective scenarios of the emerging democracy. 
However, we believe that because these issues are very important 
in themselves it would have been impossible to consider them 
appropriately within the limits defined for this type of research 
studies.
2. Public Finance Approach
From the public finance side, it is possible to say that the 
research could also have gained by having a more comprehensive 
analysis of the Chilean public finances. It would have been very 
interesting to take into account the full fiscal incidence of 
public activities at a regional level. This means obtaining the 
net effect of government intervention at a regional level. This 
is, not only how much a region is gaining from public 
expenditures but also at how much it is contributing towards it 
through taxation.
Similarly, it would be very interesting to estimate the 
proportion of social expenditures that are being financed by the 
regional taxes. It is possible to expect that the regional tax 
burden is not necessarily related to the level of benefits 
received in the form of social expenditures. Taxes may have a 
more progressive or regressive regional impact which will lead to 
a rather different net incidence.
However, this exercise would have probably driven us outside the 
area of social policy as it would have been necessary to 
consider total public expenditures, instead of just social 
expenditures, to contrast them with taxation revenues.
3. The need for need indicators
With the purpose of testing the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 
Three it was necessary to have selected indicators of basic 
needs both at sectoral level and at an overall elvel.
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since the 1960*s, the social indicator movement has provided an 
increasing number of approaches towards defining representative 
indicators of sectoral needs. Similarly, various attempts have 
been made to produce composite indicators that are representative 
of a dimension of human social conditions . However, despite
enormous amounts of research done on this field the reality is 
that we are far from having a single or composite need indicator 
that is widely accepted.
Therefore, despite the importance of the discussion about the 
concept of need, it was not thought appropriate to attempt to 
elaborate further indicators of human needs or to approach a new 
definition of them. Again, we believe that this exercise is very 
important in itself and it could have taken an important part of 
the research effort. For this reason, we constrained ourselves 
to the available social indicators for Chile and used them in 
accordance with the most common and agreed uses found in the 
literature.
4. Time series of regional social expenditures
In Chapter four we defined the time period for the analysis of 
the regional impact of social expenditures. The time period from 
1985 to 1987 was defined mostly on the basis of practical reasons 
of data availability and the research time constraints for 
estimating these figures.
It is clear from the results of the research that a long time 
series would contribute in an important way to determine the 
stability of the patterns found and, perhaps, contribute 
additional findings.
11. See: Deprivation Index (Towsend, 1979), Physical Quality of Life (Grant,1980), and others.
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9.3. THE FUTURE OF REGIONAL SOCIAL POLICY
Before discussing the future proposals for regional social 
policy, it is important to bear in mind that in December 1989, 
Chile experienced the democratic election of its President and 
Parliament after 15 years of military government. During the 
election campaign decentralization and social policy arose as one 
of the important issues of discussion. This lead to the conscious 
inclusion of the subject in the political programme of the 
contestants. The main two political contestants clearly referred 
to the need to increase the decentralization of the state 
apparatus and the direct participation of the citizens in it. 
One of the contenders specified their aim to achieve a more even 
regional development and an allocation of public resources more 
in line with the regional needs (Concertacion, 1989). The other 
political alliance stressed the necessity of strengthening the 
regional organization leading to an increase in the regional 
budgets (Democracia y Progreso, 1989). The political programmes 
also included specific sectoral proposals to achieve this 
principal aim.
In the light of these recent political developments in 
Chile, it is clear that the issues discussed in the present 
research might help to cast light on the agenda of future 
proposals for change in the administrative organization and 
regional impact of social services.
9.3.A. Conceptual Frame for a Regional Social Policy
The issue of decentralization has become an important area 
of permanent discussion. Moreover, the decentralization of 
public bureaucracy and specially the social services, appears as 
one of the very few areas of overall consensus across the 
political spectrum. The aim of decentralization is not only a 
desire for more services in the regions but as a way of solving 
part of the Chilean historical problems of excessive central 
growth, lack of participation, and regional inequalities.
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However, as can happen in a politicized atmosphere, the issue has 
shifted from discussing clear policy aims or goals to an 
idealogizised discussion about previous achievements or failures 
in respect to this general aim.
It is in this context that we believe that our conceptual 
framework may help this discussion, moving the argument from the 
theoretical models of decentralization to a set of practical 
questions that would determine the degree of discretion that the 
institutions will enjoy. Therefore, a regional policy must take 
account of the issues includëJ in this set of questions before 
categorising the ideal model of decentralization at which aims 
to reach.
The set of questions are drawn from Section 4.4. They were 
described in relation to the three forms of government 
intervention: regulation, finance and production.
REGULATION
1. What is the source of agency authority?
2. Who defines the tasks or functions of the agencies?
3. Who controls the functions of the agencies?
It is possible to expect that in a unitary country most of the
regulation functions will remain at the central level. However, 
it is reasonable to think that in a more decentralized scheme the 
agencies will be accountable to the regional powers, therefore, 
their source of authority will be at this level. This can happen 
despite the fact that the centre may define the main tasks or
functions according to the national interests.
If government is aiming to involve the regions in the management 
and developments of the services it is crucial to allow the 
regions to control the agencies operating within its boundaries.
FINANCE
Regarding this form of government intervention, we defined five
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forms of finance ranging from direct central allocations to 
totally decentralized funds.
1. Centrally Managed Finance
2. Specific Purpose Funds
3. Fund for Subsidiating a Specific Activity
4. Block Funds
5. Regionally Managed Finance
As been pointed out, the fact that the centre transfers certain 
resources to the regions does not necessarily imply hand]ing 
over autonomy. This will depend on the conditions on which the 
funds are transfered; these can range from a specific purpose 
defined by the central level to a block fund in which the region 
has the autonomy regarding the alternative uses of the resources. 
Total financial decentralization will probably mean allowing the 
regions to set their own taxes, but this is constrained within 
unitary countries. Moreover, as the research has shown, there 
seems to be a relation between more decentralized sectoral funds 
and more progressive parttens of regional social expenditures.
PRODUCTION
Production is concerned with the actual delivery of the services. 
It includes :
1. Personnel Policies
2. Levels of Field administration
The pattern recruitment and promotion of personnel is a 
determinant of the level of decentralization that can be 
achieved. If recruitment is left at a regional level, but 
promotion depends on central policies this will usually mean that 
the officials will be following the central instructions, not the 
regional ones.
More levels of field administration will usually mean more 
responsiveness to local needs. However, if local field 
administrators are appointed from the centre they will be more 
concerned with the central instructions.
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PARTICIPATION
The return of democracy has strengthened the calls for increased 
participation in the Chilean social services. It is an issue that 
is closely linked with decentralization.
However, we consider that the issue of participation is an 
additional dimension to be incorporated in each of the forms of 
government intervention.
Participation involves two levels:
i) Participation and accountability
There is a need for increasing political accountability of the 
social services at a regional or local level. This is specially 
necessary when it is aimed to increase considerably the amount of 
resources to be managed locally. In this area we will probably 
experience soon a radical transformation of the present system of 
local and regional government elections.
ii) Beneficiaries
There is also a call to include the beneficiaries of social 
programmes in their process of development. In this regard, we 
believe that it is necessary to define levels of participation 
depending on the nature of the programme. It is possible to 
expect that a community development programme will be highly 
participatory but in a vaccination programme the participation of 
the people will be mostly constrained to their willingness to be 
vaccinated or have their children vaccinated.
A regional social policy should clarify the expected levels and 
the forms of participation to be introduced. It is common to 
expect that with regards to regulation the participation will be 
in a more political level, whereas in the production of the 
services participation will involve bei?ficiaries. However, there 
are now some social programmes that also require financial 
participation from the beneficiaries.
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To conclude this section, we briefly mention some of the 
policies discussed in the study and their relation with this 
conceptual framework.
The definition of the ministerial regional agencies 
(SEREMIs) is a policy that has clearly contributed to there being 
more levels of field administration and more central presence in 
the regions (deconcetration). However, the SEREMIs budgets are 
still managed from the central level leaving few areas of 
discretion, at the same time most of the officials appointed have 
come from the centre (^^). In the case of the payment for medical 
attention (F.A.P.s), they have contributed to allocate resources 
more in relation to needs, as the centre reimburses the part of 
cost of the medical attention to each out-patient clinic. 
Although we see a departure from pure centrally managed finances 
in the health services to a type of fund for financing a specific 
activity, these types of funds still comprise only a small 
proportion of the total sectoral budget.
12. Although this also related to the serious shortages of professionals in some regions.
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9.3.B. Outline of Policy Proposals
It was not the purpose of this research to elaborate a set 
of policy proposals; such activity might draw on additional 
research simulating the possible outcomes, the sources of 
finance and the different political scenarios in which 
proposals might be accepted. Our aim in this section is much more 
limited. We give a brief outline of possible changes that might 
be introduced in the context of the present organizational 
setting and the widespread acceptance of decentralization 
policies.
There are basically two proposals to be suggested, one is 
related to the general organization of the social services and 
the other to the decentralization of them:
i) Towards a more flexible organization of social services
Our proposal can be summarized as a gradual change from a 
bureaucratic-historical model towards a more flexible and 
pragmatical organization of the social services. This evolution 
takes into consideration the present features of the system but 
increases the levels of decentralization and participation and 
is more responsive to local needs. This process can be outlined 
in the following aspects:
A pragmatic operation of social services consists in taking 
advantage of the established transparent and known rules of 
operation to concentrate on those areas that really experience 
changes from one year on to another.
This form of internalising incrementalism means leaving aside 
from the budgeting and planning efforts those areas that are
historically compromised and / or are necessary for the routine 
working of the sectoral bureaucracy. Typical examples of these 
cases are the expenditures on ministerial central bureaucracies
13. These areas would continue to appear on the budget but their justification and description is omitted, 
unless there is a major structural change.
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and services, personnel and goods for services and consumption.
Throughout this approach the sectoral planning agencies should be 
able to concentrate more in the dynamic aspects of the system 
rather than the historical aspects of functioning. In concrete 
terms we propose two aspects to concentrate on:
i) Ministerial Programmes
The ministerial programmes have proved to be very succegful. 
Each year a number of specific tasks are defined, most of 
them being carried out during the pre-defined time table. 
Through this procedure important incremental changes have 
been introduced in the organization of social services.
Our proposition is to enhance the role of these programmes 
to include each year, as an imperative ministerial task, the 
necessity of evaluating one of the programmes performed by a 
ministry. Through this method, planners and budgeters have 
to concentrate on really justifying and explaining the 
expenditures and the aims of the programmes under review. 
The findings of this exercise have then to be incorporated 
in the next year's budget.
ii) Linking policy making and planning to budgeting and 
finance
As a result of the gradual revision of the sectoral 
programmes it should be possible to produce estimates of 
both the total and unit costs of each of the social 
programmes. In other words, we are aiming to gradually 
change the traditional institutional budgets on to a 
programme basis. During the present times, not all the 
programmes have these estimated costs as they are budgeted 
under the traditional economic classification. Therefore, it 
is not surprising to see that these areas are not related 
one to another. For example, as has been seen, the 
programmes for health consultations for children and women 
are included with other health programmes in the budget of 
the National System of Health Services and it is not
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possible to know the amount of resources spent in each of 
them.
ii) Decentralization
Decentralization seems to be one of the most attractive and 
consensual words in Chilean politics in recent years. However, 
the proposals for decentralization are variable: some of them are 
aimed to achieve déconcentration, others to produce a semi- 
federal organization of the country. Our proposals are confined 
to two areas only: i) a further decentralization in social
services finances, and ii) an increasing participation of the 
beneficiaries in the organization of the social programmes.
The decentralization of social services finances implies simply 
gradually increasing the share of the more decentralized modes 
of finance within each social sector. The aim might be to reach 
80% of the sectoral finances being managed through specific 
purpose funds (SPF), funds for subsidising a specific activity 
(FSSA) or block funds (BF). Ideally, at least 60% of the sectoral 
finances should be managed in the last two modes. These modes of 
finance and their proportions have been defined on the basis of 
the successful achievements of education, which is not only the 
most decentralized sector but the one that showed the more 
progressive patterns of inter-regional allocation of resources.
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This proposal will certainly encounter opposition from the Budget 
Office that would automatically lose detailed control of this 
part of the budget. However, some forms of control will remain to 
assure that the centre did not lose its capacity to manage public 
expenditures. Firstly, the centre could retain its capacity to 
set annually the total expenditure ceilings of each programme or 
aggregation of programmes (^^). Secondly, the ministerial 
bureaucracy could also continue to define the mechanisms to 
select the individual beneficiaries on a territorial equity 
criterion.
The regional gains in discretion would imply that the regional 
ministerial office would manage the transfered funds. Regional 
financial management in this case means being able to manage 
financially the resources transfered; any transitory surpluses 
arising could be invested according to the legal regulations of 
public del?; gated institutions. The region would also be free to 
define some prioritization criteria after the fulfilment of the 
national requirements.
The increasing regional autonomy in the management of resources 
would also imply that the regional administrative offices need 
to put more emphasis on controlling and regulating their own 
resources that are transfered to the institutions that produce 
the social goods or services.
Finally, it is suggested that the decentralization of social 
services should also imply more participation not only in the 
accountability of the activities performed by the social services 
but also in the actual production of the services.
14. If the programnes are too small it will be easier to work with an aggregation of them, leaving at the 
same time the possibility of internal transfers. It is not necessary to transfer all the funds immediatelly 
but as necessity arise. However, they should not be subject to further re-negotiations.
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The future regional assemblys (or COREDEs) should have a clear 
knowledge about the total amount of resources that each sector is 
spending in the region and the types of transfers involved with 
them (^^).
The beneficiaries would have new forms of participation if 
subvention schemes, of the type of those existing in education, 
were enhanced. They can "vote with their feet" by opting not to 
attend to a certain service which does not fullfil their 
expectations. However, in many cases the local choices are 
severely constrained due to the distance to alternative services 
or transport costs.
The programmes have to be defined in a way in which the 
beneficiaries can become involved with the developments of the 
social programmes. This can be achieved through "local 
neighbourhood councils" (Juntas de Vecinos) reporting to the 
Municipal Assemblies about the activities or problems of the 
social services, as it is the case with of parents associations 
in education.
15. According to the present legislation, the regional assemblys are only informed about the capital 
investment budget. This area of expenditure constitutes the "regional budget", accounting to only 5% of the 
total social expenditures.
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During the last years, social expenditures have 
attempted to play a "poverty relief" role to concentrate the 
public efforts on the poor in accordance with a basic needs 
strategy. This is a very important activity for the state and, it 
is desirable that this approach should continue because there 
are still some basic social conditions to be improved. 
Furthermore, we believe that social expenditures can also be 
thought as resources available to strengthen national development 
in a broader meaning.
Further decentralization of social services in Chile, 
such that outlined here, should not be taken as a straight 
forward self-evident matter. It is a complex matter in which 
progress is possible. The aim of these suggestions is to produce 
an allocation of social resources more in line with the regional 
needs and redress the historical regional inequalities. Through 
this process we will not only achieve better levels of well 
being but also national democracy, which starts by giving the 
regions a fairer chance to develop.
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ANNEX 1
SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL TESTS PERFORMED
As mentioned in Chapter Four, because of the constraints in 
using a pooled database an important effort was made in 
performing a variety of statistical tests to assure the 
reliability of the results.
Tests Performed
1.- Regression goodness of fit
A standard test of measuring the goodnes of fit of the 
regression is to calculate the extent to which the regression 
accounts for the variation in the observed values of this 
dependent variable.
- Coefficient of Determination (R^): A traditional goodness of 
fit test is the R ^ , which measures the proportion of the 
variation in "y" which is explained by the multiple 
regression ( ).
The R^ is the square of the correlation coefficient between 
y , the observed value of the dependent variable, and ^y, the 
predicted value of y from the fitted line. If all the 
observations fall in the regression line R^=l, if there is no 
linear relationship R =0. However, the constraint of R^ is 
that does not account for the degrees of freedom in the 
problem.
- Adjusted R^ ; A solution to the problem described above is to 
concern oneself with variances, not with variations, thus 
eliminating the dependence of goodness of fit on the number 
of independent variables in the model ( ) . It is interesting 
to note that when new variables are added in the regression 
model, the R will always increase, whereas the Ra^ may rise 
or fall (^ ) .
1.
The traditional statistical notation is used here: 
y= dependant variable or variable whose values are to be 
predicted 
x= Independent variables
2. Adjusted
Ra^ = R^-
p <1 - R^ )
N • p - 1
Where, Ra^ Adjusted R squared
p Number of independent variables in the equation 
N Number of observations.
3. The F test also helps to test how well the regression model fits the data. The null hypotheses is that 
none of the explanatory variables helps to explain the variation of y about its mean, a high value of F will 
mean that the null hypothesis is rejected.
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2.- Parameters:
- Beta coefficients (Standarised Partial Regression 
Coefficients): It is always important for the researcher to 
know about the relative importance of each independent 
variable. However, as Johnston (1978) has pointed out it is 
inappropiate to interpret the partial regression coefficients 
as indicators of the variable weight in the model, since the 
actual magnitude of the coefficients depends on the units in 
which the variables are measured. Therefore, to make 
regression coefficients comparable, it is necessary to 
calculate the Beta weights, which are the coefficients of the 
independent variables when all the variables are expressed in 
standarised form (Z score).
- T-test: The T-test is the ratio of the absolute difference 
between sample means to the standard error of the difference. 
This means that there is no linear relationship between x and 
y , the null hypothesis is that beta=0. A positive value, 
above two will mean that the two variables are linearly 
related.
3.- Heterocedascity:
Heterocedascity occurs when the variances of the conditional 
variances are not equal. In other words, if the variance of each 
disturbance term remains the same irrespective of small or large 
values of the explanatory variable the error term is 
homoscedastic (oppositte of heterocedastic). If the error term is 
heterocedastic, the ordinary least squares estimates may be 
biased.
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Two chek ups were performed to detect the presence of 
heterocedascity;
i) Graphical analysis of residuals in relation to the 
regression line.
ii) Outliers Analysis: The appearence of cases with relatively 
large positive or negative residuals may lead to 
heterocedascity. The regression coefficients may be biased 
by the influence of one or few observations only.
4.- Multicollinearity:
Multicollinearity appears if the explanatory variables are 
perfectly linearly correlated (*), that is, if the correlation 
coefficient for these variables is equal to unity, the parameters 
become indeterminated: it is possible to obtain numerical values 
for each parameter separately and the method of least squares 
breakes down (Koutsoyannis,1985).
For preventing the ocurrence of multicollinearity, the 
variables entered to the regression models as independent, had to 
have a low correlation between each other and with the 
independent variable. A similar rule of thumb is suggested by 
Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1981) (^).
4. this means that the variables are linear combinations of the others.
5. See also note on multicollinearity on Chapter Six:education.
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1 T A B L E  2  1
1 C O R R E L A T I O N  B E T W E E N  S E L E C T E D  V A R I A B L E )  
I A N D  T O T A L  S O C I A L  E X P E N D I T U R E S  j
T O T A L  j
j c E M O - 0 . 2 3  I
j l N M O - 0 . 4 9  *  1
j E X P E 0 . 2 0  1
I P R O M 0 . 5 3  * *  1
I C O V E - 0 . 2 8  1
j s E W E 0 . 6 6  * *  1
1W A T E R 0 . 6 6  * *  1
| A F I L 0 . 4 1  1
j u N E M 0 . 2 8  I
I GDP 0 . 5 7  * *  1
j l N C O 0 . 3 9  I
j u R B N 0 . 6 4  * *  I
j u R B Z 0 . 6 2  * *  j
I T O T A L 1 0 . 1 5  I
| T 0 T A L 2 1 . 0 0  1
2-tailed signif: * .01 ** .001
See text for explanations
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